

Legitimacy and deliberation in supranational political organizations

The case of European Parliament plenary debates

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9 December 2013

Abstract

The last four decades have witnessed two crucial sociopolitical trends: the increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries. While they entail both challenges and opportunities for every kind of organization, *political* organizations are particularly affected, having seriously questioned their problem-solving abilities and thus also their legitimacy. In the special case of *supranational political organizations* those challenges arise beyond a seemingly inherent problem of legitimization: the democratic deficit. Ensuing from a normative stance, this thesis addresses a relatively emergent field of political theory: deliberative democracy; and investigates whether supranational political deliberation could serve as a means to legitimately promote ethical and moral decision-making beyond the national political sphere. Correspondingly, the thesis aims to answer the interrelated research questions: *How can the legitimacy of supranational political organizations be theoretically reconceptualized?* and *What are the effects of deliberation on decisions in consensus-oriented political bodies?* Drawing on Habermasian discourse ethics and Steenbergen et al.'s "Discourse Quality Index" (DQI), this thesis develops a new concept of supranational political legitimacy, advocating an encompassing input, throughput and output perspective, and trials the theoretically assumed causality between deliberation and decision outcomes by analyzing plenary debates of the European Parliament. Empirical results of 18 analyzed debates comprising 456 single speech acts show that the theoretically established causality between deliberation and decision outcomes cannot be sustained in reality. In order to counter the challenges posed by the increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries, those results paradoxically speak for both speeding up decision-making by lowering deliberation time as well as slowing down decision-making by enhancing organizational learning.

Keywords

Deliberative democracy, Discourse Quality Index, European Parliament, Habermasian discourse ethics, legitimacy, supranational political organization

Master thesis (30 ECTS)

Examination for a M.Sc. in Business and Economics

Department of Management and Organization

Stockholm School of Economics

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Key Concepts

Action outcomes: the pragmatic consequences that result from the implementation of a political decision outcome.

Common good: "[T]hat which benefits society as a whole, in contrast to the private good of individuals and sections of society" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). The common good is interpreted in both utilitarian terms and in respect of the difference principle (c.f. section 2.4.1.).

Communicative action: a cooperative action undertaken by individuals through mutual deliberation and reasoned argumentation rather than in strict pursuit of their own goals (Bolton, 2005).

Decision outcomes [ethically and morally superior ~; substantive ~, formal ~]: the term "decision outcome" refers to the direct written or spoken result of a preceding (deliberative) discussion (if not explicitly stated otherwise, "decision outcome" thus refers to the substantive dimension of a decision, c.f. definition below). "*Ethically and morally superior* decision outcome" means a political decision outcome that takes into account possible cross-territorial or cross-temporal effects of related action outcomes (see also "dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries" below). "*Substantive* decision outcome" refers to the content of the decision (Spörndli, 2003). "*Formal* decision outcome" means the voting result with which a political debate is closed (c.f. Spörndli, 2003).

Deliberation: stems from the Latin term "deliberatio", which means "consultation" or "consideration". Accordingly, deliberation refers here to the careful and reasoned consideration and discussion of reasons for and against a political decision outcome (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013).

Deliberative democracy: a form of democracy where deliberation is core in decision-making processes. Here, authentic deliberation rather than mere voting is the primary source of legitimacy for the law (Bessette, 1980).

Discourse ethics [Habermasian ~]: Discourse ethics refers to a type of argumentation that intends to establish normative or ethical truths by examining the presuppositions of discourse. "*Habermasian* discourse ethics" defines criteria for a

discourse that is able to yield ethically and morally edified decisions (Habermas, 1991).

Discourse Quality Index (DQI): " . . . the discourse quality index (DQI) . . . serves as a quantitative measure of discourse in deliberation. The DQI is rooted in Habermas' discourse ethics and provides an accurate representation of the most important principles underlying deliberation" (Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli & Steiner, 2003, p. 1).

Dissolution of spatial boundaries (Zürn, 2013): refers to the fact that human, financial and real capital movements have been and are becoming increasingly globalized and that we are faced with political issues that consequently need a combined transnational effort to be tackled (e.g. climate change; the term "dissolution of spatial boundaries" is used as a synonym for "denationalization" (Ecker-Ehrhardt & Wessels, 2008) in this thesis).

Dissolution of temporal boundaries (Zürn, 2013): this process refers to two facts. First, today we know more about long-term effects of certain decisions, e.g. today the global awareness about negative long-term effects of air pollution is significantly greater than 100 years ago. Second, the effects of political decisions themselves tend to extend further and further into the future (e.g. as a consequence of technological innovation), most visible in the realm of nuclear power and genetic engineering (c.f. Rosa, 2003, 2012).

Legitimacy [perceived ~, normative ~]: the term "legitimacy" is used as a political term in this thesis. Hence, it generally means "a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions - about laws, policies, and candidates for political office - made within them" (Peter, 2010). "*Perceived* legitimacy" denotes "people's beliefs about political authority and . . . political obligations" (Peter, 2010). "*Normative* legitimacy" means "some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and . . . obligation" (Peter, 2010).

Political organization: if not explicitly referred to as "supranational political organization" (c.f. definition below), the term "political organization" indicates national Western democracies, including appertaining political institutions.

Supranational political organization: Here, the term "supranational political organization" refers to a type of supranational union which lies somewhere between a

confederation (as an association of states) and a federation, denoting the political system of the European Union. Since the European Union is an organization "sui generis" (Hlavac, 2010), the term "supranational political organization" in its generalizing form is thus a *hypothetical* concept.

i. Introduction

While organizational theorists and political scientists disagree over a great many nuances of sociopolitical concepts and theories, they at least agree on this: since about four decades, processes labeled "globalization" (Albrow & King, 1990), "marketization" (Schimank & Volkmann, 2012), "scientification" (Weingart, 1983), and "technologization" (Häussling, 1998) have been transforming both organizations as well as whole societies. Amongst the many different kinds of organizations one has been particularly impacted: the political organization. Being inhibited by their very nature when it comes to making significant changes and taking effective action, political organizations, i.e. their problem-solving abilities and thus also their legitimacy, are severely affected in today's increasingly complex and dynamic environment (c.f. Brunsson, 1985, 1989). Specifically, politico-scientific debates reveal two structural challenges majoritarian Western democracies face today on a national level. First, the dissolution of spatial boundaries¹ implies that national policies of democratic polities not only lose their effectiveness (i.e. sovereign states cannot reach their goals without international cooperation any longer), but their perceived normative dignity also is degraded. Second, the perceived dissolution of temporal boundaries² indicates a new relation of majority decisions and political problem solving. Whereas the politico-social questions of the 20th century were well suited to be solved through majority decisions (because the majority's short-term interests regarding the welfare state were compatible with a long-term oriented common good), this seems no longer to be the case today: the majority's interests often are particular short-term interests at the expense of the common good and future generations (c.f. Zürn, 2013). Empirically, these challenges are e.g. reflected in poll ratings of the European Social Survey (2008), which indicate a growing dissatisfaction with fundamental institutions of parliamentary democracy, i.e. with parties, parliaments and governments. In contrast, so called non-majoritarian organizations, which are not directly involved in democratic decision-making

¹ Often this process is also named 'denationalization' (Ecker-Ehrhardt & Wessels, 2008) and refers, roughly put, to the diminished sovereign power states have in today's multipolar world.

² This process refers to two facts. First, today we know more about long-term effects of certain decisions, e.g. today the global awareness about negative long-term effects of air pollution is significantly greater than 100 years ago. Second, the effects of political decisions themselves tend to extend further and further into the future, most visible in the realm of nuclear power and genetic engineering (Rosa, 2003, 2012).

processes (e.g. central banks or constitutional courts), are held in distinctively higher esteem than democratic core institutions.³

All in all, those developments point to a reinvigoration of questions surrounding the organization of polities, their decision-making processes as well as decision outcomes and thus also their legitimacy (Zürn, 2011). In this context, it stands to reason that supranational institutions and organizations will gain in importance in the foreseeable future, as political decisions tend to extend in both time and space. In fact, the number of international agreements registered at the UN rose from 8776 in 1960 to 63419 in May 2010.⁴ However, as e.g. heated debates about the European Union's so called "democratic deficit" show, such institutions or organizations are also fighting a constant battle for political legitimacy (c.f. Follesdal & Hix, 2005; Majone, 2005).

Against this background it seems reasonable to investigate whether and how supranational political organizations could serve as a legitimate instrument to counter the serious challenges modern Western democracies face on the national level. In this regard, a relatively novel but nevertheless prominent stream of democratic theory, named 'deliberative democracy', is very promising because it explores the interaction of deliberation, decision-making and decision outcomes in political organizations.⁵ Originating from efforts to develop a theory of democratic legitimacy it stresses the discursive sphere of political interaction and adopts elements from both consensus decision-making and majority rule (Dryzek, 2010). More importantly, some deliberative democratic proponents claim that deliberation entails morally and ethically superior decision outcomes (Elster, 1998; Nino, 1996).

Although political theorists took the lead in the study of deliberative democracy, political scientists have in recent years begun to investigate its processes. One of the main challenges currently is to discover more about the actual conditions under which the ideals of deliberative democracy are more or less likely to be realized and to trace the interrelationship between deliberation and decision outcomes (Bächtiger & Tschentscher, 2007; Thompson, 2008). However, no significant academic research into the effects of supranational deliberation on decision outcomes appears to have

³ C.f. <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.

⁴ C.f. <http://treaties.un.org>.

⁵ According to Tierney (2009), perhaps the earliest notable example of academic interest in the deliberative aspects of democracy occurred in John Rawls 1971 work "A Theory of Justice".

been conducted. It therefore follows that the conception of supranational deliberation is adequate to examine further.

ii. Purpose and research question

The overall purpose of this thesis is to theoretically discuss and empirically investigate whether deliberation within supranational political organizations could serve as a means to legitimately produce superior political decision outcomes⁶. The intonation is thereby on the terms "legitimately" and "superior political decision outcomes"; the thesis' purpose is hence twofold. In the first part, it intends to outline a normative concept of legitimacy for supranational political organizations through a strictly theoretical discussion. Here, the emphasis will lie on how the political legitimacy of supranational political organizations can be defended given that people who are affected by supranational decisions often do not have a say in the actual decision-making process. Pivotal are thereby ideas underlying the concepts of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics and the question how deliberation is expected to influence the outcome of political decisions. In the second part, the thesis' aim is to investigate whether the theoretical assumptions made in constructing the concept of supranational political legitimacy can also be defended from an empirical point of view. Here, the emphasis will lie on the question whether deliberation within supranational political organizations could lead to decisions that are sustainable and/or considerate towards the global community. In this context, the focus will be exclusively on the investigation of consensus-oriented political bodies.

In accordance hereby, the thesis' aim is to answer the two interrelated research questions: *How can the legitimacy of supranational political organizations be theoretically reconceptualized?* and *What are the effects of deliberation on decisions in consensus-oriented political bodies?* For analytical purposes explained in section 2.3.3., the second research question will be divided into four "specific research questions" (SRQ). They are as follows:

⁶ In this context, the term "superior" contrasts with majoritarian decision-making outcomes on the national level and hence refers to the two systemic challenges modern democracies are confronted with, i.e. the dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries. Hence, the term "superior" relates not to the national, but rather to the trans-geographical and trans-temporal morality of decision outcomes here.

(SRQ1) *Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the formal dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse approach consensus?*

(SRQ2) *Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the substantive dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse result in superior decision outcomes?*

(SRQ3) *Is there an inherent connection between the formal and substantive dimensions of a decision? I.e. are decisions reached by consensus superior in their substantive outcome and vice versa?*

(SRQ4) *Which elements of the DQI, isolated or in combination with each other, do have a significant effect on one or both of the two dimensions of a decision? Which ones do not show any effect neither on the formal nor on the substantive decision outcome?*

iii. Delimitations

To narrow down the scope of the thesis' first research question, I will bring the theoretical discussion into line with the case of the European Union. Naturally, I will therefore be inclined to draw on scholarly discussions explicitly focusing on the case of the European Union. This decision is based on the interest in the European Union's unique political character and a personal affiliation with the European continent. Since the European Union is a political system "*sui generis*" (Hlavac, 2010), the term "supranational political organization" in its generalizing form is used as a hypothetical concept here, accounting for the above drawn inference that supranational organizations will gain in importance in the future. Moreover, trying to outline a *universal* concept of supranational political legitimacy would run the risk to undermine its very purpose because the understanding of political legitimacy is always culturally colored as well (c.f. Nathan, 2007).

Consequently, the scope of the second research question will be narrowed down by focusing the empirical investigation on political debates within the European Union. The object of research are thereby plenary debates in the European Parliament

because they are considered the "high point"⁷ of parliamentary legislative activity in the European Union.

However, the thesis does not include any general overview of the structure of the European Union and constitutive political bodies. For an insightful overview of the European Union's institutional structure, consult the homepage of the European Union.⁸

For detailed elaboration on why the European Parliament has been chosen as research object and how debates have been selected for analysis, please refer to the section titled "Methodology".

iv. Overview

In the introduction, two challenges modern Western democracies face on a national level as well as current challenges of deliberative democratic scholars have been problematized, which led to the two guiding research questions the thesis aims to answer. Accordingly, the paper will be divided into three main parts, where the first can be considered the theoretical preparatory work for the empirical investigation in the second part. The third section consists of conclusions and a discussion of the theoretical and empirical results obtained in the first and second part respectively.

More specifically, the first part is devoted to the theoretical development of a normative concept of legitimacy for supranational political organizations, which is grounded in the theoretically assumed causality between deliberation and decision outcomes as advocated by proponents of deliberative democracy.

The second part will examine this theoretically established causality through an empirical case study, thus simultaneously testing whether the theoretical assumptions made in constructing the concept of supranational legitimacy can also be defended from an empirical standpoint. The second part will be structured as follows: In the first section, the theoretical framework which will be used to answer the research question is discussed. This combines theories from different research

⁷ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>

⁸ <http://europa.eu>

fields that have been interwoven to generate a framework for the assessment of deliberation in supranational political contexts (called "Discourse Quality Index" [DQI]) and to formulate the four SRQs. In the second section, the thesis' methodological choices are explained and motivated, and their implications and potential shortcomings are discussed. Thereafter, the empirical findings are presented in third section. In the following fourth section, the empirics are analyzed using the theoretical framework.

After this, the third part follows, where the conclusions of the preceding analysis are presented and the study's generalizability and political implications are discussed, along with suggestions for future research.




Figure 1: Thesis disposition

Part I

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*Towards a normative concept of legitimacy for
supranational political organizations*

"We tend to fill voids with what we know. When we are thrown into unfamiliar spaces, we try to chart them with the maps we possess, construct them with the tools we already have. Working with analogies, extending and adapting existing concepts, seems usually preferable to the creation of ideas and structures from scratch, not only because of the risks involved in the latter, but also because of our limits of imagination."

- Krisch, 2010

Short Disposition: Part I

This part starts with a short introduction, touching upon the idea that the notion of "legitimacy" should not be conceptualized equally for the national and the supranational level. After, the reader will be introduced to the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, i.e. the contradiction between legitimate and rational decision outcomes and his advocated primacy of the polity. In the following section, this position will be juxtaposed against the primacy of the individual, which has e.g. been proposed by Thomas Hobbes. This will lead us to Scharpf's dichotomic concept of legitimacy, which draws on both Rousseau's primacy of the polity (so called political "output legitimacy") and Hobbes' primacy of the individual (so called political "input legitimacy"), and thus to the idea of deliberative democracy and deliberation as a required "throughput" factor of legitimacy for supranational political organizations. In the end, I am summing up my arguments and visualizing the concept of supranational political legitimacy with a graph.

1.1. Introduction

In philosophical and politico-scientific literature, the origin of the normative concept of democracy can largely be traced back to philosophical inquiries about political legitimacy dating back to the Age of Enlightenment and even Greek and Roman antiquity⁹. In modern Western societies, the two normative concepts "democracy" and "legitimacy" are thus widely conceived as birds of a feather; or to put it

⁹ In ancient times, however, democracy was sometimes even considered illegitimate; c.f. Miller, 2011.

differently: "robbing" people of their perceived political sovereignty is considered illegitimate in the Western hemisphere today. It therefore comes with no surprise that debates about the legitimacy of supranational political organizations, such as the one about the European Union's democratic deficit, are led with vehemence (Hix, 2008).

The ongoing debate about the European Union's apparent democratic deficit is also an impressive example to show how social constructions, i.e. the inseparability of the two concepts democracy and legitimacy, can take powerful "real" effects, such as the structural adjustments which consequently were implemented in the Union.¹⁰ Since it is arguably difficult to teach an old dog new tricks (especially if this "dog" takes shape of the Western cultural memory of the last 500 years and the "tricks" appear to be the modern Western perception of political legitimacy), the political legitimacy of supranational organizations has been a central subject of politico-scientific debates during the last few decades (Schmidt, 2013). Although such discussions are obviously desirable and also necessary in light of ongoing processes of globalization and denationalization, their fruitfulness is decisively hampered if the scientific and political tenor remains unshakeable. Or with respect to the dog analogy: if your dog is replaced by an elephant, but you will not adapt the list of tricks specifically designed for your dog, you will hardly or not be able at all to teach that elephant any tricks. Given the increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries, however, it is debatable to what extent the notion of political legitimacy should be projected from the national to the supranational political sphere. Neyer writes in this respect about a "misery of the orthodox democratic theories" which primarily stems from the failure "to adapt the notion of democracy to the empirical realities of the 21st century" (translation by author; 2009, as cited in Jörke, 2010, p. 271). What this statement implies, and what I would like to discuss in what follows, is that the prevailing notion of political legitimacy should be reconsidered when looking at the supranational political sphere.

¹⁰ For example the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in 2009, providing the European Parliament with increased legislative powers. C.f. <http://europa.eu>.

1.2. Legitimacy vs. rationality - the political philosophy of Rousseau

In a famous paragraph of his treatise "The Social Contract" (1762), Rousseau writes on "Whether the General Will can Err?":

"It follows from what precedes that the general will is always right and always tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the resolutions of the people have always the same rectitude. Men always desire their own good, but do not always discern it; the people are never corrupted, though often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil.

There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter regards only the common interests, while the former has regards to private interests, and is merely a sum of particular wills; but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences."¹¹

Rousseau's distinction between the will of all and the general will, i.e. between what every single person of a political community believes to be in their best interest at a given point in time and what the people of this same political community believe to be in their collective interest if they were not "deceived", signifies a crucial paradox of democratic legitimacy (c.f. Benhabib, 1994). Democracy, or the rule of the people, is based upon the normative premise that the exercise of this power leads to decision outcomes that represent the general will, i.e. that are equally in the interests of all the people of the respective political community. Hence, from a normative point of view, collective rules, regulations and obligations can be considered legitimately binding on all if they express the principle of collective interest. However, one would probably want to know how the general will can be expected to express the best collective interest and be for the common good of all if the stated individual preferences contradict each other? In addition, how can one distinguish between another person's actual concern for the community's common good and his or her pure self-interest?

¹¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract", published by Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998, p. 29.

Rousseau's answer is to "take away . . . the pluses and minuses which cancel one another", i.e. he basically offers a mathematical solution by setting the general will equal to the arithmetic mean of the sum of the particular wills. However, there are two main problems with the solution offered by Rousseau. First, there is the question how one can find or even define the arithmetic mean of two differing opinions, and even more so if there are several hundred or thousands of them? Moreover, even if it was possible to adequately define "the arithmetic mean of the sum of individual wills", how would this procedure be implemented institutionally?

Second, it is not clear at all how or even *if* this procedure would lead to an outcome that could be considered to preserve or enhance the common good of the respective political community. If the mathematical solution to find the general will as suggested by Rousseau means that it aims at finding the collective interests of the majority, this procedure would lack the legitimacy to "subtract" the interest of minorities because it does not say anything about the normative basis on which this subtraction would happen. Furthermore, it would be difficult if not impossible to explain why this procedure would lead to better decision outcomes (i.e. decision outcomes that preserve or enhance the common good more effectively) than any other procedure (c.f. Benhabib, 1994).

Obviously, neither Rousseau was able to resolve this democratic paradox without introducing an additional actor into his "normative-mathematical" equation. He writes:

*"Of themselves, the people always desire what is good, but do not always discern it. The general will is always right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects as they are, sometimes as they ought to appear . . . Individuals see the good which they reject; the public desires the good which they do not see. All alike have need of guides. The former must be compelled to conform their wills to their reason; the people must be taught to know what they require . . . Hence arises the need of a legislator."*¹²

Thus, the only solution for Rousseau was to generate a trade-off between the rationality of the outcome and the legitimacy of the procedure to obtain that

¹² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract", published by Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998, p. 39.

outcome, by introducing a legislator that "compels the people to reason" if they are deceived or do not know what is in their best interest. Obviously, such a solution prompts many more questions: What would such a legislator, understood as an actor of supreme rationality, look like? How would this institution be defined and generated? Moreover, how would this concept of political decision-making distinguish itself from authoritarian decision-making processes? How would this institution aggregate the knowledge about what is in the best interest of the people? However, for the purpose of this thesis, those questions are less essential than Rousseau's understanding of legitimacy and the strict separation of legitimacy and rationality he proposes.

Conclusion

For Rousseau it is clear that the will of the people is the source of all political legitimacy. At the same time, however, he has a huge mistrust of citizens' rationality, i.e. he does not trust individual actors to be able to collectively arrive at rational decisions. Those two crucial aspects of his work will be taken up separately in the following two paragraphs. The former will be discussed in the subsequent section and extended with Scharpf's dichotomic concept of legitimacy. The latter, which allows one to guess Rousseau's distrust of representative institutions and their deliberative potential, will afterwards be reconceptualized with the deliberative democratic model, thereby bridging Rousseau's apparent gap between legitimacy and rationality.

1.3. Scharpf's dichotomic concept of political legitimacy

Rousseau's political philosophy and understanding of legitimacy can be traced back as far as to Aristotle as one of the philosophical pioneers of this so called *republican* line of thought. With this heritage Rousseau shares the primacy of the polity and the emphasis on the common good, to which he adds the axiom of equal participation in collective decisions. But then for him as for Aristotle, the morality of the collective governors becomes an essential problem, necessitating the transformation of a probably "erring" will of all into a common-good oriented general will. This

theoretical difficulty was pragmatically countered with the uprising of representative democracy after the French Revolution,¹³ relating the medieval representation of estates with the aspirations for democratic self-government. Here, the orientation of representatives to the common good is to be ensured through the dual mechanisms of public deliberation and electoral accountability, while egalitarianism is reflected in the fundamental commitment to universal and equal suffrage (Scharpf, 2009).

On the other side of the spectrum of democratic political ideologies there is the younger *liberal* tradition, going back to the early modern period and Thomas Hobbes rather than to Greek and Roman antiquity. Here, priority is assigned to the individual rather than to the polity, and the state is justified by the need to protect individual interests. Thus, *individual* self-determination replaces the value of *collective* self-determination. Once the state has established basic securities, strict limitations on its governing powers should be imposed in order to protect the fundamental value of individual freedom.¹⁴ Where such governing powers cannot or only partly be restricted, individual liberty should be preserved by a rule of consensus decisions, institutionalized checks and balances of democratic constitutions, and mechanisms that account for interest pluralism. If possible, decisions should generally be based on the consensus of the interests affected rather than on majority votes (Scharpf, 2012).¹⁵

Probably the simplest and at the same time one of the most famous verbal expressions of the fundamental ideas of both the republican and the liberal line of thought is the following excerpt of Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which was delivered during the American Civil War in 1863:

"It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that

¹³ www.bpb.de

¹⁴ In the tradition of John Locke and Adam Smith, individual freedom is often interpreted as “negative liberty,” understood as the “freedom of pursuing our own good in our own way” (Berlin, 1958, as cited in Scharpf, 2009, p. 6).

¹⁵ For Kant, however, individual autonomy becomes possible by the very fact of creating a state authority. Since the human nature is basically wicked, there is a need for general laws that are effectively enforced by state authority. Such laws will allow a political community to approach a state of universal freedom if they define rules to which all those affected could agree in their position as autonomous and rational actors. However, such an argumentation could also justify a very intrusive regulatory state, especially when decisions are delegated to politically independent agencies or courts (Scharpf, 2009). Kant is thus confronted with a very similar problem as Rousseau, namely the question how to ensure that laws and policies do not depart (too widely) from the empirical preferences of self-interested citizens.

*cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – **and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.***" [bold type by author]

This comprehensive understanding of political legitimacy has later been summarized in a famous and convincing manner by Fritz Scharpf (2004) as *input legitimacy* and *output legitimacy* of a political (i.e. democratic) system, where input legitimacy refers to "government by and of the people" and output legitimacy to "government for the people" in Abraham Lincoln's address.¹⁶ The idea of output legitimacy has thus arisen from the republican line of thought, whereas the concept of input legitimacy originates from the liberal way of thinking. Scharpf describes his notion of legitimacy with a functional understanding. He writes: " . . . legitimating arguments invoking shared legitimacy beliefs imply a socially sanctioned obligation to comply with government policies even if these violate the actor's own interests or normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low cost" (Scharpf, 2006, p. 1). However, Scharpf stresses that he attempts a conceptual *normative* articulation of legitimacy. He holds that input and output legitimacy both rest on the premise that legitimate government must serve the common good of the respective community, and that this function must be protected both against the self-interest of governors and the rent-seeking behavior of advocacy groups (Tholen, 2007).

Reading these remarks, one could be inclined to reason that Scharpf considers supranational political organizations such as the European Union illegitimate, because the input side of political legitimacy is not adequately accounted for in their case. In contrast, however, Scharpf criticizes those who argue that the European Union suffers from a "democratic deficit", the solution to which would lie in further democratization. While he agrees that in certain respects the legitimacy of the European Union might be compromised, in his view the actual problem is not situated on the input side, but on the output side (Scharpf, 2006). It is problem-solving gaps and coordination problems that lead to the European Union's legitimacy

¹⁶ Interestingly, a strikingly similar concept of legitimacy for organizations in general has been put forward by organizational theorist Nils Brunsson (1989), who argues that organizations may gain support by either reflecting the inconsistent norms and demands of environmental agents ("input") and/or by supplying goods or services ("output"). Brunsson's concept will be touched upon in the discussion in part three.

deficit, not lack of popular participation, and improvements in one dimension cannot substitute for the lack of, or deficits in, the other. Scharpf thus considers the European Union's input legitimacy adequately accounted for¹⁷ and agrees with those critics that maintain that state-like participatory democratic policy making at European level is improper, because one of the necessary preconditions for this is not fulfilled: a collective, i.e. a people with a common identity does not exist (Tholen, 2007). Scharpf holds that without such a collective identity, discourses between governing and governed people about the common good would not be possible in the first place, and the imposition of not compensated sacrifices on parts of the population would not be justifiable (Scharpf, 2004).

Conclusion

Scharpf's dichotomic concept of national political legitimacy can be traced back to republican and liberal schools of political thought. However, he does not think that it can be transferred to the supranational level one-on-one, since the supranational sphere lacks a collective identity comparable to the one on national levels. This in turn prevents discourses about a collective common good beyond the national sphere from coming into existence. Scharpf's argumentation thus rests on the crucial premise that an essential factor enabling discourses about the common good in the first place is the collective identity of a citizenry, and that in the course of planning the common good, such an identity would justify impositions of not compensated sacrifices on parts of the population.

Although both republican as well as liberal political theorists - from ancient thinkers like Aristotle and early modern theorists like Hobbes, via late modern scholars like Rousseau through to contemporary political analysts like Scharpf - acknowledge that the common good is a crucial legitimizing factor for the exercise of political power, it is still unclear how it can be preserved or enhanced on the supranational level, where a collective identity is lacking and the dual mechanisms of public deliberation and electoral accountability are not or only limitedly effective. The question thus arises

¹⁷ For example through the elections to the European Parliament, where Members of the European Parliament are directly elected since 1979. Moreover, transnational European citizen groups increasingly tend to initiate, take part and influence EU-decision making processes (c.f. Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor, 2001; Castells, 2008).

whether and how supranational organizations can foster a common good beyond national spheres, given that input legitimacy is already adequately provided for as argued by Scharpf? To approach this question, I would like to draw on ideas of the concept of deliberative democracy, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

1.4. Deliberative Democracy

The ideal of deliberative democracy is a democratic concept in which public deliberation is central to political decision-making (Bessette, 1980).¹⁸ Hence, citizens taking part in political debates "share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning" (Cohen, 2003, p. 346). While deliberative theorists differ in many respects, they are in general agreement on at least this: political decision-making processes should be based on the deliberative discussion of political issues, rather than on a mere aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting (Steiner, Bächtiger & Spörndli, 2001). Thus, outcomes should be determined by reasons rather than numbers. Many crucial aspects of deliberative democracy originate in the republican view of democracy; however, Habermas (1996) introduces a procedural model of democracy situated *in between* the republican and the liberal lines of thought. With the republican school, Habermas' deliberative model shares the normative ideal of an active, talk-centric participation of possibly all citizens in political decision-making. In accordance with the liberal line, he believes in a pluralistic character of modern societies and thus rejects the republican ideal of a united political community motivated by a shared understanding of the common good. In turn, Habermas rejects liberalism's interpretation of political decision-making as being primarily the competition among, and aggregation of, individual and fixed preferences (Steiner et al., 2001).

Habermas builds his concept of deliberative democracy on two crucial pillars: the theory of communicative action and Habermasian discourse ethics. Generally, communicative action means cooperative action undertaken by individuals based upon mutual deliberation and argumentation (Bolton, 2005). Habermas defines

¹⁸ "Deliberation" means the careful and reasoned consideration and discussion of reasons for and against a political decision outcome (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013).

communicative action when the action orientations of the participating actors are not coordinated through individualistic calculations of interest enforcement, but through acts of common understanding; actors pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can coordinate their actions on the basis of shared understandings of the situation (Steiner et al., 2001). Thus, Habermas does not presuppose *per se* rational actors, but that rationality is constructed *through* communication (c.f. Habermas, 1984). At this point Habermasian discourse ethics comes into play. Discourse ethics refers to a type of argumentation that intends to establish normative or ethical truths by examining the presuppositions of discourse. In accordance hereby, Habermasian discourse ethics defines criteria for an "ideal" discourse, i.e. a discourse that is able to yield ethically and morally edified decisions (Habermas, 1991). Within such a discourse, participants are prepared to be persuaded by the "non-coercive coercion of the better argument" (Habermas, 1983, p. 132), and interests and identities are no longer fixed, but subject to closer examination and challenges and consequently to change.¹⁹

In practice, discourse ethics thus means that actors listen to diverse standpoints and respond to them, show empathy, reflect upon and evaluate others' interests and needs from the point of view of their generalizability, and are primarily interested in resolving normative controversies to the satisfaction of all. In the conception of Habermas, an "ideal" discourse thus leads to a reasonable, genuine consensus (Steiner et al., 2001).

However, because of their emphasis on deliberation and inherent discursive-ethical practices, deliberative democratic models are claimed to exhibit further advantages not explicitly addressed by Habermas. An asserted strength of these models is that they are more easily able to incorporate scientific opinion and base policy on outputs of ongoing research, because time is given for all participants to understand and discuss the science (Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006). Moreover, deliberative democratic proponents such as Elster (1998) argue that deliberation generates ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality and knowledge of the relevant facts. In addition, the more these conditions are fulfilled, the greater the likelihood that the decisions reached are morally correct (Nino, 1996). Deliberative democracy has thus an epistemic value: it

¹⁹ For example, one presupposition for such a discourse is Habermas' assumption that individuals who openly declare selfish intentions will not be able to enforce their interests (c.f. section 2.2.). For a description of the criteria for an "ideal" discourse according to Habermas, see section 2.4.1.

allows participants to deduce what is morally decent. Studies by James Fishkin (2011) and others (c.f. Elster, 1998; Ross, 2011) also have found that deliberative democracy tends to produce outcomes which are (morally) superior to those in other forms of democracy. In addition, deliberative democracy produces less partisanship and more sympathy with opposing views; more respect for evidence based reasoning rather than opinion; a greater commitment to the decisions taken by those involved; and, in accordance with Habermas, a greater chance for widely shared consensus to evolve, thus promoting social cohesion between people from different backgrounds (Fishkin, 2011; Ross, 2011).

Conclusion

With his concept of deliberative democracy, Habermas not only introduces a procedural model of democracy situated *in between* the republican and the liberal lines of thought, but he also offers a theoretical "brick" to close Rousseau's gap between legitimacy and rationality. Integrating Habermasian concepts of discourse ethics and communicative action into Rousseau's line of argumentation, the apparent need for a legislator disappears, because citizens are able to construct rationality *through* communication. A similar line of reasoning can also be applied to the supranational level, although the need for a legislator persists for pragmatic-practical reasons. Thus, although the concept of deliberative democracy originates from the national sphere, i.e. its understanding of legitimacy rests on the premise that a decision should be preceded by authentic deliberation of all citizens affected, one could argue that its proclaimed procedural strengths could serve as a legitimizing clue to the difficulties supranational organizations face according to Scharpf (that is, the problem of generating discourses about a common good against the background of a lacking collective identity). Since "ideal" discourses are claimed to result in morally superior decisions, they could thus be considered the missing link between what Scharpf calls input and output side of legitimacy.

Thus, supranational political deliberation could not only account for the output legitimacy of supranational organizations, but would at the same time introduce a third aspect into Scharpf's dichotomic concept of political legitimacy, thereby

developing it into a *trichotomic* concept of legitimacy. An elaboration on the distinction between the three aspects of legitimacy will be discussed in what follows.

1.5. Between Input and Output: Throughput Legitimacy

As discussed above, input and output legitimacy have differing rationales regarding the question whether priority should be placed on the individual or the polity. Throughput legitimacy, then, covers what goes on *in between* the input and the output. Since it has been widely neglected in normative theorizing about political legitimacy in general and the legitimacy of supranational organizations in particular, throughput has sometimes been subsumed under output legitimacy, where particular institutional or discursive processes are seen as preconditions for better output performance, and occasionally under the input side, where certain institutional processes or deliberative interactions are preconditions for better input participation (Schmidt, 2010). On a general level, it might even be difficult to unravel in normative discussions because individual scholars or political cultures may have preferences for certain types of output or input that demand certain types of throughput.²⁰ However, Schmidt (2013) argues that disentangling throughput from output and input in normative theory is nevertheless extremely useful for analytic reasons:²¹ "Normative theorizing can show that throughput also stands on its own, and not only because it refers to different mechanisms of legitimization . . . It is also because, unlike with input politics and output policies, where more of either is likely to increase the public's sense of democratic legitimacy, with throughput processes, more of it may have little effect on public perceptions of legitimacy, while less of it via corruption, incompetence and exclusion may bring down the whole house of cards" (p. 14).

Drawing on Schmidt (2013), Lieberherr (2013) understands throughput legitimacy as comprised of both participation-oriented legitimacy of input and the results-oriented legitimacy of output with a focus on the quality of interaction and procedures. She thus defines throughput based on two forms:

²⁰ One of the most prominent examples hereto is probably the systemic confrontation between communism and capitalism during the Cold War period.

²¹ Very recently, Schmidt (2013) has been the first scholar to approach a concept of throughput legitimacy for the European Union.

(1) Throughput legitimacy can relate to democratic regulatory accountability, i.e. a check on power through democratic feedback loops (e.g. the citizens' ability to vote somebody out of or into office).

(2) Throughput legitimacy is also based on performance-oriented procedures, which put the emphasis on the polity rather than the individual. Here, Lieberherr lies the focus on efficiency and competition, where efficiency refers to cost-utility and competition to competitive regulation.

The attentive reader might have recognized that what Lieberherr considers part of throughput legitimacy (i.e. "democratic regulatory accountability") is viewed as belonging to the input side by Scharpf (2004). However, for the purpose of this thesis the exact analytical distinction between input and output legitimacy is less important than the addendum I intend to make to Lieberherr's concept of throughput legitimacy.

Based on the theoretical discussion above, I am arguing that supranational throughput legitimacy requires not just efficient and competitive institutional processes, but additionally productive deliberative interrelationships among political supranational actors. As we have seen, "ideal" deliberations could constitute the missing link between the input and output side of supranational legitimacy, because they could enable discourses about a common good beyond the national political sphere are claimed to result in morally superior decisions. Hence, adding "throughput" to Scharpf's dichotomic concept of legitimacy, I am arguing that supranational political organizations can be considered legitimate to the extent that there are mechanisms for interest representation (input legitimacy); mechanisms allowing for efficiency, competition and deliberation (throughput legitimacy); and that decision outcomes allow for the preservation or enhancement of the common good.

This formulation for the legitimacy of supranational political organizations should make clear that it is a *conceptual guideline* rather than an unshakable truth. Thus, I am not presuming to define how and to what degree input and throughput mechanisms have to be institutionalized or how far decision outcomes allow for the enhancement of the common good. It is also important to note that it is a *normative* concept of legitimacy, hence this concept in itself does not say anything about people's beliefs about political authority (i.e. the *perceived* legitimacy). The

normative concept of legitimacy for supranational political organizations is visualized in the upper part of Figure 2.




Figure 2: Cycle of political legitimacy

As the figure's shading intends to emphasize, and what should be clear from the theoretical discussion above, is that although I regard input, throughput and output

all as necessary factors for the legitimacy of supranational organizations, the relative emphasis should be put on through- and output rather than on input.²² Thus, to assess whether supranational organizations are throughout legitimate, one needs to shed special light on the "throughout" aspect of this trichotomic concept of legitimacy.

Contrary to what this graph might make appear at first glance, it is also crucial to remark that organizational input, throughput and output is not understood as a strictly linear process. That is, organizational (political) decision-making as a whole is not considered a genuinely rational procedure, even if deliberation has a theoretical potential for communicative rationality. This has two essential implications. First, I am not arguing that decision outcomes only fulfill a legitimizing function. As Brunsson (2007) holds, it might well be that besides choice, decisions can also serve the mobilization of action and responsibility. Second, decisions do not necessarily result in actions, or actions might even be decoupled from decisions. It is thus essential to distinguish between what I termed "decision outcomes" and actual "action outcomes". This second point leads me to another crucial argument on which I have touched upon above: the here developed concept of legitimacy for supranational political organizations cannot stand on its own, but is dependent on input from the national sphere. On the one hand, this concept requires input from the national sphere in the sense that there have to be mechanisms that allow for national interest representation at the supranational level (as is e.g. the case with the elections to the European Parliament). On the other hand, this concept cannot and must not be judged in terms of "action outcomes", because the implementation of supranational decisions actually happens at the national level. As Brunsson (1989) argues, however, distance between "decision-makers" and "action-takers" permits leadership to establish vision, mission, and goals, which might inspire the led to "change the boundaries of what they regard as feasible". Moreover, improving the quality of decision outcomes might influence the quality of eventual action outcomes, which might in turn improve the perceived legitimacy of the supranational political organization (see Figure 2).

Besides regulations, however, there are also ideas and discourse being projected from the supranational to the national level (Schmidt, 2005). According to Schmidt, the

²² This, however, does not imply that improvements in one dimension cannot substitute for the lack of, or deficits in, the other, as I have discussed above.

way such ideas and discourse are conveyed by politicians to their national polity influences the perception of political organizations and thus also whether they are perceived as legitimate by citizens. The projection of ideas and discourse from the supranational to the national level, in turn, seems to depend on the voting result with which political debates are closed. Thus, deliberation could increase the perceived legitimacy of supranational organizations also indirectly through the degree of consensus that is achieved during political debates.

In the following section, I will summarize my argument developed in the course of the above theoretical discussion.

Conclusion: Supranational political organizations - throughout legitimate?

The above discussion has shown how the understanding of the legitimacy of supranational organizations can be reconceptualized. The advantage of this concept of "throughout legitimacy" is threefold. First, it ascribes legitimacy to processes rather than systems which is favorable in an increasingly denationalized environment (Jörke, 2010). Second, it accounts for the fact that enhancing the input legitimacy of supranational organizations is not reasonable beyond a certain threshold, given that citizenries are still exclusively defined in national terms and given the lack of a supranational collective identity. Third, it takes into consideration the politics-administration dichotomy advocated by Brunsson (1989), by disconnecting leaders from followers, i.e. separating the concept of supranational legitimacy from actual "action outcomes".

Hence, the above developed concept of legitimacy for supranational political organizations implies that supranational organizations could be considered "throughout legitimate" if they, *amongst others*, live up to the following two conditions: the institutionalized decision-making process is characterized by deliberation at the crucial decision-making moments (throughput legitimacy); and the subsequent decision outcome allows for preservation or enhancement of the common good (output legitimacy).

Interestingly, political bodies of the European Union, although operating with qualified majority voting rule (as is e.g. the case in the Council of the European Union), make a high percentage of their decisions by consensus according to recent research (Häge, 2013; Ricard, 2009). One could therefore reason that political bodies of the European Union could exhibit deliberative characteristics during their debates. In accordance with the above discussion of deliberative democracy, one could further hypothesize that deliberative discourses on the supranational European level could thus serve as a clue to the puzzles European democracies face on a national level (see green arrow in Figure 2). As previously unveiled, Western democracies face the dilemma that majoritarian voting systems on a national level are not well suited to deal with decisions that tend to extend both in time and space. Moreover, deliberation in European decision-making processes could indirectly also influence the *perceived* legitimacy of the Union through superior decision outcomes and altered discursive projections towards the national sphere, thereby possibly alleviating criticisms that lament its "democratic deficit" (c.f. Schmidt, 2013).

However, no significant academic research into the effects of deliberation on decisions in supranational political bodies appears to have been conducted. It therefore follows that the assessment of political deliberation within such institutions is adequate to examine further.

Thus, rather than precipitately testing whether decision-making processes and outcomes of the European Union actually live up to the normative concept of legitimacy developed above, part two of this thesis aims at investigating a preceding step, namely at trialing the theoretically assumed causality between deliberation and decision outcomes through empirical investigation.

Part II

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Deliberation and Decisions

"From time to time, the current debate in political philosophy about distributive justice shows eerie traits. Like lighthouses rising confidently from the sea of societal reality, the luminaries of theories of justice . . . untroubledly send each other signals across the Atlantic Ocean, i.e. their increasingly refined theoretical arguments for a consent-enabled conception of social justice, while below them the sea of socioeconomic transitions gets rougher and rougher, endangering the little boat of the welfare state, which sails under the banner of solidarity and justice, to be swallowed up completely. With respect to the prevalent politico-theoretical discourse about distributive justice, facts and norms . . . increasingly diverge in those very societies on whose grounds it is held (as well as in almost all other regions of the world), seemingly without particularly troubling the discourse participants."

- Rosa, 2012 [translation by author]

Short Disposition: Part II

This part will start with an introduction providing a short overview over previously conducted research on deliberative democracy and political deliberation. It will then attend to critics of deliberative democracy and delimit its application to real world politics. In the following section, I am discussing theoretical arguments specifically related to the relation between deliberation and decisions, from which I derive the four "specific research questions" (SRQ). After, the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is developed and operationalized, which is used to analyze debates of the European Parliament. This section is then followed by a methodological discussion, which is leading to the presentation of the empirical results and their analysis.

2.1. Introduction

"Proposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal, deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices of liberal democracy" (Bohman, 1998, p. 1). Although one of the first notable examples of academic interest in the deliberative aspect of democracy occurred as late as 1971 (John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*; c.f. Tierney, 2009), the idea itself can be traced back as far as to ancient political philosophers like Aristotle. The term officially stems from Joseph M. Bessette (1980) who coined it to oppose the elitist interpretation of the American

Constitution. In its beginnings, research on the deliberative aspects of democracy has thus been highly theoretical and it has often been criticized for lacking practical feasibility (Bohman, 1998). This "first generation" of deliberative democrats, including theorists like Habermas, Rawls, and Cohen, although differing in terms of their focus, all regarded the process of deliberation as a highly idealized concept that resulted in a 'superior' collective decision (and often in consensus). As lately as in 1998, James Bohman famously lamented the lack of any comprehensive empirical research study conducted in the field of deliberative democracy. In particular, he emphasized the crucial link between empirical evidence and institutional design, and argued this relationship was vital if deliberative democratic theory was to make the difficult transition from political theory to political reality. Hence, only very recently has there been an empirical turn in the research of deliberative democracy (Flynn, 2011).

The "second generation" of deliberative democrats,²³ then, are devoted to exploring the ways in which these first generation models might be institutionalized in large modern societies. More specifically, second generation scholars deal with the question how a deliberative democracy can be realized in large and complex societies (Flynn, 2011). Prominent representatives of this second generation are e.g. Steiner et al. (2001), who tried to identify favorable conditions for deliberation in national legislatures. Moreover, Steenbergen et al. (2003) developed a so called Discourse Quality Index (DQI), trying to operationalize Habermasian discourse ethics for empirical research. This instrument has recently been applied by Spörndli (2003) to examine the relationship between deliberation and decision outcomes in the German Conference Committee.

Although many theorists of deliberative democracy deal with decisions in some way (e.g. Habermas, who sees "ideal" discourses resulting in a rational consensus), this approach is still procedural in character: the question is not whether morally or ethically superior decision outcomes are produced, but whether the decisions gain legitimacy from a broad range of societal groups. Moreover, empirical studies which examine effects of deliberation on decision outcomes concentrate either on

²³ Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen and Steiner (2010) and Elstub (2010) explicitly or implicitly divide research on deliberative democracy into three generations, where the first and the third correspond with what I have termed first and second. However, Mansbridge et al. (2010) describe Bächtiger et al.'s (2010) and Elstub's (2010) second generation (or "type II") as an "expansion of the classic ideal" (p. 67), which is why I allowed myself to divide deliberative democracy research into two generations.

discourses in citizen forums, participatory assessments, or the public sphere (Spörndli, 2003). Debates of consensus-oriented political bodies are, however, largely neglected in the literature.²⁴

2.2. Critique of Deliberative Democracy - delimiting its range of application to real world politics

As touched upon above, the deliberative democratic model is not immune to considerable criticisms. The criticism most frequently raised against models of deliberative democracy is that of "utopian irrelevance" (Steiner et al., 2001, p. 4). Foucault (1991) e.g. rejects the possibility of an "ideal" discourse. He argues that power as a social structure resides in the discourse itself and that consequently the rules of the discourse define which arguments can legitimately be used by participants. Similarly, Mouffe (2000, as cited in Steiner et al., 2001) holds that Habermasian discourse ethics does not account for societal tensions inherent in modern pluralist societies. In her view, a change of opinion is more a sort of conversion than a process of rational persuasion, similar to a paradigm change in science.

Another line of critique is directed against the internal validity of Habermas' theory of communicative action. Critics argue his theory of communicative action implies that the usage of language would in itself mean that deliberators adopt an orientation toward a common understanding, even if they do not act in line with the requirements of communicative action. As an example, one might be confronted with a situation where actors see through a specific speech act and the related individualistic intentions of a speaker but still agree with it; this, however, would contradict Habermas' assumption that the open declaration of individualistic intentions leads to the failure of any related action. Consequently, a rationally achieved agreement does not necessarily require a preceding communicative action orientation (c.f. Greve, 1999, as cited in Steiner et al., 2001).

²⁴ Apart from Spörndli (2003). However, Bächtiger and Tschentscher (2007) recently stated that those results have to be replicated, i.e. more studies are required to substantiate their validity.

Focusing more specifically on deliberations in real world politics, Walzer (1999) observes that political debates often do not exhibit anything similar to deliberative discussions, but that discussions are very often verbal contests with the aim to win the debate. The means are the practice of rhetorical skill, the reciting of favorable evidence (or the suppression of unfavorable evidence respectively), and the discrediting of other debate participants. Political debates thus exhibit a "socio-psychological rather than a cognitive function" (Steiner et al., 2001, p. 5) as advocated by Habermasian theory of communicative action.

Thus, a fundamental question which concepts of deliberative democracy have been confronted with is the following: why should allegedly rational actors, i.e. actors who take actions not for the sake of performing them, but for the accomplishment of private goals, make an effort to engage in deliberation? Or put differently: what place can Habermasian discourses realistically have within (democratic) politics? The challenge of the Habermasian theory of communicative action has inspired theorists of rational choice to reconsider their theoretical tool kit (Steiner et al., 2001). Accordingly, Keck (1995) found that ceasing from the assumption of "common knowlegde" as a part of genuine game theory, one can fruitfully integrate communication into rational choice theory. Actors who are confronted with unknown situations might need to adopt argumentative rationality to solve their problems. As a result of the ensuing interaction process, they learn about unforeseen consequences of their actions which might even lead them to change their "utility functions". With regard to international politics, Risse (2000, as cited in Steiner et al., 2001) argues that as soon as "common knowledge" is absent in international political debates, argumentative rationality becomes necessary not only for developing trust in the seriousness of other participants' speech acts, but also for enhancing a shared understanding of the definition of the situation and of the underlying normative framework. Risse also assumes that a logic of argumentative rationality is likely to be adopted if actors are uncertain about their own identities, interests, and worldviews. Furthermore, rational argumentation, as opposed to purely rhetorical argumentation, may prevent debate participants from getting entrapped in a discursive vicious circle.²⁵ Thus, far away from an "ideal" discourse, actors may be forced into a debate

²⁵ Here, Risse advances an argument which is in line with basic propositions of negotiation theory: instead of considering only what has been said, debate participants should focus on the interests behind the actually spoken words, in order to reach a mutually acceptable negotiation deal.

which nevertheless exhibits all the characteristics of a genuine argumentative exchange.

Generally, critics agree that a realistic argument for deliberation cannot be utopian in the sense that it makes reckless assumptions about participants: e.g. it would be unreasonable to expect that deliberation will greatly transform the preferences, capacities, or character of participants in normatively desirable ways. Hence, the argument for deliberation in the real world politics has to be delimited: what deliberation can primarily do is create good faith among participants and enable them to reach a shared understanding of what is at stake in a particular political conflict even if they continue to disagree over how best to resolve it. Moreover, deliberation might help to find compromises that at least rest on greater mutual understanding and respect. Finally, deliberation is also a way to promote the diversity of input, with the goal to have input from various people to detect better ways of reaching various goals (Spörndli, 2003).

Although I have discussed the range of possible applications of deliberation in real world politics now, I have not yet countered the more fundamental objections brought forward by theorists such as Foucault (1991) and Mouffe (2000). In my opinion, however, those theorists are too extreme in their assumptions.²⁶ Although the social structure can arguably be assumed to shape the "Habitus" of people decisively, they should not be considered victims or puppets of the social structure: people are able to actively challenge the validity claims inherent in any communicative action (Steiner et al., 2001). Mouffe's presentation of a world of suspense-packed value pluralism does not account for the view that disagreement and conflict may be crucial aspects of processes of deliberation and that they might even create the very conditions that make universalized norms possible. In addition, it would also be too extreme to assume that people would never change or enlarge their perspectives or would be incapable of adapting their interests and needs to the interests and needs of fellow citizens (Knight & Johnson, 1994).

I thus conclude that there might indeed be a logic of arguing in real world politics, but what can be realistically expected will not reflect a genuine argumentative logic as proposed by the Habermasian concept of "ideal" discourses. Rather, what one might probably encounter is an amalgam of arguing, bargaining, and voting. In line with

²⁶ C.f. Steiner et al., 2001.

Steiner et al. (2001), I think that Schimmelfennig's (2001) conception of "rhetorical action" might be helpful to delimit the application of arguing in real world politics. Rhetorical action differs from communicative action insofar as rhetorical actors do not engage in a mutual search for (ethical and moral) truths but instead intend to effectively justify their own standpoint and are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be persuaded by the "better argument". However, rhetorical action might be outweighed. Hence, processes of argumentation might also help actors to learn about unforeseen consequences of their actions and to counter bounded rationality (Steiner et al., 2001). Moreover, I suggest to go one step further by assuming that actors might actually have the willingness to engage in unselfish deliberation; but rather than transforming actors' preferences, deliberation can foster mutual understanding that allows participants to see what is at stake in a decision, although they might still disagree on the way to resolve an issue (Spörndli, 2003). In addition, deliberation could also be a more effective way of collecting various inputs on how to tackle a societal problem (c.f. Benhabib, 1994). However, Foucault's argument that social structures establish boundaries for how arguments will or can be framed is a crucial objection which is considered in the empirical research design (for details, see chapter "Methodology", section 3.1.1.).

2.3. Theory and specific research questions

For the purpose of this thesis, it makes sense to draw an analytical distinction between two aspects of a decision outcome. As suggested in section 1.5., supranational deliberation could influence ideas and discourse projected from the supranational to the national level, and therefore also the *perceived* legitimacy of supranational political organization. Since the projection of such ideas and discourse is shaped, amongst others, by the voting result with which political debates are closed (Schmidt, 2005), it is reasonable to consider the so called "formal" dimension of decisions (Spörndli, 2003). Moreover, the actual content of a decision outcome could influence both the *normative* and *perceived* legitimacy of supranational organizations, through superior decision and action outcomes respectively. It is therefore adequate to consider the so called "substantive" dimension of decisions (Spörndli, 2003), which addresses the question whether decisions incorporate the

common good (e.g. does the substantive decision outcome contemplate sustainability and is it considerate towards the European or even global community?).

As will be discussed in what follows, the current literature is not specific regarding both of those dimensions, and thus remains generally vague on the effect of deliberation on decision outcomes.

2.3.1. Deliberation and formal outcomes

Arguments in the theoretical discussion of the effect of deliberation on formal decision outcomes range from positive to negative extremes. On the former, there is the above presented argument of Habermas (1983) that an ideal deliberation leads to a genuine and rational consensus of all participants because of the "non-coercive coercion of the better argument" (p. 132). In his view, a genuine consensus is not simply a negotiated agreement but a deliberative outcome that involves the transformation of the participants' preferences. On the latter, there is Shapiro (1999) who argues that deliberative decision-processes even tend to deepen pre-existing dissents because they are brought to surface through deliberation and thus radicalize final voting behavior.

However, there are a great many scholars whose arguments can be localized in the middle range in between Habermas' and Shapiro's extremes. Closer to Habermas are authors who hold that consensus, although desirable, can never be reached, even in "ideal" discourses. In Gutman and Thompson's (1990, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) view, disagreement is normatively acceptable if deliberations are conducted in an environment of mutual respect. This involves the mutual acceptance of the opponents' moral view points and the fact that there mostly are several differing opinions on a political matter. Thus, according to van den Daele and Neidhardt (1996, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) effects of mutual respect and learning will alter remaining dissents even if deliberative discussions do not lead to a formal agreement. They argue that deliberation allows participants to focus on the principal dimensions of difference, i.e. on mutual interests rather than bare political positions, and hence a compromise can be generated.

Closer to Shapiro are authors who hold that consensus is not only unattainable but also undesirable. For Dryzek and Braithwaite (2000) e.g. the concept of consensual decision-making is both unrealistic and undesirable in pluralistic societies and instead see ideal outcomes of deliberative democracies as agreements on a course of action reached through compromise, but for different reasons.

2.3.2. Deliberation and substantive outcomes

The theoretical discussion on the effects of deliberation on substantive decision outcomes is similar to the one on formal outcomes in that it shows an "indecisive" character. Broadly formulated, scholars generally simply assume that decisions reached through deliberation are highly legitimate because deliberative decision-making is viewed as more legitimate than other decision-making processes (Spörndli, 2003). The actual quality of a decision reached through deliberation seems thus not to be a vividly discussed topic in existing literature.

Estlund (1997) e.g. argues that deliberative decision-making allows participants to recognize good reasons for the brought in arguments, which leads to an outcome accepted as legitimate. Cohen (1996, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) also tries to approach the substantive dimension of deliberatively reached decisions in stating that "reasonable pluralism" combined with a "deliberative conception of justification" is "compatible with a substantive account of democracy, whose substance - captured in principles of deliberative inclusion, the common good, and participation - includes values of equality and liberty" (p. 113). Gambetta (1998, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) goes even further by arguing that even if we assume that many arguments based on the common good within a political debate are hypocritical, the contribution of such arguments can create an atmosphere where discussants are more ready to compromise. This could in turn enable decisions which enhance the common good. In line with Gambetta, Elster (1998) contends that in public debates, actors who try to justify their arguments on the grounds of self-interest will naturally adopt more reasonable positions over time, which they previously only referred to rhetorically. This phenomenon is named the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" (p. 111).

As touched upon in the first part of this thesis (c.f. section 1.4.), however, there are also authors who address the substantive outcome of deliberation more explicitly. Most prominently, there are Fishkin (2011), Ross (2011) and Nino (1996) who argue that deliberation will result in morally superior decision outcomes. As reasons they cite the potential of deliberation to generate ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality, and knowledge, as well as respect for evidence-based reasoning rather than opinion.

Such view points, however, are contested by Young (1996, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) who holds that due to social differences between various groups within a society, a common discursive ground as proposed by normatively ideal concepts of democracy cannot be expected. Thus, although deliberation may foster arguments based on a common good, the eventual output will be biased towards more privileged societal groups, because the deliberative procedure promotes and favors their speech culture. In a similar vein, Chen-Bo Zhong (2011) argues that deliberative decision-making may even *increase* unethical behavior and *reduce* altruistic motives because moral judgments are often made intuitively. An even extremer position take Naftulin, Ware and Donnelly (1973), stating that during a speech it is not so much the actual spoken content (10%) that influences the audience, but rather the lecturer's bearing (50%) and the way he conveys the message (40%).

2.3.3. Specific research questions

In light of both the earlier delimitation of the application of deliberation to real world politics and the vague and conflicting theoretical opinions regarding the effect of deliberation on decision outcomes, the following part of the thesis will exhibit an explorative character. Therefore, instead of deducing accurate causal hypotheses, I will formulate four specific research questions (SRQ). They are, based on the theoretical explication above, the following:

(SRQ1) Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the formal dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse approach consensus?

(SRQ2) Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the substantive dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse result in superior decision outcomes?

(SRQ3) Is there an inherent connection between the formal and substantive dimensions of a decision? I.e. are decisions reached by consensus superior in their substantive outcome and vice versa?

(SRQ4) Which elements of the DQI, isolated or in combination with each other, do have a significant effect on one or both of the two dimensions of a decision? Which ones do not show any effect neither on the formal nor on the substantive decision outcome?

The investigation of these specific research questions will be conducted in the order of their presentation above. Moreover, the possibility to actually examine SRQ3 and SRQ4 depends on the obtained results for SRQ1 and SRQ2. Thus, if in the case applied deliberation will not show any effect neither on the substantive nor on the formal dimension of a decision, SRQ3 and SRQ4 will not be investigated further.

2.4. Measuring political deliberation

2.4.1. Theoretical fundament for the Discourse Quality Index (DQI)

The DQI for measuring political deliberation developed in this paper mainly draws on the one developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003), which means that the core theoretical background is provided by Habermasian discourse ethics. However, the DQI provided by Steenbergen et al. has been modified and extended so as to better fit with this thesis' research purpose. In what follows, there will be an elaboration on the theoretical fundament of the subsequently developed DQI.²⁷

According to Habermas and other scholars, discourse ethics should ideally follow several rules. First, there should be open participation or "symmetrical

²⁷ It is important to point out that Habermasian discourse ethics describes an "ideal" discourse. Steenbergen et al. (2003) note: "Habermas realizes that real political debates are usually far away from the ideal type, which should therefore be seen as the end of a discourse continuum that most likely will never be fully reached. The empirical question then is how far away specific political debates are from the ideal type, and this is what the DQI intends to measure" (p. 44).

communication" (Spörndl, 2003, p. 8): Every competent individual should be allowed to take part in the discourse, which includes expressing and yielding his or her own desires, arguments and beliefs free from internal or external coercion. The ideal of open participation, however, will not be included in the DQI here because it does not show enough variance in the selected case and hence is not considered meaningful for analyzing the quality of a debate.²⁸

Second, meaningful discourse requires justification of arguments. This means that arguments should be introduced and assessed in an orderly exchange of information and reasons between parties. Moreover, the closer the connection between premises and conclusions, the more coherent the argument is and the more useful it will be for deliberation. Indeed, such connections do not always have to be mentioned explicitly, but speakers may even leave out entire parts of the argument when it is so obvious that its reference would be worthless (this is referred to as "economies of speech"; Steenbergen et al., 2003, p. 25).

Third, discourse actors should reflect upon the common good. This means that generally, the discourse should exhibit a notion of selflessness or even altruism, i.e. speakers should be considerate towards others or a greater community. In my case more specifically, this means that participants should e.g. consider impacts of climate change in a global or at least a European context. Obviously, references to the common good can be expressed in various manners, such as e.g. in utilitarian terms or by invoking the difference principle.²⁹

Fourth, the discourse should be marked by a respectful atmosphere. The dimension of respect exhibits three subcategories. First, participants should show respect towards different societal groups, i.e. they should recognize their differing needs. Second, speakers should respect various brought in demands, at least as long as they can "intersubjectively be seen as justified" (Steenbergen et al., 2003, p. 26). Third,

²⁸ This indicator e.g. could have been operationalized in the following way: 0 designating the interruption of a speaker and 1 meaning the participant was able to speak freely; however, since there is no or only very limited variance in the case applied here (i.e. every or almost every speaker is able to speak freely), it is not considered necessary to include it as an indicator in the DQI. See also section "Operationalization" for details on how to construct an index.

²⁹ The difference principle means that inequalities are acceptable only if they attach to positions open to all (equal opportunity) and still benefit the members worst-off in society. This principle was put forward by John Rawls, and first elaborated in his "A Theory of Justice" (1971), to conceptualize the requirements of social justice. He argued that it would be embraced by rational individuals asked to provide a standard of justice for their society, being subjected to a "veil of ignorance", i.e. not knowing their particular abilities and relative positions within society. Although Rawls varied the precise formulation of the principles of justice in his later work, the key notion remains that stated above.

participants should show respect towards counterarguments. Generally, the respect dimension is seen as a prerequisite for serious listening and the genuine weighing of different alternatives, which are both essential conditions for significant deliberation.

The fifth rule is what Steenbergen et al. call "constructive politics". It refers to the normative ideal that deliberation should end in a rationally motivated consensus. Although consensus is often not possible in real world politics, participants should at least try to arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise, because this is the only way in which the principle of universalism can be upheld.

Last but not least, an ideal discourse requires authenticity, which means the absence of deceptive argumentation. Translated into the world of politics, that is arguments and preferences should be sincere rather than strategic in order for open and honest deliberation to unfold. However, such an understanding of authenticity requires knowledge about a person's true intentions which is arguably difficult to measure. Therefore, the last Habermasian rule of discourse ethics will not be included here.

In addition to the principles of Habermasian discourse ethics, the DQI developed below draws on two other theoretical sources. First, it takes advantage of the recent theoretical update in the context of measuring political deliberation. Bächtiger, Shikano, Pedrini and Ryser (2011) hold that there should be discursive engagement, i.e. participants in a debate should hear or read, internalize and respond, before a debate can be judged appropriately deliberative. Although it could be argued that this so called principle of "interactivity" is already considered through the Habermasian principle of "respect", this is not the case, as will be shown below (c.f. footnote no. 35). This indicator has been largely neglected in previous measurements which therefore have not been able to adequately grasp patterns of reciprocity in deliberation.³⁰

Second, the DQI incorporates the extent to which individual speakers and, on an aggregated level, whole debates, exhibit foresight knowledge. It is now widely acknowledged that "thinking, debating, and shaping the future" (Schomberg, Pereira & Funtowicz, 2005, p. 5)³¹ is more and more essential today because of the increased speed of scientific and technological developments and the increasingly complex

³⁰ C.f. Spörndli (2003) or Tamvaki and Lord (2011).

³¹ A rough definition of "foresight" according to Schomberg et al. (2005).

interrelationship between science, technology, and society.³² According to Schomberg et al. (2005) foresight knowledge allows one to explore possible futures and develop visions on such futures as well as to identify impacts on society and implications for policy and particular stakeholders and sectors of society. Moreover, it is useful to guide and support the policy making process, thereby possibly improving governance. When discussing foresight knowledge, particular argumentation forms are predominant, which can be subsumed under the term "plausibility claims". Such forms include analogies which make possible future threats and opportunities plausible by analogy of known threats or opportunities. Moreover, counterfactual arguments are also considered a form of foresight knowledge, and are often deployed by addressing "what if" questions. Schomberg et al. write: "Analogies or counterfactuals, do not allow for predictions but produce prospective plausibility claims, which, however, do have sufficient power to allow us to explore the future on the basis of consolidated knowledge from known areas . . . However, these plausibility claims mutually lack any falsificationary power and merely illustrate the argument . . . These plausibility claims either loose substance or become more persuasive, once empirical research seems to support particular paradigms based on those plausibility claims" (p. 13). Foresight knowledge thus distinguishes itself from scientific knowledge³³ and instead should be understood as a form of strategic knowledge necessary for agenda setting, opinion formation, vision development, and problem solving. Foresight knowledge is therefore more likely to be deployed *during* the actual decision-making process rather than in post-decision moments such as policy evaluation.

2.4.2. Discourse Quality (Independent Variable)

Based on the theoretical background outlined above, I have developed a DQI with 6 indicators, which will constitute the *independent* variable in the case analysis. Below, its operationalization will be discussed, including one example for each indicator which has been awarded the highest score.

³² c.f. Rosa (2003, 2012).

³³ For an analytical distinction, see Schomberg et al. (2005, p. 14).

Unit of analysis

For the building of the DQI, the unit of analysis is a single speech, i.e. "the public discourse by a particular individual delivered at a particular point in a debate" (Steenbergen et al., 2003, p. 27). Hence, for analytical purposes, debates are broken down into single speech acts. Thereby, multiple speeches delivered by a single individual will be considered separately. Moreover, if an individual is interrupted the interruption itself is also regarded as a speech. However, speeches are only considered relevant (i.e. will only be analyzed) if they contain a demand or proposal on what decision should and should not be made. This focus is derived from the viewpoint that speeches which include demands and proposals constitute the heart of deliberation (c.f. Spörndli, 2003).

Indicators

Level of Justification

This indicator refers to the nature of justification of demands. The completeness of justification is measured in terms of the conclusions that are made.

(0) no justification: the speaker does not give any reason for his demand.

(2) inferior justification: here the speaker gives one reason for his demand, but he does not make any connection between the two. This also applies if a conclusion is solely supported with illustrations.

(4) qualified justification: the speaker gives a reason for his demand and makes a clear linkage between the two.

(6) sophisticated justification: this applies to situations where at least two complete justifications are given, i.e. two reasons for the same demand or two different demands.

Example:

*"I would particularly like to emphasise the issue of mutual recognition, a principle recommended by the Commission to improve the way the internal market works. The practical difficulties posed by applying this principle should be highlighted. **The***

consumer has no knowledge whatsoever of foreign law (first reason), just as a judge in a national court has difficulty when it comes to applying the legal rules of one country other than his own. Secondly, there is a risk that mutual recognition will lead to deregulation that is harmful to both economic operators as well as consumers (second reason). Operators that are put at a disadvantage by this principle will evidently be tempted to put pressure upon their government to align their national legislation with legislation that is more liberal. This will therefore lead to a downward alignment of consumer policy throughout the European Union. That is why I proposed replacing this principle (complete inference), which, incidentally, has been worded in an extremely vague manner in the proposal for a regulation, with a formula which is, in fact, that used in the established case law of the European Court of Justice." (Béatrice Patrie, French Member of the European Parliament)

Content of Justification

This indicator measures whether the speech invokes particular group interests, the common good, or both. In case of the latter, the balance between group interests and the common good will be assessed and either the lowest or the highest rating will be given. Common good argumentations in both utilitarian terms and with the difference principle are regarded as equally valuable.

(0) Explicit statement concerning group interests: the lowest rating is given if explicit references are made to group interests, thereby ignoring or degrading the common good.

(3) Neutral statement: There are no explicit connections made neither to group interests nor the common good.

(6) Explicit statement concerning the common good: an explicit justification is made in terms of the common good.

Example:

*"In the communication, the strategic objectives – and the related measures – are set out quite clearly. In the articles there are only vague allusions. Sometimes something has been lost altogether, **in the case of noise, for example, which in***

my opinion is a key environmental factor for human health (explicit utilitarian justification in terms of the common good)." (Bernd Lange, German Member of the European Parliament)

Respect

Although Habermasian discourse ethics distinguishes three levels of respect, this indicator is limited to the analysis of discursive counterarguments and respect towards different societal groups, because respect for "various brought in demands" can be expected to be covered by the respect for discursive counterarguments. This indicator is operationalized as follows:

(0) Counterarguments or specific societal groups are ignored or degraded: Speakers ignore brought up counterarguments in their speech or even make negative references to them and/or to specific societal groups.

(3) Counterarguments and/or specific societal groups are included in a neutral way: Counterarguments and/or specific societal groups are included in the speech but no positive or negative value judgment is made.

(6) Counterarguments and/or specific societal groups are included and explicitly valued: if counterarguments and/or societal groups are both degraded and explicitly valued within a single speech, their balance is assessed and the appropriate rating given.³⁴

Example:

*" . . . also, we must continue to demand equal treatment. Equal treatment for different generations, **for the non-young, for women, and especially for single mothers (explicit respect towards specific societal groups)**, and in this respect we naturally expect an understanding attitude from employers, as well, who must treat life-long education as a strategic interest."* (Magda Kósáné Kovács, Hungarian Member of the European Parliament)

³⁴ The highest score for the indicator "Respect" is not to be confused with the lowest score for the indicator "Content of Justification". While both refer to group interests in some way, the former does so from the perspective of the common good; the latter implicitly or explicitly ignores or degrades the common good.

Constructive Politics

This indicator measures the degree of consensus building with three categories.

(0) Positional politics: one's initial position is justified in contrast to potential mediating proposals. There is no attempt to compromise or build a consensus.

(3) Neutral politics: the initial position is justified without contrast to mediating proposals or by making a mediating or constructive proposal that belongs to another political agenda.

(6) Mediating politics: a mediating or constructive proposal is made that belongs to the current agenda.

Example:

*"Commissioner, I would like to point out that, in its proposed annex of polluting substances, **the Commission has not taken sufficient account of the fact that, due to the geological nature of the existing sub-soils, there are certain substances, such as chlorides and sulphates, that occur naturally in many of the European Union's aquifers (a constructive proposal in line with the debated topic is made)**, and that, from a scientific point of view, it is arguable whether these salts should even be classified as pollutants."* (María Sornosa Martínez, Spanish Member of the European Parliament)

Interactivity³⁵

(0) The speaker delivers her speech without any reference to brought in arguments.

(3) The speaker makes implicit or explicit reference to arguments that have been raised at a certain point during the debate, without explicitly addressing a specific participant.

(6) The speaker makes implicit or explicit reference to arguments of a specific participant.

³⁵ The correlation between the indicators "Respect" and "Interactivity" is $r=0.021$. Since this is a relatively weak correlation, a separate indicator for "Interactivity" is justified.

Example:

"I would also address the Spanish Member in this respect (explicit reference to an argument brought in previously): in the North of Europe, we often face floods, but also polluted water, from industry, whilst the problem facing the Members in the South is often related to transporting water over long distances, simply to supply drinking water or water for agriculture." (Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Dutch Member of the European Parliament)

Foresight Knowledge

(0) Foresight knowledge (in the form of an analogy or counterfactual) from another participant's speech is degraded.

(2) Speaker does not include any foresight knowledge (analogy or counterfactual) in the speech.

(4) Foresight knowledge (analogy or counterfactual) included in the speech, but without reference to the common good.

(6) Foresight knowledge (analogy or counterfactual) included in connection with the common good.

Example:

"We find clean water from the tap the most obvious thing in the world, but elsewhere thousands of children are dying every day as a result of waterborne diseases. What that clearly shows is that drinking water is first among all foodstuffs, and that we must, of course, protect our groundwater throughout Europe, so that we do not end up in future turning our own tap off and sentencing future generations to a similar fate (analogy in connection with a trans-temporal, utilitarian common good reference)." (Andreas Mölzer, German Member of the European Parliament)

After the operationalization of the independent variable "discourse quality", I will now turn to operationalizing the dependent variable, i.e. the formal and the substantive decision dimensions.

2.4.3. Scoring the formal and substantive decision dimensions (Dependent Variable)

The two dimensions of a decision will be operationalized as follows.

Formal dimension

The formal dimension is measured with the voting results at the end of each debate. Thereby, the difference between the votes for and against a specific proposal is regarded as the most convincing figure to express the degree of consensus or dissent within a debate. However, in order to account for the fluctuating polling numbers between each discussion, this difference is expressed as percentage of the total number of votes which have been casted after each debated, including the ones abstaining. Thus, the greater the value this figure exhibits, the greater the consensus reached after a debate.³⁶

Substantive dimension

The substantive decision dimension is operationalized in view of the question whether deliberation promotes ethically and morally superior decision outcomes. Two considerations are of crucial importance here. First, the moral or ethical content of political decisions is interpreted in terms of their contributions to the common good of a society. However, since questions surrounding the common good (e.g. what is actually "the" common good? how can it be best obtained? how can its attainment be measured?) are highly philosophical, the operationalization of the substantive dimension is rather pragmatic and heavily reduced in complexity. Related to this point is secondly that it is important to consider that this indicator does *not* intend to measure the absolute contribution of a final policy decision to a society's common good, but rather to assess the relative implications of a decision by comparing

³⁶ Accordingly, a value of 1 would show that a perfect consensus had been reached.

corresponding proposals before and after a given debate.³⁷ This approach is on the one hand required in order to isolate the influence of a debate's deliberative quality on a given decision, i.e. to exclude from measurement other institutional factors that are part of the whole decision-making process. On the other hand, such an approach allows to keep the focus on the actual research question and not to get lost in philosophical discussions about the implications of policy actions for a society's common good.

Accordingly, a score of 0 has been assigned for decisions with an adverse or a neutral *relative* effect on the common good; decisions that have a positive *relative* effect on the common good receive a score of 1.³⁸

2.4.4. Control Variables?

In line with Spörndli (2003) it would make sense to include control variables in the analysis, that is variables which are likely to have an effect on decision outcomes, but cannot be kept constant. In the case of the European Parliament, examples would include the length of single debates, the polarization of political positions prior to debates, or the number of Members of the European Parliament actually attending and participating in the debate. On the one hand, however, it would be very difficult to gather the required data in some of the cases. On the other hand, it makes sense to examine whether there is any correlation between deliberation and decision outcomes in the *first* place, and to investigate in a possible *second* step which control variables show an influence on the decision.

³⁷ Hence, the aim here is *not* to examine whether debates that exceed an illusory threshold of deliberative quality result in more consensual and superior decision outcomes, but whether debates that exhibit a relatively higher deliberative quality allow for relatively more consensual and superior decisions, measured as the difference between a given proposal before and after the corresponding debate.

³⁸ As an example: if, before the debate, a proposal on the regulation of the advertising of tobacco products still allowed for advertising in virtual media (given that advertising in physical media already had been banned; virtual media being e.g. television and physical media e.g. newspapers), but after the debate the proposal provided for a comprehensive ban, then the substantive decision outcome would be awarded a score of 1.

2.4.5. Operationalization

An index is a composite measure of variables, or a way of measuring a construct using more than one data item. There are four main steps in constructing an index: selecting possible items, investigating their empirical relationship, scoring the index and validating it (Babbie, 2001). For practical reasons, I will focus on the first three steps here.³⁹

Item Selection

When selecting the items or indicators which are going to make up the index, one has to pay attention to the *face validity* of the single indicators, i.e. the indicators should measure what one actually intends to measure. Moreover, when choosing the indicators one should pay attention to the degree of *variance* that each item exhibits. If for example one indicator was intended to measure the interactivity between different participants of a debate, but was formulated in such a way that everybody showed interactivity or nobody did (i.e. that one would obtain one of the two extreme outcomes), then the indicator would not show any variance and consequently could not be considered meaningful for analyzing the quality of a debate.

Examining the empirical relationships

The second step aims at examining the empirical relationships between the indicators one intends to construct the index with. That is, the indicators should fulfill the criteria of *unidimensionality*, which means that two indicators should possibly not overlap by partly or fully measuring the same object. Moreover, if there is an

³⁹ Generally, indices are tested for their internal and external validity (Babbie, 2010). Internal validity is tested through an item analysis, where one examines the extent to which the index is related to the individual items it comprises. However, since this index is based on the theoretical concept of Habermasian discourse ethics, an internal validation would mean to seriously question Habermas' theory, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, external validity, which is usually tested by comparison of scores for related questions (e.g. in the context of a survey), is not possible here because an object of comparison is lacking. In the context of the DQI, internal and external validation has been conducted by Steenbergen et al. (2003) by examining whether scholars agree in their judgment that a particular indicator is applicable and, if it is deemed applicable, whether scholars agree on the score that a speech should receive. Since I am conducting this study on my own, however, this approach for validation has to be dropped as well. Since I largely draw on Steenbergen et al.'s DQI, however, I rely on their judgment that the DQI is "indeed a reliable measure" (p. 37).

empirical relationship between two indicators, the score of one item can be used to approximate the score of another one before actually scoring it. If two indicators are empirically related to each other, it can be argued that both items reflect the same concept and can therefore be included in the same index.

Scoring the Index

After having finalized the various items, one assigns scores to them, thereby making a composite variable out of several indicators. Obviously, since the final scores should quantitatively support the analysis by revealing *relative* differences, it is recommended to choose the scores in a way that facilitates final comparison (e.g. by using scores that are multiples of each other; c.f. section 2.4.2.).

For the DQI developed here, face validity is assumed as given, because its closer examination would mean to question Habermasian discourse ethics, which is beyond the scope of this thesis (see also footnote no. 39). As the cross-table below (Table 1) shows, variance between the six qualitative indicators is also clearly given within the 456 analyzed speech acts: every indicator exhibits different degrees of various scores.

Level	Score	n	%
	0	44	9.7
	2	89	19.5
	4	177	38.8
	6	146	32
	Total	456	100

Content	Score	n	%
	0	0	0
	3	205	45
	6	251	55
	Total	456	100

Respect	Score	n	%
	0	1	0.2
	3	284	62.3
	6	171	37.5
	Total	456	100

Con. Pol.	Score	n	%
	0	51	11.2
	3	327	71.7
	6	78	17.1
	Total	456	100

Interact.	Score	n	%
	0	230	50.4
	3	90	19.8
	6	136	29.8

For. Kn.	Score	n	%
	0	0	0
	2	424	93
	4	27	5.9

					6	5	1.1
	Total	456	100		Total	456	100

Table 1: Variance of the discourse quality indicators (Note: Level=Level of Justification; Content=Content of Justification; Respect=Respect; Con. Pol.=Constructive Politics; Interact.=Interactivity; For. Kn.=Foresight Knowledge)

Moreover, a correlation matrix reveals that all of the indicators correlate relatively weakly and mostly positively.⁴⁰ Thus, while strict unidimensionality is not given, it is nevertheless approximated so that the indicators can be meaningfully combined in an index. This also means that it makes sense to construct a *single* index instead of several indices, which would have been necessary if the indicators did not correlate. Moreover, it makes sense to construct an *additive* index instead of a *weighted* index in this case, because on the one hand this considerably facilitates empirical interpretations in later steps. On the other hand, the very nature of the DQI would make it very difficult to argue for a relatively stronger weighting of one indicator compared to another.

In addition, although the DQI with its 6 components ("DQI6") is suited to trace the relation between deliberation and the *substantive* decision outcome, theoretical considerations suggest that the indicators "Content of justification" and "Foresight knowledge" will not show any effect on the *formal* decision outcome.⁴¹ In order to trace the relation between deliberation and the formal decision outcome, a DQI with 4 components ("DQI4") is therefore adequate.

⁴⁰ see Table 5 in appendix A.1.

⁴¹ Out of the 6 indicators, the level of justification, respect, constructive politics, and interactivity are decisive for the formal dimension of decisions. The higher those qualities, the more probable a consensus decision becomes (Spörndli, 2003).

3.1. Methodology

3.1.1. Scientific approach and research design

Assessment of political deliberation and its effects on policy outcomes is complex, as is the very concept of deliberative democracy itself. Since the thesis' second leading research question and purpose require an in-depth understanding of this complex issue, a combination of a qualitative and a quantitative lens has been deemed suitable through which to study the research question. Qualitative methods are distinguished by their hermeneutic approach, and thus focus on words, contexts and processes. Quantitative methods, however, are characterized by the systematic empirical investigation of social phenomena through, amongst others, statistical techniques. On the one hand, the qualitative methodological perspective corresponds well with the thesis' explorative ambitions (Schutt, 2011). On the other hand, the quantitative approach is necessary to assess the degree and nature of correlation between policy outcomes and corresponding preceding political debates (c.f. Spörndli, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2001).

To answer the second leading research question a deductive approach has been used where specific research questions (SRQ) have been derived from a theoretical discussion, which have subsequently been subjected to investigation by applying them to an empirical case study.⁴² The debates selected within the chosen context of analysis (see section 3.1.2. below) have been broken down into single speech acts, which constitute the principal unit of analysis. Speech acts are considered relevant if they contain arguments concerning the issue of debate. Speech acts have been scored according to their discourse quality (independent variable) and compared to the corresponding decision outcome (dependent variable). Since the scores for the independent variable are gathered through an intensive analysis of single speech acts, only a limited total number of debates could be included.⁴³ Because of this restriction, a so called "most similar systems design" (MSSD) has been used, also called

⁴² As noted above, the often vague and opposing theoretical arguments that make up the scholarly debate about the effects of deliberation on the two dimensions of a decision did not allow for a deduction of sharply formulated hypotheses. Moreover, since this study is rather exploratory in character, I have chosen to let the empirical part be guided by specific research questions instead.

⁴³ However, as the selection criteria for the debates exhibits a restrictive design, it would have been difficult to include more than the eventual number of debates in any case. See chapter 3.1.2. below for elaboration on the selection criteria for the debates.

"comparable cases strategy". According to Peters (1998), comparison is the closest substitute for experimentation in the general field of social research, which allows the researcher to draw careful generalizations. However, since institutional factors are likely to influence both discourse quality and the two dimensions of a decision (c.f. Foucault, 1991), the study had to be conducted in a single institutional context in order to factor out its influence on the research results. The MSSD is thus deployed to compare political institutions (in this case "institutionalized political debates") "that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others" (Steiner et al., 2001, p. 19).

In order to gain access to relevant empirical material I have chosen to conduct a case study of supranational parliamentary debates, where publicly accessible records and minutes have been used. George and Bennett (2005) argue that there are four primary advantages of case methods: "their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity" (p. 19). Additionally, a case study's focus lies on understanding and describing a process, which is consistent with the empirical research question of this thesis (Yin, 2012).

In order to assess the degree of correlation (Pearson's "r") between political debates and corresponding decision outcomes, *p*-values have been calculated. They indicate the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, given that it is true. Usually, the null hypothesis expresses the opposite formulation of the alternative hypothesis, which is what you actually intend to investigate. Here, the null hypothesis is therefore the opposite of the SRQs and can be formulated in the following general manner: "Political deliberation does not exhibit any effect on corresponding decision outcomes." Thereby, the significance level has been set to $\alpha=0.05$. Thus, the greater the *p*-value, the greater the probability of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis, given that the above null hypothesis is true (this is referred to as Type I error). This means that if the correlation between deliberation and decision outcomes shows a *p*-value greater than $\alpha=0.05$, the relation is considered statistically *insignificant*.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ It is usual to set the *p*-value to 0.05, 0.01 or even 0.001 (c.f. Weiss, 2007). Since this study exhibits an explorative character, I have decided to set the *p*-value to the more generous value of 0.05.

3.1.2. Case selection

When conducting a case study, the choice of the study object is crucial. One of the aspects considered when selecting the case was the institutional level of politics. Naturally, the stated purpose of this thesis only allowed for the selection of supranational bodies, rather than national or sub-national institutions. Another aspect considered was the nature of the political body. Here again, the research question itself made the choice of a legislative supranational body obvious, rather than a judicial or executive actor. Moreover, the supranational legislative body should exhibit characteristics that allowed, at least theoretically, for potential deliberation. In addition, that political body should actually have a say in the decision-making process, rather than simply constitute a passively involved, formal actor. A final consideration taken into account was that the political debates ideally should be well documented, as this would significantly increase the potential quality of the overall study.

With these criteria in mind, the choice of study object fell on the European Parliament as a *second-best option*.⁴⁵ The European Parliament is said to have deliberative potential (Ricard, 2009) and is generally considered a crucial actor in legislative processes of the European Union (c.f. Tsebelis, 1994).⁴⁶ However, only in certain decision-making procedures is it actually involved to a considerable degree. This leads us to the second part of the case selection: the selection of debates for analysis.

Here, one of the crucial aspects considered was the type of legislative process. It was important that the European Parliament actually has a say in the decision-making process rather than occupying a simple minor role. Furthermore, it was essential that the debates are publicly available (c.f. footnote no. 45) and that the debates themselves also take on a significant role within the selected type of decision-making procedure, from a theoretical as well as from a practical point of view. Moreover, the debates themselves should exhibit a certain minimum length and they should be centered around subjects which arguably could have a noticeable effect on the

⁴⁵ The initial and admittedly more suited aim has been to study debates from the European Conciliation Committee. This would have been a very suited study object for the following three reasons. First, the conciliation committee is by its very definition a political body with a high potential for deliberation, because it is composed of a selected number of Members from both the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union and is called into action if no agreement has been reached between the two bodies after the first two readings in Parliament. Second, it is limited in number of participants so that the principle of symmetrical communication can be well approximated. Third, since debates are confidential, public pressure is relatively lower. Moreover, participants are more likely to change opinions and preferences when debates are isolated from public. This third point, however, is also the reason why the conciliation committee could eventually not be selected as study object for this thesis; a corresponding request for records of conciliation committee debates has unfortunately been denied on the grounds that these debates are not accessible to the public (see appendix A.3. for the corresponding email exchange). Debates of the EU Parliament, however, are publicly available on the homepage of the European Union.

⁴⁶ The most valid point of objection against selecting EU Parliament plenary debates as a research object is the justified remark that a great deal of legislative work is already conducted prior to the plenary debates in subject-specific committees. Hence, possible amendments to Commission proposals are not a result of plenary deliberation, but of preparatory work by responsible committees. Moreover, it is very rare that all the Members of the European Parliament are present at plenary debates, but that they often vote according to what affiliated party members recommend them to vote. Although these remarks cannot be denied, I argue that deliberation can still show effect on the substantive decision outcome even if proposal amendments are not introduced during the debates themselves. In this case, deliberation would influence *which amendments actually are adopted* by parliament. Concerning the effect of deliberation on the formal outcome, it is important to recognize that Members of the European Parliament generally vote according to transnational party lines rather than purely national ones. Therefore, if a deliberative plenary debate affects the opinion of a participating Member, it is also likely to affect the preference of his colleague if he usually votes according to his recommendations, even if he does not belong to the same or an affiliated national party. Or in the words of Schmidt (2005): " . . . [M]embers of the European Parliament speak for the general good, rather than as representatives of electoral majorities . . . " (p. 766).

common good.⁴⁷ Last but not least, the debates should be accompanied by a vote showing exact voting figures, rather than a simple show of hands.

With due regard to those criteria, the choice naturally fell on the ordinary legislative decision-making procedure, where the European parliament occupies the strongest role compared to other types of decision-making processes.⁴⁸ Moreover, the choice of the type of debate fell on plenary debates, because they involve members not only from the Parliament, but also from the Commission and the Council of the European Union. The involvement of different institutional actors can arguably be expected to have a positive influence on the liveliness of a debate (which increases the chance that issues are actually discussed and not merely signed off). What is more, plenary debates are considered the "high point" of European Parliament legislative activity.⁴⁹ Debates themselves, then, have been chosen in such a way that there actually has been a modification of the initial Commission proposal. This would make sure that Parliament did not simply sign off the initially proposed legislative act. The debate length has been set to a minimum of 10 pages, following the example of Spörndli (2003).

Given the combined restrictive impact of these selection criteria, out of all publicly available plenary debate records (time frame between 1999 and 2012) a mere 18 debates have been considered suitable for analysis. Within these 18 debates, a total of 456 speech acts are deemed relevant in that they actually contribute to the subject at hand.⁵⁰

3.1.3. Developing the theoretical framework

Although the theoretical discussions on deliberative democracy are relatively emergent, it has been possible to draw on the work of Steenbergen et al. (2003) for the measurement and assessment of political deliberation. However, the developed DQI is amended and extended by adjusting Steenbergen et al.'s indicators to fit the

⁴⁷ As an example: a debate on the regulation of tobacco advertising in virtual and physical media would thus be better suited than a debate on the preservation of common cultural heritages.

⁴⁸ c.f. <http://europa.eu>

⁴⁹ www.europarl.europa.eu

⁵⁰ Although slightly fewer in the number of actual debates, this study is thus significantly more comprehensive in terms of speech acts than previous comparable studies; see Spörndli (2003) for details.

present research focus, thereby reverting to recent academic insights about additional factors that are likely to influence deliberation and to the connection between foresight knowledge and deliberation. The review of previous research (c.f. section 2.3.) was conducted in order to describe the effects of deliberation on policy outcomes from a theoretical perspective, and to subsequently deduce "specific research questions" which could be subject to exploratory empirical investigation. By trying to identify a knowledge gap regarding previous academic research on the effects of deliberation on policy outcomes, there was also an ambition to confirm the thesis' potential academic contribution through the conducted literature review.

3.1.4. Material and data sources

Given the nature of the present study and research question, the collection of primary data is deemed both a necessary and sufficient approach to ensure stringent academic quality. Thereby, publicly available, translated plenary debates have been collected in written form from the official website of the European Parliament. A list of the political debates and their respective subjects can be found below.

Debate Topic⁵¹	Date	Length (in pages)
<i>Community policy in the field of water</i>	15 February 2000	21
<i>Incineration of waste</i>	14 March 2000	12
<i>Community environment action programme</i>	30 May 2001	11
<i>Sales promotions in the internal market</i>	03 September 2002	14
<i>Tobacco sponsorship and advertising</i>	18 November 2002	14
<i>Ecopoint system in Austria in 2004</i>	11 February 2003	12
<i>DAPHNE II⁵²</i>	02 September 2003	12
<i>Protection of Groundwater against pollution</i>	28 April 2005	15

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⁵¹ In some cases, there are two debates on the same topic, but for different proposals. Then, the debates have been named [Debate Topic] **1** or [Debate Topic] **2** respectively.

⁵² A program to combat violence against children, adolescents, and women.

<i>Organisation of working time 1</i>	10 May 2005	18
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 1</i>	7 July 2005	13
<i>Lifelong learning</i>	24 October 2005	10
<i>Protection of Groundwater against pollution 2</i>	12 June 2006	15
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 2</i>	23 October 2006	10
<i>Organisation of working time 2</i>	15 December 2008	22
<i>Food distribution to the most deprived persons in the community</i>	26 March 2009	14
<i>Placing on the market and use of biocidal products</i>	21 September 2010	12
<i>Waste electrical and electronic equipment</i>	3 February 2011	12
<i>Granting and withdrawing international protection</i>	04 April 2011	10

Table 2: List of European Parliament plenary debates selected for analysis

3.1.5. Quality of research design

A disadvantage of single case studies is that they can suffer from limited external validity due to their idiosyncratic focus (Yin & Heald, 1975). There is also a "growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within case analysis and cross-case comparisons" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 18). Generalization of research findings from a single case study can therefore be problematic. Despite this, the opportunity of adding further cases to perform a comparative case study has been declined. The main reason for this decision has been to keep institutional factors constant, i.e. to exclude the influence of institutional characteristics on the formal and substantive outcome of a political debate. This way, the nature of the correlation between deliberation and policy outcome can be defined more narrowly. Furthermore, I argue that the single case method's strength in generation of specific research questions and in analysis of complex causality more than offset this limitation.

Reflecting on these methodological choices, there are alternative methods and research designs that could have been adequate. A slightly more quantitative approach could have enabled an integrated analysis of the deliberative assessments in several parliamentary bodies by collecting a larger sample of primary data. For instance, debates of parliamentary bodies across various institutional levels, e.g. between supranational and national forums, and on larger samples of differing policy fields, could have been performed. Through these data increases, along with the opportunity to analyze data from several political bodies across various policy fields, these measures could also have increased the thesis' external validity, i.e. facilitating generalization of its conclusions. However, given the limited previous research within the field; the complexity of the studied phenomena and the importance of in-depth analysis to adequately assess the quality of political deliberation; the explorative ambition of this thesis; the personal limitations in the knowledge of languages; as well as the limited space and time frame; the choice was made to disregard these alternative research designs.

4.1. Empirical Results

4.1.1. Assessing speeches with the discourse quality indicators

Looking at aggregated scores of single debates, one quickly notices that a majority shows a relatively high value⁵³ (i.e. $\geq 50\%$ of the total of single speech acts within a debate) of both common-good argumentation and common-good argumentation in combination with at least one complete argumentative inference. What is more, debates are conducted in a rather respectful manner, with a mean value of 4.12 across all debates. In addition, with a few exceptions debates can be characterized as rather interactive, showing a mean value of 2.38 across all the debates. What is striking, however, are the values for "constructive politics" and "foresight knowledge" respectively. The mean value for "constructive politics" across all debates is 3.18, which means that although the Members of the European Parliament engage interactively, they do so in a rather neutral way, defending their own position while

⁵³ C.f. Spörndli (2003).

not denouncing opponents' arguments. Furthermore, the mean value for "foresight knowledge" across the debates (2.16) shows that it is applied very rarely during European plenary debates. By analogy with jury deliberations, one could state that European plenary debates are generally characterized by a "verdict-driven" rather than an "evidence-driven" deliberation style, where the former refers to a confrontational, pace-oriented debate and the latter to a deliberation in the genuine sense of the term.

Juxtaposing the individual discourse quality indicators against each other, one notices that there are no significant, crucial relationships between them. As an example, it cannot be said on the basis of the obtained results that the average length of speech acts within one debate would have an influence on this debate's overall DQI score. Neither can it be concluded that the percentage of complete argumentative common-good inferences would significantly influence the overall DQI score of a debate or that the more common-good inferences there have been, the more constructive arguments the debate exhibited.

4.1.2. The discourse quality's effect on the formal dimension of decisions

The cross-table below (see Table 3) shows that there is no eye-catching correlation between the quality of a debate in the European Parliament and the corresponding voting decision. The calculations confirm that the correlation is relatively weak for the DQI4 and subsequent formal decision outcomes ($r=0.29$) and that the correlation is consequently not statistically significant ($p=0.33$). Hence, there is a probability of 0.33 of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis ("Political deliberation does not exhibit any effect on corresponding decision outcomes"), given that it is true for the formal outcome. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the formal decision outcome because there is not enough evidence to state that the alternative hypothesis is true at the previously determined significance level $\alpha=0.05$. The same holds for the DQI6 and corresponding voting decisions. Here the values of the correlation and the significance are virtually the same, i.e. $r=0.30$ and $p=0.32$. The hypothesis that the

content of argumentation will not have any influence on the formal decision outcome is hence confirmed.⁵⁴

Debate Topic⁵⁵	Final DQ4	Formal Outcome
<i>Community environment action programme</i>	9.59	0.27
<i>Lifelong learning</i>	11.00	0.81
<i>Food distribution to the most deprived persons in the community</i>	11.60	0.63
<i>Granting and withdrawing international protection</i>	11.68	0.01
<i>Placing on the market and use of biocidal products</i>	13.18	0.81
<i>Sales promotions in the internal market</i>	13.50	0.33
<i>Waste electrical and electronic equipment</i>	13.56	0.85
<i>Ecopoint system in Austria in 2004</i>	13.60	0.66
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 1</i>	14.55	0.80
<i>Tobacco sponsorship and advertising</i>	14.73	0.19
<i>Organisation of working time</i>	14.92	0.13
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 2</i>	15.82	0.75
<i>DAPHNE II</i>	17.58	0.91

Table 3: Comparison of discourse quality and formal decision outcome (Note: Final DQ4= sum of the individual scores of the DQI4, adjusted for the total sum of speech acts within a debate)⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Foresight knowledge is included here.

⁵⁵ Table 3 shows only 13 debates, since 5 out of the 18 selected plenary debates have been closed by a simple show of hands.

⁵⁶ Ironically, this table thus contradicts Ricard (2009), which I have drawn on to argue that the European Parliament exhibits characteristics of a consensus-oriented political body.

Hence, SRQ1 ("Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the formal dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse approach consensus?") can be answered with *"No, deliberation does not have any effect on the formal dimension of a decision. Thus, it cannot be stated that debates which approach an "ideal" discourse approach consensus."*

4.1.3. The discourse quality's effect on the substantive dimension of decisions

The cross-table for the correlation between the discourse quality and the substantive decision outcome below (see Table 4) shows that the correlation is even weaker here and even slightly negative. For the DQI6 it amounts to $r=-0.076$ and the statistical significance accordingly is $p=0.76$. Hence, there is a probability of 0.76 of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis ("Political deliberation does not exhibit any effect on corresponding decision outcomes"), given that it is true for the substantive outcome. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the substantive decision outcome because there is not enough evidence to state that the alternative hypothesis is true at the previously determined significance level $\alpha=0.05$.

Debate Name	Final DQ6	Substantive Outcome
<i>Community environment action programme</i>	15.64706	1
<i>Lifelong learning</i>	16.31579	0
<i>Granting and withdrawing international protection</i>	17.73684	1
<i>Food distribution to the most deprived persons in the community</i>	19.06667	0
<i>Sales promotions in the internal market</i>	19.31818	0
<i>Community policy in the field of water</i>	19.77143	1
<i>Waste electrical and electronic equipment</i>	20.25926	1
<i>Placing on the market and use of biocidal products</i>	20.28571	1
<i>Ecopoint system in Austria in 2004</i>	20.35	0

<i>Organisation of working time 2</i>	20.36957	0
<i>Protection of Groundwater against pollution 1</i>	20.58621	0
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 1</i>	21.18182	0
<i>Incineration of waste</i>	21.47619	1
<i>Protection of Groundwater against pollution 2</i>	21.51852	0
<i>Tobacco sponsorship and advertising</i>	21.63636	1
<i>Organisation of working time 1</i>	22.05556	1
<i>Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) 2</i>	22.11765	1
<i>DAPHNE II</i>	25.21053	0

Table 4: Comparison of discourse quality and substantive decision outcome (Note: Final DQ6= sum of the individual scores of the DQI6, adjusted for the total sum of speech acts within a debate)

Thus, SRQ2 ("Does deliberation have a direct and independent effect on the substantive dimension of a decision? Hence, do debates that approach an "ideal" discourse result in superior decision outcomes?") can be answered with *"No, deliberation does not have any effect on the substantive dimension of a decision. Thus, it cannot be stated that debates with a relatively higher discourse quality result in superior decisions."*

It is thus not considered necessary or fruitful for the purpose of this thesis to investigate SRQ3 ("Is there an inherent connection between the formal and substantive dimensions of a decision? I.e. are decisions reached by consensus superior in their substantive outcome and vice versa?") and SRQ4 ("Which elements of the DQI, isolated or in combination with each other, do have a significant effect on one or both of the two dimensions of a decision? Which ones do not show any effect neither on the formal nor on the substantive decision outcome?") for the reasons stated under chapter 2.3.3.

Overall, this paper thus confirms the findings of Spörndli (2003) about the effect of deliberation on the substantive dimension of a decision. However, it could not substantiate his findings about the interplay between deliberation and the formal decision dimension, which he found to significantly and positively correlate (for details c.f. Spörndli, 2003). However, since these are the only two studies on this matter conducted so far, further research is needed to draw definite conclusions on the influence of political deliberation on decision outcomes.

5.1. Analysis

The following analytical section is divided into three parts. The first two discuss the theoretical arguments about the effect of deliberation on the formal and substantive decision outcomes from section 2.3. in light of the obtained empirical results. They thus relate to the theoretically established *causality* between deliberation and decisions. The third part is devoted to the discussion of the apparent lack of *correlation* between deliberation and decisions, as has been shown above. Thereby, the first two parts are deliberately kept shorter than the third, which is more yielding and acts as a major bridging to the final conclusions and discussion.

5.1.1. Effects on the formal decision outcome

The above empirical results on the effect of deliberation on the formal decision outcome contradict theorists advocating the extreme positions. On the one hand, Habermas' argument that an ideal deliberation leads to a genuine and rational consensus of all participants because of the "non-coercive coercion of the better argument" (Habermas, 1983, p. 132) cannot be substantiated. We can therefore neither assume that deliberation involves the transformation of the debate participants' preferences nor that deliberative decision-processes tend to deepen pre-existing dissents (Shapiro, 1999). The obtained results tend to speak for theorists like Dryzek and Braithwaite (2000), who hold that the concept of consensual decision-making is unrealistic in pluralistic societies and instead see ideal outcomes of

deliberations as agreements on a course of action reached through compromise, but for different reasons.

Overall, the analysis of single speech acts and the empirical results tend to speak for the delimitation of deliberation in real world politics outlined above, where I have written that "rather than transforming actors' preferences, deliberation can foster mutual understanding that allows participants to see what is at stake in a decision, although they might still disagree on the way to resolve an issue."

5.1.2. Effects on the substantive decision outcome

Regarding the substantive decision outcome, the empirical results tend to speak for Elster (1998), who contends that in public debates, actors who try to justify their arguments on the grounds of self-interest will naturally adopt more reasonable positions over time, which they previously only referred to rhetorically. On the grounds of the obtained results, it could be argued that there actually has been a so called "civilizing force of hypocrisy", because arguments obviously based on common good-averse group-interests have never been made during any of the debates (c.f. Table 6 in appendix A.2.). In order to substantiate the appearance of this phenomenon, however, one would have to show that there actually has been a foretime during which the analyzed speakers tended to ground their arguments more obviously in self-interest.

Hence, the results contradict theorists like Young (1996, as cited in Spörndli, 2003) who reason that due to social differences between various groups within a society, the eventual output will be biased towards more privileged societal groups, because the deliberative procedure promotes and favors their speech culture. As explained above, however, European Parliament plenary debates are conducted in a respectful manner, with a relatively high degree of common good argumentations. Similarly, the results seem to object Chen-Bo Zhong (2011), who argues that deliberative decision-making may even increase unethical behavior and reduce altruistic motives.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Although the correlation between plenary debates and substantive decision outcomes is even negative, it exhibits a very low value. The results is thus considered statistically insignificant and must not be considered as evidence for possible ethical dangers inherent in deliberative decision-making.

Overall, Schimmelfennig's (2001) conception of "rhetorical action" appears thus to be a helpful theoretical instrument to delimit the application of arguing in real world politics. The analysis of single speech acts and the empirical results tend to confirm that "actors do not engage in a mutual search for (ethical and moral) truths but instead intend to effectively justify their own standpoint and are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be persuaded by the better argument." However, the impression has not been given that rhetorical action might be outweighed. Hence, it could be argued that processes of argumentation will not help actors to learn about unforeseen consequences of their actions and to counter bounded rationality.

5.1.3. Discussion about the correlation between deliberation and decisions

There are three possible reasons why there seems to be no correlation between discourse quality and formal and substantive decision outcomes:

(1) *Measuring discursive quality with the DQI constructed and applied here, there actually is no correlation between the discourse quality and formal and substantive decision outcomes on a general level.*

This is obviously a point of concern which, however, needed to be substantiated by more and broader empirical studies in order to be able to discuss it fruitfully. The validity or falsification of empirical results cannot be discussed meaningfully after only two different empirical investigations.

(2) *Measuring discursive quality with the DQI constructed and applied here, there actually is no correlation between the two in case of the European Parliament.*

Apparently, the argument raised above concerning the validity or falsification of the obtained empirical results also applies here. However, I would like to discuss three legitimate points of concern in light of the obtained empirical results.

First, although plenary debates are generally considered the "high point" of the European Parliament's legislative activity, and the European Parliament's legislative power even seems to have been increased through the introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the question remains to what extent political preferences

actually are formed *during* the debates. Thus, there is not only the question how far the opinions and preferences of actually *present* and/or *participating* Members of the European Parliament are changed and modified as a consequence of the debate, but also to what degree a possibly changed opinion of a participating and/or present Member could and would influence the preferences of a colleague, who has not been present during the debate (neither physically nor virtually). The answer to the latter part of the question would most likely not only depend on the fact whether the physically present Member actually participated in the debate, but also on the party affiliation or membership of his or her colleague. This in turn would then possibly depend on the political orientation of the colleague, i.e. whether he or she is feeling obliged to act in line with national party ambitions or rather with the idea of an integrated Europe or even world community. This train of thought could be driven on for several lines, but the central question remains whether Members of the European Parliament build their opinions and preferences *during* or rather *before* plenary debates, or a combination of both. Thus, the apparent lack of correlation between the quality of debates of the European parliament and subsequent decision outcomes could also be attributed to plenary debates not being significantly preference or opinion forming. In their analysis of jury decision-making and deliberation, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) accordingly suggest that jury verdicts are determined by the distribution of verdict preferences *prior* to deliberation. As of this writing, however, no research appears to have been conducted on this subject in the context of the European Parliament.

Second, European plenary debates not being significantly preference or opinion forming could also imply that the general level of quality of such debates is too low for them to exhibit any effect on subsequent decision outcomes. This would in turn mean that the quality or style of deliberation has to reach a certain standard or to be of a certain kind in order to be able to influence decision outcomes. In this regard, Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying and Pryce (2000) write about jury decision-making: "It is clear from the voluminous literature on deliberation that much is going on during deliberation and many opportunities exist for outcome influence. One of the most likely factors mediating the influence of the initial distribution of verdict preferences and final verdicts is deliberation style" (p. 45). They suggest that an "evidence-driven" style (as opposed to a verdict-driven style characterized by a rapid description of factions) might allow members of the minority faction to identify

others in the jury who feel as they do and allow for a more spirited and maybe successful defense of their shared viewpoint. Combining findings from Devine et al. (2000) with the results obtained here, one could infer that European plenary debates could possibly gain significance in ordinary legislative procedures (i.e. increase the influence on substantive decision outcomes) by incorporating and making use of strategic knowledge to a greater extent. This would allow the general plenary debate style to switch from a currently rather "verdict-driven" style to a more "evidence-driven" style; which leads me directly to the third point.

Even if European plenary debates currently could be characterized as being evidence-driven, i.e. even if they made use of strategic knowledge to a greater extent, it would of course not automatically induce a sudden influence of corresponding debates on decision outcomes. What is crucial here is a cognitive intermediate step, i.e. the cognitive processing of the received information during the debates. Although heavily dependent on personal-individual characteristics such as information processing capabilities and the momentary state of mind, it can decisively be influenced through institutional mechanisms, one of the most prominent probably being "organizational learning" (c.f. Crossan, Lane & White, 1999; March & Olsen, 1975). Hence, the lack of correlation between deliberation and decision outcomes in the case of the European Parliament could also be attributed to its institutional environment, such as a lack of mechanisms promoting organizational learning. This idea will be discussed more narrowly in the below "Discussion" under section 6.2.2.

(3) *The DQI does not measure discursive qualities that actually do have a meaningful influence on the two dimensions of a decision; or positively formulated: the DQI measures discursive qualities that do not have any meaningful influence on decision outcomes.*

As mentioned and explained under 2.4.1., it is not possible to capture the authenticity of a speaker's arguments and stated intentions with the DQI. In light of the obtained empirical results, however, the authenticity of a speaker might have significant effects on the persuasive power of his arguments. As is often the case in the context of social interaction, powerful cognitive forces take place subliminally, without one being aware of them at all (c.f. Cialdini, 2006). To this category of not coverable factors of social interaction also belongs the extent to which people actually *feel* respected within a debate, which might have a significant influence on how people engage in a

debate and thus also on the likelihood that they change opinions and preferences as a consequence of the debate (King, 2009). In addition, although the DQI tries to assess the way people counter arguments from a linguistic perspective, it is not able to capture the degree to which participants focus on their opponents' underlying interests as opposed to their opponents' spoken substantial stance. In courses imparting negotiation skills, one of the most basic learning targets is to focus on the opponents' underlying (unstated) interests rather than his or her spoken stance, in order to increase the likelihood that a mutually acceptable agreement will be reached. However, the degree to which speakers actually are able to focus on opponents' underlying interests significantly depends on their knowledge of them prior to a debate, since actual interests are often hidden behind curtains of magniloquence. Naftulin et al. (1973) e.g. showed in a socio-psychological study, which came to be known under the name "Dr. Fox experiment", that there is a correlation between teacher expressiveness, content coverage, student evaluation and student achievement. More precisely, they were able to show that a well-presented lecture, even when containing wrong or contradicting information, could convey a sense of "having learnt something" amongst the listeners. Naftulin et al. concluded that what is actually registered by the audience is not so much dependent on the actual content of a speech but rather on the lecturer's bearing and the way he conveys the message. Thus, the apparent lack of correlation between the quality of debates of the European parliament and subsequent decision outcomes could be attributed to the DQI's lack of indicators which possibly exhibit a decisive influence on the formal and substantive dimension of a decision.

The following last part of this paper will summarize both the findings made in part one and the results obtained in part two, discuss their political implications and come up with suggestions for future research.

Part III

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Conclusions and Discussion

6.1. Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis has been to theoretically discuss and empirically investigate whether deliberation within supranational political organizations could serve as a means to legitimately produce superior political decision outcomes. This research focus grounded in the motivation to investigate means to counter the challenges modern Western democracies face on the national level, i.e. the incompatibility of national majoritarian decision-making with an increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries. In line with this purpose, I have first developed a normative concept of supranational political legitimacy, which has in a subsequent step been subjected to empirical examination. Thereby, the aim has been to investigate whether the theoretical assumptions made in developing the concept of legitimacy could also be defended from a practical point of view.

The two interrelated research questions that this thesis has sought to answer have thus been: *How can the legitimacy of supranational political organizations be theoretically reconceptualized?* and *What are the effects of deliberation on decisions in consensus-oriented political bodies?*

The concept of supranational political legitimacy developed in the first part brought forward the following argument: supranational political organizations can be considered legitimate if they, *amongst others*, live up to the following two conditions: the institutionalized decision-making process is characterized by deliberation at the crucial decision-making moments; and the subsequent decision outcome allows for preservation or enhancement of the common good. In the second part, rather than precipitately testing whether decision-making processes and outcomes of the European Union actually live up to these criteria, I trialed the theoretically assumed causality between deliberation and decision outcome through empirical investigation. For this purpose, I made recourse to an earlier developed measure of political deliberation by Steenbergen et al. (2003), the "Discourse Quality Index", and modified and extended it to fit the research question at hand. This instrument has then been applied to analyze a total of 18 plenary debates in the European Parliament. As the results indicate the theoretically assumed causality between discourse quality and decision outcome cannot be sustained in reality: neither does deliberation promote consensus decisions, nor does it foster superior decision

outcomes. Corresponding computations have shown that the correlation between deliberation and decision outcomes is too weak to be statistically significant. However, since practical deliberative democracy is a relatively emergent field of research which is yet to be explored, the results obtained here would have to be validated through additional studies in order to draw definite conclusions. As matters stand now, the effect of deliberation on decision outcomes is disputable, especially with regards to the formal dimension.

The findings obtained here, however, might not only be attributable to the fact that there *de facto* is no correlation between deliberation and decision outcomes - be it on a general or an European level specifically - but also to the very nature of the DQI itself. Thus, it is possible that the DQI measures discursive qualities that actually do not have any meaningful influence on decision outcomes. Or vice versa: the DQI does not measure discursive qualities that actually might have a meaningful influence on the two dimensions of a decision, such as a speaker's bearing or the extent to which people actually feel respected within a debate.

The empirical results obtained here, however, do *not* imply that the whole normative concept constructed in the first part does not hold, but rather that deliberation does not have to be a necessary constituent of throughput legitimacy in order for the supranational organization to be perceived legitimate. That is, deliberation cannot be considered the missing link between the input and output side of supranational political legitimacy. Hence, the question remains how to construct that link. Or to put it differently: How can the two challenges Western democracies face on the national level be pragmatically countered?

Based on the obtained findings, a corresponding answer will be sketched out in the following chapter, following the subsequent methodological discussion.

6.2. Discussion

6.2.1. Methodological concerns

In terms of the thesis' reliability concerns mostly relate to the nature and composition of the DQI and the actual status of European Parliament plenary debates within the

whole ordinary legislative procedure. For instance, an important question to ask is at which point of the whole legislative procedure the eventual voting behavior of Members of the European Parliament tends to be determined. In addition, the nature and composition of the DQI applied here invokes justified questions about its actual significance: does the DQI actually measure factors which will have an influence on the formal and substantive dimension of a decision? However, these are both issues whose reasonable answering would be subject of independent research studies. Additionally, the reasonability of instruments like the DQI can prudently be assumed as long as the correlations or causalities they inherently establish have not been explicitly falsified.⁵⁸ In general, it can therefore be argued that the thesis' conclusions are of satisfactory reliability.

Since it is difficult to conclusively judge measurements conducted with the DQI in terms of their internal validity, construct validity (face validity), or content validity,⁵⁹ Steenbergen et al. (2003) argue that the DQI's internal and external validity is dependent on the following two factors. First, researchers using the DQI should agree that a particular indicator is applicable to a given debate (internal validation). Second, if the indicators are considered applicable, researchers should agree on the scores that a speech should receive (external validation). In the context of the present paper, the DQI's internal and external validity could thus not be tested because I conducted this study independently. However, I argue that internal validity is nevertheless satisfactory because the DQI applied here largely corresponds to the one developed by Steenbergen et al., which has been found to be "indeed a reliable measure" (p. 37). Hence, although it is difficult to conclusively judge this study's findings in terms of their external validity, it is argued that the results are satisfactorily reliable, not least because the DQI's internal validity has been tested and approved by a third party.

As discussed in section 3.1.5., the single case study method does generally suffer from a slightly reduced external validity. Accordingly, the chosen method has generated explorative insights, but occasionally at the price of a reduced external validity. This causes some uncertainty as to whether the conclusions are valid to apply on the discourse on organizational theory in general and on deliberative democracy in particular. The decision to isolate the study to a supranational European setting -

⁵⁸ C.f. Popper (2005) on the falsifiability of statements, hypotheses and theories.

⁵⁹ C.f. footnote no. 39 for elaboration.

with, from an international perspective, unparalleled institutional characteristics (Hlavac, 2010) - also decreases the opportunity to generalize some of the conclusions to the supranational political sphere of other regions. I consequently argue that the reduced potential for generalization of the findings in this thesis arguably represents its most important limitation. In spite of these limitations, I argue that these methodological choices have been generally beneficial. They have allowed a more narrow approach, which has facilitated in-depth analysis.

6.2.2. Political Implications

The following discussion of the empirical results' political implications is divided into two sections. The first relates to the lacking effect of deliberation on the formal aspect of decisions, and the second consequently to the substantive dimension. While the former is dedicated to a little thought experiment, thus being highly speculative, the latter - although still notional - is more grounded in the actually obtained results.

Formal dimension of decisions

The starting point for the following remarks is the recognition that decisions reached through consensus generally enjoy a stronger backing, not only because relatively more people eventually agree, but also because consensus decisions require a lot of time and thus dedication, increasing not only aggregate but also *individual* support for the decision (c.f. Cialdini, 2006). As touched upon in parts one and two, a debate closed with a consensus voting in the European Parliament might thus enjoy stronger backing by the individual Member states. In contrast, when a plenary debate is closed with a highly controversial voting result, one could conclude that the decision will suffer from a relatively weaker backing by the individual Member states. From Table 3 in the empirical section we know that almost half of the analyzed debates are concluded with a disputed voting result. Based on the reasoning above, this would imply that the aggregate level of the individual Member states' European policy backing is rather mediocre. What would this mean for the national polities specifically and the European system as a whole? Developing the thought further, one could argue that a rather low national level of supranational policy backing leads to

ideas and discourses being conveyed in a distorted manner from the supranational to the national level. That is, national leaders would continue to project traditional visions of national democracy rather than to address the changes in the traditional workings of their democracies (Schmidt, 2005). This in turn would result in a low level of *perceived* legitimacy on the part of European citizens vis-à-vis the European Union as a whole. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what Schmidt (2005) names and shames. She writes:

"That they [national leaders] choose not to engage their publics in deliberation about the effects of Europeanization on the polity attests to the difficulties of doing so when the short-term political costs are high and the benefits low. But their failure to do so leaves them open to the censure of their publics for policies for which they are not fully responsible, over which they often have little control, and to which they may not even be politically committed. And this is the source of a national democratic deficit, which is more serious regarding questions of political legitimacy than the democratic deficit at the EU level" (p. 761).

Turning back to the beginning of this passage, one can infer that fostering consensus decision-making in the European Parliament in particular or on the European level in general could be an important step to improve the perceived legitimacy of the European Union, thereby possibly alleviating criticisms that lament its "democratic deficit" (c.f. Schmidt, 2013). As indicated in the conclusion above, however, it is still unclear whether political deliberation could be a means to foster consensus decision-making. Since the results of this study speak rather against it, the following section will, *inter alia*, discuss other means to foster consensus in and the perceived legitimacy of supranational political organizations.

Substantive dimension of decisions

The results obtained in this study raise questions about the functions of language in general and the function of parliamentary debates in particular. According to Jakobson (1960), there are six functions of language: a referential, an expressive, a conative, a poetic, a phatic, and a metalingual function. Out of these, the conative is

arguably the most essential one in the context of (political) debates.⁶⁰ At least from a theoretical point of view, the main goal of a debate participant is to defend her view point vis-à-vis the audience and to persuade potential opponents with her argumentation (Hoppmann, 2011). From a normative perspective, the aim of a (political) debate is thus to allow for the interaction and aggregation of individual preferences in such a way that the subsequent decision outcome preserves or enhances the common good of the ones involved in and affected by the debate, assuming that the goal of individual speakers is to maximize the common good.⁶¹

Obviously, it is difficult to translate this line of argumentation directly into the legislative decision-making process of representative democracies, because a parliamentary debate is by far not the only factor contributing to an eventual policy decision. Also, it is difficult to generalize the obtained findings because of the single-case focus and the unique institutional characteristics of the European Union. However, the results obtained here allow one to question the actual value of parliamentary debates as institution within the legislative decision-making process. If parliamentary debates themselves apparently do not exercise any influence neither on the formal nor on the substantive decision outcome, what is its actual contribution to the whole legislative process? Or put differently: what is the value of sustaining something in reality that does not live up to its demands in any normative sense?

Although speculative and also provoking, one could argue in the light of the obtained findings that parliamentary debates as an institution should be abolished. However, the question is not only why such an institution should be preserved under the given circumstances, but also what could be gained from its abolition. The findings of this paper allow for the reasonable speculation - given that the DQI is a reliable instrument for measuring the effect of a debate's deliberative quality on the corresponding decision outcome - that a great deal of the parliamentary work is already done *before* the actual debate, i.e. that Members of Parliament determine their opinions and preferences before the debate and that the debate itself does therefore not exhibit any significant influence on the decision outcome. According to my argument developed in the first part, the abolishment of the European Parliament plenary debate could thus even be justified from the point of view of legitimacy,

⁶⁰ The conative function of language means that it is able to engage the addressee directly, e.g. through vocatives and imperatives. For elaboration on the six functions of language, c.f. Jakobson (1960).

⁶¹ c.f. Rousseau's "The Social Contract", 1762.

because deliberation can apparently not be considered the missing link between the input and output side of supranational legitimacy as argued earlier. This is not to say that the European Union's output legitimacy or even throughput legitimacy can generally not be defended, but rather that deliberative concepts of supranational legitimacy cannot any longer be legitimized on the ground that deliberation promotes superior outputs.

Assuming that parliamentary debates as an institution can hence not bring any pragmatic value to the legislative decision-making process, a crucial added value that could be created through its abolishment would be *time*. Although this argument might appear obvious, the temporal factor is a theoretically widely neglected precondition of democratic politics. Although a few scholars have occasionally addressed this topic before,⁶² Hartmut Rosa was the first to comprehensively conceptualize the temporal preconditions of modern democratic politics with his habilitation treatise in 2004.⁶³ Although his dissertation amounts to an encompassing theory of social criticism, his core argument relating to the temporal preconditions of democratic politics can be summarized as follows: through, amongst others, technological developments, modern societies witness what he calls the "social acceleration of time". This phenomenon manifests itself e.g. in an increased pace of the everyday life, i.e. one is required to do more and more in less and less time. However, since especially democratic politics needs time (the discussion and weighting of various issues necessarily occupies much time), we are experiencing the increasing desynchronization of relatively slower spheres such as the political realm and relatively faster spheres such as the technological realm. Consequently, decision-making is relocated to other, faster arenas (e.g. the executive) and democratic politics shifts to "muddling through",⁶⁴ which in turn implies that political legitimacy is undermined and the problem-solving capacity of democratic institutions is severely hampered.⁶⁵ Since he does not see any possibility to slow down the increasing

⁶² The most prominent examples are Scheuerman (2004), Virilio (1977), and Wolin (1996).

⁶³ It has been published by Suhrkamp in 2005, under the title "Beschleunigung: Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen der Moderne".

⁶⁴ This term has been coined by Charles Lindblom (1959) to describe the incrementalism inherent in policy-making processes.

⁶⁵ This argument is also to be found in literature on organizational theory. Brunsson (1985, 1989) e.g. holds that political organizations have a diminished ability to take efficient action, but a better chance of survival, compared to private organizations.

acceleration of social life, Rosa's prognosis is that democracy will eventually fall victim to the forces of speed.⁶⁶

In the light of these remarks, the abolishment of parliamentary debates as an institution could probably pave the way for faster and maybe even improved decision-making at the supranational and also the national level. This would also correspond to Lieberherr's (2013) second point of throughput legitimacy (c.f. section 1.5.): on the one hand, the abolishment of supranational parliamentary debates would allow for increased efficiency (i.e. cost-utility) of national or supranational decision-making procedures. On the other hand, assuming that everything else within political decision-making processes remains equal, the abolishment of parliamentary debates might also increase internal political commitment. Since the whole process is allocated to fewer decision-making moments, the dedication of each actor would have to increase in order to reach a qualitatively equivalent decision outcome. This, in turn, could be a promising starting point for the promotion of consensus decision-making on the supranational level. Hence, while supranational political deliberation cannot be considered a fruitful measure to counter the increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries which modern Western democracies are confronted with on the national level, the systematic cut-back of "idling" political institutions could pave the way not only for improved, but also for accelerated decision-making, thereby possibly promoting the perceived legitimacy of political organizations.

Paradoxically, however, the obtained results also speak for a diametrically opposed argument to the one just presented. Although it can be argued, with the concept of supranational legitimacy developed in the first part and in light of the received findings, that supranational decision-making processes should be accelerated through abolishment of parliamentary debates, it is not necessarily the only conclusion. First of all, it is essential to recall that I am not considering "supranational deliberation" as the only means constituting throughput legitimacy. Second, neither have I been arguing that deliberation would be the only way to achieve common good-oriented decision outcomes; rather, it was the very aim of this thesis to figure out whether it could be *a* possible means. Hence, although it can be

⁶⁶ Although Rosa's approach to a theory of social criticism has been groundbreaking, his conclusion is thus similar to the ones reached by many other social theorists, the most prominent probably being the implications of Colin Crouch's (2004) concept of Post Democracy. His concept denotes a polity conducted by democratic rules, but whose application is progressively limited. For further information c.f. Crouch (2004).

argued that (supranational) parliamentary debates should be abolished because they apparently do not exhibit any effect on subsequent decision outcomes, it does not mean that they could not be preserved: the findings do not indicate a deterioration of decision outcomes as a consequence of preceding deliberation.

Drawing on Brunsson's (1989) argumentation about organizational legitimacy, one can actually find compelling reasons *for* the preservation of national and supranational parliamentary debates. Brunsson asserts that inconsistent social demands and norms require especially political organizations to speak one thing, but do another. That is, they have to present themselves to their environment in a way that is inconsistent with the realities of internal operation and action. This "hypocrisy" addresses the "demands for rationality, decency and fairness, while also efficiently generating coordinated action" (p. 7). Similarly, Meyer and Rowan (1977) state: "Institutional rules function as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects. Organizations whose structures become isomorphic with the myths of the institutional environment . . . decrease internal coordination and control in order to maintain legitimacy" (p. 340). Translated into this thesis' research results, this means that although parliamentary debates seem to lack any pragmatic value, they should be preserved in order to address the external environment's (i.e. the national citizens') inconsistent demands for rational and fair decision-making procedures. Thus, supranational parliamentary debates, although possibly "idling", would have to be preserved in order for the organization to reflect a rational decision-making process and thus to be perceived as legitimate.

However, can this argument still be supported if the external environment stops demanding "rationality, decency and fairness" and instead starts longing for efficient and coordinated action? How should be responded if the external environment gets tired of "hypocritical" (political) organizations telling "myths"? As stated in the very beginning of this thesis, results of the European Social Survey (2008) point to a growing public dissatisfaction with fundamental institutions of parliamentary democracy, i.e. with parties, parliaments and governments. In contrast, non-majoritarian organizations not directly involved in democratic decision-making processes (e.g. central banks or constitutional courts) are held in distinctively higher esteem than democratic core institutions. Again, this objection could be used to underpin the argument for the abolishment of supranational parliamentary debates -

but it also allows one to rethink Brunsson's (1989) and Meyer and Rowan's (1977) remarks. Obviously, such survey results indicate a growing preference for action over "hypocritical storytelling" and thus could also speak for enhancing the pragmatic value of parliamentary debates. As indicated in section 5.1.3., the findings of this paper allow for the interpretation that the European Parliament could benefit from promoting organizational learning - understood as the mutual learning between Members of the European Parliament (c.f. March, 1991) - in the context of its plenary debates. Organizational learning would thus be a process which leads - to different degrees - to a modification of the Parliamentary knowledge base. Hence, the pragmatic value of European plenary debates could be fostered through the development of an integrated understanding of problems and solutions within the European Parliament (Malek, 2001). Based on Antal and Sobczak (2004), one could also advance the argument that European parliamentary learning is not underdeveloped in general, but only the kinds of learning which organizations have to become skilled at in order to tackle transnational political issues. Among the most important ones they name single loop (improving on existing way of doing things), double loop (learning how to do things differently) and deuterio-learning (the ability to learn how to learn), unlearning (set aside practices that have become outdated and develop appropriate ways of dealing with current and future challenges), and knowledge creation (referring to the abilities and ways to create and use new knowledge). Accordingly, the thesis' findings allow for the speculation that the way Members of the European Parliament debate on a matter does not promote abilities and ways to create and use new knowledge. Specifically, the obviously lacking use of strategic knowledge into European plenary debates calls for institutional mechanisms that promote its use not only during the debates, but also in cognitive learning processes thereafter. This appears all the more important considering the finding that (moral) rationality is apparently not constructed through communication, and given that individual actors are not rational per se. To the extent that improved organizational learning within European decision-making processes is reflected in subsequent *decision* outputs, this would promote the *perceived* legitimacy of the European Union vis-à-vis national citizens through possibly improved *action* outcomes.

In light of an increasing dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries and the ensuing challenges modern Western democracies are confronted with on the national

level, the obtained empirical results thus paradoxically speak for both an *acceleration* of supranational decision-making through its "derationalization" and its simultaneous *deceleration* through an improvement of organizational knowledge creation.

6.2.3. Suggestions for future research

This thesis has provided new insight on the effects of deliberation on decisions in the context of supranational legislative decision-making processes. However, in order to substantiate the results obtained here, further studies are needed in this field of research in the first place. Since the DQI is not able to capture personal-individual factors (such as the extent to which people feel respected within a debate, or are persuaded by a specific argumentation), it could be complemented by interviews that specifically capture such aspects, so that the researcher obtains a more comprehensive picture of factors that might influence a decision. In addition, future studies would ideally compare the effects of deliberation on decisions across differing institutional contexts. Moreover, the empirical results obtained here call for investigating the "derationalization" of political decision-making processes and for improving the understanding of organizational learning in the context of political organizations.

Overall, however, I think it is of crucial importance for political science and organizational theory scholars in general and for scholars of democratic theory in particular to be cognitively receptive to new unorthodox ideas and concepts, be it in a normative or a positivist realm. As the discussion above has shown, a reconsideration of the "rational" political decision-making procedure could not only be fruitful, but will also simply be necessary in the future. With increasingly complex and also accelerated modes of social interaction, a stronger focus on interdisciplinary approaches could be a promising starting point. Hence, contemporary democratic theorists could make a big step forward by adapting the notion of democracy to the empirical conditions of the 21st century, thus significantly lowering the risk of getting "caught up" in the increasingly "dynamic sea" of socio-political empirical realities.

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Appendix

A.1. Correlation matrix

L and C	L and R	L and CP	L and F	L and I
0.102717	0.121268	0.102812	0.048576	0.041463
C and R	C and CP	C and F	C and I	
0.220623	0.074921	-0.0052	-0.05187	
R and CP	R and F	R and I		
0.017488	0.118703	0.02084		
CP and F	CP and I			
-0.09563	0.17516			
F and I				
0.013176				

Table 5: Correlation matrix (Note: L=Level of Justification; C=Content of Justification; R=Respect; CP=Constructive Politics; F=Foresight Knowledge; I=Interactivity)

A.2. Detailed scoring of individual debates

	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
<i>Debate Topic:</i>							
<i>Organisation of</i>							
<i>working time 1</i>							
Speech 1	4	6	3	3	4	0	
Speech 2	6	6	6	3	4	3	
Speech 3	6	3	3	0	4	0	
Speech 4	2	6	6	6	2	3	
Speech 5	4	3	6	6	2	0	
Speech 6	4	6	3	3	4	0	
Speech	6	3	6	6	2	6	

7						
Speech						
8	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
9	2	6	6	0	2	3
Speech						
10	4	3	6	3	4	3
Speech						
11	6	6	6	0	2	0
Speech						
12	2	6	3	6	2	0
Speech						
13	6	6	3	6	2	6
Speech						
14	6	6	6	6	6	6
Speech						
15	6	6	3	6	2	3
Speech						
16	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
17	0	6	6	0	4	0
Speech						
18	4	3	6	3	2	3
Speech						
19	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech						
20	6	6	6	3	2	3
Speech						
21	4	3	3	3	4	3
Speech						
22	2	3	6	0	2	3
Speech						
23	4	6	6	0	2	6
Speech						
24	4	3	6	3	2	0
Speech						
25	6	3	3	3	2	6
Speech						
26	4	3	3	3	4	3
Speech						
27	4	3	3	0	2	0
Speech						
28	6	3	6	6	2	3
Speech						
29	4	6	6	6	2	6
Speech						
30	2	6	3	6	2	6
Speech						
31	2	3	6	3	2	0
Speech						
32	6	3	6	6	2	3
Speech						
33	2	3	6	0	2	0
Speech						
34	4	3	6	3	2	0

Speech 35	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 36	4	6	6	6	2	6
Average	4.2	4.6	5	3.3	2.6	2.4

22.0556

*Debate Topic:
Organisation of
working time 2*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 37	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 38	4	3	6	6	2	3
Speech 39	6	6	6	6	2	3
Speech 40	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 41	6	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 42	4	3	6	3	4	0
Speech 43	4	6	6	0	4	6
Speech 44	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 45	6	3	3	0	4	3
Speech 46	4	3	3	0	4	0
Speech 47	6	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 48	2	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 49	4	6	6	3	6	3
Speech 50	2	3	6	3	4	6
Speech 51	6	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 52	2	3	6	0	2	0
Speech 53	2	3	3	3	4	0
Speech 54	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 55	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 56	6	3	6	6	2	0
Speech 57	2	6	6	0	4	0
Speech 58	4	3	3	0	2	0

Final DQ6

Speech 59	2	3	3	0	2	3
Speech 60	4	6	6	0	2	0
Speech 61	2	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 62	2	3	3	0	2	0
Speech 63	2	6	6	6	2	6
Speech 64	2	3	3	0	2	0
Speech 65	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 66	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 67	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 68	2	3	3	0	4	3
Speech 69	4	3	6	6	2	3
Speech 70	6	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 71	2	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 72	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 73	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 74	4	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 75	0	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 76	2	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 77	2	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 78	4	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 79	2	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 80	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 81	4	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 82	4	6	3	3	2	6
Average	3.7	4.2	4.8	2.7	2.4	2.6

20.3696

*Debate Topic: Financial
Instrument for the
Environment (LIFE +) 1*

L C R CP F I

Final DQ6

Speech 1	6	3	3	6	2	0
Speech 2	6	6	6	6	2	3
Speech 3	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 4	6	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 5	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 6	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 7	2	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 8	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 9	2	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 10	4	6	3	6	2	3
Speech 11	2	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 12	6	6	6	6	2	6
Speech 13	4	3	3	0	2	6
Speech 14	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 15	6	3	3	6	2	3
Speech 16	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 17	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 18	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 19	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 20	6	3	3	0	2	6
Speech 21	2	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 22	2	3	3	6	2	6
Average	4.5	4.6	3.5	3.8	2	2.7

21.1818

*Debate Topic: Financial
Instrument for the
Environment (LIFE +) 2*

Speech 23	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 24	4	6	6	3	6	6
	6	6	6	6	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 25	6	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 26	6	6	6	6	2	0
Speech 27	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 28	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 29	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 30	4	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 31	6	3	3	6	2	0
Speech 32	4	6	6	6	2	3
Speech 33	4	3	3	0	2	6
Speech 34	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 35	4	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 36	2	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 37	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 38	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 39	4	3	3	3	2	3
Average	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.9	2.2	3.7

22.1176

*Debate Topic:
Protection of
groundwater against
pollution 1*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 2	6	6	6	0	2	6
Speech 3	2	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 4	4	3	3	6	2	3
Speech 5	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 6	6	3	6	6	2	6
Speech 7	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 8	4	6	6	0	2	0
Speech 9	6	6	6	6	2	0

Final DQ6

Speech 10	6	3	3	0	2	6
Speech 11	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 12	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 13	6	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 14	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 15	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 16	4	3	3	6	2	3
Speech 17	4	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 18	6	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 19	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 20	4	6	6	3	6	0
Speech 21	6	6	6	6	2	3
Speech 22	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 23	6	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 24	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 25	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 26	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 27	4	3	3	0	2	0
Speech 28	4	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 29	6	3	3	3	2	3
Average	4.3	4.9	3.9	3.2	2.1	2.2

20.5862

*Debate Topic:
Protection of
groundwater against
pollution 2*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 30	4	6	6	3	6	6
Speech 31	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 32	6	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 33	4	6	6	6	2	0

Final DQ6

Speech						
34	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
35	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
36	4	6	6	0	2	0
Speech						
37	0	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
38	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech						
39	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
40	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
41	6	6	3	3	2	6
Speech						
42	2	6	3	0	2	0
Speech						
43	6	6	3	3	4	0
Speech						
44	4	6	3	6	2	0
Speech						
45	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech						
46	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
47	4	3	3	0	2	3
Speech						
48	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
49	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
50	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
51	2	6	3	3	2	3
Speech						
52	2	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
53	4	6	3	6	2	0
Speech						
54	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech						
55	2	6	3	6	2	6
Speech						
56	6	3	3	3	2	6
Averag						
e	4.1	5.7	4.2	3.1	2.2	2.2

21.5185

*Debate Topic:
Community policy in the
field of water*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech						
1	6	6	6	3	2	0

Final DQ6

Speech						
2	4	6	6	0	2	6
Speech						
3	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
4	6	6	6	6	2	0
Speech						
5	6	3	3	3	2	3
Speech						
6	2	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
7	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
8	0	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
9	2	6	6	6	2	0
Speech						
10	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech						
11	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
12	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
13	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
14	4	6	6	6	2	0
Speech						
15	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
16	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
17	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
18	4	3	6	3	4	0
Speech						
19	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
20	4	6	6	0	2	0
Speech						
21	6	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
22	2	6	3	3	2	6
Speech						
23	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech						
24	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech						
25	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
26	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech						
27	6	3	3	0	2	0
Speech						
28	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech						
29	4	3	3	3	2	0

Speech 30	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 31	4	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 32	4	3	3	0	2	0	
Speech 33	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 34	4	3	3	6	2	6	
Speech 35	6	6	6	3	2	6	
Average	4.2	5	4.3	3	2.1	1.3	19.7714

<i>Debate Topic:</i> <i>Incineration of waste</i>	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
Speech 1	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 2	6	3	3	3	2	3	
Speech 3	6	6	3	0	2	6	
Speech 4	4	6	6	6	2	0	
Speech 5	6	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech 6	4	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech 7	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 8	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 9	6	3	3	0	4	0	
Speech 10	6	3	3	3	4	6	
Speech 11	6	3	6	3	2	6	
Speech 12	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 13	4	3	3	6	2	6	
Speech 14	6	3	3	3	2	3	
Speech 15	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 16	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 17	6	6	3	3	2	6	
Speech 18	6	6	3	3	2	3	

Speech 19	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 20	6	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 21	6	6	3	3	2	6	
Average	5.4	4.9	3.6	3	2.2	2.4	21.4762

*Debate Topic: Sales
promotions in the
internal market*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
Speech 1	2	3	3	6	2	3	
Speech 2	6	3	6	3	2	6	
Speech 3	4	3	3	0	2	6	
Speech 4	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 5	2	3	6	3	2	0	
Speech 6	6	6	6	6	2	0	
Speech 7	4	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 8	4	3	6	0	2	0	
Speech 9	2	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech 10	2	6	6	0	2	0	
Speech 11	2	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 12	2	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 13	4	3	6	3	2	3	
Speech 14	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 15	4	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 16	6	6	6	3	2	3	
Speech 17	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 18	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 19	6	3	3	6	2	6	
Speech 20	2	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 21	4	3	3	3	2	0	

Speech 22	6	3	3	3	2	6	
Average	3.8	3.8	4.1	3	2	2.6	19.3182

*Debate Topic:
Community
Environment Action
Programme (2001-
2010)*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
Speech 1	0	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 2	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 3	2	6	3	3	2	6	
Speech 4	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 5	2	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 6	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 7	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 8	2	6	3	6	2	3	
Speech 9	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 10	0	3	3	0	2	0	
Speech 11	2	6	3	6	2	6	
Speech 12	0	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 13	0	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 14	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 15	4	3	6	6	2	6	
Speech 16	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 17	6	3	3	3	2	3	
Average	1.3	4.1	3.2	3.4	2	1.8	15.6471

*Debate Topic: Lifelong
learning*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
Speech 1	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 2	6	3	3	3	2	0	

Speech							
3	4	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
4	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
5	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
6	0	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech							
7	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
8	2	3	6	3	2	6	
Speech							
9	4	3	6	3	2	0	
Speech							
10	2	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
11	6	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
12	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
13	2	3	6	3	2	6	
Speech							
14	4	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
15	4	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
16	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
17	0	3	6	3	2	0	
Speech							
18	0	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech							
19	0	3	3	3	2	6	
Average	2.9	3.3	3.8	3	2	1.3	16.3158

*Debate Topic: Ecopoint
System in Austria in
2004*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I	Final DQ6
Speech							
1	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
2	6	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
3	6	6	3	6	2	3	
Speech							
4	0	6	3	3	2	6	
Speech							
5	6	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech							
6	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech							
7	0	6	6	3	2	6	

Speech 8	4	6	3	3	2	6	
Speech 9	4	6	6	3	2	3	
Speech 10	6	6	6	6	2	6	
Speech 11	4	6	6	3	2	3	
Speech 12	0	6	3	0	2	0	
Speech 13	2	3	6	3	2	3	
Speech 14	0	6	3	6	2	3	
Speech 15	2	3	3	0	2	3	
Speech 16	0	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 17	4	3	6	0	2	6	
Speech 18	6	3	3	3	4	0	
Speech 19	4	3	6	3	2	3	
Speech 20	6	3	6	6	2	3	
Average	3.1	4.7	4.4	3.2	2.1	3	20.35

*Debate Topic: Placing
on the market and use
of biocidal products*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 2	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 3	0	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 4	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 5	6	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 6	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 7	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 8	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 9	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 10	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 11	0	6	3	3	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 12	4	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 13	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 14	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 15	4	3	6	0	2	0
Speech 16	4	6	3	6	2	3
Speech 17	0	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 18	0	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 19	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 20	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 21	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 22	6	3	6	3	4	0
Speech 23	4	6	3	6	2	6
Speech 24	2	6	3	0	2	0
Speech 25	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 26	4	3	3	6	2	0
Speech 27	6	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 28	0	6	3	3	2	6
Average	3.6	5	3.6	3.2	2.1	2.7

20.2857

Debate Topic: Waste electrical and electronic equipment

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	6	3	4	0
Speech 2	6	6	3	6	2	0
Speech 3	4	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 4	6	6	3	0	2	6
Speech 5	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 6	2	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 7	4	3	6	3	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 8	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 9	6	6	6	6	2	0
Speech 10	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 11	6	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 12	2	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 13	4	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 14	2	3	6	0	2	0
Speech 15	2	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 16	0	6	3	6	2	6
Speech 17	4	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 18	4	3	3	3	2	3
Speech 19	6	3	6	3	2	3
Speech 20	0	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 21	4	3	6	3	2	0
Speech 22	6	6	3	2	2	0
Speech 23	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 24	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 25	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 26	4	6	3	3	4	3
Speech 27	4	6	3	6	2	6
Average	3.9	4.6	4.3	3.2	2.1	2.1

20.2593

*Debate Topic: Granting
and withdrawing
international protection*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 2	0	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 3	2	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 4	2	6	3	3	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 5	4	6	6	3	2	3	
Speech 6	4	3	6	3	4	6	
Speech 7	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 8	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 9	2	3	0	3	2	6	
Speech 10	4	3	6	3	2	0	
Speech 11	2	6	6	3	2	0	
Speech 12	2	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 13	0	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 14	4	6	3	3	2	0	
Speech 15	4	3	3	6	2	0	
Speech 16	2	3	3	3	2	6	
Speech 17	2	3	3	3	2	0	
Speech 18	0	3	3	6	2	3	
Speech 19	0	3	3	3	2	3	
Average	2.2	3.9	3.8	3.3	2.1	2.4	17.7368

*Debate Topic: DAPHNE
II (2004-2008)*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 2	6	6	6	3	4	6
Speech 3	6	3	3	6	2	6
Speech 4	4	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 5	6	6	3	6	2	3
Speech 6	6	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 7	2	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 8	6	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 9	6	6	6	3	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 10	4	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 11	4	3	6	3	2	6
Speech 12	6	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 13	6	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 14	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 15	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 16	6	6	6	3	2	3
Speech 17	6	6	6	6	2	3
Speech 18	4	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 19	6	3	3	3	2	0
Average	5.3	5.5	5.2	3.5	2.1	3.6

25.2105

Debate Topic: Food distribution to the most deprived persons in the community

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 2	6	6	6	6	2	6
Speech 3	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 4	0	6	3	3	2	6
Speech 5	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 6	4	3	3	0	2	0
Speech 7	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 8	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 9	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 10	2	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 11	2	6	3	0	2	0
Speech 12	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 13	0	3	3	6	4	0
Speech 14	4	6	3	6	2	6

Final DQ6

Speech 15	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 16	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 17	4	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 18	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 19	0	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 20	6	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 21	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 22	0	6	3	6	2	3
Speech 23	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 24	2	6	6	3	2	0
Speech 25	0	3	3	3	2	0
Speech 26	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 27	0	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 28	4	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 29	6	6	3	3	2	3
Speech 30	6	6	3	3	2	6
Average	3.6	5.4	3.3	3.2	2.1	1.5

19.0667

*Debate Topic: Tobacco
sponsorship and
advertising*

	L	C	R	CP	F	I
Speech 1	6	6	3	3	2	0
Speech 2	4	6	3	6	2	6
Speech 3	4	6	6	0	2	0
Speech 4	4	3	3	3	2	6
Speech 5	6	3	3	6	2	0
Speech 6	6	3	3	0	2	0
Speech 7	2	6	6	3	2	6
Speech 8	0	6	3	0	2	3

Final DQ6

A.3. Email exchange with European Conciliation Committee

Subject: Master Thesis - records of Conciliation Committee debates

Dear Sir or Madam

My name is Simon Ljungberg and I'm currently writing my Master thesis for the Stockholm School of Economics. My research is about the effect of a political debate's discursive quality on the eventual policy outcome and I'd like to take debates of the EU Conciliation Committee as a case study. However, they are not publicly available on the web. Now my questions are if they are recorded after all and if so if it is possible to get Conciliation Committee debate records?

Thanks a lot for your help and kind regards

Simon Ljungberg

RE: Master Thesis - records of Conciliation Committee debates

15/11/2013 - 14:48 1

► Von: Conciliation Secretariat

Blockieren

Dear Mr Ljungberg,

We thank you very much for your email and your interest in matters of Conciliation but as you probably are aware of the debates of Conciliation committees are not public and there it is no possibility to have an audio or written record of them.
We wish you good luck for your thesis and if we can help you on another subject, do not hesitate to contact us.

Best regards,

Chantal Lefort



Chantal LEFORT

Conciliation and Codecision Secretariat

European Parliament

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