

Postmaterialism and Income Inequality:

A Study on the Effects of Income Inequality on Attitudes toward Immigration in 32 Countries

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ABSTRACT: Drawing on recent research dealing with income inequality and tolerance, this thesis seeks to address the impact of income inequality, both across and within nations, on attitudes toward immigration. I perform a series of OLS-regressions, based on data from the European Social Survey, where the obtained results confirm a negative relationship between income inequality and tolerance of immigration. For the upper middle class, the results support the Postmaterialist proposition that national prosperity leads to more tolerance. However, this does not hold for the middle and working class. The gap pertaining to the different responses to immigration within the boundaries of a particular community seems wider than previous studies have suggested. These findings are significant to take into account for policy makers. Firstly, they shed light on the underlying reasons as to why resistance toward newcomers is tangible nowadays, a heated subject in the political sphere presently. Secondly, they explain the underlying dynamics that give rise to far right parties and the appeal they command in many European countries. Thirdly, they incorporate income inequality as an integral component when dealing with the issues of tolerance. It is my contention that failure to take these insights into consideration and may engender more intolerant social and political values. This in turn is liable to create tensions between different social strata and thus less harmonious societies.

KEYWORDS: POSTMATERIALISM, INEQUALITY, IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL WEALTH, INGLEHART, SOCIAL TRUST, USLANER

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N.B: Throughout the thesis, I use the words tolerance and attitudes, and immigrants and immigration interchangeably due to their similar connotations and implications.

1. Aim and Purpose

Europe has over the past decades incessantly received influxes of migrants, mostly from developing countries, where people from different cultures and religions have sought refuge in Europe. This phenomenon has changed the ethnic makeup of these advanced industrial societies. Despite filling an important need for unskilled labor in their host countries, Europe's new minorities seem to experience resistance and tangible cyclical intolerance from native populations (Weldon, 2006). By tolerance, I adopt Florida's (2003) definition as "openness, inclusiveness, and diversity to all ethnicities, races, and walks of life". Following this logic, tolerance is characterized by an attitude of openness, irrespective of his/her underlying opinion of those to whom this attitude is extended.¹ The most visible manifestation of this opposition is the occasional resurgence of right-wing and nationalist parties whose political program is considerably based on anti-immigration sentiments (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Weldon, 2006).

Many researchers have studied the phenomenon of immigration, the different levels tolerance toward it, and most importantly, the interrelationship between immigration and national prosperity. Inglehart (1987) was pioneer in this respect with his Postmaterialist thesis, where he asserts that liberal values occur as a result of democracy, economic development, and modernization. These factors are prerequisites for an increased preference for pluralistic tolerance and positive attitudes toward immigration. He argues that prolonged periods of economic and physical security shift people's attention from "Materialist" concerns to the so-called "Postmaterialist" concerns, such as inclinations to self-expression and social engagement. This shift is supposedly apt to make people feel less threatened by foreigners and thus be more positive toward immigration.

Inglehart's thesis and the following studies that revolve around this topic, seem to tackle this issue in general terms, assuming that the implications of economic prosperity have similar repercussions for all the citizens within a nation. They fail to make distinctions among different social classes within the nation in question. By concentrating on average value dissimilarities across countries and time, the Postmaterialist theory indicates that national economic wealth influences the attitudes of citizens in much the same way. As such, the line of demarcation between different groups and the different ways in which they experience economic prosperity

¹ This is also in line with the definition of Corneo and Jeanne (2009) as "respect for diversity."

is not clear. In fact, the evidence in Table 2 below shows that at times when nations enjoy higher cycles of economic wealth, we can still detect tendencies of intolerance among certain groups displayed through far-right insurgence. Thus, there is a kind of tension between theory and reality as regards Inglehart's approach.

This tension could potentially be better explained in terms of the increasing income inequality that has sharply risen in many countries since the 1970s. It should imply that not everybody has enjoyed the economic gains and prospered to the same extent, and that the sole examination of the overall wealth may lurk the reason why not everybody has become more tolerant. Following the logic of the Postmaterialist theory, the well-off citizens on the higher socioeconomic ladder should then be more tolerant than their fellow citizens on the lower part. Grabb's (1979) research on the working class concluded that members of the working class are somewhat more likely to be intolerant toward various outgroups, regardless of the background of the newcomers. His findings draw the same conclusion as Inglehart (1987) that lower income or economic insecurity bring about feelings of distrust or cynicism about life and other people experienced as deviant or strangers. However, it should be noted that since Grabb's findings, there has been almost three and a half decades. The inequality has since then continued to increase, which could mean that other social classes higher up are now also affected. Although national economic wealth and its dynamics can explain the shifting attitudes toward immigration, cross-national studies focusing on the importance of social trust contends that income inequality renders a more effective way of explaining and understanding differences in social tolerance (Uslaner, 2002; Andersen and Fetner, 2008). Based solely on US data, Uslaner (2002) suggested that income inequality reduces the trust in society which then produces intolerance toward foreigners and immigration.

Built on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the present thesis will show that although national wealth across nations is a significant indicator, the income inequality *within* nations must also be incorporated when attempting to understand differences in attitudes toward immigration. It seems that the inequality within nations is even more important to take into consideration in the context of discussing intolerance than previously suggested. The data I intend to use includes six rounds from the ESS collected between the years 2002-2012 from 32 European countries. Europe per se is particularly interesting to analyze as all countries have become multicultural amid the era of globalization. It is my intention to perform a series of OLS-regression models where I compare attitudes of members within a nation toward immigrants and immigration. The first statistical model includes only GDP per capita as a

national-level variable to test Inglehart's Postmaterialist theory that economic development and social tolerance are positively correlated. Model 2 incorporates the Gini index to see how the presence of this variable alters the coefficients and results. The third model tests the effect of social trust on the significance and effect of the other national-level variables. Lastly, the fourth adds an interaction variable between social class and per-capita GDP to capture its effect on attitudes toward immigration.

The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: the second section outlines a literature review on the theories and research that the stated hypotheses will be based on. These hypotheses are then outlined and developed in the third section. The fourth section presents the data and my statistical model combined with an outline of my econometric approach. The results are presented in the fifth section to be followed by a discussion and conclusion about the results in the sixth section.

2. Literature review

Before outlining my hypotheses, I will discuss the literature revolving around my thesis and as such constituting a kind of framework to it. I intend to partly draw upon research from Inglehart's (1987) Postmaterialist thesis and Uslaner's (2002) study about social trust. The next step will be to present current empirical studies related to these theories. Lastly, I will briefly outline literature regarding individual-level variables that can predict attitudes toward immigration.

2.1 Postmaterialism and tolerance

Inglehart's Postmaterialist theory (1987) has paved the way to the emergence of a considerable amount of literature about the process in which modern societies have altered, now putting greater emphasis on social issues rather than economic issues. In his thesis "*Value change in industrial societies*", Inglehart makes the distinction between the Materialist and the Postmaterialist mindset. The Materialists are more likely to live under conditions of economic insecurity, tending to reaffirm traditional values, nationalism, and the maintenance of law and order. In comparison, in the absence of war, generations raised with high economic security tend to display a Postmaterialist mindset with an inclination to issues such as self-expression, equality, social solidarity, and aesthetic satisfaction. Also, important to this study, a population that has experienced economic stability is less likely to feel threatened by foreigners and are thus more tolerant toward immigration.

Inglehart's theory has been embraced by many researches since its publication. However, he tends to adopt a general perspective, in the sense that he concentrates on the variations in social attitudes across nations without taking into consideration the importance of the variations that exist within the nations in question. More specifically, he treats national populations as homogenous and coherent in terms of how they experience the benefits of national economic wealth. Although many European countries are wealthier than ever, we notice that the support for the far-right parties and xenophobia has soared lately. This phenomenon counters Inglehart's theory, as we would expect such a "Materialist" reaction at times of economic decline. It could be such that he does not sufficiently dwell on the peculiarities and consequences of the ever-increasing income inequality within many European countries. That should mean that not everybody within the nation enjoys the benefits of this national wealth in the same way, leading in turn to different attitudes toward immigration. In other words, the

relation between the distribution of resources within countries and Postmaterialist values has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature about Postmaterialism.

National income inequality is not completely disregarded by Inglehart. In his article, he assumes that as the inequality of income increases, it only affects values up to a certain point where it afterwards level off. However, it should rather be such that a higher inequality means that a considerably higher number of the population live under conditions of economic scarcity and do not enjoy the profits from the national wealth in the same manner, and therefore return to Materialist concerns. A specific socioeconomic group then gets a larger share of the pie at the expense of others. Thus, these differences in income inequality within countries could affect the level of tolerance, making people respond to the issue of immigration in a differential manner.

2.2 Income inequality and tolerance

In “*The Moral Foundations of Social Trust*”, Uslaner (2002) highlighted the importance of the notion of social trust and its implications on tolerance levels in general. According to his findings, the causal relationship is such that as the economic inequality increases, trust declines and consequently creates tension between *all* members of the society in question, regardless of social class. Important to this argument is Uslaner’s distinction between what he describes as generalized trust and particularized trust:

- Generalized trust is the perception that most people are part of your moral community. It is a measure of the scope of our community and it is based upon both morals and our collective experiences, but also upon an optimistic world.
- Particularized trust refers to having only trust in some people. Thus, when we only have faith in some people, he argues, we are most likely to trust people like ourselves shun from people they do not see as part of their moral community.

According to Uslaner, it is generalized trust that is required to stimulate more tolerance and be susceptible to newcomers and immigration. Interestingly, he makes a connection between higher levels of economic inequality and the decreasing levels of generalized trust among Americans, causing frictions within society and intolerance toward outgroups. Uslaner also asserts that economic inequality within countries can be more instrumental for explaining differences in social values than the concept of national wealth.

Although Uslaner's (2002) study seeks to shed light on the importance of trust in society in connection with various social values, it mainly focuses on US data that is atypical because of its unique immigration culture and legislation. This raises the question whether or not the theory is applicable to other societies around the world. Its exclusive focus on variation within a single nation is liable to restrict its general relevance as regards tolerance and inequality. For instance, Europe is adopting a more restrictive approach to immigration that is not in total tune with what is happening in USA, and this is a case in point. In addition, trust is not a fixed characteristic. It is cultural, being shaped by the historical experiences of given people, and is therefore subject to change (Inglehart 1987). Such discrepancies must be considered in relevant discussions and analyses. Uslaner (2002) makes it clear that national prosperity has modest effects on trust, but that there is a direct linkage between trust and economic inequality *in the United States*. The dynamics of income inequality and trust however may operate differently in different political, cultural, and historical settings. Inglehart (1987), for instance, tested this for European data and suggested rather that national wealth is related to interpersonal trust, in the sense that it leads to an enhanced sense of security that is conducive to trust. Thus, the theories diverge in this area.

2.3 Previous research about income inequality and Postmaterialist values

Andersen and Fetner (2008) were pioneers in the context of emphasizing the importance of assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations when it comes to studying social values and attitudes. Based on cross-national data from 35 countries, evidence was provided that as the income inequality increases, tolerance tends to decline while national wealth matters mostly for all social classes above the working class. Andersen and Fetner's (2008) findings were interesting in that they were the first to shed light on this important aspect. However, we should look upon their findings with a degree of caution. Their study circles solely around tolerance levels and attitudes toward homosexuality. The results could either be similar or different for other Postmaterialist issues. Depending on the issue's level of controversial status in each respective country, it could be the case that economic conditions affect different issues in different manners. Applied to this thesis, people could be more/less sensitive to economic development, income inequality, and the acceptance of newcomers in contrast to how they react to homosexuality.

Andersen and Fetner's findings are also liable to show a certain degree of endogeneity and other data issues. In their regressions, they lacked a direct measure of trust and implicitly took for

granted that Uslaner's (2002) causal association between income inequality, trust, and tolerance holds. The authors did not seem to consider the fact that Uslaner's study focuses solely on US data and whether it can be applied to European data as such. In addition, their individual-level predictor of social class also is not optimal. Although they are explicit in that they believe that the ideal would be to employ a measure of income instead, they simply use the respondent's occupation as a proxy for his/her social class. This proxy has its limitations, but also misses the fundamental importance of economic security in the formative years of the respondent. Inglehart (1971) explicitly stated that not only is the individual's current economic condition important, but also what kind of economic environment that he/her grew up in during their formative years. Thus, Andersen and Fetner's (2008) findings open up for many new areas to study and ways to improve their models.

2.4 Individual-level predictors of tolerance

It is arguably ascertained that no single process or measurement can provide an exhaustive list of predictors as regards attitudes toward immigration. Scruples in respect of foreigners can be defined as the premonition that a certain outgroup creates competition, whether real or imaginary, endangering the indigenous population's current status. It is not my intention to give a comprehensive review of the literature about this topic, but simply to highlight the most important control variables required for this thesis. Similar to Weldon (2006), I will break down these factors into three categories: (1) demographic characteristics, (2) psychological dispositions, and (3) political orientations and probe into them in the subsections below.

2.4.1 Demographic characteristics

Although there are several demographic characteristics believed to affect an individual's attitudes toward immigration, a fairly clear consensus has drawn upon the importance of education, socioeconomic class, age, gender, and the size of the town in which a person resides.

Numerous studies over several decades have linked higher levels of education to "liberal" social attitudes (Davis, 1975; McCutcheon, 1985; Stouffer, 1955). The traditional and dominant view is that education fundamentally affects people, changing their characters and basic values in the direction of advocacy of diversity and social acceptance (Vogt, 1997; Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Weldon, 2006). Moreover, a higher level of education enables individuals to learn more about groups different from themselves. This association however remains somehow controversial, as it is not clear whether education liberalizes or simply leads to people having

better knowledge of social norms and values (Jackson, 1972). It is not uncommon that people participating in surveys tend to answer according to what they consider “appropriate” liberal answers to questions, leading as such to measurement errors. Regardless of its mechanisms, the variable remains one of the most critical variables to control for within the field of social tolerance.

In line with the research of perceived threats and lower levels of economic security, there is also a solid link between individual economic position and social tolerance. Realistic group conflict theory (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Andersen and Fetner, 2008) argues that individuals are more likely to develop prejudiced and intolerant attitudes toward groups with which they believe they are in competition or conflict with. For instance, in the past, the working class seems to be the group that is most directly in competition with immigrants and ethnic minorities for jobs (Uslaner, 2002; Weldon 2006; Castles, 1984). However, the increase in automation and outsourcing in the past decades have also reduced the ranks of traditional middle class jobs and other highly skilled occupations. Grabb (1979) found that working class people tended to be in “economic distress” and thus less likely than those who exhibited financial security to exhibit Postmaterialist values. As people in economic distress tend to adhere to more Materialist concerns, such as nationalistic tendencies, opposition to immigration and to everything they would conceive as different or deviant from what they are accustomed to is more common.

The size of the local in which people live in have also proved to be positively linked with higher levels of tolerance (Cullen, Wright, and Alessandri, 2002; Andersen and Fetner 2008). In light of this argument, research shows that people who have a person with a different background in one of their personal networks, are more likely to be tolerant, which is more likely to occur in larger communities. Furthermore, economic opportunities are also more abundant in major cities than in smaller ones, which consequently prompts more tolerance.

Another demographic variable found in studies to predict the extent of tolerance is age. Younger adults tend to express a higher level of social tolerance than older adults (Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Weldon, 2006). A recent multivariate analysis that was carried out by World Value Survey data (1999-2004), found that people in older cohorts are more likely to be reluctant to immigration than people in younger cohorts (Weldon 2006). However, this effect may be due to cohort and period effects and not age per se (Inglehart, 1987; Andersen and Fetner, 2008). Also consistent with previous research, men appear to exhibit less liberal values than women in general (Britton 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008).

2.4.2 Psychological dispositions

The psychological aspect of tolerance is the most debated area of research within tolerance of immigration. Researchers have for a while believed that the adoption of more intolerant values and attitudes lie beyond the control of the individual, and that it is the product of the interaction between personal experiences and multiple emotional characteristics. Freud has also underlined that early hard work and sense of duty affect the makings of personalities (Adorno, 1950). Despite their criticisms regarding theoretical and methodological grounds, empirical studies have shown a correlation between such values and negative attitudes toward immigration, minorities, and other outgroups. Inglehart (1979) proclaims that a typical feature correlated to negative attitudes toward immigration is the belief in the maintenance of law and order. In addition, the perception of insecurity and feeling scared are also closely linked to being reluctant to immigration and foreigners (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Marcus et al. 1995; Weldon, 2006).

2.4.3 Political orientations

Political orientations and values play an increasingly important part as regards attitudes toward immigration. The present-day politics focuses to an increasing extent on immigration and how it should be tackled. The left-right ideologies emphasize different aspects of immigration; conservatism, i.e. more right than left, tends to be reluctant to immigration; while more left is a predictable advocate of tolerance and opening borders. This is particularly the case in Western Europe with Left-Libertarian and Green parties (Uslaner 2002; Weldon 2006).

3. Hypotheses

Despite high levels of national wealth, the electoral popularity of far-right parties that adopt anti-immigrant rhetoric, are expanding in many European countries. This actualizes the need to analyze attitudes toward immigration from a different angle. Earlier studies have suggested that inequality needs to be considered in combination with national prosperity when conducting cross-national studies of attitudes and values. These assumptions coupled with the discussions from Sections 1 and 2, lead us to the following research question:

- *Does income inequality affect tolerance levels for immigration, and if so, to what extent do these levels differ across different social classes?*

This question stems from the notion that not everybody gains from the increases in national wealth to the same extent as previous studies have implicitly assumed. In order to answer the posed question above, I intend to develop the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *People residing in a rich country are likely to be more tolerant of immigration.*

This hypothesis is directly adopted from Inglehart's (1987) Postmaterialist thesis, which states that the publics of relatively rich societies are least likely to emphasize Materialist values, and most likely to emphasize Postmaterialist ones. The logic behind this is that economic security will induce more tolerance to outgroups and immigration. This is expected to hold even after controlling for the individual-level predictors. After that I intend to test whether income inequality negatively affects social tolerance by adding a measure of it to the model. The second hypothesis can thus be articulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2: *Income inequality has a negative correlation with tolerance for immigration. Those in lower social class positions tend to be less tolerant on average than their counterparts.*

People living in countries where inequality prevails are likely to be, on average, less tolerant, and vice versa. This hypothesis is derived from the literature pertaining to the relationship between income inequality and social trust. Furthermore, the upper middle class will be expected to be the most tolerant group as they are the most economically secure.

Hypothesis 3: *The apparent effect of income inequality on attitudes toward immigration, remains relatively unchanged when controlling for trust.*

This hypothesis provides a way to elaborate Uslaner's literature on social trust. Since his research is confined to the US and its unique settings, there is room for inquiring if this holds in relation to European settings. The absence of a direct measure of social trust in this type of literature, makes this hypothesis important to test and probe into.

Hypothesis 4: *National wealth and socioeconomic class interact in their effects on attitudes toward immigration.*

Social classes diverge in terms of attitudes toward immigration as the GDP per capita increases in line with the Postmaterialist thesis. The upper middle class profits mostly from economic development and hence its attitudes toward immigration become more generous as the per-capita GDP increases which is not the case for the classes further down.

4. Data

In this section, I provide an overview of the dataset used for this paper, its advantages and disadvantages, and data weighting. This is followed by a description of the variables under consideration for the analysis.

4.1 European Social Survey

In order to test my research question, I use a combination of pooled cross-sectional data from six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) and country-level data obtained from various official sources. The ESS is a biennial cross-sectional survey administered in a large sample of (mostly) European nations. The survey was carried out through face-to-face interviews by the European Science Foundation in order to measure and compare attitudes and behaviors across countries and over time in a methodologically reliable way. The six rounds of the survey were conducted in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 32 countries participated in at least one round of the survey, and 17 countries participated in all six rounds (see Appendix 8.1). All of the ESS surveys consist of representative samples of all persons aged 15 and above residing within private households in each country. Each individual is selected by strict random probability methods at every stage. From the ESS dataset, there are in total 291,686 observations, from different individuals across different time periods from 2002 to 2012.

This dataset is worth using because it contains relevant information about attitudes toward immigration and other social values across Europe of great interest for this study. The database is considered to be highly reliable and is used extensively in general studies about social behavior and attitudes of the people in Europe because of its uniform methodological standards and strict rules regarding sampling. The survey is also conducted for strict academic purposes, which reduces the risk for manipulation from various interest groups. By combining this dataset with country-level variables, I will be able to test the effect of income inequality on attitudes toward immigration while controlling for a sufficient set of variables applicable to test my hypotheses. According to Inglehart, a fundamental prerequisite for Postmaterialism is the absence of war. Thus, to reduce the risk of endogeneity, Israel and Cyprus were excluded from the regressions due to their internal conflicts and wars.

One potential caveat of the data is that it contains a relatively short time period (10 years; 2002-2012), whereas a longer time period would provide more extensive results of how national

wealth and inequality affect attitudes toward immigration. It also raises the question if the results are only valid for this specific time period. Datasets that go back more in time would increase the reliability of the results to a great extent. But there are several other reasons for why I chose to work with this dataset in spite of its relatively short time period. In fact, I could not come across other data that is as sophisticated and with such a good quality on a disaggregated level. Also, in contrast to other widely used datasets, it was the only dataset that covered most of the data and variables needed to answer my research question and hypotheses.

To get the most accurate estimates, it is important to weigh the data and take into account how likely each respondent was to be part of the sample. This is also important to avoid overrepresentation of certain national groups. ESS provides a set of alternatives for each observation. For this thesis, I use the post-stratification weights and population size weights. The former is the most sophisticated weighting strategy that uses auxiliary information to reduce the sampling error and potential non-response bias. It has been constructed using information on age-group, gender, education, and region. Population size weights were employed as this study examines data for more than two countries combined. The population size weights are the same for all persons within a country but differ across countries. The purpose is to correct for the fact that most countries taking part in the ESS have different population sizes but similar sample sizes. The absence of this weight may lead to bias and overrepresentation of smaller countries at the expense of larger ones.

4.2 Dependent Variable

I operationalize Florida's (2003) concept of tolerance by making use of replies to questions from the European Social Survey. The dependent variable is the sum of four equally weighted questionnaire items used to tap attitudes toward immigrants. In each round of the survey, respondents were asked to give their opinions about a set of various political and social issues, including attitudes toward immigration. The exact wording of the questions were as follows:

- Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?
- [...] would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
- Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

- To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe come and live here?

I argue that such a composite measure created from a combination of items is employed to reduce the risk of measurement error, which would be the case if I only relied on a single item. For the majority of the questions, attitudes are measured on an 11-point scale ranging from i.e. “[immigration is] is bad for the economy” (coded 0) to “[immigration is] good for the economy” (coded 10). In order to minimize the risk of missing cases, I included all respondents who answered at least two of the four questions for each index. For the questionnaire items that used a different measure, I converted the values so that they would correspond to the 11-point scale used by the majority of the questions.

Admittedly, there are several limitations with this dependent variable when using it as a proxy for intolerance. It does not tell us whether or not respondents display intolerant behavior or find immigrants acceptable. The case could be that a respondent could disapprove of immigration per se as a result of for instance economic reasons, and hence respond a lower value, but simultaneously disapprove of legal sanctions or other restrictions that discriminate immigrants. According to an article on voting on the radical right and xenophobia, it was stated that it is possible to be skeptical to immigration in general without necessarily being xenophobic or racist (Rydgren, 2008, Karlsson 2009).

4.3 Independent variables on an individual-level

Among the independent variables, the socioeconomic class is the variable of most concern. Modern societies are becoming increasingly complex in an era of globalization, which makes the effort of classifying people according to class more challenging and controversial. There are many approaches to decide how classes should be divided but there is no general consensus. Although household income is generally said to be a good measure, it is practically an insufficient factor. Inglehart (1987) highlights the importance of the economic conditions an individual experienced during his/her formative years, asserting that the individuals’ father’s socioeconomic class can in some cases be a *stronger* predictor of the respondents’ values than the respondent’s income level, for instance. With this in mind, I intend to adopt the strategy of indexing these two variables; namely, the father’s social economic status when respondents are at age of 14 and the respondent’s level of income.

Following this, I will divide socioeconomic class according to a simplified version of Dennis Gilbert's (2002) proposed class system commonly used by sociologists. Instead of seven categories, I use three broad categories. The main reason behind using this academic model is due to the fact that it fits the occupational categories listed in ESS the best, and as such suits my purposes.

Thus, if the father had a professional or managerial occupation and the respondent had an income in the top 16% of the income distribution, she or he is coded as having an "upper middle class"-status. Alternatively, if the father had a manual occupation and the respondent was in the bottom 53%, she or he is coded as having a "working class" status. These details are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive Information for the Socioeconomic Class Variable

Social class	Income (% of income distribution)	Father's occupation when respondent was 14	N
Upper middle class	Top 16%	Traditional and modern professional occupations, higher administrator occupations, senior managers	35769
Middle class	54-83%	Clerical and intermediate occupations, technical and craft occupations, farmer, middle or junior managers, skilled workers, sales occupations	91603
Working class	Bottom 53%	Semi-routine/manual/service occupations, routine manual and service occupations, semi-skilled and unskilled workers	64650

There are many legitimate objections to this approach. It can be argued that this approach by no way can be applicable for the modern society we live in today. Fathers are no longer the sole providers for each respective household, mothers have emerged as providers too. Secondly, the importance of formative security and the father's socioeconomic status differ across countries when it was found. It is not uncommon nowadays to find a high income taker with roots in a working class environment adopting evident Postmaterialist values. However, it has been argued in many papers that early instilled values tend to persist throughout an individual's life. Social trust, which is conducive to tolerance, is in many instances formed during an individual's formative years when parents are highly influential in their attitudes toward education, social life, and trust (Uslaner, 2002). This string of reasoning seems highly plausible that I intend to derive from it.

Another variable of concern is how to measure the perceived fear that immigration is likely to entail. The fear of incumbent terrorist attack to hit the country in which an individual resides has been tangible recently. This has contributed to massive opposition toward immigration, and has become an increasingly recurrent argument against immigration (Galea et al., 2002; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008). There is a questionnaire item that explicitly revolves around this point in ESS, but it was only measured in the last two survey years and thus rendered marginal. Instead, I tap this concept with a measure of to what extent a respondent feels unsafe in society. Although it is not ideal strategy, it contains far less missing values and has been included in every survey year and could generate a close estimate of this.

As outlined in Section 2.3, there is a vast literature on various variables related to attitudes toward immigration, and it is important to control for these in order to reduce the risk for omitted variable bias and other sources of endogeneity. In addition to the variables above, I will control for gender, age, education, feeling of safety, size of town in which the respondent resides, political ideology, and to what extent people believe in the maintenance of law and order. Models 3-4 will also control for social trust. Age is simply measured in number of years, and will enter the models as an orthogonal quadratic polynomial in order to capture a non-linear relationship with attitudes. Education is measured as the number of years of the respondent has completed and to what extent he or she believes in the maintenance of law and order, is tapped with a questionnaire item that poses this question explicitly. Lastly, political ideology is measured through a left-right political ideology scale and size of the town in which the respondent resides and is divided into five categories: (1) A big city, (2) suburbs or outskirts of big city, (3) town or small city, (4) country village, and (5) farm or home in the countryside. For the exact wording of some survey question, see Appendix 8.2.

4.4 National-level variables

In addition to the individual level variables, it is also necessary to control for country-level factors. The macro level factors of crucial importance in this study are national wealth (as measured by GDP per capita) and income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient). All models also include a set of dummy variables representing the year in which the survey was administered to control for changes in attitudes over time.

In line with current standards, per capita GDP is used as a measure of the national wealth. GDP measures annual economic output and the total value of new goods and services produced

within a country's borders. Per-capita GDP tells us how big each person's share of GDP would be if we were to divide the total into equal proportions. It is a generally accepted measure for standard of living and often used as an indicator of our material standard of living. Nevertheless, the metric has its shortcomings. Firstly, at times it is very hard to accurately account for all goods and services produced in a country. There are hardly any statistics available on the underground economy, for instance. Secondly, to make such aggregating possible, it is at times hard to define what exactly constitutes production and what does not. Despite its pitfalls, GDP per capita is considered the broadest indicator of economic prosperity and will be used for this thesis. The values for all countries are adjusted and measured in 2015 U.S. dollars and take into account inflation, allowing accurate comparisons between different time periods. They were taken from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files. In order to make the coefficients from the models easier to interpret, per capita GDP is divided by 1,000.

The common practice for assessing income inequality is the use of the Gini index. It measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 implies perfect inequality (where one household has all the income). Although a number of alternative methods exist that may offer a more nuanced understanding of the distribution of income, the availability of such data for the given countries and time periods for this paper is insufficient. Hence, the Gini index will be used for operationalizing income inequality here. In an effort to make the information comprehensible, the value in question has been multiplied by 100. The Gini index was adopted from the World Bank, which is generally regarded as a reliable source for this data. For the countries and years not covered by the World Bank, the data used was compiled by other agencies in the following order: Luxemburg Income Study, World Development Indices, and the European Commission. The national-level variables are illustrated in Table 2. The extent to which there is support for far-right political parties in the country in the respective year is also listed.

5. Methodological approach

With the research question and theoretical framework in mind, I intend to develop a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) models to predict attitudes toward immigration. The main analysis reports the findings from four OLS models that build incrementally. The model below is the baseline model in which all following regressions will be benchmarked against:

$$AtI_i = \delta + \beta_0 + \beta_1 * (GDP\ per\ capita)_i + \beta_2 * (X_i) + \varepsilon_i,$$

Where AtI_i is a measure of attitudes toward immigration and can take on any value between 0.6875 and 10.25. The lower value signifies the least tolerant and the higher value the most tolerant. δ is a set of dummy variables representing the year in which the survey was administered to control for changes in attitudes over time. B_0 is the individual level intercept. The B_1 measures the effect per-capita GDP has on attitudes and is the only contextual variable in the first regression to test Hypothesis 1 and the Postmaterialist thesis. X_{it} is a regressor aimed at capturing all individual specific characteristics (see Section 2.4 and 4.2.1) that may differ across individuals in the sample, and includes:

- Social class. There are three dummy variables for each class used in the model. These are upper middle class, middle class, and the working class. A
- Education, as measured by how many years of full-time education the respondent has completed.
- Left-right political ideology, which is a measure of the respondent's left-right ideological self-placement on a 10point scale, where 1 represents left and 10 right.
- Age of the respondent and age^2 that is the orthogonal quadratic polynomial.
- The size of the town in which the respondent resides. This variable can take on one of the following dummy variables:
 - A big city
 - Suburbs or outskirts of big city
 - Town or small city
 - Country village
 - Farm or home in countryside (base-variable)
- Gender, which is a dummy variable differentiating respondents according to gender, where the value of 1 is given to people who identify themselves as male.

- Importance of following rules. This is a measure of to what extent an individual believes in maintenance of law and order, and can take on a value between 1 and 6, where 1 represents the highest support for more law and order.
- Feeling of insecurity. This variable captures to what extent the respondent feels safe in the community in which he/she lives. It can take on a value between 1 and 4, where 4 represents feeling very safe and vice versa for 1.
- Trust in people (only in models 3-4), that is an 11-point scale that aims to capture the respondent's level of trust. The higher the value, the more trustful the person is.
- ε_i captures the error term for individuals.

The baseline model with just one contextual variable is supposed to give an initial gauge of the variable's strength and significance. Model 2 incorporates the Gini index to test if income inequality and tolerance of immigration are negatively correlated (Hypothesis 2). Model 3 derives from Hypothesis 3 including a trust variable to explore the impact incorporating this variable on the size and significance of the other variables. Model 4 adds terms to capture the cross-level interaction between socioeconomic class and GDP per capita (Hypothesis 4).

5.1 Endogeneity and other data issues

The analysis of this data is subject to potential estimation biases stemming from endogeneity, whereby a right-hand side variable is correlated with an unobserved error term. Endogeneity stems from several potential sources (Wooldridge, 2002): the omission of a relevant variable and measurement error being the most common.

The study of tolerance toward immigration usually runs the risk of validity and reliability due to omitted variables that need to be accentuated and accounted for when regressing. Some of these factors are easy to control for, such as gender, age, political ideology, and other components captured by the ESS. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to ensure that all individual characteristics influencing tolerance have been assembled and controlled for. There is a high likelihood that a correlation between the error terms and dependent variable remains. This could exaggerate the effect of the controlled variables when the effect in reality is related to other important demographic, psychological, or value-based characteristics unaccounted for. I have tried to solve for this by controlling a sufficient amount of independent variables.

It is not an uncommon practice to use a multilevel regression model in most of the empirical literature related to national wealth and tolerance (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Weldon 2006).

The majority of them argue that because the analysis occurs at two levels (the individual- (level 1) and country-level (level 2)), it is advisable that we must take into account this multilevel structure in order not to underestimate the standard errors and overestimate the coefficients of the country-level variables. This could otherwise lead to the impression that these variables are significant when in fact they are not (Weldon, 2006). To assess whether or not this is necessary, I investigated whether there is sufficient variance represented at a higher level to warrant the mixed approach. This question was addressed through a variance components model as below:

$$ICC = \frac{\text{Level 2 variance}}{(\text{Level 2 variance} + \text{level 1 variance})}$$

Which yielded:

$$ICC = \frac{0.7145666^2}{(0.7145666^2 + 1.995794^2)} = 0.11362$$

There is no consensus where the total variance needs to be represented at a given level. For the data I intend to use, I showed above that approximately 11% of the total variance in the dependent variable is represented at the country level, which is not considered to be a high level (Occhipinti, 2012). The limitation of using a conventional OLS regression is hence relatively minor and it is not imperative to consider the level when representing the variance of the outcome at different levels (i.e. there is not a sufficient design effect). Furthermore, all models take into account the clustering of respondents within country and year, which is an alternative to the multilevel approach. This was accomplished by indexing each country/year pair.

Another concern for the reliability of the data is measurement errors. I will assume the Classical Errors in Variables (CEV) assumption holds since there is no reason to believe that any individuals will over- or underreport the responses for the survey questions of ESS. One potential source for the measurement error, however, lies in the dependent variable. Challenging immigration is at certain points controversial due to its close association with racism. As such, it might not be culturally acceptable to answer the questions of the dependent variable in line with one's actual stance on the issue and people, but rather report what they consider to be "appropriate". As my study is not dependent on one single questionnaire item, the potential error this prompts is to a certain extent reduced.

6. Results

The empirical results used for the analysis are outlined in this section. The first subsection includes descriptive statistics of national differences in attitudes toward immigration and country-level variables. It is followed by the regression outputs for the hypotheses and a robustness test of the results.

6.1 Descriptive information for each country regarding attitudes toward immigration

Table 2 illustrates the relationship between the divergent attitudes toward immigration and the country-level variables. In line with previous research, the results offer tentative support for the standard argument about the relationship between national wealth and tolerance. As predicted, the most tolerant countries tend to be those with higher registered levels of economic wealth. Two notable exceptions to this generalization are Poland and Greece, where the former has had a high level of economic growth in the past years and the latter has struggled considerably to cope with growth and as such affecting its attitudes toward immigrants. This provides support to Inglehart's Postmaterialist proposition about the relationship between national wealth and tolerance.

Table 2: Descriptive Information for Each Country by Survey Year. Countries Are Ranked in Descending Order According to Mean Attitude toward Immigration

Country	Survey year	N	GDP per capita	Gini	Far-right support	Mean attitude toward immigration
Iceland	2004	526	46,921.13	28.11	N/A	6.828779 (1.757025)
	2012	666	44,258.84	26.94		6.910473 (1.6505)
Sweden	2002	1764	29,571.7	23	1.4%	6.835388 (1.705595)
	2012	1750	57,134.08	27.32	5.7%	6.89675 (1.80574)
Luxemburg	2002	1105	52,240.9	N/A	11.3%	6.666799 (1.68683)
	2004	1426	74,970.92	30.25	9.9%	6.038131 (1.832185)
Poland	2002	1659	5,196.933	34.05	9.5%	5.820901 (1.567667)
	2012	1583	13,142.05	32.39	31%	6.557604 (1.877846)
Switzerland	2002	1836	41,336.72	27.3	22.5%	6.310968 (1.513399)
	2012	1400	83,208.69	31.64	26.6%	6.19817 (1.579639)
Finland	2002	1887	26,834.03	26	0.99%	6.133313 (1.549216)
	2012	2127	47,415.56	27.12	19.05%	6.16699 (1.587227)
Norway	2002	1971	57,570.27	31.72	14.6%	5.864409 (1.60129)
	2012	1586	10,1563.7	25.9	22.9%	6.349661 (1.668205)
Denmark	2002	1311	46,487.51	N/A	12%	5.731074 (1.813136)
	2012	1547	57,636.13	29.08	12.3%	6.092356 (1.911654)

Bulgaria	2006	822	4,455.69	35.73	8.14%	6.144541 (2.434709)
	2012	1625	7,333.355	36.01	9.36%	5.687769 (2.267592)
Spain	2002	1346	17,019.54	31	N/A	5.803492 (1.655203)
	2012	1745	28,647.84	35.89	N/A	6.05437 (2.071059)
Ireland	2002	1812	32,537.96	N/A	6.5%	5.859237 (1.876382)
	2012	2505	48,976.93	32.52	9.9%	5.618937 (2.230197)
Netherlands	2002	2193	28,817.32	27	N/A	5.610665 (1.523603)
	2012	1741	49,474.71	27.99	10.1%	5.964209 (1.584186)
Germany	2002	2645	25,205.16	31.708	0.4%	5.844778 (1.727151)
	2012	2841	44,010.93	28.3	1.5%	6.242014 (1.811478)
Belgium	2002	1711	35,589.71	N/A	14.7%	5.427455 (1.655818)
	2012	1842	44,731.22	27.59	25.2%	5.501493 (1.73702)
Lithuania	2010	1242	11,988.76	33.76	12.7%	5.231532 (1.91941)
	2012	1593	14,342.52	35.15	7.31%	5.544413 (1.98578)
Austria	2002	1811	26,351.38	N/A	10%	5.652575 (1.775387)
	2006	2061	40,430.99	29.59	11%	5.206847 (2.090288)
Italy	2002	1039	22,205.84	32.8	N/A	5.661333 (1.682286)
	2012	897	34,844.5	35.16		5.662347 (2.27895)
Croatia	2008	1254	15,893.86	33.71	3.5%	5.326156 (2.187756)
	2010	1405	13,509.19	27.35	3.5%	5.404537 (2.194963)
France	2002	1421	24,275.24	27	11.1%	5.358418 (2.010267)
	2012	1918	40,850.35	33.1	13.6%	5.292003 (2.09685)
Slovenia	2002	1333	11,814.1	29.12	4.38%	5.245171 (1.584425)
	2012	1114	22,477.6	25.59	1.8%	5.434695 (1.970816)
Slovakia	2004	1153	10,654.79	28.94	3.3%	5.326485 (1.768958)
	2012	1635	17,207.28	26.12	6.13%	4.840635 (2.012671)
Great Britain	2002	1925	28,301.21	35	6.7%	5.17276 (1.917033)
	2012	2123	41,294.51	32.57	18.5%	5.05199 (2.112976)
Ukraine	2004	1231	1,367.35	28.93	0.2%	4.811942 (2.313926)
	2012	1453	3,855.42	24.74	10.45%	5.010668 (2.284418)
Portugal	2002	1166	12,882.29	N/A	0.09%	5.101308 (1.733137)
	2012	1855	20,577.4	36.04	0.31%	4.664993 (1.963232)
Estonia	2004	1563	8,850.468	35.38	N/A	4.543706 (1.935572)
	2012	2111	17,490.99	33.15	16.87%	5.288341 (1.853621)
Czech Republic	2002	1013	8,011.898	25.5	N/A	4.974087 (1.726591)
	2012	1655	19,640.93	26.13	1.07%	4.607062 (1.961358)
Hungary	2002	1256	13,509.19	26.84	N/A	4.682972 (1.613237)
	2012	1605	12,819.71	30.55	16.67%	4.753427 (1.880873)
Russia	2006	1788	6,920.19	41.54	24.37%	3.915199 (2.204576)
	2012	2021	14,078.83	41.59	13.14%	4.065623 (2.070232)
Turkey	2004	1468	5,855.539	41.29	8.35%	4.00166 (2.465818)
	2008	2258	10,382.32	38.28	14.7%	4.069279 (2.234943)
Greece	2002	2277	14,005.36	N/A	0.1%	3.96967 (1.895163)
	2010	2010	26,841.86	34.48	0.3%	3.452353 (1.916608)

6.2 The effect of inequality on attitudes toward immigration

Recall my econometric specification from Section 4.3:

$$AtI_i = \delta + \beta_0 + \beta_1 * (GDP \text{ per capita})_i + \beta_2 * (X_i) + \varepsilon_i,$$

Table 3 displays the coefficients for the OLS-regression models. The first column illustrates the baseline model with GDP per capita as the only country-level variable, which tests the validity of Inglehart's Postmaterialist thesis about the positive relationship between national prosperity and tolerance. This model incorporates all individual-level variables (except social trust). In line with previous research, the social categories that are most likely to be more tolerant of immigration are women, the young, leftists, the highly educated, those from larger communities, believers of less law and order, and people who feel safe in their daily life. The values prove to be statistically significant at the 1%-level, with the exception of the size of town variable. The essential results here, however, are the coefficients of social class and GDP per capita, which move in the expected directions and are both statistically significant. The results thus support Inglehart's Postmaterialist thesis regarding the positive relationship between national wealth and liberal values that in this context are specifically related to attitudes toward immigration. In other words, the results from this regression support Hypothesis 1. Examining the coefficients for social class, the results show that the working class is the least tolerant in comparison with the other social classes. It is worth noting in this respect that this regression is rather simple and is liable to attract omitted variable bias. It could be the case, for instance, that the statistical significance reflects the absence of other important variables needed to be controlled for. The results from the first column will be used as a kind of benchmark to which the constitutive remaining models containing a new set of other factors be compared and contrasted to.

Column 2 conveys the results from Model 2 that tests the second hypothesis. The results here reveal that as inequality increases, as represented by an increase in the Gini coefficient, the level of tolerance decreases. The result is also strongly statistically significant. This is totally in line with the expectation of Hypothesis 2. The results are also quite remarkable. A country with a low Gini index (i.e. where $Gini = 0.2$) has an average attitude that is almost 1.5 points higher on this scale than a country with a very high inequality (i.e. $Gini = 0.4$). The coefficient for GDP per capita also dropped by almost half of its original value in column 1 to 0.00768 units and is not as strongly significant as before. This suggests that the Gini index and GDP per capita

reflect similar mechanisms but with certain deviations. The increased R-squared value indicates that the addition of the Gini index slightly improves the fit of the model.

Model 3, which includes a dimension of trust provides support for Hypothesis 3. As evident in Column 3, the effect of the Gini has increased marginally from Model 2 (-0.0656 vs. -0.0621) and is still strongly statistically significant. This means that social trust and the Gini index reflect quite different mechanisms and as such they are not entirely in line with Uslaner's theory about the relationship between income inequality, trust, and tolerance. Another interesting observation is the effect of the GDP per capita which is reduced to less than half its size, again, and as such no longer statistically significant. This was the effect expected from the Gini index (if we followed Uslaner's (2002) logic). Nevertheless, Uslaner's pivotal notion that economic inequality within nations is a more important predictor of tolerance than national prosperity contains a shred of truth. Model 4 will later show that national wealth does in fact matter, though not for all.

Lastly, Model 4 allows us to test Hypothesis 4, which states that social class and GDP per capita interact in their effects on attitudes toward immigration. As indicated in Column 4, the social class variables are no longer statistically helpful while most other variables have remained relatively unchanged. The interaction effect on attitudes give support for Hypothesis 4. Contrary to what was found in Model 3, the results here are in tune with Inglehart's Postmaterialist proposition that GDP per capita matters, but this effect does not hold equally for all social strata. GDP per capita is relevant mostly for the upper middle class where we can see a relatively strong significance level. On the other hand, for the middle class and the working class, GDP per capita matters far less, and the effect is not even statistically significant. Models 3 and 4 represent the best correspondence with an R-squared of 0.181, suggesting that these models are the most appropriate models given the employed data.²

² I also explored the possibility of capturing a nonlinear effect for GDP per capita by fitting a quadratic trend and by taking its log. None of these potential methods provided a better fit to the data than the final models presented in Table 3. I also considered the possibility that social class and income inequality had different effects on attitudes. This interaction was not statistically significant, however, and was thus not included in the final models.

Table 3: Estimates for OLS Models Predicting Attitudes toward Immigration in 32 Countries
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

VARIABLES	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
National level variables				
GDP per capita	0.0149*** (0.00491)	0.00722* (0.00395)	0.00312 (0.00403)	0.00281 (0.00402)
Gini coefficient		-0.0656*** (0.0148)	-0.0621*** (0.0156)	-0.0620*** (0.0155)
Individual level variables				
Upper middle class	0.331*** (0.0569)	0.369*** (0.0535)	0.306*** (0.0500)	-0.0109 (0.151)
Middle class	0.128*** (0.0407)	0.0933** (0.0371)	0.0638* (0.0361)	0.0475 (0.137)
Working class	0	0	0	0
Trust in people			0.165*** (0.00857)	0.165*** (0.00856)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0.00887** (0.00380)
Middle class				0.000528 (0.00320)
Working class				0
Political ideology	-0.101*** (0.0137)	-0.101*** (0.0137)	-0.104*** (0.0130)	-0.104*** (0.0130)
Age	-0.0225*** (0.00280)	-0.0226*** (0.00283)	-0.0201*** (0.00271)	-0.0202*** (0.00271)
Age ²	0.000170*** (2.67e-05)	0.000162*** (2.63e-05)	0.000129*** (2.52e-05)	0.000130*** (2.53e-05)
Gender (Men = 1)	-0.0844*** (0.0179)	-0.0825*** (0.0183)	-0.0589*** (0.0173)	-0.0590*** (0.0173)
Education (in years)	0.104*** (0.00601)	0.0992*** (0.00566)	0.0850*** (0.00498)	0.0850*** (0.00504)
Importance of law and order	0.0413*** (0.0150)	0.0342** (0.0148)	0.0297** (0.0144)	0.0298** (0.0144)
Feeling of safety	-0.409*** (0.0228)	-0.409*** (0.0206)	-0.343*** (0.0202)	-0.343*** (0.0202)
<i>Size of town</i>				
A big city	0.373*** (0.0705)	0.406*** (0.0651)	0.418*** (0.0602)	0.418*** (0.0601)

Suburbs or outskirts of big city	0.293*** (0.0772)	0.341*** (0.0740)	0.356*** (0.0704)	0.354*** (0.0702)
Town or small city	0.193*** (0.0593)	0.216*** (0.0556)	0.237*** (0.0526)	0.236*** (0.0526)
Country village	0.137** (0.0554)	0.128** (0.0513)	0.157*** (0.0489)	0.155*** (0.0490)
Farm or home in countryside	0	0	0	0
<i>Survey year</i>				
2002	0	0	0	0
2004	-0.312* (0.168)	-0.209 (0.180)	-0.172 (0.175)	-0.173 (0.174)
2006	-0.434* (0.243)	-0.271 (0.212)	-0.245 (0.209)	-0.247 (0.208)
2008	-0.442** (0.197)	-0.212 (0.187)	-0.130 (0.188)	-0.131 (0.188)
2010	-0.459** (0.200)	-0.260 (0.188)	-0.215 (0.190)	-0.214 (0.190)
2012	-0.336 (0.267)	-0.142 (0.208)	-0.107 (0.216)	-0.107 (0.216)
Constant	5.650*** (0.213)	7.981*** (0.520)	7.170*** (0.551)	7.178*** (0.548)
Observations	211,669	194,809	194,526	194,526
R-squared	0.133	0.149	0.181	0.182
N_clust	150	139	139	139

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6.3 Robustness testing

To test the robustness of the results, I run the same econometric specification as above, using the same dependent variable at a more disaggregated level. In the main regression in the Section 6.2, I aggregate attitudes toward various aspects of immigration, e.g. from a cultural and economic perspective. A recurrent point of interest was how individuals experience the phenomenon of immigration and whether it contributes in one way or another for the prosperity of the welcoming nation. Instead of grouping these into one, I will run regressions where each individual variable will be the only dependent variable and then compare the discrepancies with the original and composite variable from Table 2.

I regress Models 1-4 for each disaggregated dependent variable, and the results for the effect of the control variables on the dependent variable are illustrated in Table 4. Even though all the regressions were run with all the control variables, the Table only shows for the sake of simplicity the results of the variables that are particularly interesting.

Table 4: Estimates for OLS Models Predicting Attitudes toward Immigration in 32 Countries
Using a Disaggregated Dependent Variable

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Allow people from poorer countries to live here				
GDP per capita	0.0144*** (0.00471)	0.00764* (0.00415)	0.00413 (0.00413)	-0.00113 (0.00149)
Gini coefficient		-0.0590*** (0.0150)	-0.0557*** (0.0153)	0.0190*** (0.00559)
Trust in people			0.134*** (0.00967)	-0.0421*** (0.00331)
Upper middle class	0.634*** (0.0754)	0.649*** (0.0743)	0.564*** (0.0710)	-0.0731 (0.0875)
Middle class	0.221*** (0.0506)	0.182*** (0.0494)	0.147*** (0.0488)	-0.0327 (0.0660)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0-0.00143 (0.00200)
Middle class				0.000114 (0.00155)
Observations	226,409	208,035	207,646	206,152
R-squared	0.066	0.076	0.091	0.104
Immigration bad or good for economy				
GDP per capita	0.0149*** (0.00366)	0.00962*** (0.00295)	0.00452 (0.00294)	0.00304 (0.00297)
Gini coefficient		-0.0449*** (0.0107)	-0.0400*** (0.0116)	-0.0363*** (0.0123)
Trust in people			0.196*** (0.00951)	0.177*** (0.00901)
Upper middle class	0.733*** (0.0870)	0.751*** (0.0831)	0.628*** (0.0748)	0.0301 (0.223)
Middle class	0.168*** (0.0386)	0.139*** (0.0378)	0.0892** (0.0369)	-0.0429 (0.125)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0.00988* (0.00507)
Middle class				0.00165 (0.00303)

Observations	225,222	206,895	206,520	205,039
R-squared	0.055	0.060	0.094	0.112
Cultural life undermined/ enriched by immigrant				
GDP per capita	0.0238*** (0.00640)	0.0128** (0.00503)	0.00777 (0.00515)	0.00612 (0.00519)
Gini coefficient		-0.0960*** (0.0186)	-0.0908*** (0.0196)	-0.0878*** (0.0202)
Trust in people			0.196*** (0.0100)	0.175*** (0.00947)
Upper middle class	0.574*** (0.0972)	0.609*** (0.0881)	0.483*** (0.0791)	-0.150 (0.200)
Middle class	0.309*** (0.0526)	0.253*** (0.0491)	0.201*** (0.0482)	0.0754 (0.169)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0.0106** (0.00512)
Middle class				0.00142 (0.00390)
Observations	225,853	207,509	207,127	205,636
R-squared	0.087	0.109	0.139	0.156
Immigration make country worse or a better place to live				
GDP per capita	0.0158*** (0.00532)	0.00686 (0.00423)	0.00177 (0.00426)	0.000193 (0.00424)
Gini coefficient		-0.0752*** (0.0147)	-0.0705*** (0.0157)	-0.0679*** (0.0164)
Trust in people			0.194*** (0.00985)	0.179*** (0.00916)
Upper middle class	0.581*** (0.0832)	0.614*** (0.0783)	0.489*** (0.0697)	-0.222 (0.153)
Middle class	0.183*** (0.0415)	0.139*** (0.0380)	0.0875** (0.0370)	-0.0933 (0.143)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0.0144*** (0.00412)
Middle class				0.00350 (0.00333)
Observations	224,963	206,522	206,151	204,666
R-squared	0.067	0.084	0.120	0.133
Original model				

GDP per capita	0.0149*** (0.00491)	0.00722* (0.00395)	0.00312 (0.00403)	0.00281 (0.00402)
Gini coefficient		-0.0656*** (0.0148)	-0.0621*** (0.0156)	-0.0620*** (0.0155)
Upper middle class	0.331*** (0.0569)	0.369*** (0.0535)	0.306*** (0.0500)	-0.0109 (0.151)
Middle class	0.128*** (0.0407)	0.0933** (0.0371)	0.0638* (0.0361)	0.0475 (0.137)
Trust in people			0.165*** (0.00857)	0.165*** (0.00856)
<i>GDP * social class interaction</i>				
Upper middle class				0.00887** (0.00380)
Middle class				0.000528 (0.00320)
Observations	211,669	194,809	194,526	
R-squared	0.133	0.149	0.181	
Robust standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

By comparing the results to the main regressions, it is evident that the estimates bear the same signs and correspond to the most significance levels. Hence, the hypotheses still have tangible validity. However, the sizes of the various estimates vary to some extent from the main regression. The pattern of interest, on the other hand, persists and all hypotheses still hold.

7. Discussion and conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to investigate to what extent income inequality affects attitudes toward immigration and how they vary in connection with different social classes. As my findings suggest, the income inequality negatively affects attitudes toward immigration. In addition to this, I also sought to stir new insights regarding the concepts of Postmaterialism, income inequality, and the consequences in attitudes they entail toward immigration. Initially, I started by examining Inglehart's Postmaterialist proposition. He asserts that generations raised with high levels of national wealth tend to put greater emphasis on liberal values in modern and advanced industrial societies. Following this string of thoughts, I found that GDP per capita does in fact have a significant effect on positive attitudes toward immigration. However, when controlling for income inequality, the significance of the level of per-capita GDP was slightly diminished. When controlling for the factor social trust on the other hand, the effects of this variable decreased dramatically. This implies that national prosperity and trust engender similar effects and mechanisms on attitudes toward immigration. However, the effect and significance of the Gini index remained relatively unchanged. Further analysis that allowed per-capita GDP to interact with social class indicated that economic development matters expectedly *only* for the upper middle class, with no significant effect on the middle and working class.

The perceptions reported in this thesis are consistent with Uslaner's (2002) theory; that social trust is crucial in relation to explaining attitudes toward immigration and that income inequality does a better job in explaining tolerance. My findings however are slightly divergent from Uslaner's in certain respects. According to Uslaner, economic inequality undermines social trust and hence generates intolerance. My results however suggest that it is rather the national wealth and social trust that through similar mechanisms are apt to explain attitudes toward immigration. Previous research, then, indulges in what I perceive as a kind of simplification when implicitly assuming a causal relationship between income equality and social trust. Although this paper focused on income, if we were to rather look at household wealth, the rise of inequality would have been even greater (Inglehart, 2015) which could mean that the variable could be even stronger than my results indicated.

Another finding that contributes to the current literature about Postmaterialism, is the importance of considering and controlling for the *relative* inequality within nations when measuring social values and attitudes. It is in place to maintain that looking upon different countries as homogenous entities is not an effective way for understanding social values and

attitudes, according to my findings. As the results indicated, tolerance levels differ to a great extent across different social classes. These findings are in tune with previous research (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Svallfors, 2006), that showed that tolerance is least likely among the working class and it enhances further up we go on the social ladder.

It is my contention that class and national prosperity interact in their impacts on attitudes toward immigration. To put it differently, the manner in which national wealth influences the individuals' attitudes, is highly dependent on his or her economic conditions. Andersen and Fetner (2008) found that national wealth matters for all social classes with the exception for the working class. However, by improving upon their model with more recent data, I found that per-capita GDP matters exclusively for the upper middle class that constitutes the top 16% of the population and grew up surrounded by higher formative security. This perception does by no means apply for the middle and working class, according to my findings. It leads us to the assumption that the gap between the various social strata is considerably wider than previously envisaged. Although national prosperity is unquestionably essential, it falls short of sufficiently clarifying the differences in attitudes according to social class. In other words, the Postmaterialist thesis is valid and serviceable in its core; that national wealth leads to more liberal values, but it is applicable only for the individuals who gain the most from it.

Another important finding is related to the concept of social class and its utility in explaining various political phenomena across modern industrial societies (Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999). At the very least, these findings cast doubt on scholars arguing that the applicability of social class is no longer a "meaningful social entity" (Pakulski and Waters, 1997; Weeden and Grusky, 2005). They claim that class still matters but that modern societies have become too complex to employ broad category class schemes. I found however that belonging to a special social class proves relatively significant despite using a variable that only includes three broad social classes. We could observe conspicuous class differences despite the confinement to three broad categories. It underlines the fact that class differences still exist. It is worth mentioning that I used the occupation of father in combination with the respondent's income as a proxy for social class, which has its advantages and limitations. A suggestion for future research is to deploy an even more sophisticated proxy, which could lead to even further insights.

Other interesting areas for future research worth pursuing and dwelling upon is the effect of inequality on other Postmaterialist issues. Although the article had an exclusive focus on

attitudes toward immigration, the results obtained would be interesting to contrast to other phenomena and their respective sensitivity toward economic conditions. Although Postmaterialist issues are correlated, their attitudes are surely not identical (Loftus, 2001; Treas, 2002; Andersen and Fetner, 2008).

Tolerance constitutes an integral part of a functioning democracy. The fact that Europe is quickly becoming one of the most diverse regions in the world makes it imperative for policy makers to take into account income inequality and its implications on attitudes toward immigrants. Negative stances toward immigration can reveal intolerance toward minorities existing within the boundaries of a nation. As economic inequality expands, it can lead to tensions between the constituent groups with negative reverberations on the economy and the democracy. Previous studies regarding Postmaterialism concluded that the promotion of tolerance is mainly achieved through focus on national prosperity, the findings from this thesis indicate that income inequality needs to be addressed in combination with it. Failing to do this may result in tensions along social classes with an increased polarization and alienation. Important to this argument is the observations carried out by Sniderman and Haegendoorn (2007) regarding multiculturalism in the Netherlands, that pinpoint the counterproductive effect of various policies and legislation intended to protect different minority groups. The authors mean that the exerted efforts for alleviating the burdens of these groups can become counterproductive. They exacerbate the level of resistance from the native population of the respective country. Such policies may in fact intensify the effect of inequality on attitudes toward immigrants and outgroups (Andersen and Fetner, 2008).

Governments are advised to pursue policies that aim at redistributing income in order to reduce inequality. This could be performed through the implementation of progressive taxation, the expansion of the welfare state, strengthening the regulation of the labor markets, and developing international arrangements. Such measures can prevent firms from avoiding taxes by shifting their assets or operations overseas (Inglehart, 2015). For future research, it would be interesting to analyze the impact of such policies.

In conclusion, my findings and perceptions draw upon the Postmaterialist thesis that both absolute and relative economic security can influence Postmaterialist issues. Compared to previous researches, I show that the gap between the various existent social classes is even wider when taking into account the individual's income level and to what extent he or she lived in economic security during his/her formative years. National wealth per se generates tolerance

in connection with some social groups and not all of them; those situated higher up in the income distribution. This underlines the importance of considering income inequality within countries and not just across countries. This consideration would make it possible to detect the differences in tolerance levels among various social classes. The general idea of the Postmaterialist still holds, that economic security enables people to shift attention away from material concerns to other liberal values. According to the accumulated data, the upper middle class and above, become more tolerant toward immigration as per-capita GDP increases; while the middle and working class exhibit less tolerant attitudes despite the prevailing high national wealth. This insight could offer an explanation as to why we see electoral success for far-right parties even during economic booms. As such, high levels of tolerance are more likely to prevail in prosperous societies, where the benefits associated with national wealth are relatively equally shared among all their members.

8. References

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9 Appendix

9.1

In ESS, the following countries were surveyed for each year:

ESS round (→)	1	2	3	4	5	6
Country (↓)						
Austria	X	X	X			
Belgium	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria			X	X	X	X
Croatia				X	X	
Cyprus			X	X	X	X
Czech Republic			X	X	X	X
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X	X
Estonia		X	X	X	X	X
Finland	X	X	X	X	X	X
France	X	X	X	X	X	X
Germany	X	X	X	X	X	X
Greece	X	X		X	X	X
Hungary	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland		X				X
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X	X
Israel	X			X	X	X

Italy	X	X				X
Lithuania					X	X
Luxemburg	X	X				
Netherlands	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X	X
Russian Federation		X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia		X	X	X	X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X	X
Switzerland	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkey		X		X		
Ukraine		X	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X	X	X	X	X

9.2

The exact wording of the questionnaire items used for this thesis are as follows:

- TRUST: [...] do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
- POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?
- SAFETY: How safe do you - or would you - feel walking alone in this area after dark?

- Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.
“She/he believes that people should do what they are told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.”