

Transposition of Legitimacy Across Fields

A Case Study of the Swedish Gambling Industry

Abstract: In early 2019 the Swedish online gambling industry was re-regulated, paving way for private operators to establish business. These operators resorted to various marketing activities as they battled for market share. Curiously, an eID-solution became a common element in marketing. We identified a desire to gain legitimacy. This led us to our research question: can legitimacy theory explain why gambling operators heavily marketed their eID-solution, if so how? By combining institutional concepts of transposition and legitimacy we aimed to explore if legitimacy can be a subject for transposition across two organizational fields. We found that cultural-cognitive legitimacy can be transposed, but that the gain was temporary as the legitimate field retaliated out of fear of losing legitimacy. Here, we identified that the state of legitimacy can prevent the durability of the transposition.

Keywords: Electronic Identification, Gambling, Institutional Theory, Organizational Legitimacy, Transposition

Authors: Gustaf Banér (22703)

Christoffer Ripe (50382)

Tutor: Örjan Sölvell, *Professor, Department of Marketing and Strategy*

Examiner: Carin Holmquist, *Professor Emirita, House of Innovation*

Henrik Glimstedt, *Associate Professor, Department of Marketing and Strategy*

Master Program in Business Management

Stockholm School of Economics

Gustaf Banér and Christoffer Ripe, 2019

Acknowledgement

We would like to take this opportunity to thank the participants for their time and for the exciting conversations. It has truly been a privilege to learn more about the e-identification and the gambling industry.

The thesis would not have been possible without the wisdom and aid from our supervisor, Örjan Sölvell – we are forever grateful. We would also like to thank Stockholm School of Economics for this opportunity to develop, both academically and professionally. It has been five (and six) wonderful years.

Lastly, we would to thank our family and friends for the great support along the journey.

Thank you.

Gustaf Banér and Christoffer Ripe

Definitions

<i>BankID</i>	The organization, Finansiell ID-Teknik AB, the and banks that provide BankID and the eID-solution in itself is used interchangeably under BankID.
<i>Constituent</i>	‘One who authorizes another to act as agent’. (Merriam-Webster, n.d.) We have chosen to adapt Wood’s (1991) view of an organization’s immediate audiences as constituents, that ultimately have the power to grant organizations legitimacy.
<i>eID</i>	Electronic identification is secure digital solutions, developed for proof of identity of citizens.
<i>Gambling</i>	To play a game for money or to bet on an uncertain outcome. (Merriam-Webster, n.d.) We will focus on online gambling.
<i>Legitimacy</i>	‘Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995:574).
<i>Marketing</i>	The process or technique of promoting a product or service. (Merriam-Webster, n.d.)
<i>Organizational field</i>	An organizational field is the ‘set of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:148).
<i>Private operator</i>	Privately owned gambling operators that are present in the Swedish online gambling industry. We will focus on online gambling operators.
<i>State-owned operator</i>	Fully state-owned gambling operators that are present in the Swedish online gambling industry. We will focus on online gambling operators.
<i>ToL</i>	Transposition of legitimacy across two organizational fields.
<i>Transposition</i>	Transposition is when an actor selects and transport an institutional element across two organizational fields (Sewell, 1992).

Table of Contents

Introduction	5
1.1 Research gap	7
1.2 Research purpose and question	7
1.3 Delimitation	8
Literature review and theoretical framework	9
2.1 Institutions	9
2.2 Legitimacy	10
2.3 Transposition	14
2.4 Synthesis and theoretical gap	15
2.5 Theoretical Framework	15
Methodology	17
3.1 Pre-study	17
3.2 Research design and approach	18
3.3 Data collection	20
3.4 Quality of the study	24
Empirical Findings	26
4.1 The gambling field	26
4.2 The e-identification field	33
4.3 BankID in the context of gambling	36
4.4 BankID in gambling marketing	37
4.5 BankID reacts	40
Discussion	43
5.1 An organizational field that lacks legitimacy	43
5.2 BankID as a legitimate institution	46
5.3 Transposition of legitimacy	47
Conclusion	55
6.1 Theoretical contribution	55
6.2 Managerial implications	56
6.3 Limitations	57
6.4 Future research	57
References	58
Appendices	67

Introduction

Empowered by the digitization, the Swedish online gambling industry has experienced rapid growth. Despite a prevailing state-monopoly, overseas gambling operators had been able to gradually steal a larger market share (Finansdepartementet, 2017). These operators were not obliged to follow Swedish jurisdiction and did therefore not pay any taxes in Sweden. Adding to this, the industry is morally sensitive by nature, and exhibits low perception of the general public (Svenskt Kvalitetsindex, 2019). On this account, there was a desire from the state to regain control over the market, both in terms of compliance and image (Finansdepartementet, 2017). The unsustainable situation came to an end when the market was re-regulated the 1st of January 2019. The re-regulation enforced a license-based system where licensees were granted access to the Swedish market and was now competing under the same conditions as the former state-owned monopolists (Sveriges Riksdag, 2018).

After the re-regulation private operators (overseas and new) established business and battled for market share, resorting to various marketing efforts. Swedish media was flooded with online gambling marketing. In the first quarter following the re-regulation, there was an increase of 40 percent in marketing spend among the ten largest actors, compared to 2018 (Naess, 2019). In general, gambling marketing from private operators are distinguished by content related to speed, bonuses or favorable odds, all with the objective of attracting new potential gamblers. However, in early 2019, one element was haphazardly added to their marketing, which raised questions.

In their marketing an e-identification solution, BankID, started to appear in this context of marketing. In many cases, the BankID brand was larger than the brand of the operator. In other cases, it was featured out-of-context. The brand spread like wildfire across the industry as it was featured by almost all operators, large and small. Why was this seemingly technical product marketed to such a large extent? After all, in the grand scheme of things, the verification stage plays a minor role in the gambling experience. The occurrence of BankID in marketing is an intriguing phenomenon. So, we asked ourselves: why BankID?

BankID was developed by some of the largest banks in Sweden. The solution is owned and maintained by Finansiell ID-Teknik AB, which in turn also is bank-owned (BankID, n.d.). The solution is unrivaled in popularity and is considered one of Sweden's most trusted brands (Lynxeye, 2019). Perhaps this trust stems from its close association to important institutions. Banks are supplying the solution, while others, like the Swedish Tax Agency, have integrated its solution into their platform. It is therefore an integral part of the Swedish society. Hence, the inclusion of BankID was most likely not a coincidence from a legitimization perspective.




Figure 1.1: Timeline of the studied phenomenon

This study will research this phenomenon from an organizational legitimation standpoint. From the very beginning of institutional theory, legitimacy has been considered a key concept (Scott, 1995). Legitimacy plays a vital role for organizational survival as it affects social and economic exchange with other actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). When organizations are considered debated or illegitimate they become less desirable for stakeholders in the organizational field to interact with. It is therefore decisive for the performance and survival of these actors to engage in legitimacy gaining activities, an area that has been researched extensively by previous scholars (Suchman, 1995). Developing ties with important institutions both in terms institutional linkages and partnerships have been put forward as plausible strategies for gaining legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Dacin, Oliver and Roy, 2007).

However, these scholars have primarily focused on legitimacy gaining activities within an organizational field. Less attention has been given to legitimacy gaining activities across two separate fields. This seems to be the case in the studied phenomenon which makes it interesting to research from a theoretical standpoint. Importation theory deals with how an institutional element can be transported across two distinctly different fields. If the element is not altered as it is transported across fields, it is an act of transposition (Sewell, 1992). Some scholars illustrate how legitimacy can be gained as a secondary effect by transposing an institutional practice (Haydu, 2002; Hwang and Powell, 2005). Extending this line of thought, we would like to explore if legitimacy can be a subject for transposition. In light of this, we wish to investigate if the inclusion of BankID in marketing translates to an attempt to transpose legitimacy from the e-identification field to the gambling field.

1.1 Research gap

There is a plethora of research relating to legitimacy in various organizational contexts. However, transposition theory has not been an integral part of organizational legitimacy theory, and we therefore wish to research these in tandem. These are the research gaps we have identified:

As these two theoretical fields has not been combined extensively in previous research, our first objective is to address this gap. Transposition of legitimacy (TOL) is the mechanism that bridges these theories. Our aspiration is to demonstrate that TOL can be applied to our empirical context, and by extension fill this gap.

The second gap we wish to address concerns legitimacy gains. Previous literature has identified various ways that legitimacy can be gained (Greenwood et al, 2017). What is often lacking is a richer analysis of what types of legitimacy were gained. As Suchman's (1995) definition is far superior in terms of popularity, we hope to contribute empirically by applying an adapted version of his framework to our empirical context.

Lastly, previous transposition literature does not explicitly incorporate the state of legitimacy of the two fields. By taking this into consideration we wish to nuance the legitimation process. Our case study could therefore give new meaning to legitimation theory that is, by nature, abstract (Kanter, 1977).

1.2 Research purpose and question

The purpose of our study is to generate a richer understanding of legitimacy gaining theory by combining the literature of legitimacy and transposition on our identified empirical context; the inclusion of BankID in gambling marketing. Based on the identified research gap, our study has been guided by the following research question:

Can legitimacy theory explain why gambling operators heavily marketed their eID-solution, if so how?

In turn, we hope to enrich our findings by incorporating the types of legitimacy and the current state of legitimacy of the two fields into the analysis. The subsequent fallout of the legitimation process is also covered in our scope.

1.3 Delimitation

The thesis will focus primarily on the online gambling industry in Sweden, and the usage of BankID in marketing. While the online gambling industry may experience other tensions or challenges related to the re-regulation, these are beyond scope and will therefore be excluded from our study.

Literature review and theoretical framework

2.1 Institutions

Institutional theory explains how organizational behavior is characterized beyond rationality. It focuses on how organizations are formed and governed by their surroundings, invasive patterns and modernities rather than from simple rational behavior (Greenwood et al, 2017). The research field has multiple sub-branches where neo-institutionalism has become most prominent. Neo-institutionalism builds on the conviction that organizational behavior is shaped by institutional arrangement and social processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Going forward, we have decided to break down our research question ‘can legitimacy theory explain why gambling operators heavily marketed their eID-solution, if so how?’, in accordance to three institutional concepts, *organizational field theory*, *organizational legitimacy theory*, *transposition theory*.

2.1.1 Organizational field

A fundamental concept that permeates neo-institutionalism is organizational fields (Scott, 1991). This is a construct described by Scott (1995:56) as ‘a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field’. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006:28) adds to the definition by describing an organizational field as ‘clusters of organizations and occupations whose boundaries, identities and interactions are defined and stabilized by shared institutional logics’. Thus, the term has become recognized to illustrate core actors that constitute a central organizing unit of institutional life including suppliers, resources and consumers, state-agencies and other organizations that produce similar services or products (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

Scott (1995) argues that the behavior in the organizational field is shaped by three institutional structures: cultural-cognitive (what is taken for granted or held objectively true), normative (what is considered appropriate) and regulative (what is regulatory and legally acceptable). In turn, this provides the field with stability and collective social behavior (Scott, 1995). These institutionalized structures pressure field members to adopt similar structure and forms, what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describes as isomorphism. As actors incorporate commonly used elements, organizations in the field become homogeneous in structure, culture and output (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

2.2 Legitimacy

2.2.1 What is legitimacy?

Legitimacy has been defined in various ways over the years (Suchman, 1995). A popular definition was provided by Suchman (1995:574); ‘Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’. Many, including Suchman himself, later advocated the removal of the word ‘desirable’ in the definition to avoid confusion with status or reputation (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). We have chosen to use Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy but excluded the aspects of desirability.

Legitimacy can be used to evaluate various subjects, including organizations and its attributes and behavior (Johnson 2004). Suchman (1995) argues that legitimacy is perceptive, or assumption based, since it represents observers’ reactions when observing organizations. Legitimacy is therefore possessed objectively by organizations but created subjectively by its constituents (Suchman, 1995). It is dependent on the collective audience and therefore an organization’s actions must be congruent with the behavior of the social group it is addressing (Suchman, 1995). Apart from that a legitimate organization is perceived as more worthy, Suchman (1995:575) also argues they appear ‘...more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy’.

Deephouse and Suchman (2008) suggest that legitimacy is dichotomous; an organization is either *legitimate* or *illegitimate*. They explain that an organization can become ‘more legitimate’ by becoming more legitimate to more people, or more legitimate by becoming more clearly legitimate (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Conversely, Greenwood et al. (2017) argues that legitimacy is not dichotomous but rather a spectrum of four states reaching from: *accepted*, *proper*, *debated* to *illegitimate*. The difference between *accepted* organizations and *proper* organizations in a social system lies in the degree of active evaluation. The former is not actively evaluated, thus passively accepted or taken-for-granted, ultimately enjoying a low level of scrutiny, whilst the latter can be subject of recent evaluations. Organizations in a social system can be viewed as both accepted and proper at the same time, depending on the stakeholder. This is exemplified by Greenwood et al. (2017): a long-standing food company that might be taken-for-granted by some stakeholders (e.g. customers) but are still subject to food inspections from state-agencies, deeming them proper. If there is active disagreement regarding an organization’s activities or values present in a social system (i.e. organizational field), the organization can be considered *debated* (Meyer and Scott, 1983; Hirsch and Andrews, 1984). In the context of the

food industry, this could be a result of a *Listeria* outbreak at a company or, genetically modified food. An *illegitimate* organization is widely considered inappropriate and its existence is seriously questioned. As we believe that there are nuances to organizational legitimacy we have chosen to incorporate Greenwood et al. (2017) more elaborative view of legitimacy.

2.2.2 Types of legitimacy

Among institutional scholars there seem to be a general agreement of what constitutes legitimacy, yet it has been compartmentalized in many ways (Deephhouse and Suchman, 2008). Having extensively reviewed the field, Greenwood et al. (2017) divided legitimacy into four criteria that aim to encapsulate past research: *regulatory*, *pragmatic*, *moral* and *cultural-cognitive* legitimacy.

Regulatory legitimacy stems from complying to rules and regulations of a nation-state (Greenwood et al., 2017). Organizations must have the legal mandate in order to be present in the field and be perceived as legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Moral legitimacy on the other hand, is based on whether an action is “the right thing to do”, i.e. if it confers to the observer’s social values. It is therefore ‘sociotropic’ (Suchman, 1995). Conversely, pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interest of the evaluator and it therefore arises from a rational assessment whether the organizational activities are beneficial for its constituents (Suchman, 1995). An actor can also address pragmatic legitimacy by improving the environment for the broader audience (political, economic or social interdependencies) that indirectly affect constituents well-being (Suchman, 1995). Lastly, cultural-cognitive legitimacy regards the taken-for-grantedness of an organization in a field by its constituents, that the organization’s existence is ‘necessary or inevitable’ (Suchman, 1995). As Jepperson (1991) noted, cultural-cognitive aspects are separate from evaluation. An organization can be taken-for-granted and be a subject for either positive or negative evaluation.

2.2.3 Gaining legitimacy

Different scenarios or situations require different strategies in terms of legitimacy management (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995). Suchman (1995) proposed three general challenges when it comes to legitimacy management: *gaining*, *maintaining* and *repairing*. In our case study we investigate whether a specific strategy can increase legitimacy and therefore it makes sense to focus on legitimacy gaining strategies. In broad strokes, regulatory legitimacy can be gained by *applying and meeting standards*, pragmatic legitimacy by *demonstrating adequate performance*, moral legitimacy by *fitting with social values* and cultural-cognitive legitimacy by *conforming to meaning systems* (Greenwood et al., 2017).

Suchman (1995) describes three types of legitimacy-gaining strategies: *conform* to pre-existing environments, *select* among environments and *manipulating* environmental structures. How actors conform to the pre-existing environment falls outside of our scope. We are studying how the industry interacts rather than looking at how individual actors conform to established actors. In similar fashion, ‘select among environments’ to become accepted ‘as is’, is not true in our case either. Our empirical context suggests that an action has been taken to reflect attributes from another field. This leads us to the final legitimacy-gaining strategy: manipulating environmental structures. Here an actor ‘manipulate environmental structure by creating new audiences and new legitimating beliefs’ (Suchman, 1995:587). Herforth, the strategy of manipulating environmental structures will be the foundation of our legitimacy analysis.

Pragmatic legitimacy can be gained by product advertising, or by image advertising (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). To gain moral legitimacy is a far more complex assignment. For a single organization it can be done by demonstrating superior technical success. However, since moral legitimacy is socially constructed (Powell, 1991), isolated performance is not the most efficient way to gain moral legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Instead, organizations should join forces and perform collective actions and ‘proselytize’ that e.g. outputs, structure and mission honor social values (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1994). Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is in this strategy also dependent on collective action and can be gained by ‘mimicking standards and seek certifications’ (Suchman, 1995:600). Encouraged isomorphism can in this matter promote standardization and increase the taken-for-grantedness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). We assume that regulatory legitimacy-gaining strategies is not addressed by Suchman (1995) as it is often ingrained in other types of legitimacy. In accordance to recent literature we have chosen to disentangle regulatory legitimacy from the other type of legitimacies. Compliance is a reliant strategy to gain regulatory legitimacy and is therefore incorporated in our framework (Greenwood et al., 2017). See *Table 2.1* for a summary of this.

Concept	Definition	Conceptual example
<i>Regulatory</i>	Legitimacy is gained by complying to regulations	Degree of monitoring, complying to rules and regulations
<i>Pragmatic</i>	Legitimacy is gained from the self-interest from constituents	Superior product features, cost savings, risk reduction
<i>Moral</i>	Legitimacy is gained from the level of appropriateness of an organization's actions	Adhering to business norms and social values
<i>Cultural-cognitive</i>	Legitimacy is gained from mimicry of the environment and being taken-for-granted	The level of cultural closeness, comprehensibility, communicative ability

Table 2.1: Types of legitimacy (*Adapted framework from Karlsson and Middleton, 2015*)

Notably, institutional linkage, alliances and partnerships has received some attention by scholars (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Dacin, Oliver and Roy, 2007). These theories are concerned with developing strong ties to established institution to be perceived as more legitimate (Baum and Oliver, 1991). These findings tend to rest on bilateral agreements, which was missing in our empirical case study (the unlawful use in marketing).

2.2.4 Why does legitimacy matter?

A plethora of literature describes how legitimacy influence behavior and its decisiveness for organizational performance and survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). It plays a crucial role for organizations, primarily as it affects social and economic exchange since stakeholders in an organizational field prefer to engage with legitimate actors (Greenwood et al., 2017). There is a tendency for members to incorporate institutional elements to be perceived as legitimate in an organizational field to ensure its survival and avoid being questioned as a field member (Greenwood et al., 2017). When organizations are considered legitimate it enables them to act freely in their organizational field (Knoke, 1985; Deephouse, 1996; Brown, 1998). As legitimacy is vital for market access, the implication for illegitimate and debated organizations is limited freedom and close monitoring by constituents (Greenwood et al., 2017).

2.3 Transposition

2.3.1 What is transposition?

Transposition is one of three different types of processes for importing institutional elements from another organizational field; *translation*, *theorization* and *transposition* (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). These processes are interrelated but does not necessarily materialize in a progressive fashion (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). Translation is the act when organizations adapt and modify an institutional element to fit their own organizational field (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Campbell, 2004). Theorization is when organizations generalize a translation to enable diffusion in the institutional environment (Strang and Meyer, 1994). Lastly, transposition occurs when an actor selects and transport an institutional element across two organizational fields (Sewell, 1992).

Sewell (1992) was the first to describe transposition in an institutional context and defined it as the process through which organizational actors select and transport schemas and resources across two institutional/organizational fields. The perception of transposition was widened by Stryker (1994) that acknowledged that rules could also be entitled for transposition. Later transposition has been developed to include various subjects, including institutional templates, practices, elements, forms and logics that are imported from one institutional field to another (Schneiberg, 2002; Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Hwang and Powell, 2005; Schneiberg, 2006; Powell and Sandholtz, 2012; Skog and Sölvell, 2019).

2.3.2 Driving and enabling factors of transposition

Today, scholars do not have a common understanding of the causes behind institutional transposition. Some scholars suggest that transposition is a consequence of newcomers entering a field (Schneiberg, 2002; Padgett and McLean, 2006), bringing qualities from their field of origin (Powell and Sandholtz, 2012). Conversely, Tracey and Phillips (2011) argues that actors performing a transposition could either be from the field which the subject was transposed from or the field where it was transposed to.

Schneiberg (2013) portrayed several facilitating factors of transposition including a crisis in the field. Similarly, Djelic (2001) and Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005) emphasized the presence of an acute crisis as a basis for transposition. Hwang and Powell (2005) added that an exogenous shock can be a motive for transposition. Evidently, the motives of an institutional transposition vary, but seem to be related to an urgent need of change in the field.

2.4 Synthesis and theoretical gap

Legitimacy has been extensively studied across various organizational contexts. Originally focusing on organizational survival, the field has now started to investigate its effect on other types of organizational success (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). We have chosen to view legitimacy as a form of appropriateness (according to the four types of legitimacy), depending on the state of the organization (Greenwood et al., 2017).

Translation and theorization have received substantial attention in previous research, while transposition has received little attention (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). Even fewer studies have combined legitimacy theory with transposition theory. When legitimacy has been researched in the context of transposition, it has been viewed as a secondary consequence of transposing an institutional element (Haydu, 2002; Hwang and Powell, 2005). While there are many subjects of transposition, it is not clear whether legitimacy itself can be a subject for transposition.

Legitimacy can be gained in multiple ways (Greenwood et al., 2017). Suchman (1995) presents one possible strategy that is less understood in this context; manipulation of the environment. It would be interesting to see if this strategy could set the groundwork for a transposition of legitimacy. In terms of what type of legitimacy that can be gained, we believe that previous case studies lack a richer legitimacy analysis. The four types that Suchman (1995) proposes, that is later adapted in Greenwood et al.'s (2017) handbook, could serve as an excellent foundation for such an analysis. Perhaps, additional insights could be obtained by incorporating the different states of legitimacy.

We will address the identified theoretical gaps by (1) analyzing if legitimacy can be transposed across fields by manipulating the environment (Suchman, 1995). In turn, we will (2) investigate what type of legitimacy (regulatory, pragmatic, moral and cultural-cognitive) that was gained from the transposition (Greenwood et al., 2017). To nuance the analysis, we will (3) incorporate the current state of legitimacy in the two organizational fields (Greenwood et al., 2017).

2.5 Theoretical Framework

Our ambition is to investigate the identified theoretical gaps by using legitimacy and transposition literature as a theoretical framework. The empirical context is BankID in the Swedish online gambling market, which makes an interesting case. By researching transposition by applying legitimacy lens to our empirical context, we hope to identify how legitimacy can be transposed. See *Figure 2.1* for the theoretical framework.




Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework

Methodology

In this chapter we will outline the methodology of our study. The chapter will be divided into four areas: *pre-study*, *research design and approach*, *data collection* and *quality of the study*. The pre-study aims to illustrate how the thesis developed from the initial focus to the research topic. The second and third section elaborates on the chosen methodological approach and what were considered in the research process, in terms of data collection and data analysis. In the final section we reflect on the quality of our research.

3.1 Pre-study

3.1.1 Initial focus

Like most Swedes, we are both avid users of BankID. With its high market penetration, and impeccable brand, BankID has become a national standard. In connection with the re-regulation of the gambling industry, gambling marketing increased significantly, and BankID became a common element. We deemed it unlikely that BankID would be featured to this extent unwillingly, as our initial explanation behind the large volume was an underlying partnership. Research within the field of business pointed us toward brand alliance and reputation endorsement theory (Cooke and Paul, 2000).

3.1.2 Pre-study research

To investigate the phenomenon further we divided our pre-study in two. First, we researched the role of BankID in society. Through reports published by BankID (Wemnell, 2019) and Lynxeye (Lynxeye, 2019) we found that BankID is the dominating eID-provider in Sweden and is one of the most appreciated brands. Second, we set out to investigate how gambling operators conduct business within the industry. We began with examining secondary sources. Reports published by the Swedish Gambling Authority (Swedish Gambling Authority, 2019), Svenskt Kvalitetsindex (2019) and Statista (Lotteriinspektionen, n.d.1; Lotteriinspektionen, n.d.2; Lotteriinspektionen, n.d.3) were helpful to map out the industry. Later we conducted two shorter unstructured interviews, one with a gambling operator present in the Swedish market and one with a banking adviser, involved with BankID. We decided to interview ‘both sides’, to get a richer understanding of the studied phenomenon. These interviews were exploratory as we wanted to identify general findings that could explain the phenomenon. Here we found that BankID was in fact featured unwillingly, and that gambling operators had challenges related to legitimacy. Therefore, our focus shifted towards institutional, and organizational legitimacy theory.

Naturally, we were curious if legitimacy could be transferred from BankID to the gambling field. Hence, we hope that, by applying an institutional lens on our studied phenomenon, we can generate new insights for scholars and practitioners.

3.2 Research design and approach

3.2.1 Methodological fit

There has been little research about legitimacy and transposition theory in conjunction. Literature of legitimacy has mainly focused on exploratory case studies (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). We found the same pattern when reviewing transposition theory. Following research practice, to answer our research question ‘can legitimacy theory explain why gambling operators heavily marketed their eID-solution, if so how?’ we therefore adopted a qualitative research approach. With an exploratory stance we were interested in getting an understanding of underlying motives of the phenomenon. This was extra helpful as literature is limited. We acknowledge that replicability and generalizability might be limited with a qualitative approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011).

3.2.2 Research design

The uniqueness of the studied phenomenon made it appropriate to use a case study method (Yin, 1994). This method generated in-depth insights of the interaction between the studied phenomenon, i.e. BankID in marketing, and its context, gambling. The combination of a re-regulation in a morally questionable market and visual contextualization with a highly appreciated brand, surely makes this an interesting case. A case study design would allow us to test existing literature on the studied phenomenon, ultimately empowering us to dig deeper and ask questions like ‘why’ and ‘how?’.

We recognize that case studies come with issues regarding generalization (Weick, 1969), but these issues are addressed in *Section 3.4.3*. In line with Dubois and Gadde (2002) argumentation, we instead see the chosen method as a strength, as the uniqueness of the empirical observation can shine new light on organizational complexity (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Case studies can also generate meaningfulness to abstract theory (Kanter, 1977), which is also in line with our addressed theoretical gap (see *Section 2.4*).

3.2.3 Abductive approach

Inspired by Dubois and Gadde (2002) framework of systematic combining, we chose to adapt an abductive approach (Kirkeby, 1994). Systematic combining builds more on refinement of existing theories than on inventing new ones (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). The iterative process of going ‘back and forth’ from one type of research activity to another, between empirical observations and theory, allowed us to expand our understanding of both theory and the empirical phenomenon (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2017). It also allowed us to adjust the theory to adapt the peculiarities of the empirical context (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). We believe that these strengths outweigh the possible downside of handling the different intertwined elements in the research work (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).

With an abductive approach we were able to, over time, develop and refine what we have discovered in our empirical fieldwork, through analysis and interpretation (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). The approach is particularly advantageous if the objective is to ‘discover something new’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) which we hope to achieve by applying a new theoretical framework to a unique empirical setting. From an empirical standpoint the approach was also preferable as the environment was constantly changing during the researched period, which required reiteration. In turn, we were not limited or challenged by the dynamic context. Following the changing environment in real time made it easier for us to understand the sequence and the impact of the events.

In accordance to this research approach we choose institutional legitimacy as a theoretical lens after gaining some understanding of the field from the the pre-study and additional research. From the establishment of institutional legitimacy theory we continued to collect data iteratively between theory and empirics. This process allowed us to more precisely adjust our research to fit both theory and the researched phenomenon. How we worked practically with an abductive approach is exemplified in *Figure 3.1*.




Figure 3.1: Abductive approach and interviewing

3.3 Data collection

3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

To be able to immerse in and explore our phenomenon we choose to collect data by conducting interviews. This is a suitable data collection technique commonly used in the qualitative method (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). As we had a general notion of what area we wanted to investigate, we opted for conducting semi-structured interviews (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Semi-structured interviewing is the preferred method in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Edmondson and McManus, 2007) since it entails flexibility, where the participants can elaborate on thoughts and motivations (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Participants can be open-minded while guided by some common topics and themes. It also allows ‘room to pursue topics of particular interests’, which favored our exploratory approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011:467). The interviews were conducted by using an interview protocol as a guide (Yin, 2011), covering the topics we wished to address.

Each interview guide was tailored for the specific interview subject to ensure a natural fit. Test questions based on the research topic was formulated in the pre-study and later revised for the main study (Bryman and Bell, 2011).

3.3.2 Purposive sampling

We chose to develop a purposive sampling as we wanted to make sure that the sample members had a strategic fit with our study and could answer the research goals we had in mind (Bryman and Bell, 2011). A purposive sampling ensured a variety in our sample members and that they were knowledgeable about the phenomenon (Mason, 2017).

3.3.2.1 Selection of organizations

We used the findings from our pre-study to ensure that we approached relevant organizations. The selection process was iterative as we discovered new areas of interests throughout the data collection phase. We based our selection of organizations on two different selection criteria. First, we wanted to locate organizations that had ongoing or previous involvement related to the phenomenon. Second, we wanted to get a balanced view of our empirical case and ensure that we had a variety in our selection of organizations. This provided us with a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the phenomenon, which would not have been possible if we only acknowledged one perspective (Bryman and Bell, 2011).

We ended up with the following two sample groups: (1) gambling operators and authorities monitoring the gambling industry, and (2) the key actors of the eID field, including BankID and authorities. We chose not to address consumers in our study. Despite being constituents in the gambling field, we believed that they are not central in our study for three reasons. First, we were interested in the organizational perspective, and therefore consumers as receivers of the marketing would therefore not explain the underlying motives behind the transposition itself. Second, we concluded that secondary sources sufficiently explained their thoughts in this matter. Finally, many of our interview subjects were users of both BankID and gambling services, and their answers were in line with secondary sources. See *Figure 3.2* for the two sample groups.




Figure 3.2: The two sample groups

Having identified the two sample groups, we prioritized key organizations within each group. When approaching organizations in the gambling industry the purposive sampling process was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, we selected two trade associations from the gambling industry. One represents the state-owned operators in the industry and the other represents the largest privately-owned operators. These organizations filled the role as an industry proxy. In the second stage we took a closer look at active operators in the market. Here we approached initiators or early adopters of BankID in the gambling industry to gain richer understanding of the phenomenon. These operators have also been referred to as the industry leaders and filled the role as an operator proxy. To get the perspective of BankID, we focused primarily on organization that has a direct involvement with BankID. This gave us an understanding of the transposition from the eyes of ‘what was being transposed’.

Lastly, we approached authorities monitoring two different fields; gambling and eID. The former was selected as we wanted to develop further understanding of the conditions in which gambling operators operates. The latter was selected as we wanted to understand the importance of eID in society to get a richer understanding of BankID.

3.3.2.2 Selection of participants

The targeted participants were carefully selected to fit our research (Bryman and Bell, 2011). To ensure that we approached relevant individuals in our selected organizations, we critically examined each participant in advance based on its current and previous involvement in our research context. We exclusively targeted experienced managers to make sure that we received credible, and elaborate answers. When our targeted managers were unable to participate, we asked to be introduced to suitable substitutes. We recognize that this could potentially lead to a case of biased sampling, as executives could propose individuals for convenience rather than relevance. This risk was mitigated by being transparent about our research subject and sampling rationale, without jeopardizing the quality of our study. Hence, we ensured the strategic fit in these instances.

In the end, 18 participants were interviewed. The list of interview participants, category, position, location and date is found in *Table 3.1*.

Participant	Category	Position	Location	Interview type	Date
Participant 1	eID	Manager (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	26/02/2019
Participant 2	eID	Consultant (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	27/02/2019
Participant 3	eID	Manager (state-authority)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	28/02/2019
Participant 4	Gambling	Representative (trade association)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	06/03/2019
Participant 5	Gambling	Manager (private operator)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	07/03/2019
Participant 6	eID	Top Executive (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	08/03/2019
Participant 7	eID	Manager (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	11/03/2019
Participant 8	eID	Manager (state-authority)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	11/03/2019
Participant 9	eID	Manager (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	13/03/2019
Participant 10	Gambling	Representative (trade association)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	14/03/2019
Participant 11	eID	Top Executive (state-authority)	Stockholm	Virtual (Skype)	21/03/2019
Participant 12	Gambling	Manager (private operator)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	25/03/2019
Participant 13	Gambling	Manager (State-authority)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	26/03/2019
Participant 14	eID	Manager (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	28/03/2019
Participant 15	eID	Manager (BankID)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	28/03/2019
Participant 16	Gambling	Manager (state-owned operator)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	03/04/2019
Participant 17	Gambling	Top Executive (state-owned operator)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	03/04/2019
Participant 18	Gambling	Fmr Board Member (state-owned operator)	Stockholm	Face-to-face	15/04/2019

Table 3.1: Participants in main study

3.3.3 Interview process

The interviews spanned between 40 - 100 minutes and was digitally recorded by a mobile device. During the research period, both the Swedish gambling industry and the banking industry were subject to strong media scrutiny. Consequently, firm-confidentiality was stressed, and organizations and participants were kept anonymous. Anonymity encouraged honest responses, despite the sensitive nature of the topics, which increased the credibility of our findings (Bryman and Bell, 2011). This materialized in gender-neutral pseudonyms; 'Participant X'. We sought affinity by presenting our interest for the topic and prepared well-before the interviews to ensure that the subject felt sufficiently comfortable to give genuine answers. Since the research topic is rather sensitive it was important for us to emphasize that we did not have a hidden agenda to receive honest responses.

All interviews, except one, was conducted face-to-face. This was our preferred choice as it yields richer information, including facial and language expressions (Lee and Aslam, 2018). The face-to-face interviews took place in a conference room at the participant's office. This maximized comfort and minimized their effort, ensuring a natural setting (Bryman and Bell, 2011). We used 'Skype' for the virtually conducted interview. To avoid miscommunication, we held the interviews in Swedish for native Swedes. The remaining interviews were held in English.

The interviews were held in a conversational manner. We began with questions that aimed to make the interview subject feel comfortable. We proceeded with a mixture of open-, theory-driven- and confrontational questions (Flick, 2009). Open-ended questions aimed to identify general areas of tension, which also minimized the risk of confirmation bias (by not asking leading questions). When we discovered areas of interest we used probe questions. Theory-driven questions were asked to investigate the fit between theory of legitimation and transposition, and the empirical accounts. Finally, confrontational questions were asked to challenge their answers. In other words, the semi-structured interview format allowed us to better incorporate the viewpoint of the interview subject, as flexibility entailed customization, without compromising on our theoretical framework. Example interview protocols can be found in *Appendix 1.* and *Appendix 2.*

Each interview was conducted by both authors, where one was leading the interview while the other one was taking notes. It also allowed a flexible dynamic for additional probing and complementary questions. We transcribed the recordings shortly after the interviews were conducted to ensure that non-verbal communication was also taken into consideration (Brinkmann, 2013). The media player 'VLC' allowed us to slow and readily pause the recording with global hotkeys. 'Office Word' was used to write down the account.

3.3.4 Secondary data

In addition to our interviews we used secondary data, like published reports from prominent research institutes, media outlets and authorities. To use secondary data in a complementary fashion helped us to avoid asking the participant about descriptive data that is accessible elsewhere. Screenshots and photographs were taken of the marketing, when we were exposed to it. These were later stored locally.

3.3.5 Data analysis

After the interviews had been conducted and transcribed, we began analyzing the data. We chose to look for patterns and see where it matched with our theoretical framework (Yin, 2015). Each participant from each sampling group (gambling and eID) were systematically coded and analyzed with theory of legitimacy and transposition in mind. This process was iterative to ensure the best empirical and theoretical fit. We were therefore able to compare these different groups and identify points of conflict with theoretical accuracy.

3.4 Quality of the study

Before we assess the quality of our study, we must first clarify our ontological stance (Bryman and Bell, 2011). On one side of the spectrum, researchers that consider themselves as realists and advocate one objective reality would refer to criteria of reliability and validity. On the other side, interpretivists would apply assessment criteria of trustworthiness and authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Our stance is somewhere in the middle of the two opposing views, leaning towards the interpretivist paradigm as we believe that the examined phenomenon can be interpreted differently by different actors. In line with our ontological stance, we have chosen to adapt Guba's (1985) trustworthiness criteria; *credibility*, *dependability*, *transferability* and *confirmability*.

3.4.1 Credibility

Credibility refers to the extent the study has correctly understood the social world studied and that the study was carried out 'according to the canons of good practice' (Bryman and Bell, 2011:396). It is linked to validity, which concerns the plausibility and the credibility of empirical data (Hammersley, 1992). Guba (1985) presents a series of techniques that we adopted to ensure the credibility of our findings. First, our phenomenon concerned the aftermath of a re-regulation and thus evolved over time. In consequence we got a great understanding of the situation and understood the relationship between the subjects over time. We were persistent in our observations, as we quickly identified which part we

wanted to investigate, namely BankID in a specific marketing context, and thus managed to explore the phenomenon in-depth. In due time, we observed recurring themes and thus reached saturation in data (Merriam, 2015). Finally, by interviewing at different points in time, and by comparing people with different views, we could increase the credibility (Guba, 1985).

3.4.2 Dependability

Dependability corresponds to the term reliability of quantitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Reliability can be increased for interview data by checking interview guides (Flick, 2009). Before interviewing we reviewed literature on interviewing techniques, which we tested in our pre-study. Interviews were conducted by two interviewers to avoid misinterpretations. During interviews we chose not to refer to the answers of other subjects to avoid biases in their answers. Transcriptions and recorded audio were all cross-checked to make sure that it was done in an orderly fashion. Swedish quotes were carefully translated and reviewed together with a native speaker to ensure correctness (Gibbs, 2007).

3.4.3 Transferability

Transferability refers to the extent the study holds true in another context or in the same context at a different time (Guba, 1985). As we conducted a case study, the transferability is limited by nature. For the reader to evaluate the transferability we did our utmost to thoroughly describe the phenomenon and make our conclusions traceable (Guba, 1985).

3.4.4 Confirmability

Confirmability concerns a researcher's objectivity (Bryman and Bell, 2011); that the findings are not shaped by researcher bias or interest (Guba, 1985). To increase the confirmability, we have chosen to highlight two areas that might affect the impartialness of the study. First, both of us have prior knowledge of the industry, having worked with it in a work-related context. Second, both of us are non-gamblers.

Empirical Findings

We will in this chapter present our empirical findings in five main sections. The first two sections will explore the landscapes of the two organizational fields, gambling and eID. The landscape will not be mapped in detail, but in accordance to our studied phenomenon. The third section will present how these two interrelate. Visual empirics, i.e. marketing will be exhibited in section four. Finally, we will conclude the empirical findings, by going through the aftermath of BankID being featured in marketing.

4.1 The gambling field




Figure 4.1: The gambling field

4.1.1 Gambling operators

4.1.1.1 State-owned operators

Prior to the re-regulation, the Swedish state had a monopoly in the market for a long time, the two largest operators being Svenska Spel and ATG. After the re-regulation, these organizations are still present in the market, but are competing on the same premises as new operators. For some, the state-owned operators still imply a sense of responsibility and trustworthiness. For others it implies hypocrisy, talking about responsible gambling whilst advertising the service to the public (BOS, n.d.2; Tjärnström, Lindwall and Hagman, 2019).

We have the highest level of trust. Customers feel that it is safe and secure to play here. They like that we are state-owned since they know that their loss goes to something that is good for society.

(Participant 17, State-owned operator, Gambling)

4.1.1.2 Private operators

Privately-owned overseas operators were present in the Swedish online gambling market, despite the prevailing state monopoly. These actors have traditionally been based in Malta or UK where they also enjoyed corporate tax benefits, thus, not paying any tax in Sweden (Finansdepartementet, 2017). On the other hand, Swedish law, restricted the access for these online gambling operators to important marketing channels, like OOH (out-of-home) advertising (Finansdepartementet, 2017). However, by buying advertising space on private media outlets, they have been present on the Swedish market, but to a limited extent in comparison to the state-owned organizations.

We have seen increased competition in recent years, from the previously unregulated operators. So, our market share has shrunk while the gambling market has grown.

(Participant 16, State-owned operator, Gambling)

After the re-regulation, most overseas operators chose to obtain a license in Sweden, thus gaining access to the same marketing channels as the previously state-owned monopoly. So far 80 operators have been granted a license (Swedish Gambling Authority, 2019). Licensees must comply to the Swedish regulations and pay corporate taxes.

Previously, we had a regulatory framework that was very strict, while our competitors had no restrictions and no legislation to take into account. The competition has become tougher, but it has also become more equal because we play according to the same rules on the same playing field.

(Participant 17, State-owned operator, Gambling)

4.1.1.3 Different business conducts

Gambling operators generate revenue by taking a small stake from the turnover of individual players. However, state-owned gambling operators and private operators conduct business differently. Generally, the main objective of the private operators is to maximize shareholder value (SHV), which means that these operators mainly strive to maximize profit. This has proven to be a successful strategy, as these operators generally are very profitable and generates a high return on investments. Sometimes this strategy causes the private operators to fanatically prioritize short-term gains over long-term business objectives. It has also led to a business pattern where private operators try to generate more

revenue by making customers play more. Being a state-owned operator implies another level of security of survival and therefore allows prioritization of other objectives than SHV-maximization. For instance, responsible gambling is highly prioritized among state-owned operators.

Responsible gambling activities costs revenue. If you call your 'best customer' who is losing huge amount of money on your platform and tells them that they should not gamble on your platform anymore - you lose revenue. It is of course a factor that explains why gambling operators that have private owners and maybe are on the stock exchange, does not work with this to the same extent - you lose revenue.

(Participant 17, State-owned operator, Gambling)

4.1.2 Trade associations

The gambling industry has two trade associations. The first association is the Swedish Gambling Association (SPER), which was essentially founded to promote industry agreements to protect the consumer, promoting ethical and moderate marketing. Traditionally, members have exclusively included former state-owned operators, but recently private operators have become members (SPER, n.d.).

The Swedish Trade Association for Online Gambling (Branschföreningen för Onlinespel or BOS) was instead founded on the premise of re-regulating the market to promote a fair competitive environment, while also promoting ethical and moderate marketing. As of today, only private operators are members (BOS, n.d.1). In terms of market share, the lion's share constitutes of members of a trade association. However, in terms of number of licensees, only a minority is a member of a trade association.

4.1.3 Regulatory agencies

4.1.3.1 EU directives

Regarding security and financial verification, two important directives have also shaped today's market. The PSD2 (Payment Service Directive 2) and 4/5AMLD (4th and 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive), aimed to increase transparency when it comes to for instance, terror financing and money laundering (Finansinspektionen, 2018).

KYC, knowing your customer, and second AML, anti-money laundering practices, makes sure that the person receives the funds when they are taken out, is the same person as the person that deposited the

funds. We are responsible for an incredible number of processes that ensure that we are not for example facilitating money laundering, terrorism, whatever that is.

(Participant 5, Private operator, Gambling)

In practice, this meant that gambling operators required robust payment and identification processes. Here, KYC (Know Your Customer) is vital. Operators not only need to make sure that the customer is properly identified, but also analyze and understand patterns and reliability of the data provided. While an ID often is good enough, eID has become more popular as it also tends to decrease operational inefficiencies. Due to its importance, the KYC and AML aspects was also incorporated in the formulation of the new Swedish Gambling Act (2018:1138). It states that licensed actors are enforced to improve the security level in the verification process of new gamblers. The preferred alternative according to the authorities is to implement a secure e-identification system.

The verification process was very important in the formulation of the new law. Partly because of KYC and AML, but also from a responsible gambling perspective, age limit etc. These types of aspects were considered.

(Participant 10, Trade association, Gambling)

4.1.3.2 The Swedish Gambling Authority

The Swedish Gambling Authority (SGA) is controlled by the government and is the chief regulatory authority that grants permits to and supervises operators wishing to be present in the Swedish market. Naturally, after the re-regulation the number of gambling operators that are subject for supervision has increased. Furthermore, the authority works to decrease problem gambling by providing tools and reduce illegal gambling.

There was a huge change in terms of number objects to supervise. We only supervised a few gambling operators during the monopoly. The overseas gambling operators have been here, but we have not had any control over them and have had no opportunity to supervise them. It will require a great adjustment to understand this new digital world.

(Participant 13, State-authority, Gambling)

SGA's perception of different online industry operators varies a lot. The larger operators, including both state-owned Svenska Spel and larger private operators, are perceived positively, as they strive for a sustainable gambling industry to a larger degree. Conversely, smaller operators are perceived as driven by short-termism and prioritize financial gains over sustainable aspects.

There are a number of operators who think long-term, responsibly and want to take the lead in order for the industry to actually improve its reputation which is bad. It is a wide spectrum. Others act like they are here briefly to make money in the fastest possible way, build up their customer base, and then hope to be acquired. They are not as prone to act in accordance to the purpose of the law.

(Participant 13, State-authority, Gambling)

However, failing to take regulatory aspects into considerations seem to be a prevalent issue for the industry. In the case of marketing, operators in the industry tend to find it difficult to restrain themselves. One operator was recently sued and faced the threat of losing its license as its marketing was not considered moderate. The tendency to push the limits is here exemplified.

That's the gambling industry's biggest challenge in all categories. We're too all-in on most issues. We have a hard time restraining ourselves, even when we receive signals that indicate regulatory consequences. We can't handle it, and unfortunately go all the way to the end.

(Participant 4, Trade Association, Gambling)

In an opportunistic fashion the private operators often try to interpret the legislation in ways that are beneficial for themselves. For instance, it appears to be a prevailing issue that private operators' interpretation of the definition of moderate marketing does not correspond well with the purpose of the new Swedish Gambling Act (2018:1138).

The restriction is pretty ambiguous in the legislation and is open to interpretation. The operators are very good at interpreting it positively for themselves.

(Participant 10, Trade association, Gambling)

4.1.4 Key suppliers

4.1.4.1 Game suppliers

Few operators develop their gaming systems themselves. Instead operators rely on game suppliers. This entails a lack of differentiation among the operators. Therefore, there is little loyalty in the industry, meaning that consumers tendency to switch between different operators is high. There is an inclination to copy best-practice from other operators, as customers seek out the best deal, meaning that there is no sustainable competitive advantage for many private operators. Operators often resort to aggressive marketing campaigns to cope with this issue.

In this case there's no differentiation between what you get here and what you get with other operators, aside from the experience itself. [...] The games that you play here are the same you play everywhere else. We don't actually develop games. We have a partnership with game suppliers that allows us to use these games. So, you can play with us or you can play with the competitors.

(Participant 5, Private operator, Gambling)

4.1.4.2 Verification solutions

Historically, the verification journey has been far from a smooth ride. To be able to register yourself as a gambler, you had to scan and upload an identity document, like a passport or a driving license. Depending on the quality of the document, it was either approved or rejected. Upon approval, you could commence gambling. Identity documents are sensitive by nature and uploading them over internet might give an individual second thoughts. This suggests that a potential gambler needs visual cues that addresses privacy concerns when it comes to registration. Operationally, gambling actors have had to allocate significant amounts of resources in terms of money and labor to customer support and compliance related issues. Today, the verification process is more efficient thanks to new eID technology.

When gambling operators gained access to new technology it did not only improve security but also customer satisfaction and internal efficiencies. In Sweden, the most dominant provider of eID is BankID and most commonly used in the gambling industry. Other alternatives like FrejaID provides a satisfactory service but has not yet been able to gain any traction.

4.1.5 The public perception of the industry

There is a negative perception of the gambling industry. When gamblers were asked about the industry *money, payback, marketing* and *scams* sprung to mind. For non-gamblers *scams, addiction, loss* and *money* came to mind (Svenskt Kvalitetsindex, 2019). Scams and addiction have a negative undertone and there is therefore an inclination to move away from these associations as a gambling operator. This does not only translate to responsible gambling efforts, but also semantic efforts. To illustrate this, actors in the field often refer to themselves as entertainment providers.

Gaming is a fantastic industry within entertainment. The service we charge for is an experience not completely different from other experiences like Netflix, opera or cinema visits. Customers pay for the gaming experience we deliver.

(Participant 4, Trade association, Gambling)

In terms of gaming operators, you should also know that everyone in the industry refers to as gaming, not so much betting. When you talk about gaming, the industry relates to having fun, but when you talk about gambling people refer to addiction.

(Participant 5, Private operator, Gambling)

Recently, the industry has been featured heavily in media due to the increased amount of gambling marketing. It is evident that the sheer volume has impacted the operators negatively. It is questionable if this is a sustainable long-term strategy both from a financial and societal perspective.

If we go out on the street and ask the first man or woman how they reason [on perception of gambling]. I would guess that she or he would start complaining about the gambling marketing and would associate my industry with the excessive volume of gambling marketing. I think that is the spontaneous reaction right now.

(Participant 4, Trade association, Gambling)

The aggressive marketing intensifies the negative perception of the industry. A study from Sifo shows that 70 percent of the Swedish population would like to prohibit gambling marketing completely (Wikén, 2019). One operator mentions that they can no longer do marketing in social media since gambling commercials is frowned upon.

We cannot be on social media anymore, because gambling advertising on social media is so hated.

Here we are affected by the current climate.

(Participant 16, State-owned operator, Gambling)

The main thing on the agenda is the gambling marketing, it annoys and bothers everyone. You can hardly watch TV or listen to radio in commercial channels without being disturbed by one-sided gambling advertising, with the same message.

(Participant 13, State-authority, Gambling)

4.1.6 Conclusion

As established we can see that the gambling industry is perceived negatively. Some point at the sheer association with problem gambling and the tendency for some operators to push for immoderate marketing, despite the trade associations best efforts to guide the industry behavior. See *Figure 4.1* for an overview of the gambling field.

4.2 The e-identification field




Figure 4.2: The eID field

In Sweden there is one e-identification provider with an almost monopolistic stature, namely BankID. It was the first solution offered to the market, and its longevity has shaped the Swedish society. E-identification is therefore synonymous with BankID. One participant exemplifies:

Over the years, we have had an annual survey on eIDs. There people have answered 'I have no eID' and to later answer 'I regularly use BankID'.

(Participant 8, State-authority, eID)

In line with this thinking, we have chosen to focus on BankID when we evaluate the eID field. Furthermore, we acknowledge that there are regulatory stakeholders, like DIGG (Agency for Digital Government) and EU, that shapes and monitors the eID field. We also recognize that there are competitors in the market, which are yet to gain any traction. As these two falls outside our scope, we have chosen to exclude these as well.

4.2.1 BankID

With the aim of developing an eID-solution and a befitting infrastructure, the greater part of the largest Swedish banks created a bank consortium (BankID, n.d.). It was not the first time the Swedish banks collaborated regarding larger investments that would both benefit society and for themselves financially (Bankomat, n.d.). The collaborative forces were very successful, and the effort resulted in BankID. The solution was quickly diffused as it was offered for free to the individual citizen, and the eID could be used to access both banks and important state-authorities. This resulted in a unique position for BankID,

where governmental authorities were consciously reliant on BankID, initially not finding enough reason to encourage competition.

It is a critical infrastructure for society - the backbone of the digital society we live in.

(Participant 3, State-authority, eID)

For the individual, it is an incredible advantage; efficiency and time saving.

(Participant 6, BankID, eID)

BankID is a success story, they are responsible for the development in which we are world-leading.

(Participant 8, State-authority, eID)

Today, BankID is still used by almost all Swedish banks and state-authorities, like the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket) and Försäkringskassan. In recent times, BankID has faced an increasing demand from other industries, making its dominating market position more assertive. Solution buyers with high-volume verifications is preferable as BankID generates revenue through a pay-per-verification model. The increasing demand from these buyers is not surprising since 97.5 percent of all Swedes between age 21 and 50 have BankID (Wemnell, 2019). It plays an integral part in society for the citizen. One participant exemplifies:

It is one of the two first apps that you download when you get a new phone.

(Participant 13, State-authority, Gambling)

BankID has rejected offers to expand its product features, focusing on solely on a specialized product. They also see themselves as a core component of Sweden's digital environment, but exclusively as an eID-provider. This is something that they are proud of and not willing to risk in exchange for short-term financial gains.

We provide an infrastructure only for identification, signature and verification, nothing else in principle. Our goal is to be good, secure, and a useful infrastructure for identification and signature in Sweden.

(Participant 6, BankID, eID)

4.2.2 The perception of BankID

BankID usually receives unilateral praise. It is often associated to the important institutions it is integrated with. One participant suggests that perhaps some of the positive perception stems from its founders.

There is generally a high confidence in banks. The general belief is that large old companies and institutions are decent and proper. You can't stop using banks.

(Participant 7, BankID, eID)

The perception has also been measured to some extent. BankID scores the highest in terms of trustworthiness of all digital brands in Sweden (Lynxeye, 2019). However, trust is only one attribute of many that BankID display according to external surveys. One participant clarifies:

You use BankID without thinking, it is an enabler for many other services. We have delivered a good solution, with high availability, you trust that it works, it feels safe and user-friendly.

(Participant 6, BankID, eID)

A world without BankID is unthinkable. One participant compares the taken-for-grantedness that some of the larger Swedish bank has in a financial context, with what BankID display in an e-identification context.

It takes a while before one manages to establish himself, so it's about time too. When are you taken-for-granted? SEB, Nordea, Handelsbanken they are taken for granted in a financial world.

(Participant 7, BankID, eID)

4.2.3 Conclusions

It is established that BankID is perceived positively. It's described as extremely trustworthy, which also seem to translate tacitly. It can almost be an institution itself as it plays an integral part of today's society. See *Figure 4.2* for an overview of the eID field.

4.3 BankID in the context of gambling




Figure 4.3: Timeline of the phenomenon

BankID has previously not been a part of the gambling industry. Empowered by the Swedish Public Procurement Act (LOU), a state-owned operator was able to implement BankID as early as August 2017. For the private operators, the process was not as smooth. In one case, an operator had initiated contact with a bank they had a long-term relationship with. Despite this, the perception of the industry made it difficult convincing the bank to grant access to BankID. However, trust and reputation broke the deadlock and this operator received access before the re-regulation. Another operator faced the same reluctance from the banks, but here the re-regulation granted the operator access to BankID. One participant recalls this reluctance:

It was a bit turbulent at the beginning. The reason being, BankID is owned by the banks in Sweden and not being in a regulated market, the banks did not quite accept you as business.

(Participant 5, Private operator, Gambling)

Operators realized that integrating BankID would be beneficial. From an operational standpoint, integrating BankID made sure that the operators followed AML and KYC requirements, while also addressing internal inefficiencies (paperwork and manual labor). From a consumer standpoint, BankID lowered the threshold for new gamblers in the verification process.

All errands related to customer login disappeared. It became simple. We got a much simpler customer registration process. Fewer people discontinued the customer registration journey.

(Participant 16, State-owned operator, Gambling)

One private operator is looking beyond compliance and internal efficiencies, and instead points at the signal value of having BankID.

I think in general consumers/customers trust banks more than the gambling industry. If we offer a solution which is commonly used by banks, which is a trusted institution, then of course we increase trust towards us as a gambling operator.

(Participant 12, Private operator, Gambling)

As the re-regulation was enforced, BankID quickly diffused across gambling operators. Some operators had a formal contract with a BankID provider (a bank). However, other operators were able to utilize BankID in the verification process through third-party providers (TPP), without any bilateral agreement and against the will of BankID. Essentially in the verification process a gambler gives a TPP the verification permission.

I, as an individual, may not understand that I let a third party into my bank who can collect anything. I have zero control over what they collect. Some will probably only retrieve what is necessary, other will download everything.

(Participant 7, BankID, eID)

4.4 BankID in gambling marketing

After access to BankID and important marketing channels had been granted to newly established operators, the BankID logotype started to appear in marketing. This was an odd occurrence as BankID previously had barely been featured in marketing in any industry. In some cases, operators even featured the logotype without a formal contract with BankID. One month into the newly regulated market, BankID was featured in physical and digital marketing, as well as verbal communication like podcasts and radio (Törner, 2019). Seemingly out of nowhere, the technical eID-solution was constantly exposed alongside gambling operators in every marketing channel.

I think one started, then the others saw a risk: 'oh, they will win customers by using BankID's brand', then everyone followed, then the logotype just got a bigger and bigger. In the end the BankID brand was bigger than the gambling operator's brand.

(Participant 9, BankID, eID)

Almost all gambling marketing that we captured between January to March featured BankID. Surprisingly, one of the largest state-owned operators, chose not to use BankID in its marketing. As the

state-owned operator had previous access to BankID, they also had the opportunity to be the only operator to use BankID in marketing. We found that the operator never had any intentions of using BankID in its marketing, before or after the re-regulation. The strangeness of featuring a technical eID-solution in one's marketing was highlighted, especially as it is not the core offering.

The limited space we have to talk with our customers, we talk about our products or our brand.

(Participant 16, State-owned operator, Gambling)

If you do not have a high trust, then you feature BankID, like it would rescue it. It becomes banal, it feels a bit strange, you are a gambling operator, but you flash BankID. It is not the product.

(Participant 17, State-owned operator, Gambling)

The BankID logotype was used in multiple ways by many different private operators. In some cases, the logotype was larger than the operator's own logotype. Often it was displayed with content related to security or speed. Another finding was that the logotype was used beside text that was unrelated to attributes offered by BankID, like withdrawals which is not possible to do with BankID.



Figure 4.4: 'Secure verification with BankID' (Storspelare, 2019)



Figure 4.5: 'withdrawals in 6 minutes directly through BankID' (Voodoo Dreams Casino, 2019)



Figure 4.6: ‘try your luck’ (Casumo, 2019) and Figure 4.7: ‘now even faster with Swish’ (LeoVegas, 2019)

However, the most common way of using BankID was without any text at all. Simply positioning the BankID logotype somewhere in the marketing campaign. Sometimes, the logotype was also exposed together with a Swedish celebrity, e.g. Zlatan Ibrahimovic or Dolph Lundgren. One participant from the gambling field elaborated on this and thought that perhaps BankID is used by former overseas operators to be perceived as more Swedish. Lastly, the logotype was clustered together with logotypes that are related to responsible gambling such as Stödlinjen, Spelinspektionen and 18+.




Figure 4.8: ‘Zlatan Ibrahimovic’ (Bethard, 2019) and Figure 4.9: ‘Dolph Lundgren’ (LeoVegas, 2019)

It is possible that a certain degree of Swedishness is signaled by the BankID logo. Some overseas operators may suffer from not being perceived as Swedish. Being Swedish in Sweden is generally perceived as something positive. Svenska Spel and ATG benefits from it, but it also extends to activities outside of gambling such as Swedish meat. Swedish consumers like what is Swedish.

(Participant 4, Trade association, Gambling)

When we interviewed operators about the purpose behind the inclusion of BankID, it was in line with the communicated attributes, speed and security. These seemingly practical attributes do not explain why the BankID logotype was larger than the operator's own logotype or featured out-of-context. For instance, if an operator wanted to communicate 'speed' in terms of withdrawals, surely a Swish logotype would be better suited, as BankID is solely used for verification (Getswish, n.d.). When we confronted a gambling operator on whether it was featured for reasons related to trust and reputation, the participant answered 'definitely'. The same participant later explained how they are monitoring these associative aspects.

We have ongoing research regarding what industries BankID is associated with.

(Participant 12, Private operator, Gambling)

As multiple operators started use BankID in marketing, other central actors in the field, like comparison sites, followed. At the peak of convergence, it was a comparison site that was named 'Bankidcasinot.se' that ranked gambling operators that offered BankID. Thus, BankID started to become a more integral part of the gambling field.




Figure 4.10: 'www.bankidcasinot.se' (Bankidcasinot, 2019)

4.5 BankID reacts

The nature of the gambling industry means that there are a lot of transactions that needs to be verified on a frequent basis, which makes a strong business case for BankID. The two organizational fields developed a transactional relationship, suggested by the direct implementation of BankID by some operators. This relationship changed when BankID was featured in marketing on a large scale.

In mid-February 2019, BankID updated its brand guidelines as its logotype had been used incorrectly in commercial material, *in any shape or form* (BankID, 2019). The new version prohibited the use of BankID brand in commercial marketing. This was the first time BankID had changed its brand guideline since 2003, indicating that BankID had never been featured in paid commercial, at least not in a problematic fashion. Gambling operators with a contract were told to change their marketing with immediate effect and operators without a contract faced legal retaliation.

For those with a contract, we can make adjustments on an ongoing basis. When we received our new brand guidelines, we could refer to it instead of the old one. The old one was designed to cover the size of the logo, which colors to include and so on. [...] It was a good addition, it enabled us to say, 'this is what applies, and we want you to comply immediately'. For those without a contract, there are more legal processes going on.

(Participant 9, BankID, eID)

The mass usage culminated in an unsustainable environment. BankID saw a risk of being exposed in gambling marketing, and the risk of brand deterioration forced their hand.

They [the public] believe that we support this form of gambling, that we are in some way involved, we only sell a verification service to some actors. We do not want to be associated with advertising, where you ride on BankID's brand to sell more or get more customers to register.

(Participant 9, BankID, eID)

BankID expressed a sense of anger, and naivety, hinting that they were taken advantage of. It is evident that BankID was not expecting its logotype to be used in this way, and most certainly not by operators that they did not have a contractual relationship with.

We were not prepared for the gambling market to use BankID in marketing, especially when they did not have an agreement. I could not have imagined such a risk. Especially in this way, with marketing on TV, outdoor, they also ignored the little that was in the guide. It was instantly the wild west.

(Participant 7, BankID, eID)

The banks behind BankID unanimously believed that the operators acted in this way to leech of the BankID brand. BankID are aware of its position in society, but also of the negative perception of the gambling industry. Therefore, they see the motive of the inclusion as a desire to be perceived as more acceptable.

It is not about: 'Awesome! Now I know that I can use BankID to log in. Now I can finally play, because I have not dared to before!'. It's about credibility.

(Participant 6, BankID, eID)

Despite the changes in the new guideline, the logotype was continuously misused by gambling operators and other field actors alike. In other words, new brand guidelines and threat of legal consequences had little effect. It is clear that BankID has lost control over their brand.

Unfortunately, it has not yet had a full impact on the market. We still see players who use BankID frequently.

(Participant 9, BankID, eID)

While many of the larger, more reputable brands, stopped using BankID in commercial material, other licensees resorted to other institutional brands, or tried to assimilate BankID associations without using the logotype. In the following example, the operator both tried to replicate BankID (‘Play with mobile bank registration’) and by scaling up the Swedish Gambling Authority logotype.



Figure 4.11: Before (Ninja Casino, 2019) and Figure 4.12: after guideline was updated (Ninja Casino, 2019)




Figure 4.12: Before: ‘How does casino with BankID work? Guide and top ranked casinos’ (Game Lounge, 2019)




Figure 4.13: After: ‘How does casino with Mobilt ID work? Guide and top ranked casinos’ (Game Lounge, 2019)

For more examples of marketing featuring BankID, see *Appendix 3*. See *Figure 4.3* for an overview of the timeline of the phenomenon.

Discussion

In this chapter we will discuss our empirical findings. We will begin by analyzing the two organizational fields from a legitimation perspective. To understand the state of legitimacy of the gambling field and the eID field, we have chosen to analyze the field from the four types of legitimacy proposed by Greenwood et al. (2017). This helps us understand how the field is impacted by the behavior of chosen field actors, and by extension how the field is perceived from a legitimation standpoint. We will thereafter put forward our arguments for why we believe that the studied phenomenon is a case of manipulating the environment to transpose legitimacy. We will conclude this chapter by discussing the implication of the transposition.

5.1 An organizational field that lacks legitimacy

5.1.1 Regulatory legitimacy

The gambling field has throughout its history been perceived as a field with negative reputation. The long history of irresponsible operators that has prioritized short-term profitability over societal responsibility has created a negative perception that overshadows the industry. This is especially true for the private operators that competed in the Swedish market until the re-regulation without contributing to society in terms of taxes and without conforming to Swedish gambling regulations. Many were not acting in accordance to the regulatory framework put forward by the state. The fact that the private operators were lacking legal mandates to act in the market indicates low regulatory legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1997).

As the industry was re-regulated, the preexisting private operators realized that they needed to change approach and conform to the new jurisdictions to survive in the field (Meyer and Rowan, 1997). Not only would it be illegal for an operator to continue to do ‘business as usual’, but it would also be inefficient since non-licensees have limited market access (e.g. would not be allowed to market in media), which is a prerequisite for survival in the industry (Greenwood et al., 2017). Hence, conforming to the new regulation was an initial and necessary step to be perceived as legitimate.

However, conducting business in accordance to the legislation has been an ambiguous task for the gambling industry. One of the biggest sources of ambiguity has been related to what is considered ‘moderate marketing’. There is an inconsistency in how the gambling operators and government authorities interpret the new regulation (Öbrink, 2019). Consequently, the government has threatened

to increase the restrictions (contrary to the preferred option of being self-regulated), which would be devastating for the gambling industry from a legitimization standpoint. Increased restrictions limit the opportunity to act freely in the market, and impacts the degree of scrutinization (Greenwood et al., 2017). For instance, when an operator's opportunity to market themselves disappear, so does the ability to gain pragmatic legitimacy through marketing (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). In this case, the regulatory legitimacy becomes a prerequisite for gaining other types of legitimacy.

5.1.2 Pragmatic legitimacy

Evaluating the level of pragmatic legitimacy is a harder task as it is based on constituents' self-interests. Therefore, it is safe to assume that some marketed attributes (not necessarily BankID) resonates better with some, and worse with others, especially across gamblers to non-gamblers to regulatory authorities. A commonly marketed attribute is speed: "*quick withdrawals*" or "*no registration*". Some gamblers might appreciate these features as they simply makes it easier to gamble. However, regulatory authorities and non-gamblers might see the very same attribute as facilitator of problem gambling. It is therefore hard to make any general conclusions regarding the level of pragmatic legitimacy in the gambling field.

5.1.3 Moral legitimacy

According to the general opinion, the field is fundamentally based on morally questionable grounds (Svenskt Kvalitetsindex, 2019). Problem gambling is an important issue today and has increased since the market was re-regulated. Online gambling has been highlighted as particularly dangerous in this context (Randhawa and Lönnroth, 2019). Both trade associations, their members, and the government recognize the issue and work actively to reduce its prevalence. Unfortunately, there are still individual operators that prioritize short-term gains over sustainable business conduct. It is therefore unlikely that the gambling field would promote societal welfare (Suchman, 1995). We therefore conclude that the industry, by nature, exhibits low levels of moral legitimacy.

5.1.4 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy

Gambling has existed before written history. There is no doubt that the gambling field's existence is taken-for-granted. As there has traditionally been a state-owned gambling monopoly in Sweden, the taken-for-grantedness of the field has been closely linked to the state-owned operators. Historically, the state-owned operators have exclusively been monitored by authorities, paid taxes, and had access to certain suppliers and marketing channels. The public have therefore been exposed to state-owned operators to a much greater extent than to private operators. That the latter only had limited access to

the market indicates that many did not consider them a part of the Swedish gambling field. They lack a belonging or a taken-for-grantedness to the Swedish market.

As the market opened up, the field dynamics changed. Private operators are now operating on the same premises as the state-owned operators. However, it is important to distinguish that same access does not equal the same level of taken-for-grantedness. Increasing the cultural-cognitive legitimacy therefore ought to be of utmost importance for the private operators, in order to act freely on the market (Greenwood et al., 2017).

5.1.5 Conclusion

There are several state-authorities involved with gambling. Some of these organizations monitor and grants licenses to individual operators, which suggests that there is no widespread condemnation, and the gambling field's state of legitimacy can therefore not be illegitimate (Greenwood et al., 2017). On the other hand, prevailing logics in the market has provoked discussions, both on a governmental level and a public level, indicating that the field's state of legitimacy is not accepted nor proper, but in fact 'debated' (Greenwood et al., 2017). After all, some constituents are in favour of gambling, while some wish to abolish all together due to problem gambling. The current state of the field of being debated is not desirable as there is still a significant portion questioning its organizational activities and fundamental values (Greenwood et al., 2017). Therefore, there is an overarching risk of losing legitimacy to a degree, it is less secure.

Our empirics show that operators are trying to improve the legitimacy of the industry. To illustrate this, the largest operators (and others) in the field has gathered under two trade associations to address image related challenges. Their ethical marketing guidelines are an example of this. Also, efforts to semantically tackle the cognitive aspect has been identified. The gambling industry is trying to reposition themselves as 'the gaming industry', meaning that it is strictly entertainment, distancing themselves from negative associations like problem gambling.

Our findings are in line with the theoretical assumptions that legitimacy is important in the market formation, especially in a field that is perceived as controversial (Kjellberg and Olson, 2017). Put it differently, legitimacy plays a significant role when gambling operators are doing business since lacking legitimacy will cause inertia in multiple ways. Authorities will monitor them more closely, suppliers will be restrictive to collaborate, consumers will question their intentions and shareholders and institutional investors will be more cautious to invest due to the lack of long-term thinking (Greenwood et al, 2017). See *Table 5.1*.

Types of legitimacy	Effect
<i>Regulatory</i>	Neutral
<i>Pragmatic</i>	Uncertain
<i>Moral</i>	Low
<i>Cultural-cognitive</i>	Low
Verdict	Low legitimacy
<i>State of legitimacy</i>	<i>Debated</i>

Table 5.1: Legitimacy of the gambling field

5.2 BankID as a legitimate institution

As established in *Section 4.2.3*, BankID is considered a cornerstone of Sweden’s digital society. This is a result of having prominent founders, a high diffusion across trusted institutions and desirable attributes. We have also established that BankID plays a crucial role in all levels of society, from the individual level to the nation-state. The organization handles personal identities, which is sensitive by nature, and it is therefore with great responsibility that society entrust BankID. This unique position requires BankID to act in a truthful fashion or else be deprived of the prestigious privilege. Our empirical findings therefore support that BankID is an institution itself.

5.2.1 Regulatory and pragmatic legitimacy

Its longevity and field position suggest that BankID has been complying to rules and regulations. This would imply that the regulatory legitimacy is high. BankID would also not have been able to sustain its dominating field position in society without fulfilling its constituents’ self-interests. If they provide beneficial exchanges, by product and availability, one can assume that their level of pragmatic legitimacy will remain high.

5.2.2 Moral and cultural-cognitive legitimacy

This also applies to moral legitimacy. Privacy and integrity matters for the individual, which BankID handles with great care, indicate that they correspond to the social values and the norms of society (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). BankID also conform with the cognitive aspects of legitimacy as it coheres to established cultural accounts, in all levels of society (Meyer and Scott, 1983). For many, other

alternatives are unthinkable implying that the taken-for-grantedness is very powerful (Suchman, 1995). This would suggest that cultural-cognitive legitimacy is high.

5.2.3 Conclusion

It is clear that BankID's state of legitimacy is 'accepted' among the general public, as they are rarely questioned (Suchman, 1995; Greenhouse et al., 2017). However, there are regulatory agencies that monitor BankID, and they have acknowledged that their monopolistic market position comes with a dependency that is problematic from a societal perspective. The occurrence of evaluation from this perspective would suggest that BankID's legitimacy can also be considered 'proper'. Hence, BankID is accepted/proper, which in theory translates to an organization being labeled 'appropriate', exhibiting a more secure legitimacy (Greenhouse et al., 2017). See *Table 5.2*.

Types of legitimacy	Effect
<i>Regulatory</i>	High
<i>Pragmatic</i>	High
<i>Moral</i>	High
<i>Cultural-cognitive</i>	High
Verdict	High legitimacy
<i>State of legitimacy</i>	<i>Accepted/Proper</i>

Table 5.2: Legitimacy of BankID

5.3 Transposition of legitimacy

5.3.1 A case of legitimacy

From *Section 5.1.5* of the discussion we have established that private gambling operators lacks legitimacy to an extent, and that the legitimacy is less secure. In comparison, we established in *Section 5.2.3* that BankID is a highly legitimate institution, and that the legitimacy seems stable. When BankID started to appear in gambling context, through marketing, it seemed unlikely that this was incidental from a legitimization perspective.

We would like to argue that this was an attempt to transpose legitimacy. BankID is synonymous with legitimacy, a symbol of legitimacy. Therefore, transposing BankID, should by extension mean transposing legitimacy. BankID (and its legitimacy) is not altered as it is selected and transported across

the fields, which theoretically supports the case of transposition. (Sewell, 1992; Schneiberg, 2002). We therefore conclude that this is a case of transposition of legitimacy (see *Figure 5.1*).




Figure 5.1: Transposition of legitimacy

Theory supports that creating ties of some sort between an operator and BankID, would be beneficial for the operator. Strong ties to an important societal institution might among many reasons enhance legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Oliver, 1990). The re-regulation acted as an exogenous shock that enabled organizations to address issues related to legitimacy, as marketing channels opened up (Hwang and Powell, 2005). Featuring the BankID brand in marketing, would give the appearance that a gambling operator has strong ties to BankID, i.e. the operator manipulates the environment (by featuring BankID in marketing) to transpose legitimacy (from BankID).

We have found support in our empirics that the environment was manipulated through marketing. The BankID logotype was larger than the operator's own logotype and was often used out-of-context or marketed with features that BankID cannot provide, like withdrawals. This all indicates that the private operators wanted to associate BankID and its attributes with their business, which was also confirmed in the interview process. We also found that gambling operators without an agreement with BankID behaved in the same way. This further supports our line of argument, as the technical aspect of the solution was not even integrated, and therefore technical superiority cannot be the reason of the inclusion. In contrast, state-owned operators that is considered legitimate chose not to market BankID during this period, which also supports that legitimacy was the objective.

Arguably, transposition could already have happened in the implementation stage. We have chosen to make a distinction. Only a select group of constituents (and only in the verification process), were able to see the importation of BankID. This group had already deemed the operator sufficiently legitimate to interact with it in the first place. Therefore, we have excluded this point of view from our analysis. Instead, the sharp increase of OOH- and traditional media marketing, suggests that operators intended to reach the general public with their communication to appear legitimate.

5.3.2 What type of legitimacy was gained?

In this section, we will analyze if the attempt to transpose legitimacy was successful. We will base our analysis on the four types of legitimacy. Suchman (1995) suggest that legitimacy can differ depending on the level of analysis. For instance, pragmatic legitimacy is less dependent on ‘collective action’ than cultural-cognitive legitimacy. We will therefore begin discussing legitimacy on an organizational level i.e. when an operator markets BankID to fulfill their own business objectives. In the second part of our analysis we will investigate the aggregated effect (field level) of the use of BankID in marketing by individual operators.

5.3.2.1 Organizational level

5.3.2.1.1 Regulatory legitimacy

The re-regulation requires that the gambling operator provides an eID-solution (Sveriges Riksdag, 2018). Featuring BankID, which is an eID-solution, signals compliance to the requirement. However, a report published 2019 by Svenskt Kvalitetsindex shows that 89 percent of the general public was not aware of the re-regulation and should therefore not be aware of the eID-requirement. Consequently, we should not find an increase in regulatory legitimacy among this group. Despite this, regulatory legitimacy can be gained among the minority of the general public that are aware of the re-regulation. Authorities are seemingly the most important stakeholder in this context but should not be affected by the display of the BankID brand in marketing, as they are already monitoring the industry extensively.

5.3.2.1.2 Pragmatic legitimacy

Literature claims that pragmatic legitimacy can be gained by product or image marketing to better appeal to the constituents’ self-interest (Suchman, 1995). Our empirics supports the literature. In terms of product features BankID is described as simple, fast, efficient and secure. When BankID becomes a part of the offering presented by a gambling operator, and its beneficial features are communicated, surely some features resonate with some constituents. For instance, if an operator would market ‘safer registration with BankID’ to a risk-averse gambler, then according to theory the exchange ought to be beneficial for the gambler, and thus the pragmatic legitimacy should have been gained.

5.3.2.1.3 Moral legitimacy

Much of the gambling operators’ lack of moral legitimacy derives from issues related to money laundering and problem gambling. Although many operators allocate a significant amount of resources to combat these two issues, it does not always manifest in the moral evaluation of its constituents.

BankID does ensure thorough AML and KYC processes, which makes it harder for criminals to launder money and makes it easier to help those struggling with problem gambling. This is in accordance to literature, that claims that moral legitimacy is gained by appealing to social values. However, such action has a limited effect, as moral legitimation requires a track-record of moral efforts (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990), which is a lengthy process, especially if you have moral baggage. Suchman (1995) elaborates and claims that moral concerns are more resistant to self-interest manipulation, and assumingly the gambling field's lack of moral legitimacy would probably overshadow any possible gain from using the BankID brand in marketing.

5.3.2.1.4 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy

We have identified two possible reasons for the inclusion of BankID from a cultural-cognitive perspective. The first reasons concern a private operator's desire to be perceived as a natural part of the Swedish gambling field in the mind of the constituents; the inclusion of BankID equals Swedish gambling operator (cf. Svenska Spel). This alternative seems unlikely, reason being when BankID started to appear in marketing, there was no previous association to gambling. Instead, BankID was strongly associated with important state and financial institutions that had integrated the solution. Notably, only a select few operators had an agreement with BankID, but none chose to market it. As the two did not feature publicly together, it seems unlikely that constituents made the cognitive association, and the inclusion should not have had a cultural-cognitive effect for the individual operator.

The second reason concerns the individual operator's desire to become cognitively associated with BankID. This means that the two belong in the same cognitive schema, i.e. BankID and the gambling operator are together taken-for-granted. However, we have found support that the effect on cognitive legitimation will be limited. To impactfully increase one's cultural-cognitive legitimacy, collective action is required across the field (Suchman, 1995). Trade association would be a suitable forum for mobilization. However, most licensees are not members of a trade association, and the trade associations themselves do not have any explicit goals regarding this matter. It also seems unlikely that collective action is of the best interest of an individual operator. The individual operator does not want to hasten the standardization of BankID in the field as the competitive advantage of having the solution would be lost.

5.3.2.1.5 Conclusion

We have shown that in theory, regulatory, pragmatic and moral legitimacy are gained for the individual operator. These gains come from the implementation of BankID as a practice, which by extension mean that BankID enables compliance, improvement of the product, and the ability to address societal issues.

However, we have not found that these types of legitimacy were transposed from BankID. Rather, BankID is perceived as a practice and the legitimacy is gained as a consequence. We can therefore not find support in this section that legitimacy was transposed, but this level of analysis suggests that it was instead gained as a consequence of implementing BankID as a practice. The effect on legitimacy on an organizational level according to theory is summarized in *Table 5.3* and *Figure 5.2*.

Types of legitimacy	Empirical context	Effect on legitimacy	Legitimacy transposed
<i>Regulatory</i>	Complies to eID-requirement	Gained	No
<i>Pragmatic</i>	Offers better product	Gained	No
<i>Moral</i>	Addresses problem gambling (KYC)	Gained	No
<i>Cultural-cognitive</i>	Visual association with BankID	Uncertain	Uncertain
Verdict	BankID in marketing	Gained	No

Table 5.3: Effect on legitimacy on an organizational level




Figure 5.2: Effect on legitimacy on an organizational level

5.3.3.2 Aggregated (Field) level

5.3.3.2.1 Regulatory and pragmatic legitimacy

It seems unlikely that the awareness of the eID-requirement should increase as we progress to an aggregated level of analysis. Operators still comply to requirement to the same degree and therefore regulatory legitimacy should remain on the same level. Further, pragmatic legitimacy is based on direct exchange, hence the self-interest of the constituents does not become fulfilled when BankID is featured

by multiple operators (BankID does not become a better or worse solution). Therefore, pragmatic legitimacy should also remain on the same level.

5.3.3.2.2. Moral legitimacy

As we transcend to an aggregated level, the mass exposure of BankID should according to theory have a more profound effect on moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). When many operators display BankID in marketing, which hypothetically could be the solution to money-laundering and problem gambling, it is evangelized on a large scale (Suchman, 1995). This should according to theory increase moral legitimacy. However, BankID is not preached as a measure to address these societal issues. For instance, marketing does not explicitly articulate that problem gambling is tackled with the help of BankID, on the contrary communication regularly encourages gambling. Most importantly, the potential gain in moral legitimacy is overshadowed by the aggressive marketing that many considers increases problem gambling (Öbrink, 2019; Micu and Ulander, 2019). We therefore conclude that moral legitimacy also remains on the same level.

5.3.3.2.3 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy

When analyzing the cultural-cognitive legitimacy on an aggregated level, the effect becomes the most pronounced. We have identified that there is a low degree of differentiation among the operators. This in turn fosters high degree of mimicking or isomorphism. In order to survive in this market, operators employ intrusive marketing campaigns. This is all accelerated by the digital nature of the business.

In other words, the prevailing logics in the field cultivate ‘turbo’ isomorphism and aggressive marketing. In practice, this implied that BankID spread like wildfire in marketing across the gambling field (see *Section 4.1.4.1* and *Section 4.4*). Almost overnight, constituents were extensively exposed to BankID in a gambling context.

Theory claims that collective action to encourage isomorphism is required to gain cultural-cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). To exemplify, this could mean that the trade association advocates BankID as an industry standard, which is not the case. We have found that collective action is not necessary as isomorphism is already prevalent in the field. In this case isomorphism enabled BankID to become taken-for-granted in the field (see *Figure 5.3*).




Figure 5.3: BankID becomes taken-for-granted in the gambling field

The joint taken-for-grantedness, implies that the positive heuristics assigned to BankID (including legitimacy) should also have been transmitted to the gambling field and therefore we would like to claim that cultural-cognitive legitimacy was successfully transposed. The strong ‘symbol of legitimacy’ is now a part of the gambling field. In other words, what individual operators consciously and unsuccessfully tried to achieve in terms of cognitive associations, therefore unexpectedly became successful on an aggregated level.

We have found support that the transposition was successful in the reaction of BankID. Their prompt and strong reaction displays a feeling of losing control over their brand, which would support the notion that they were quickly becoming a part of the gambling field.

5.3.3.2.4 Conclusion

We have found that the gain of regulatory, pragmatic and moral legitimacy remains unchanged as we transcend to an aggregated level. Therefore, we see no evidence of a transposition of legitimacy here either. On a cultural-cognitive aspect of legitimacy, we have found evidence of TOL. In theory, BankID has become a part of the gambling field by mass exposure. We can therefore conclude that cultural-cognitive legitimacy was successfully transposed (see *Figure 5.4*).




Figure 5.4: Effect on legitimacy on an aggregated (field) level

5.3.3 The paradox of transposing legitimacy across fields

The transposition of cultural-cognitive legitimacy was short-lived since BankID retaliated by prohibiting the use of BankID in marketing. This does not mean that BankID did not want anything to do with the gambling field. As a matter of fact, BankID already had a transactional relationship with many operators as it suited their business model. As long as the relationship was perceived as purely transactional, BankID had no reason for taking measures. The same would perhaps apply if the brand would have been featured by a small number of operators, since its perceived association with the gambling field would be insignificant. Still, when BankID was featured on a large scale by multiple operators, the perceived association became stronger, which led to measures being taken. This would suggest that BankID opposed becoming a part of the gambling field. They resisted the transposition.

From their perspective, becoming a part of the gambling field imposes a risk of deterioration of the brand's legitimacy. We have not found support that their concern is valid; we have not measured the effect or found support in theory. Despite this, the perceived risk of losing legitimacy justified total prohibition in this case. Moreover, being involuntarily included in marketing, and by extension involuntarily associated with the gambling field created additional irritation.

Here we have identified an opposing force that challenges the durability of the transposition. As BankID opposed the transposition and terminated it by prohibition, the gain in cultural-cognitive legitimacy that could be derived from the transposition was a short-term gain. After all, the gambling operators are dependent on BankID accepting the transposition to sustain the gain. Perhaps a strategic alliance would have been a better way of gaining sustainable legitimacy. For now, this seems unlikely as the gambling field is still perceived as debated, and therefore still is a risk element. Here we have identified a paradox; 'the paradox of transposition of legitimacy'. An organization in need of legitimacy (illegitimate/debated) that wants to transpose legitimacy is dependent on the legitimate organization (proper/accepted) to gain long-term legitimacy. The legitimate organization does not want to deteriorate its legitimacy and will therefore resist the transposition. Therefore, an organization that want to become more legitimate by transposition, need to become legitimate in order to transpose for legitimacy.

Conclusion

To answer the research question ‘can legitimacy theory explain why gambling operators heavily marketed their eID-solution, if so how?’ our research have found that transposition of legitimacy can be an explanation. Both theory and our empirical findings heavily imply this. We have found support in literature that legitimacy was in fact gained, both on an organizational and aggregated level. However, legitimacy was only transposed (i.e BankID’s legitimacy was transported across the fields) on an aggregated level.

On an organizational level, gambling operators successfully gained regulatory, pragmatic and moral legitimacy as a consequence of implementing BankID as a practice. In addition, on an aggregated level, we found that cultural-cognitive legitimacy was transposed. This transposition was an unintentional consequence of the prevailing isomorphism and subsequent marketing behavior.

As BankID prohibited the use of the brand in marketing, the private gambling operators failed to establish a durable transposition. Here we identified a paradox, where an accepted field resists the transposition of legitimacy from a debated field, out of fear of losing their own legitimacy. Therefore, an organization in need of legitimacy need to be legitimate in the first place, to initiate transposition of legitimacy.

In conclusion, the operators had a great opportunity to gain legitimacy. Prevailing field logics, like short-termism and opportunism took over, and the opportunity was lost. An agreement seemed necessary in order to gain long-term legitimacy, both by implementation of BankID as a practice and by transposition in this case.

6.1 Theoretical contribution

Our phenomenon gave us the unique opportunity to follow a field under transformation. It allowed us to study the direct aftermath of an attempted transposition of legitimacy. Our insights were generated from the most immediate decision-makers and the affected stakeholders, which also gave our findings a nuance. We have identified three ways this thesis empirically contributes to legitimacy and transposition theory.

First, we have in our study we have found empirical support that a legitimation lens can be applied to transposition theory. Suchman’s (1995) concepts could accurately be applied to our studied empirical

context, which show a theoretical fit. We can also justify that the studied phenomenon was a case of transposition.

Second, we have found empirical support that cultural-cognitive legitimacy can be transposed across two fields (Sewell, 1992; Suchman, 1995). However, we were not able to demonstrate that the other three types of legitimacy were subjects for transposition. Furthermore, in line with existing literature (Haydu 2002; Hwang and Powell, 2005), we have in our study demonstrated how regulatory, pragmatic and moral legitimacy can be gained as a secondary effect, by implementing BankID as a practice. This gain is evident on both an organizational and an aggregated level.

Finally, we have identified a paradox: ‘the paradox of transposing legitimacy’. We have found empirical support that a field (of accepted or proper state of legitimacy) will resist the transposition of legitimacy from a field (of illegitimate or debated state of legitimacy), out of fear of losing its own legitimacy. Therefore, an organization in need of legitimacy need to be legitimate in the first place, to initiate transposition of legitimacy.

6.2 Managerial implications

Our findings can be used by practitioners in a similar context. We present two legitimacy-gaining strategies for organizations in need of legitimacy: a *short-term* and a *long-term* strategy. We also highlight a possible risk for managers of legitimate brands.

Managers of this type of organization can by featuring a legitimate brand from another industry, gain legitimacy. If this is done without a bilateral agreement with the featured party, the gain of legitimacy will be short-lived. Resisting forces will emerge, and the legitimacy effect will be limited.

If there would be an agreement between the two parties, the gain of legitimacy can be durable. Probably, the manager of the organization in need of legitimacy, must become legitimate by other means before an agreement can be signed, and the legitimate brand can rightfully be featured.

Lastly, our study has highlighted the possible risk with managing a legitimate brand. It is important to understand that many other less legitimate actors, might see a reason to take advantage of the legitimate brand. It is therefore important to preventively guard yourself against these risks. Making sure that the company brand guideline is up to date is a great first step.

6.3 Limitations

We have identified three areas that could limit our findings. First, in our study we have chosen the organizational perspective to understand underlying motives. We have therefore not held interviews with consumers and might have overlooked insights that could have been valuable to understand their perspective on the studied phenomenon.

Second, we have found support in both theory and in our findings that legitimacy can be transposed and can be gained as a consequence of implementing a legitimate practice. The qualitative nature of our study limited our understanding to what extent legitimacy was gained, as we did not quantify the increase. In our case, this type of research would be difficult as the phenomenon was so widespread that it would be hard to control for external validity.

Third, perhaps smaller organizations could have generated a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. As mimicking was prevalent in the field, we deemed that the larger operators and the two trade associations could work as an industry proxy.

6.4 Future research

First, we advocate future research to replicate the study on other fields characterized by low legitimacy, e.g. weapon trade, alcohol or tobacco. It would be of interest to examine if legitimacy can be gained in a similar fashion, especially the case of transposing legitimacy across fields.

Institutional logics also deserve to be given attention in future research relating to gaining legitimacy by transposition. Understanding different institutional logics in different fields, could potentially generate insights in how transposition of legitimacy can be sustained, and how motives shape the end-result.

Lastly, a longitudinal study of transposition of legitimacy would be of interest to extend the findings of this thesis. Incorporating the perspective of the consumer, and how their attitudes and perception changes over time, could yield new insights. In combination with a quantitative approach, the legitimization effect could perhaps be more implicit and generalizable.

References

- Aldrich, H.E. & Fiol, C.M. 1994, 'Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation', *Academy of management review*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 645-670.
- Alvesson, M. & Skoldberg, K. 2017, *Reflexive methodology: New vistas for qualitative research*, Sage.
- Ashforth, B.E. & Gibbs, B.W. 1990, 'The double-edge of organizational legitimation', *Organization science*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 177-194.
- Bankomat n.d., *About Bankomat*, Bankomat, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://bankomat.se/about-us/>.
- BankID 2019, *BankID Brand Guidelines*, BankID, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.bankid.com/assets/bankid/logo/BankID-varumarkesguide-v10-SE-2019-02-18.pdf>.
- BankID n.d., *About Finansiell ID-Teknik*, BankID, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.bankid.com/om-oss>.
- Bankidcasinot 2019, *Play without registration 2019*, advertisement on Google, 12 March 2019.
- Baum, J.A. & Oliver, C. 1991, 'Institutional linkages and organizational mortality', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp. 187-218.
- Bryman, A. & Bell, E. 2011, *Business research methods*, Oxford University Press.
- Bethard 2019, *Win a trip to Zlatan in LA*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 4 March 2019.
- BOS n.d.1, *About BOS*, BOS, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.bos.nu/en/about-bos/>.
- BOS n.d.2, *Questions & Answers*, BOS, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.bos.nu/faq/>.
- Boxenbaum, E. & Battilana, J. 2005, 'Importation as innovation: Transposing managerial practices across fields', *Strategic organization*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 355-383.
- Brinkmann, S. 2013, *Qualitative interviewing*, Oxford university press.
- Brown, A.D. 1998, 'Narrative, politics and legitimacy in an IT implementation', *Journal of Management Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 35-58.

- Campbell, J.L. 2004, *Institutional change and globalization*, Princeton University Press.
- Casumo 2019, *New jackpot every day*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 28 March 2019.
- Cooke, S. & Ryan, P. 2000, 'Brand alliances: from reputation endorsement to collaboration on core competencies', *Irish Marketing Review*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 36.
- Dacin, M.T., Oliver, C. & Roy, J. 2007, 'The legitimacy of strategic alliances: An institutional perspective', *Strategic Management Journal*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 169-187.
- Deephouse, D.L. 1996, 'Does isomorphism legitimate?', *Academy of management journal*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1024-1039.
- Deephouse, D.L. & Suchman, M. 2008, 'Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism', *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism*, vol. 49, pp. 77.
- DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. 1991, 'Introduction. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis', *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 1-40.
- DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. 1983, 'The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields', *American Sociological Review*, , pp. 147-160.
- Djelic, M. 2001, *Exporting the American model: The post-war transformation of European business*, Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Dowling, J. & Pfeffer, J. 1975, 'Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior', *Pacific sociological review*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 122-136.
- Duelz Casino 2019, *BankID, new games and casino duels!*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 13 March 2019.
- Dubois, A. & Gadde, L. 2002, 'Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research', *Journal of business research*, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 553-560.
- Edmondson, A.C. & McManus, S.E. 2007, 'Methodological fit in management field research', *Academy of management review*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 1246-1264.
- Flick, U. 2009, *An introduction to qualitative research*, Sage Publications Limited.

- Finansdepartementet 2017, *A re-regulated gambling market SOU 2017:30*, Regeringskansliet, accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www.regeringen.se/4969b7/contentassets/29291777554d47e49e717171e4eb5f83/en-omreglerad-spelmarknad-del-1-av-2-kapitel-1-21-sou-201730>.
- Finansinspektionen 2018, *EU-regulations for PSD2*, Finansinspektionen, accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www.fi.se/sv/bank/andra-betaltjanstdirektivet-psd-2/eu-regler-for-psd-2/>.
- Game Lounge 2019, *How does casino work with BankID? Guide and ranking!*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 11 March 2019.
- Game Lounge 2019, *How does casino work with Mobile ID? Guide and ranking!*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 10 April 2019.
- Getswish n.d., *About Swish*, Getswish, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.getswish.se/about-swish/>.
- Gibbs, G.R. 2007, 'Thematic coding and categorizing', *Analyzing qualitative data*. London: Sage, pp. 38-56.
- Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T.B. & Meyer, R.E. 2017, *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism*, Sage.
- Greenwood, R. & Suddaby, R. 2006, 'Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The big five accounting firms', *Academy of Management journal*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 27-48.
- Guba, E.G. 1985, *The context of emergent paradigm research*, Sage, CA.
- Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. 1994, 'Competing paradigms in qualitative research', *Handbook of qualitative research*, vol. 2, no. 163-194, pp. 105.
- Hammersley, M. 1992, 'On feminist methodology', *Sociology*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 187-206.
- Haydu, J. 2002, 'Business citizenship at work: Cultural transposition and class formation in Cincinnati, 1870–1910', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 107, no. 6, pp. 1424-1467.
- Hirsch, P. & Andrews, J.A. 1986, 'Administrators' response to performance and value challenges: Stance, symbols, and behavior', *Leadership and organizational culture: New perspectives on administrative theory and practice*, pp. 170-185.

- Hwang, H. & Powell, W.W. 2005, 'Institutions and entrepreneurship' in *Handbook of entrepreneurship research* Springer, pp. 201-232.
- Jepperson, R. 1991, 'Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism', *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis*, pp. 143-163.
- Johnson, C. 2004, 'Introduction: Legitimacy processes in organizations' in *Legitimacy processes in organizations* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 1-24.
- Kanter, R.M. 1977, (1977a). *Men and women of the corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Karlsson, T. & Middleton, K.W. 2015, 'Strategies for creating new venture legitimacy', *Industry and Higher Education*, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 469-479.
- Ketokivi, M. & Choi, T. 2014, 'Renaissance of case research as a scientific method', *Journal of Operations Management*, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 232-240.
- Kirkeby, O.F. 1994, 'Abduktion', Andersen, H., ed., *Videnskabsteori og metodelaere*, Fredriksberg: Samfundslitteratur, pp. 122–152.
- Kjellberg, H. & Olson, D. 2017, 'Joint markets: How adjacent markets influence the formation of regulated markets', *Marketing Theory*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 95-123.
- Knoke, D. 1985, 'The political economies of associations', *Research in Political Sociology*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 211-242.
- Lee, W. & Aslam, U. 2017, 'Towards the wholesome interview: Technical, social and political dimensions'.
- LeoVegas 2019, *Get payback quick as lightning!*, advertisement on YouTube, 25 February 2019.
- LeoVegas 2019, *Now even faster with Swish*, OOH advertisement, 8 February 2019.
- LeoVegas 2019, *Up to 200% in welcoming bonus!*, advertisement on Tyda, 27 February 2019.
- Lotteriinspektionen. n.d.1, Gambling and lottery market distribution in Sweden 2016, by revenue (in million SEK), Statista, Accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www-statista-com.ez.hhs.se/statistics/703830/gambling-and-lottery-market-distribution-in-sweden-by-revenue/>.

- Lotteriinspektionen. n.d.2, Gambling and lottery market distribution in Sweden in 2017, Statista, Accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www-statista-com.ez.hhs.se/statistics/703718/gambling-and-lottery-market-distribution-in-sweden/>.
- Lotteriinspektionen. n.d.3, How often do you gamble or play lottery?, Statista, Accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www-statista-com.ez.hhs.se/statistics/703804/gambling-and-playing-lottery-frequency-in-sweden/>.
- Lynxeye 2019, *Purposeful Brands Digital 2018*, Lynxeye, accessed 9 May 2019, <http://www.lynxeye.com/sv/thinking/purposeful-brands-digital-2018-se-listan-har/>.
- Mason, J. 2017, *Qualitative researching*, Sage.
- Merriam, S.B. & Tisdell, E.J. 2015, *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation*, John Wiley & Sons.
- Merriam-Webster n.d., Constituent, Merriam-Webster, accessed on 11 May 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constituent>
- Merriam-Webster n.d., Gambling, Merriam-Webster, accessed on 11 May 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gambling>
- Merriam-Webster n.d., *Marketing*, Merriam-Webster, accessed on 11 May 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marketing>
- Meyer, J.W. & Scott, W.R. 1983, 'Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local government', *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality*.
- Meyer, J.W. & Scott, W.R. 1983, 'The organization of societal sectors', *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality*.
- Meyer, J.W. & Rowan, B. 1977, 'Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony', *American journal of sociology*, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 340-363.
- Micu, P. & Ulander, T. 2019, 'Took his life after the gambling addiction - the minister's response to the family', *Expressen*, accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www.expressen.se/dinapengar/ministern-var-skyldighet-att-skydda-de-som-drabbas-av-spelmissbruk/>
- Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., Huberman, M.A. & Huberman, M. 1994, *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*, sage.

- MrGreen 2019, +200 Freespins, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 29 March 2019.
- Naess, J. 2019, 'Game advertisers who invested the most in 2019', *Dagens Media*, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.dagensmedia.se/marknadsforing/marknadsforing/spelannonsorerna-som-gasat-mest-2019/>.
- Ninja Casino 2019, *Payback on your account before the next stop*, OOH advertisement, 4 February 2019.
- Ninja Casino 2019, *Play with your mobile bank registration*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 13 March 2019.
- Oliver, C. 1990, 'Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and future directions', *Academy of management review*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 241-265.
- Padgett, J.F. & McLean, P.D. 2006, 'Organizational invention and elite transformation: The birth of partnership systems in Renaissance Florence', *American journal of Sociology*, vol. 111, no. 5, pp. 1463-1568.
- Pollock, T.G. & Rindova, V.P. 2003, 'Media legitimation effects in the market for initial public offerings', *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 631-642.
- Powell, W. 1991, 'Expanding the scope of institutional analysis', *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis*, Chicago, pp. 183-203.
- Powell, W.W. & Sandholtz, K.W. 2012, 'Amphibious entrepreneurs and the emergence of organizational forms', *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 94-115.
- Randhawa, R. & Lönnroth, A. 2019, 'New statistics: The number of gambling addicts has almost doubled in 10 years', *SVT*, accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/ny-statistik-antalet-spelmissbrukare-har-knappt-fordubblats-pa-10-ar>
- Sahlin-Andersson, K. 1996, 'Imitating by editing success. The construction of organizational fields and identities'.
- Schneiberg, M. 2013, 'Lost in transposition? (A cautionary tale): The bank of North Dakota and prospects for reform in American banking' in *Institutional logics in action, part A* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 277-310.

- Schneiberg, M. 2006, 'What's on the path? Path dependence, organizational diversity and the problem of institutional change in the US economy, 1900–1950', *socio-Economic review*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 47-80.
- Schneiberg, M. 2002, 'Organizational heterogeneity and the production of new forms: Politics, social movements and mutual companies in American fire insurance, 1900–1930' in *Social structure and organizations revisited* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 39-89.
- Scott, W.R. 1995, 'Institutions and organizations. Foundations for organizational science', *London: A Sage Publication Series*.
- Scott, W.R. 1991, "Unpacking institutional arguments. WW Powell, PJ DiMaggio, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*".
- Sewell Jr, W.H. 1992, 'A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation', *American journal of sociology*, vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 1-29.
- Singh, J.V., Tucker, D.J. & House, R.J. 1986, 'Organizational legitimacy and the liability of newness', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp. 171-193.
- Skog, A. & Sölvell, Ö. 2019, 'The dark side of agglomeration, sustained wealth and transposition of trading institutions—the case of Bordeaux in the 18th and 19th centuries', *Journal of Economic Geography*.
- SPER n.d., *About SPER*, SPER, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.sper.se/about-sper/>.
- Strang, D. & Meyer, J.W. 1994, 'Institutional conditions for diffusion. R. Scott, JW Meyer, eds', *Institutional Environments and Organizations*, pp. 100-112.
- Stryker, R. 1994, 'Rules, resources, and legitimacy processes: Some implications for social conflict, order, and change', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 847-910.
- Storspelare 2019, *Study shows: security is most important for Swedish gamblers*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 26 February 2019.
- Suchman, M.C. 1995, 'Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches', *Academy of management review*, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 571-610.
- Suchman, M.C. 1994, *On the role of law firms in the structuration of Silicon Valley*, Disputes Processing Research Program, Institute for Legal Studies

- Svenskt Kvalitetsindex 2019, *Swedish Gambling Industry 2018*, Svenskt Kvalitetsindex, accessed 8 May 2019, <http://www.kvalitetsindex.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Spelbranschen-rapport-2018.pdf>.
- Sveriges Riksdag 2018, *The Swedish Gambling Act (2018:1138)*, Sveriges Riksdag, accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/spellag-20181138_sfs-2018-1138.
- Swedish Gambling Authority 2019, *Gambling Industry Quarterly Statistics*, Spelinspektionen, accessed 11 May 2019, <https://www.spelinspektionen.se/globalassets/dokument/statistik/arssiffror-statistik/spelmarknaden-2018.pdf>.
- Swedish Gambling Authority, 2019, *Gambling operators with a license*, Spelinspektionen, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.spelinspektionen.se/licensansokan/bolag-med-spellicens>.
- Tjärnström, H., Lindwall, P. & Hagman, G. 2019, 'Gambling CEOs: Stop with Triss-scratching in Morgonsoffan', *Dagens Industri*, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.di.se/debatt/spelbolagens-chefer-staten-gor-mest-reklam/>.
- Tracey, P., Phillips, N. & Jarvis, O. 2011, 'Bridging institutional entrepreneurship and the creation of new organizational forms: A multilevel model', *Organization science*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 60-80.
- Törner, A., 2019, 'Perfect Day on gambling marketing: 'We need to be more thorough'', *Resumé*, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.resume.se/nyheter/artiklar/2019/02/21/perfect-day-vi-behover-vara-annu-noggrannare/>.
- Unibet 2019, *Collect your bonus - deposit 100kr and get 600kr in total to play for!*, advertisement on Facebook, 28 February 2019.
- Voodoo Dreams Casino 2019, *Withdrawals in 6 minutes, directly through BankID*, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 22 March 2019.
- Weick, K.E. 1969, *The Social Psychology of Organizing (1979 ed.)*, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Wemnell, M. 2019, *Annual Statistics BankID - 2018*, BankID, accessed, 9 May 2019, <https://www.bankid.com/assets/bankid/stats/2018/statistik-2018-12.pdf>.

- Wikén, E. 2019, 'Sifo: Majority of Swedes want to ban gambling advertisements', *SVT*, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/70-procent-av-svenskarna-positiva-till-att-forbjuda-spelreklam>.
- Wood, D. J. 1991, Corporate social performance revisited, *Academy of Management Review*, 16, pp. 691-718.
- Yin, R.K. 2015, *Qualitative research from start to finish*, Guilford Publications.
- Yin, R.K. 2011, *Applications of case study research*, Sage.
- Yin, R.K. 1994, *Case study research: Design and methods*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Öbrink, A. 2019, 'Criticism against gambling marketing - Ardalan Shekarabi (S) calls on the gambling operators', *SVT*, accessed 9 May 2019, <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/kritik-mot-spelreklam-ardalan-shekarabi-s-kallar-till-sig-spelbolagen>

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Interview protocol: BankID

Warm-up

Q: Briefly, could you start with telling us your background and your role today?

Main questions

Industry

Q: What does BankID mean for you and what role does it play in society?

Q: Why is BankID established in society?

Q: Is there any/what are the challenges of having this position in society?

Q: What associations to BankID do you think that different stakeholder in society has?

BankID in marketing

Q: What is BankID's view of businesses featuring the BankID logotype in marketing?

Q: What was the reaction when gambling operators featured the BankID logotype in their marketing?

Probe: Why do you believe that gambling operators chose to include BankID in their marketing?

Q: Do you think BankID's brand was affected by being featured in gambling operators marketing?

Probe: Does BankID have a strategy to sustain the brand credibility?

Appendix 2 - Interview protocol: Gambling

Warm-up

Q: Briefly, could you start with telling us your background and your role today?

Main questions

Industry

Q: How would you describe the industry?

Q: What challenges does the gambling industry have?

Probe: How would you say the industry is perceived?

Q: What challenges do you have as an actor in the gambling industry?

Probe: What difficulties do you face getting your message across?

Probe: To what degree would you say imitation or “copying” is prevalent?

Q: What has been the biggest change since the re-regulation? For the better? For the worse?

BankID

Q: Can you tell us about the implementation of BankID?

Q: How was contact established?

Probe: How would you describe the process?

Q: Why did you choose to implement BankID?

Q: What is your view of BankID and what role does it play in society?

BankID in marketing

Q: BankID has recently been present in marketing among actors in the industry. Why do you think that is?

Probe: What about credibility?

Q: What do you think the response has been from the different stakeholders?

Probe: BankID has recently changed its policies regarding the usage of BankID in marketing. Why do you think that is?

Appendix 3 - Advertisements



Figure 4.4: Storspelare 2019, Study shows: security is most important for Swedish gamblers, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 26 February 2019.




Figure 4.5: Voodoo Dreams Casino 2019, Withdrawals in 6 minutes, directly through BankID, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 22 March 2019.




Figure 4.6: Casumo 2019, New jackpot every day, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 28 March 2019.



Figure 4.7: LeoVegas 2019, Now even faster with Swish, OOH advertisement, 8 February 2019.



Figure 4.8: Bethard 2019, Win a trip to Zlatan in LA, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 4 March 2019.



Figure 4.9: LeoVegas 2019, Up to 200% in welcoming bonus!, advertisement on Tyda, 27 February 2019.

Spela Utan Registrering 2019 | Snabba och skattefria vinster

www.bankidcasinot.se/ ▼

Vi har samlat alla sajter utan registrering och konto här. Spela snabbt med BankID. Topplistan 2019.

Figure 4.10: Bankidcasinot 2019, Play without registration 2019, advertisement on Google, 12 March 2019.



Figure 4.11: Ninja Casino 2019, Payback on your account before the next stop, OOH advertisement, 4 February 2019.



Figure 4.12: Ninja Casino 2019, Play with your mobile bank registration, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 13 March 2019.




Figure 4.13: Game Lounge 2019, How does casino work with BankID? Guide and ranking!, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 11 March 2019.




Figure 4.14: Game Lounge 2019, How does casino work with Mobile ID? Guide and ranking!, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 10 April 2019.



(in Figure 4.3): MrGreen 2019, +200 Freespins, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 29 March 2019.




Figure 4.14: Duelz Casino 2019, BankID, new games and casino duels!, advertisement on Aftonbladet, 13 March 2019.




Figure 4.15: LeoVegas 2019, Get payback quick as lightning!, advertisement on YouTube, 25 February 2019.




Figure 4.16: Unibet 2019, Collect your bonus - deposit 100kr and get 600kr in total to play for, advertisement on Facebook, 28 February 2019.