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What impacts one's willingness to defend? A study of the influence of military training in Sweden

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Abstract: This thesis studies the effect of military training on one's willingness to defend by answering the question: *How does military training influence the likelihood of people expressing (or having) a willingness to defend one's country?* Using difference-in-differences and IV approaches within a linear probability model framework, it exploits two exogenous variations in conscription policy on new survey data in Sweden. First, conscription has almost exclusively covered men, leaving two distinct groups. Second, the treatment intensity has varied over time on a cohort level. The Cold War era is marked by high, and the following period ensuing its end, low conscription. Overall, military training is not found to be a significant determinant of one's willingness to defend. In perhaps the most relevant metric, the willingness to partake in combat roles, no effects are detected. Notably, the more prominent effect seems to stem from being in the treatment group, which encompasses gender effects. These gender effects are less significant in the other metrics, but military training remains, on average, not a prominent determinant of one's willingness to defend one's country.

Keywords: Conscription, military training, willingness to defend

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1 Introduction

The war in Ukraine has prompted countries across Europe to revisit concepts and questions many hoped would be undertaken as a study of history rather than policy. Several governments are increasing defence budgets, investments in the defence sector and looking more seriously at personnel requirements in the armed forces (SIPRI, 2023). Concerning the latter, conscription has historically been a widely used policy in Europe and is still broadly implemented. 15 out of 44 European countries employ conscription in some form today. Outside Europe, that number totals 85 countries (Forces, 2022). Few government policies similarly force young men and women to undertake tasks directly and spend several months to years in the country's service. As can be expected, this has long-term impacts on many fields of economic interest and perhaps most notably on labour markets (See among others: Angrist, 1990; Imbens and Klaauw, 1995; Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007; Keller et al., 2009). In war, it is not surprising that the benefit of such policies would outweigh the costs, but in peacetime, the argument is not as clear. Some potential reasons for its usage could be, for instance, that there is a continuous need for a minimum level of deterrence, protection of borders or upkeep of the relationship between the armed forces or state and the general population. The latter is essential and made explicitly so in the war in Ukraine: the willingness of ordinary citizens to defend their country matters significantly (Norris and Kizlova, 2022). In following the broader European trend, Sweden has also been increasing its focus on defence by re-establishing the concept of 'total defence' and re-instating conscription (Riksdagen, 2014; Holm, 2017). The importance of willingness to defend and the policy of total defence is perhaps best summarised by the Swedish Defence Commission:

> (author's tr.) "The foundation for total defence is ultimately the population of Sweden. The population's willingness to defend, its resilience, and its ability to cope with war are crucial for achieving a credible total defence."[1] (Försvarsberedningen, 2017, p. 32)

This thesis will therefore use unique survey data in Sweden to estimate the causal effects of military training on the willingness to defend, herefrom also referred to as *defence will*. The overarching research question is: *How does military training influence the likelihood of people expressing (or having) a willingness to defend one's country?* Because military training is suspected to be endogenous, two methods will be used to answer the question. First, a difference-in-differences approach exploits two exogenous variations in conscription policy: i) conscription has almost exclusively covered men, leaving one treated and one untreated group, ii) there have been two different periods in conscription intensity after World War II: the Cold War era when conscription was 'general'[2] and almost all eligible men were conscripted, and a later period when the conscription intensity was greatly reduced. The difference-in-differences approach, therefore, compares differences in defence will between the treated and untreated groups before and after the changes in conscription intensity. Second, IV regressions that uses the same variation as instruments for military training will be employed. The identifying assumption for the difference-in-differences method is that besides different time trends, any differences in willingness to defend

[1] (swe.) "Grunden för totalförsvaret utgörs ytterst av Sveriges befolkning. Befolkningens försvarsvilja, motståndskraft och förmåga att hantera en krigssituation är avgörande för att uppnå ett trovärdigt totalförsvar."

[2] (swe.) Allmän värnplikt.

between the two periods, beyond those experienced in the untreated group, are due to the decline in military training. For the IV, besides relevance, is that the variation used as instruments is uncorrelated with any other determinants not captured by the model. The approach to defence will is binary, and hence the difference-in-differences and IV methods are carried out on a linear probability model (LPM) framework.

The findings are grouped into three main categories. First, there are no discernible effects of military training concerning combat roles, which is the most relevant metric for defence will. Instead, treatment group or gender effects seem to be the primary determinant. Specifically, being male is associated with a 39% and 41.4% higher likelihood of expressing positive will for the two specifications used in the difference-in-differences model. The IV show similar overall results. Second, the treatment group or gender effects are not as prevalent in the other six metrics of willingness and are only significant for non-combat roles and general defence will. The raw data differences in willingness are smaller between the treated and untreated groups for these metrics, which explains the results. Third, military training does not appear to impact defence will significantly for the remaining metrics. The IV results for the remaining metrics are insignificant at any conventional level. These findings are overall robust to changes in the empirical strategy.

The thesis has several and many policy-related contributions. First, it uses new and unique data on a highly relevant and current policy issue. Second, it provides a framework for the literature on determinants of defence will. Third, it constructs a theoretical basis for why military training would affect one's willingness to defend. Fourth, previous research has found differences in defence will in Sweden between men and women, those military-trained and those not, and older cohorts compared to younger (Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021). One possible reason provided is that conscription could explain these differences. This thesis contributes to the literature by not finding that this explanation is probable. Instead, it seems that men are more willing to defend the country than women, regardless of whether they are military-trained. Fifth, another broader contribution is that conscription in peacetime might be a minor factor in building defence will. If military training, contrary to how it is usually portrayed, does not significantly increase willingness in economic terms, conscription would act more as a guarantee of personnel rather than defence will. As such, it points to the fact that this potential benefit should not form a part of the calculation when forming or evaluating the impacts of conscription policy. Although the thesis use Swedish data, Sweden has followed the general trend of having conscription, removing it and recently re-instated it (Hutt, 2022). Last, this discussion further contributes to the aforementioned literature in economics on the implications of conscription because it questions one of the often discussed benefits of it, which otherwise would be weighed against the documented negative impact on, for instance, life-time earnings (Angrist, 1990;[3] Imbens and Klaauw, 1995). Given that numerous countries employ conscription, this contribution has potential real policy implications and relevance.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. First, a background section defines the concept of defence will, including its different categories, and mentions previous research in the Swedish setting. Second, the literature review section will introduce the constructed framework for the literature. Third, a theoretical basis for why military training would affect one's willingness to

[3] One relevant contextual difference is that the article covers the impact of conscription in relation to military service in Vietnam.

defend is presented. Forth, in the data section, the surveys are described. Fifth, the empirical strategy is put forward in the method section. Sixth, in the results section, the findings are presented. Seventh, the results are analysed in the discussion section. The conclusion and suggestions for further research are provided in the last section.

2 Background

The background will cover two topics. The first relates to the definition of defence will as employed in the thesis. The second describes the latest research in the Swedish context regarding the concept.

2.1 What is 'willingness to defend'? – A definition

Although the main focus of the thesis is not to provide an in-depth conceptual analysis of defence will, a definition is required to adequately gain a better theoretical and empirical understanding of the concept. The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) report *"Will to defend in theory and in practice"* (Wedebrand and Jonsson, 2021), provides an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the concept in the Swedish setting, a categorisation of willingness to defend, and a definition. In the report, the concept is classified into three categories: *personal defence will,*[4] *general defence will*[5] and, *supportive defence will.*[6]

The first category, personal defence will, cover the willingness to personally participate in operations activated in the case of war or heightened readiness. The most intuitive example is serving in the armed forces. However, as this category can only be measured as a perception of potential behaviour, it cannot be equated with actual behaviour in the case of war. Nonetheless, there is no other way to measure this dimension in peacetime, which means it represents the most valid metric available.

The second category, general defence will, relate to opinions and perceptions regarding whether a country should defend itself in the case of a military attack. As this perception concerns attitudes and behaviour which the individual typically does not personally decide upon, there is not the same issue when interpreting the answers as with the former dimension.

The last category, supportive defence will, is broader and contains that which does not fall in either of the first two. Examples given in the report concern acceptance of higher defence spending or opinions on which level the armed forces and other crisis management services should be held (Wedebrand & Jonsson, 2021, pp. 34–35). The report concludes by proposing the following definition of defence will:

> (author's tr.) "To have willingness to defend is to be willing (or be disposed), for defence related purposes, to act or think in certain ways."[7] (Wedebrand & Jonsson, 2021, p. 43)

[4] (swe.) Personlig försvarsvilja.
[5] (swe.) Allmän försvarsvilja.
[6] (swe.) Understödjande försvarsvilja.
[7] (swe.) "Att ha försvarsvilja är att i ett försvarsrelaterat syfte vara benägen (eller disponerad) till att handla eller tycka på vissa sätt."

The proposed definition is intentionally broad and generic, but it provides clarity when used in conjunction with the three categories. At this moment, it is important to note the distinction of the discussion regarding defence will from that of "morale" and "willingness to fight" more generally, which is made at greater length in Appendix A. As stated, this thesis is interested in the concept as understood in the Swedish setting and employs the definition proposed by Wedebrand and Jonsson (2021). The definition aligns with the surveys as they were developed with these categories in mind.

2.2 The Swedish context

The most substantial and recent publication about willingness to defend in Sweden is Jonsson and Wedebrand (2021)'s report *"Swedish will to defend"*. It analyses the responses from the 2018 survey and provides insightful results about the determinants of defence will and the current outlook (Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021). It is still an under-explored area of study in Sweden, and the survey conducted by FOI is the first of its kind in decades.[8] The empirical base for the concept in the Swedish context is, therefore, limited.

The report goes through the survey from 2018 and examines several groups in the population to see if there are any differences in the intensity of the defence will. As such, the report is descriptive and exploratory. Certain background variables were, however, expected to be interesting concerning it. The different groups examined were groups based on gender, age, having conducted military training, income, education, employment, family and housing situation, country of birth and place of residence.

The analysis suggests that gender might play a significant role in the explanation of willingness, in particular for combat roles. Almost 70% of men express a positive defence in combat roles compared to 35% for women. While differences persist in the other forms of personal defence will, such as non-combat roles and not life-threatening non-combat roles, they become less pronounced. Although the same difference is not seen in the other categories, men generally report a higher willingness to defend their country overall. Concerning age, individuals between 30-40 years and 50-69 years old report the highest willingness to defend the country. Younger people between the ages of 18-29 report the lowest defence will when it comes to personal involvement in combat roles. Jonsson and Wedebrand question what women and younger generations have in common and propose that their lack of exposure to general conscription might explain their lower willingness. Since the questionnaire includes a question if the subject has conducted military training, the report also examines this background variable. The summary statistics indicate a higher willingness to assume a combat role among those who have conducted military training. The difference is almost 30 percentage points (from 70% among trained to 40% among untrained). In contrast, the report concludes that income, education, employment, housing and family background, country of birth, and place of residence (geographical differences) all have insignificant or weak relations to defence will. One issue mentioned with the comparisons related to the place of birth effects is the underrepresentation of foreign-born among the respondents.

In general, the report does not find significant differences between the groups in the categories

[8] MSB publishes yearly its series "Opinions" which is a public poll that covers similar topics, but a targeted survey conducted by SCB has not been undertaken.

of supportive and general defence will. They are relatively consistent and stable. Therefore, the differences are most noticeable for personal defence will, particularly the willingness to engage in combat.[9] Notably, the main differences concern gender, age, and military service. It should, however, be mentioned that no multivariate analysis has been undertaken to control for any omitted variables that might change these observed differences. Nevertheless, the report is simultaneously at the forefront of the empirical assessment of defence in Sweden and one of the most extensive and most recent empirical assessments of one's willingness to defend.

One of the contributions of this paper is to build upon and expand the main results of the report. Specifically, to better understand the impact of military training on defence will. Given that conscription is on the rise in Sweden and the individual is the basis for total defence planning, understanding this connection is of considerable importance for defence planners in both military and civil dimensions.

3 Literature review

The literature review aims to take a broader stock on the current understanding of determinants of defence will than only military training. Most of the literature relating to it has been explanatory or descriptive and used data from the World Value Survey (WVS). Appendix B provides a more extensive study of the literature. However, when synthesising the material, two main categories of explanatory factors are observed based on which type of "flow", or operating channel, of causality they propose (Table 1). Why military training would impact one's willingness to defend can be seen through the lens of what the author labels 'internal' and 'external factors'.[10] This section begins by presenting the framework in table form and then examining the two categories by themselves.

Table 1: Framework for the literature concerning theories of defence will

External factors	Internal factors
Outside factors that influence attitudes and behaviour through, for instance the context, country or culture the individual interacts with – are understood as *external factors* explaining defence will.	Inherent factors that influence attitudes and behaviour, for instance, through the individual's personality, experiences and characteristics – are understood as *internal* factors explaining defence will.
External factors capture effects that primarily emanate from outside the individual but which in an *interaction* with the individual explain attitudes and behaviour relating to defence will.	Internal factors capture effects that primarily emanate from within the individual but which *can interact* with outside contexts in explaining attitudes and behaviour relating to defence will.

[9] The raw data comparisons made in this thesis indicate a similar result (Tables 5 and 6). This is also one of the reasons why combat roles are given extra weight.

[10] For a detailed description of the development of the framework and the categories, see Appendix C.

3.1 External factors

One of the most cited theories in this category is that of Puranen (2014), and Inglehart et al. (2015). Namely, that the cultural environment of increased choice- and emancipation values decreases defence will. A similar argument is made regarding the impact of increased economic development (Puranen, 2014; Inglehart et al., 2015; Andžāns et al., 2021). In connection, an overall sense of national pride on a societal level is further seen as increasing it (Diez-Nicolas, 2010). Relating to economic development, Anderson et al. (2020) find that income inequality on the country-level impacts defence will negatively although Andžāns and Sprūds (2020) do not get significant results in their tests. The same authors find that trust in political institutions and armed forces seems to impact one's willingness in a positive way.

More related to the history and security environment, the fear of war is proposed as an explanatory factor (Listhaug, 1986), although this particular factor is more difficult to categorise based on if the author means that the differences are made on personal judgements or differences in security environments such as geopolitical risk. However, since this particular study is conducted in an intra-societal fashion, the interpretation is that it concerns more the general security environment. Related are the issue of territorial disputes (Kim, 2020), historical experiences of war (Listhaug, 1986; Puranen, 2014; Inglehart et al., 2015), the involvement in the international arena (Listhaug, 1986), gender understood as a social construct (Torgler, 2003; Kim, 2020; Andžāns et al., 2021; Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021), and in particular alliance structures (Yeh, 2021) and allied troops stationed in one's country (Jakobsen and Jakobsen, 2019).

3.2 Internal factors

A particularly salient internal factor is the individual's personality which impacts defence will (Kasemaa and Säälik, 2021). In addition, beliefs such as pride, trust and political ideology (Torgler, 2003) impacts it. Related, there seems to be, from an individual level, covariance between feelings of nationalism, patriotism, cosmopolitan obligations (Bayram, 2019) and sense of obligation to one's country (Andžāns and Sprūds, 2021) and willingness. These are also examples of testing a similar hypothesis but arguing different flows of effects (Diez-Nicolas, 2010; Bayram, 2019). On a similar note, the fear of war can also be thought of more as a personal judgement than related to the security environment since in those articles the authors conduct inter-societal comparisons (Palkova, 2021; Andžāns and Sprūds, 2021). Most reasonably, all individuals living in the same country should be exposed to the same external security environment, but what should differ are their calculations concerning it. Similarly, the argument is the same in articles examining the trust in the armed forces and attitudes toward the political institutions (Palkova, 2021) within a country.

There are also some differences regarding attitudes, such as believing better solutions to conflicts exist than war, that risking ordinary people's lives is unnecessary or evaluations of the probability of success (Andžāns and Sprūds, 2021). Having citizenship or not (Juurvee, 2021). Related, attitudes such as willingness to defend oneself seem to affect defence will (Andžāns et al., 2021). Additionally, engagement in organisations (Gajauskaitė, 2021).

Relating to military experience or training, a lack thereof seems to affect willingness negatively through not knowing how to partake (Andžāns and Sprūds, 2020; Palkova, 2021; Ga-

jauskaitė, 2021). Alternatively, that simply some differences can be observed between the two groups (Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021).

In addition, individual characterises such as gender (Torgler, 2003; Kim, 2020; Andžāns et al., 2021; Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021), religiousness (Torgler, 2003; Kim, 2020), education (Torgler, 2003; Kim, 2020; Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021), age (Torgler, 2003; Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021) are argued to impacts defence will.

4 Theory

The theoretical basis for why military service would affect defence will include several different parts but takes influence from the general framework of economics. More specifically, the subfield of behavioural economics. It also highlights why combat roles is the most connected metric to military training when evaluating the concept. Three different broader channels of effects are put forward. Concerning the framework presented above, the first two would be examples of either internal or external factors of one's willingness to defend, while the last is an example of an external factor. The thesis will not be able to test the channels directly, but they constitute a contribution and will inform the discussion of the results.

4.1 Changes in preferences

A common misconception is that acting rationally is equated with acting without concern for others. Rationality does not imply selfishness. Instead, it requires that the agent acts following its own set of preferences. They can, for instance, be based on altruistic preferences and subject to the broader social context (O'Leary, 2019). Public Service Motivation (PSM) is one strand of research that emphasises the individual utility agents can get through acting in the best interest of the public (O'Leary, 2019; Heine et al., 2022). Military service or the attitude of defence will can be seen as potential examples. Even though PSM and other similar theories have merit in highlighting a broader set of preferences than the conventional economic model posits, it is insufficient to describe why military service would affect willingness. Instead, which is true throughout this section, those agents undergoing military training must be disproportionally affected in either a positive or negative direction relating to defence will because of their training. Using the PSM framework, one could argue that military training could strengthen or promote self-sacrifice for the public benefit more than would be the case for others, increasing the willingness to participate in armed resistance.

4.2 Changes in information sets

Information is another essential part of economic decision-making. Imperfect information is one explanatory reason for why economic agents make suboptimal choices.[11] In other words, people who would otherwise express defence will in combat roles are reluctant to do so because they have imperfect information concerning what it would entail. Of course, it can also flow in the opposite

[11] Suboptimal is not meant to be understood as normative.

direction since a lack of information might be why it exists. In the literature, the lack of information and decreased willingness is mentioned (Andžāns et al., 2021; Palkova, 2021). Conducting military training would, regardless of which way the effect operates, reduce uncertainties for the agent about, for instance, what the combat position would entail in the case of war. It would make the agent more confident in assessing its abilities and the risks. Another way information might affect utility maximisation is through risk-averseness. Reasonably, these informational aspects should be relatively more connected to combat positions in the case of war than other types of defence will.

The discussion about the informational dimension is also related to attitude formation through indirect and direct experience. Direct experience involves not only more correct information but it also creates longevity of the attitudes. Moreover, direct experience reveals information about oneself in interaction with the experience. Specifically, one not only gets information about, for example, what a combat role entails, but one also gets information about how one would react experiencing the combat role, which is not available otherwise (Fazio et al., 1978; Fazio and Zanna, 1978; Millar and Millar, 1996).

4.3 Changes in social environments, contracts, and sanctions

Military training introduces the agent to new social settings, which include unit, regimental or branch affiliations. Indeed, unit or group dynamics have been highlighted as one of the key components in defence will or willingness to fight (Atran et al., 2014; Connable et al., 2018). Membership in social groups which in this case arise during military training, introduce to the subject new social norms, roles, and expectations, which are often enforced through social sanctions, peer-pressure and subsequently internalised by the individual (Goette et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006).

Apart from the individual's preference profile and information set, as well as the socialisation in the military, there is also the impact of the general social environment. Not uncommonly, the interaction between the individual and the society is seen as a form of contract, where there exist positive and negative reciprocity and social esteem considerations. In this system, military service can be seen as a civic duty, akin (although arguably much more extensive) to voting as described by Knack (1992). Not meeting expected standards or behaving by social norms could then imply social sanctions generating disutility (Elster, 1989) through, for instance, esteemed-based peer pressure (Adriani and Sonderegger, 2019). Those who have undergone military training would perhaps not unreasonably have another relation to this specific reciprocity or duty than the general public. Concerning gender, as understood in a social context, women tend to be less expected to partake in war (Torgler, 2003; Andžāns and Sprūds, 2021), which would decrease their social costs and make their marginal participation less likely all else equal (Torgler, 2003).

5 Data

Two parts form the data section: the first goes through the surveys conducted in 2018 and 2022, which forms the sample data used in the thesis, and the second describes and presents data on conscription since it will form the basis of empirical strategy.

5.1 The surveys conducted in 2018 and 2022

The data consist of two surveys conducted in 2018 and 2022. They do not follow the same individuals over time. Statistics Sweden (SCB) conducted the surveys on FOI's behalf. Both surveys cover persons between 18-99 years old. The surveyed sample was 5,000 in 2018 and 5,050 in 2020; the total surveyable population at those times were 8,066,211 and 8,309,848, respectively. The survey in 2018 had 30 questions, 2,132 respondents, and a response rate of 42.7% (over coverage excluded). The 2022 survey had 51 questions, 1,810 respondents, and a response rate of 35.9% (over coverage excluded). The survey was posted to the respondents with the opportunity to fill in the answers on the attached questionnaire and post it back or online through a personal code. Those not answering the first round received three additional reminders with the same material provided. Not included in the questionnaire but drawn from the population database are the respondent's gender, age, civil status, country of birth (grouped), citizenship (grouped), place of residence (municipality and county/region), education and income (individual and household) (SCB, 2019; SCB, 2022). For a detailed description of the main survey questions used, see Appendix D.1.

The survey sampling contains all persons between 18-99, encompassing everyone subject to conscription or undertaking military service in the period of interest. It further covers the entirety of the Swedish population and is randomly assigned, which means that the sample bias relating to sample selection error is considered a low concern. The survey does have coverage error; in 2018, the over-coverage was ten people, and in 2022, 13 people. Coverage error means that during the conduction of the survey, it was revealed that these people do not form a part of the target population through, for instance, emigration or passing away. Concerning the surveyed population, these numbers are small due to the high quality and frequent updates on Swedish population statistics and are not considered a large concern. The main issue of the survey is the non-response (See Appendix D.2). In both surveys, the non-response rate is more than half of those surveyed (SCB, 2019; SCB, 2022).

The non-response rate is divided into two categories. The first is a complete non-response, where the respondent has not answered the entirety of the survey for various reasons. The second is a partial non-response rate in which a respondent has returned the survey but has not included an answer for one or several questions. For the survey in 2018, the partial non-response rate was on average between 0-2.5% per question, with a maximum of 14.3%. This more significant partial non-response rate is due to the selection of "other" in that question without specifying in text form what that other is. In 2022, the partial non-response rate was on average 3% with a maximum of 4.4% (SCB, 2019; SCB, 2022).

In the method section, the specifications are intended to be run on a combined dataset containing both surveys to increase statistical power. Therefore, it is interesting to compare if there are considerable differences between the two surveys that would indicate that they need to be treated as separate. Since the survey in 2018 was carried out, Sweden and the rest of the world have felt the impact of the covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The 2022 survey was carried out during the fall of 2022, which means that the respondents have been exposed to the war and the following political discussion. These world events indicate that there might be large differences between the responses in 2018 and 2022. Overall, some differences exist between the

2018 and 2022 surveys that might affect the results when combining the datasets. These influences do not affect any particular age group disproportionally. Fortunately, they are not large for the dependent variables. This is similar to the conclusion drawn in Wedebrand and Andersson (2023). The dataset will therefore be combined but include a dummy that captures systematic differences between the surveys.

When combined, the following summary statistics can be observed for the dependent variables. The answer choices described in Appendix D.1 are coded from 1 (highest willingness) to 4 (lowest willingness). The summary statistics for the dependent variables are:

Table 2: Table over dependent variables

Dependent variable	Mean	N	SD	Max	Min
Personal defence will, combat role	2.43	2,713	1.03	1	4
Personal defence will, non-combat role	1.82	2,719	.87	1	4
Personal defence will, not life-threatening non-combat role	1.58	2,721	.79	1	4
General defence will	1.58	2,710	.78	1	4
Importance of military defence	1.45	2,730	.69	1	4
Importance of civil defence	1.35	2,732	.58	1	4
Increased funds	1.86	2,639	.80	1	4

The specifications described in the method will include controls. They are primarily chosen based on availability. Fortunately, they include many of the conventionally used controls. Those independent variables of a format that does not make sense to present in a summary statistics table are excluded. They include dummies for occupations, civilian status, country of birth, education, region of residence and when surveyed. Military training will not be used as an independent variable directly. It is binary where one equals "yes". The combined dataset concerning the explanatory variables yields the following table:

Table 3: Table over a subset of the independent variables

Independent variable	Mean	N	SD	Max	Min
Military training	1.71	2,726	.45	1	2
Income (SEK)	378,211	2,728	255,628	3,435,880	0
Age	47.29	2,742	13.90	70	18

5.2 Data over conscription

One contextual factor that will be exploited to limit self-selection bias and potential reverse causality in the method is conscription. Data requested from the Swedish Defence Conscrip-

tion and Assessment Agency[12] and combined with data from FOI and SCB in Figure 1, show that up until the end of the Cold War, almost all men were subject to conscription (Plikt- och prövningsverket, 2023; Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023; SCB, 2023). These data show the percentage of the target cohort that started training. The number of men assessed is more extensive and includes people who were disqualified for medical reasons and those who refused despite penalties in the form of prison sentences. During the 1980s, between 250 to 500 people per year actively refused military service, which is a small number in comparison to the around 50,000 who started training each year (TT, 2005). Conscription was removed in 2011 and re-instated in 2018 for both genders (Försvarsmakten, 2020b). Women have, therefore, in general, not been subject to conscription. Even with the extension of conscription to women, they only represent a quarter of those assessed and between 15-17% of those that start training each year (SVT Nyheter, 2018; SVT Nyheter, 2020). This should also be viewed in combination with the fact that the re-introduction of conscription covers a much smaller percentage of the target population. Further, it was not until 1980 that women were allowed to serve voluntarily and not until 1989 that all branches of the Armed Forces were open for female applicants (Försvarsmakten, 2022). These policies, viewed in conjunction, imply that women are essentially unaffected by conscription compared to men and can serve as a relevant counterfactual.



Figure 1: Conscription over time

Two sharp declines can be observed, the first in 1991/1992 and the second in 1996/1997 (Figure 1). In both cases, there was a reduction of around 10,000 conscripts a year. They follow after

[12] (swe.) Plikt- och prövningsverket.

two Defence Acts[13] [14] which define the short-term budget and strategic objectives of the Armed Forces, which include personnel requirements. In the main regression, the Defence Act of 1996 will be used as the cut-off since it initiated the change of the purpose of the Armed Forces from deterring, countering and repelling a potential invasion to a more adaptive defence organisation (Regeringen, 1996). In the robustness controls, the Defence Act of 1992 and 2000 will also be used (Regeringen, 1992; Regeringen, 2000). The Defence Act of 1992 was implemented faster than the other two, which is why 1991 is used as the cut-off. These data do not include potential volunteers.[15]

As shown in the combined survey data in Figure 2, the trend among respondents follows the general conscription level and therefore does not indicate a significant fraction of volunteers. The decreases in 91/92 and 96/97 are not observed to the same degree; instead, a declining overall trend is present. There is a certain overrepresentation of men in the youngest cohort reporting military training compared to Figure 1. This overreporting is expected to result from bias arising in the responses among the youngest cohorts in the sample. However, when making the comparison, one should keep in mind that the survey data measure if the respondent has undertaken military training for at least three months, not if they have been conscripted.

Among women, 26 out of 1,350 (1.9%) have completed military training. In comparison, among men, 738 out of 1,305 (56.5%) respond that they have conducted military training.



Figure 2: Military training among men and women in sample

[13] (swe.) Försvarsbeslut.
[14] They are concluded as a rule every four years.
[15] The author has been unable to get data on the number of volunteers.

6 Method

To answer the question: *How does military training influence the likelihood of expressing (or having) a willingness to defend one's country?* A difference-in-differences and an IV approach will be employed on a linear probability model (LPM) framework where the primary metric of interest is defence will in combat roles.

This thesis uses the difference-in-differences and IV approaches to address the potential endogeneity of military training. Figure 3 displays data on combat roles, indicating that individuals who undergo military training may have higher willingness when treatment intensity is low on the cohort level, suggesting self-selection and reverse causality. Conversely, it might be the case that younger people who conduct military training have a higher defence will since the experience is 'fresh in mind'. It could also be the case that the willingness decrease as a rule over age. This discussion highlights that motivation or pre-existing defence will is not necessarily the sole reason for the trend in Figure 3, but it remains the main concern from the author's side. Evidence does also point to self-selection and reverse causality as potential problems. Seniors in US high schools who thought that they would serve in the armed forces exhibited higher pro-military views even before service had taken place. These results are also even higher for those seniors who envisaged a career in the military (Bachman et al., 1987). It is moreover suspected that in the Swedish context, when less than 5,000 out of cohorts of 100,000 get conscripted (Plikt- och prövningsverket, 2023; Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023; SCB, 2023), as where the case when conscription was re-introduced, these recruits will most likely have a high motivation or already an existing willingness to qualify and get selected. Suspected endogeneity, such as self-selection and reverse causality, will bias the estimates and probably overestimate the true effect of military training.



Figure 3: Personal defence will - combat role, military training

6.1 Empirical strategy

The empirical strategy used in this thesis relies on exploiting two exogenous variations in conscription policy. First, until 2018, only men were subject to conscription. Essentially this leaves two groups: one broadly treated and one untreated. As mentioned in Section 5.2, only 1.9% of women have undertaken military training compared to 56.5% of the men in the sample. The representation of women in the sample who indicate military training appears to be randomly scattered. This is reassuring, since there was concern that they would be clustered after 2018, when conscription was reintroduced. Secondly, and as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, there is also a change in exogenous policy regarding the treatment intensity on a cohort level over time. The Cold War marks one period when the Armed Forces aimed to deter, counter and repel a potential armed invasion. The other reflects the increased sense of security and peace in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This thesis uses the Defence Act of 1996 as the main cut-off point between these two periods. One reason is that the decline continued more starkly after 96 than the previous Defence Act and that on the population level, despite the previous reduction, around 60% of the cohort still underwent military training. Thus there are two time periods, one where more than 50% and one where substantially less than 50% of the cohort were treated each year.[16]



Figure 4: Personal defence will - combat role

Concerning the dependent variable, there are three metrics for the personal defence will, one for general defence will, and three for the supportive defence will. Each metric is coded in a binary fashion, indicating whether the respondent has a positive or negative willingness to defend

[16] As has been mentioned, in the sample one post-1996 year has a training average that is 50% among the men. This spike is most likely due to the bias among the respondents. Robustness checks are carried out to see if there are systematic concerns concerning the main results of this nature.

the country. The metrics of personal defence will are: combat roles, non-combat roles and not life-threatening (NLT) non-combat roles. Combat roles is the primary metric of interest since it is argued to have the closest relation to military training and is also the metric which shows the largest differences between genders and those trained and not trained. (Compare Figures 3 and 4 to 5 and 6. See also: Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021). Figures 5 and 6 aim to highlight the broad consensus in the raw data among the other metrics of defence will. The supportive dimension is covered by the metrics: the importance of military defence capabilities, the importance of civil defence capabilities, and whether or not to increase funds to the total defence system. While military training would be expected to relate to combat roles more closely, previous research suggests that military service is linked to increased pro-military views, traditionalism, conservatism and nationalism, which might influence the other dimensions (Schreiber, 1979; Bachman et al., 1987).

The thesis employs in its main regressions an LPM framework for three main reasons: first, because the outcome is binary, one is either willing to defend the country or not; second, because the difference-in-differences and IV approaches make probit or logit coefficients hard to interpret and especially so when the specification includes composite terms; third, because the results of interest in the thesis are on an average group level which makes the linearity assumption less problematic. However, as described below, probit results, with their less stringent assumption of the probability distribution, will be provided in Appendix E.4 as a part of the robustness checks.

The main identifying idea behind the empirical strategy is that the end of the 'general' part of general conscription[17] would, therefore, if military training is a strong positive determinant of one's willingness to defend, adversely affect the treated group. If there is a general trend of decreased willingness due to, for example, increases in 'pro-choice' values in society at large as some of the literature posits (Puranen, 2014; Inglehart et al., 2015), this trend would have been similar among the untreated and treated group when controlling for gender. Also, if there is a faster decline for men due to changes, for instance, in 'masculinity' that would affect men more than women, this would be captured by the model specification's differences in overall time trends. Similar arguments can be extended to all systematic changes after 1996. The two different specifications that will be employed in both methods are inspired by Jayachandran et al. (2010) and include one specification examining level effects (Specification 1) and one which also allows for different slopes after 1996 (Specification 2). The differences in slopes would capture any accelerated effects in the treated group.

For the difference-in-differences, the identifying assumption is that besides the different time trends, any differences in defence will between the two periods beyond those experienced in the untreated group are due to the decline in military training. This assumption is less strict than what is necessary for the IV model, which uses the same variation as instruments (See equations 3 and 5). Besides relevance $Cov(z,x) \neq 0$, the model must fulfill the exclusion restriction. More specifically, this needs that $Cov(z,\varepsilon) = 0$, in other words, that the level or the joint level and slope difference after 1996 for men compared to women are uncorrelated with any other determinants of defence will. When observing the difference-in-differences and the IV together, it becomes more apparent that the first can be viewed as a reduced form of the latter.

[17] (swe.) Slutet på den "allmänna" delen av allmän värnplikt.



Figure 5: Raw data comparisons of the six complementary metrics of defence will - Military training



Figure 6: Raw data comparisons of the six complementary metrics of defence will - Gender

Further, the coefficients in the difference-in-differences would be ITT effects compared to the IV's average treatment effects (in the absence of heterogeneous potential outcomes). The IV yield, in a sense, more precise estimates scaled after uptake at the expense of stronger assumptions, assumptions which are arguably not fulfilled. In the first specification, the accelerated trend, through, for instance, lagged and or cumulative effects of the reduction in military training, would potentially violate the assumption. In specification 2, when this variation is used as an instrument, there might still be issues that unobserved factors, such as the level of patriotism, would be correlated with both the instrumented variable and the outcome. Even though the strategy employed control for the most acute issues, the IV results should be cautiously approached and are included for completeness. The main interest is, therefore, in the difference-in-differences, which has a less stringent assumption, and since the thesis is academic but policy influenced, the ITT estimate is still highly relevant.

Since the treatment group includes two potentially important determinants of defence will, military training and gender, it is also interesting to compare the treatment group effect by itself to eventual differences post-1996.

6.2 Model specifications

The survey data is organised in a panel format, with the running time variable based on the year the respondent turned 18. This assumes that all individuals who reported undergoing military training did so in the year they turned 18. Moreover, since the total defence obligation only concerns citizens between 16-70 years old, the panel is restricted to the cohorts of interest who turned 18 from 1970 until 2022. In all specifications, the vector of control variables used include: log of income, dummies for education attainment, dummies for civil status, a dummy for those foreign-born, dummies for the region of residence and a dummy for the survey. In addition, all models include treatment group fixed effects, age fixed effects, and allow for separate overall linear time trends.

6.2.1 The difference-in-differences models

Specification 1: Examines the change in level after 1996.

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{igt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Year_t + \beta_2 Male_g + \beta_3 Post96_t + \beta_4 (Male_g \times Year_t) \\ + \beta_5 (Male_g \times Post96_t) + \gamma_{ig} + \delta \boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + \varepsilon_{igt} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Where Y_{igt} is defence will of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to one if positive. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. The interaction term $Male_g \times Post96_t$ capture any level differences between the treated and untreated group after 1996. γ_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ are relevant control variables defined above. In this specification β_5, the level difference, is of particular interest.

Specification 2: Examines the change in level and difference in slope after 1996.

$$Y_{igt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Year_t + \beta_2 Male_g + \beta_3 Post96_t + \beta_4 (Male_g \times Year_t) + \beta_5 (Male_g \times Post96_t) + \beta_6 (Year_t \times Post96_t) + \beta_7 (Male_g \times Year_t \times Post96_t) + \gamma_{ig} + \delta \boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + \varepsilon_{igt} \quad (2)$$

Where Y_{igt} is defence will of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to one if positive. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. The interaction term $Male_g \times Post96_t$ capture any level differences between the treated and untreated group after 1996. The interaction term $Year_t \times Post96_t$ captures shifts in baseline time-trends after 1996. The triple interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t \times Post96_t$ allows for a difference in slope after 1996 between the treated and untreated groups. γ_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ are relevant control variables defined above. In this specification β_5 and β_7 are of interest since they jointly allow for both an overall level effect and change in slope after 1996 between the treated and untreated groups.

Table 10 illustrates how well the strategy captures changes in military training across the treated and untreated groups. Generally, the strategy captures changes quite well, except for the accelerated trend. The reason is suspected that the separate overall linear trend for the treatment group works well enough to capture the decline. The goodness of fit is also encouraging, with an overall R-squared of 60%.

6.2.2 The instrumental variable models

IV specification 1: Equation 3 is the first stage and Equation 4 is the second stage. Instrument in bold but without italics.

$$Miltrain_{igt} = a + b_1 Year_t + b_2 Male_g + b_3 Post96_t + b_4 (Male_g \times Year_t) + \mathbf{b_5}(\mathbf{Male_g} \times \mathbf{Post96_t}) + c_{ig} + d\boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + e_{igt} \quad (3)$$

$$Y_{igt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Year_t + \beta_2 Male_g + \beta_3 Post96_t + \beta_4 (Male_g \times Year_t) + \beta_5 \widehat{Miltrain}_{igt} + \gamma_{ig} + \delta \boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + \varepsilon_{igt} \quad (4)$$

First stage: $Miltrain_{igt}$ indicates military training of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to one if true. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. The instrument $Male_g \times Post96_t$ capture any level differences between the treated and untreated group after 1996. c_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ are relevant control variables defined above.

Second stage: Y_{igt} is defence will of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to

one if positive. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. $\widehat{Miltrain}_{igt}$ are fitted values. γ_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ are relevant control variables defined above.

IV specification 2: Equation 5 is the first stage and Equation 6 is the second stage. Instruments in bold but without italics.

$$\begin{aligned} Miltrain_{igt} = a + b_1 Year_t + b_2 Male_g + b_3 Post96_t + b_4(Male_g \times Year_t) \\ + \mathbf{b_5}(\mathbf{Male_g} \times \mathbf{Post96_t}) + b_6(Year_t \times Post96_t) \\ + \mathbf{b_7}(\mathbf{Male_g} \times \mathbf{Year_t} \times \mathbf{Post96_t}) \\ + c_{ig} + d\boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + e_{igt} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{igt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Year_t + \beta_2 Male_g + \beta_3 Post96_t + \beta_4(Male_g \times Year_t) \\ + \beta_5(Year_t \times Post96_t) + \beta_6 \widehat{Miltrain}_{igt} + \gamma_{ig} + \delta \boldsymbol{X}_{igt} + \varepsilon_{igt} \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

First stage: $Miltrain_{igt}$ indicates military training of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to one if true. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. The interaction term $Year_t \times Post96_t$ captures shifts in baseline time-trends after 1996. The joint instruments $Male_g \times Post96_t$ and $Male_g \times Year_t \times Post96_t$ capture any level and accelerated trend differences between the treated and untreated group after 1996. γ_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ is defined as above.

Second stage: Y_{igt} is defence will of individual i with gender g turning 18 at time t, equal to one if positive. $Year_t$ is a continuous year variable centred on 1996. $Male_g$ are treatment group fixed effects, equal to one if male. $Post96_t$ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1997 or after. The interaction term $Male_g \times Year_t$ allows for separate time trends between the treated and untreated group. The interaction term $Year_t \times Post96_t$ captures shifts in baseline time-trends after 1996. $\widehat{Miltrain}_{igt}$ are fitted values. γ_{ig} are age fixed effects. $\mathbf{X}_{igt}$ is defined as above.

6.3 Robustness checks

Multiple robustness controls will be conducted to ensure the accuracy of the results when changes are made to the main regression.

First, instead of the Defence Act of 1996, the Defence Act of 1992[18] or 2000 will be used to measure the sensitivity of the results by choice of the cut-off year between the two periods. Second, instead of carrying out an LPM regression, a probit model will be used to see if the more relaxed probability distribution assumption will influence the results of the difference-in-

[18] See Section 5.2 for why 1991 is used as the cut-off year for the Defence Act of 1992.

differences regressions. Third, certain younger cohorts report very low willingness due to there being few observations where the sole or two respondents singularly or both indicate negative defence will. Potentially this could skew the slope since they are, in all instances, men. In these robustness controls, those cohorts are removed. Fourth, since when conscription was re-introduced it covered both men and women in 2018, one robustness control removes these cohorts since the division in exogenous conscription treatment is not as strongly fulfilled. Although in the raw data, no women in these cohorts indicate that they have conducted military training. The younger cohorts are also those with the least observations overall, which means that this robustness control also indicates whether the unbalance of respondents in the younger cohorts has a large effect on the main results (See Table 9). In addition to the previously mentioned control, the possibility of conducting a weighted regression has been considered but not been carried out. This is due to the fact that there are indications of some bias in the responses among the younger cohort with an overrepresentation of military training as one example. Re-weighting these observations would be to magnify these concerns.

7 Results

As mentioned in the method section, the primary coefficients of interest are the ones capturing level (Specification 1) and level and slope differences (Specification 2) after 1996. In addition, the coefficient for being in the treatment group is interesting to compare against these results. Therefore, the result section will focus on these coefficients and include other aspects if they are of interest. Further, as previously mentioned, the most connected metric to military training is defence will in combat roles which will be presented first. The remaining metrics will be discussed jointly afterwards.

7.1 Defence will in combat roles

In the difference-in-differences method, neither a level nor a joint level and accelerated trend are visible. What seems to be the more prominent determinant of willingness is being in the treatment group, also referred to as gender fixed effects. Being male is associated with a 39% and 41.4% higher likelihood of expressing positive defence will in combat roles for specifications 1 and 2, respectively (Table 4). Both estimates are also highly significant, with z-values above 8. The IV regressions tell a similar story. Although the point estimate is positive for the instrumented variable, it is highly insignificant. The confidence interval is arguably too large for meaningful discussions. Again, gendered effects seem to be the more prominent determinant of willingness. Regarding the IV strategy, in addition to the reservation made in the method concerning the exclusion restriction, the strategy seems to be weakly identified and especially so for specification 2 when observing the F-statistics.

Table 4: Defence will in combat roles

	Difference-in-differences		IV regressions			
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1		Specification 2	
			Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables of interest						
Military training			0.146		0.198	
			(0.40)		(0.53)	
Male	0.390***	0.414***	0.312**	0.534***	0.290*	0.543***
	(8.42)	(8.46)	(1.99)	(13.30)	(1.83)	(11.42)
Male * Post96	-0.0288	0.0132		-0.196***		-0.184***
	(-0.39)	(0.19)		(-2.88)		(-2.93)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00810				-0.00278
		(-1.30)				(-0.55)
Other variables						
Year	0.00228	0.00560*	0.00238	-0.000675	0.00648**	-0.000885
	(0.76)	(1.69)	(0.82)	(-0.30)	(2.14)	(-0.29)
Post96	-0.0185	-0.0233	-0.0173	-0.00767	0.00381	-0.0134
	(-0.27)	(-0.33)	(-0.27)	(-0.16)	(0.06)	(-0.28)
Male * Year	0.00147	0.00318	0.00365	-0.0148***	0.00469	-0.0142***
	(0.56)	(1.12)	(0.47)	(-5.56)	(0.61)	(-4.41)
Year * Post96		-0.0101			-0.0135**	0.000778
		(-1.40)			(-2.02)	(0.19)
Constant	0.202	0.385*	0.238	-0.242***	0.438**	-0.240**
	(1.16)	(1.79)	(1.35)	(-2.91)	(2.12)	(-2.36)
Observations	2525	2525	2525	2525	2528	2528
Mean	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.305	0.512	0.305
F-statistics			8.28		4.40	
Within R-sq	0.165	0.166				
Between R-sq	0.743	0.731				
Overall R-sq	0.182	0.183				

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 5: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.0718**	0.0984***	-0.0331	-0.0354	0.0770***	0.0746***	0.00874	-0.00337	-0.0184	-0.0200	0.0113	0.0224
	(-1.94)	(-0.99)	(-1.62)	(-1.48)	(2.83)	(2.69)	(0.32)	(-0.11)	(-0.88)	(-0.81)	(0.26)	(0.46)
Male * Post96	0.0682	0.119**	0.0247	0.0278	-0.0935**	-0.0937*	-0.0833*	-0.0994*	-0.0472	-0.0450	0.0251	0.0387
	(1.20)	(2.16)	(0.69)	(0.76)	(-2.07)	(-1.87)	(-1.72)	(-1.75)	(-1.41)	(-1.45)	(0.34)	(0.53)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00949*		0.000181		0.000488		0.00372		0.000132		-0.00332
		(-1.72)		(0.05)		(0.10)		(0.82)		(0.05)		(-0.66)
Other variables												
Year	0.00105	0.00668***	0.00102	0.00455	0.0202***	0.0221***	0.0114***	0.0127***	0.00295**	0.00555***	0.0115***	0.00999***
	(0.42)	(2.67)	(0.37)	(1.49)	(6.05)	(5.41)	(5.73)	(5.80)	(2.03)	(3.53)	(3.30)	(2.59)
Post96	-0.0778*	-0.0783*	-0.0769***	-0.0657**	0.0257	0.0323	-0.0294	-0.0185	-0.00120	0.00696	-0.0778	-0.0883
	(-1.94)	(-1.65)	(-2.80)	(-2.02)	(0.44)	(0.55)	(-0.64)	(-0.43)	(-0.03)	(0.19)	(-1.26)	(-1.45)
Male * Year	-0.00394*	-0.00202	-0.00244	-0.00261	0.00119	0.00101	0.00156	0.000683	0.000202	0.0000794	-0.000795	0.0000178
	(-1.94)	(-0.99)	(-1.62)	(-1.48)	(0.72)	(0.60)	(0.85)	(0.32)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(-0.33)	(0.01)
Year * Post96		-0.0173***		-0.0111*		-0.00589		-0.00430		-0.00818***		0.00495
		(-3.28)		(-1.89)		(-0.88)		(-1.03)		(-2.59)		(0.63)
Constant	0.647***	0.939***	0.901***	1.059***	0.373***	0.455***	0.502***	0.546***	0.934***	1.050***	0.541***	0.487**
	(5.09)	(6.58)	(9.81)	(9.00)	(3.40)	(3.71)	(6.13)	(4.66)	(14.99)	(13.08)	(3.68)	(2.47)
Observations	2528	2528	2531	2531	2522	2522	2538	2538	2541	2541	2463	2463
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818
Within R-sq	0.0496	0.0530	0.0397	0.0404	0.0516	0.0515	0.0390	0.0394	0.0435	0.0444	0.0293	0.0297
Between R-sq	0.623	0.623	0.408	0.398	0.581	0.610	0.539	0.549	0.219	0.204	0.233	0.191
Overall R-sq	0.0647	0.0681	0.0605	0.0614	0.0669	0.0671	0.0505	0.0509	0.0487	0.0498	0.0461	0.0464

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 6: IV regression I: Other metrics of defence will

	Personal defence will								General defence will			
	Non-combat roles				Non-combat roles, NLT							
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	-0.339		-0.268		-0.124		-0.141		0.468		0.439	
	(-1.08)		(-0.89)		(-0.66)		(-0.73)		(1.59)		(1.49)	
Male	0.253*	0.536***	0.223*	0.546***	0.0332	0.535***	0.0409	0.545***	-0.173	0.536***	-0.161	0.545***
	(1.81)	(13.29)	(1.66)	(11.40)	(0.40)	(13.23)	(0.48)	(11.35)	(-1.35)	(13.28)	(-1.24)	(11.40)
Male * Post96		-0.201***		-0.187***		-0.199***		-0.185***		-0.200***		-0.186***
		(-2.91)		(-2.96)		(-2.88)		(-2.93)		(-2.91)		(-2.96)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00307				-0.00304				-0.00295
				(-0.60)				(-0.59)				(-0.58)
Other variables												
Year	0.000871	-0.000543	0.00741***	-0.000811	0.000978	-0.000350	0.00449	-0.000590	0.0204***	-0.000428	0.0222***	-0.000707
	(0.31)	(-0.23)	(2.58)	(-0.26)	(0.35)	(-0.15)	(1.45)	(-0.19)	(6.52)	(-0.19)	(6.13)	(-0.23)
Post96	-0.0796	-0.00537	-0.0473	-0.0118	-0.0779***	-0.00774	-0.0669**	-0.0141	0.0288	-0.00675	0.0321	-0.0130
	(-1.56)	(-0.11)	(-0.86)	(-0.24)	(-2.68)	(-0.16)	(-2.07)	(-0.29)	(0.47)	(-0.14)	(0.54)	(-0.27)
Male * Year	-0.00889	-0.0146***	-0.00747	-0.0139***	-0.00426	-0.0147***	-0.00462	-0.0140***	0.00811	-0.0148***	0.00752	-0.0141***
	(-1.36)	(-5.37)	(-1.22)	(-4.23)	(-1.02)	(-5.38)	(-1.08)	(-4.25)	(1.27)	(-5.54)	(1.18)	(-4.37)
Year * Post96			-0.0215***	0.000971			-0.0111**	0.000880			-0.00556	0.000988
			(-4.47)	(0.24)			(-2.12)	(0.22)			(-0.97)	(0.24)
Constant	0.563***	-0.248***	0.881***	-0.247**	0.870***	-0.249***	1.024***	-0.247**	0.488***	-0.244***	0.561***	-0.244**
Observations	2528	2528	2528	2528	2531	2531	2531	2531	2522	2522	2522	2522
Mean	0.802	0.305	0.802	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.858	0.305	0.858	0.305
F-statistics	8.49		4.52		8.32		4.43		8.49		4.51	

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: IV regression II: Other metrics of defence will

	Military capabilities				Civilian capabilities				Increased funds			
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	0.403		0.362		0.227		0.209		-0.121		-0.0875	
	(1.44)		(1.29)		(1.41)		(1.25)		(-0.35)		(-0.25)	
Male	-0.208*	0.538***	-0.190	0.546***	-0.141**	0.538***	-0.132*	0.546***	0.0770	0.544***	0.0622	0.552***
	(-1.72)	(13.39)	(-1.57)	(11.45)	(-2.05)	(13.39)	(-1.87)	(11.45)	(0.51)	(13.35)	(0.42)	(11.26)
Male * Post96		-0.207***		-0.196***		-0.208***		-0.198***		-0.208***		-0.197***
		(-3.03)		(-3.15)		(-3.05)		(-3.18)		(-3.00)		(-3.19)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00244				-0.00233				-0.00239
				(-0.48)				(-0.46)				(-0.47)
Other variables												
Year	0.0114***	-0.000149	0.0125***	-0.000857	0.00300**	-0.000218	0.00566***	-0.000840	0.0115***	-0.000266	0.0103***	-0.000798
	(5.35)	(-0.07)	(5.54)	(-0.28)	(2.09)	(-0.10)	(3.83)	(-0.27)	(3.39)	(-0.11)	(2.82)	(-0.24)
Post96	-0.0263	-0.00757	-0.0275	-0.0142	0.000308	-0.00663	0.00776	-0.0128	-0.0787	-0.00823	-0.0789	-0.0141
	(-0.52)	(-0.15)	(-0.54)	(-0.29)	(0.01)	(-0.13)	(0.20)	(-0.26)	(-1.21)	(-0.17)	(-1.25)	(-0.30)
Male * Year	0.00743	-0.0145***	0.00656	-0.0140***	0.00350	-0.0145***	0.00311	-0.0140***	-0.00255	-0.0145***	-0.00186	-0.0140***
	(1.18)	(-5.38)	(1.05)	(-4.27)	(0.96)	(-5.37)	(0.83)	(-4.27)	(-0.35)	(-5.16)	(-0.26)	(-4.06)
Year * Post96			-0.00315	0.00234			-0.00834***	0.00206			0.00356	0.00177
			(-0.71)	(0.59)			(-2.66)	(0.52)			(0.51)	(0.41)
Constant	0.604***	-0.254***	0.641***	-0.276***	0.992***	-0.254***	1.107***	-0.273***	0.512***	-0.241***	0.468**	-0.255***
	(5.78)	(-3.08)	(4.77)	(-2.81)	(14.66)	(-3.09)	(12.65)	(-2.76)	(2.92)	(-2.92)	(2.22)	(-2.62)
Observations	2538	2538	2538	2538	2541	2541	2541	2541	2463	2463	2463	2463
Mean	0.917	0.305	0.917	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.818	0.305	0.818	0.305
F-statistics	9.16		5.01		9.30		5.09		9.00		5.08	

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

7.2 Other metrics of defence will

Similarly to combat roles, on an aggregate level, there is limited evidence for military training to be a significant determinant of defence will. Only one accelerated trend is significant (although on a 10% level), that for non-combat roles with a negative estimate of -0.949% when compared to the baseline (Table 5). However, the same specification has a positive level difference of 11.9%, which make the inference more difficult. General defence will and the supportive defence will metric of the importance of military defence capabilities show negative level differences for the treated group after 1996. They have weak significance, and only specification 1 of general defence will has significance at the 5% level with an estimate of -9.35%. The instrumented variables in the IV regressions likewise have no significance and shifts between positive and negative coefficients depending on the metric (Tables 6 and 7). The F-statistics are similar to combat roles.

The treatment effects are weaker for the other metrics and only significant for non-combat roles and general defence will in the difference-in-differences models. The coefficients are also smaller in magnitude. For noncombat roles being male is associated with an increase of defence will compared to the baseline of 7.18% and 9.84% for specifications 1 and 2, respectively. For general defence, 7.70% and 7.46% for specifications 1 and 2, respectively. The IV estimates for gender effects in non-combat roles remain positive with 25.3% and 22.3% increase in the likelihood to have a positive willingness for specifications 1 and 2, respectively (significant at the 10% level). For the importance of military capabilities and civilian capabilities, they are negative.

7.3 Robustness controls

The robustness controls do not change the interpretation of the main results. The null result presented remains when changing the empirical strategy (See Appendix E).

For combat roles, no effects are found at a 5% significance level for any of the difference-in-differences regressions. The IV regressions are not significant. The gender fixed effects are significant and of a similar magnitude as the main regression for the difference-in-differences.

For the other metrics, the positive level difference for non-combat roles is largely robust, as is the negative accelerated trend. Overall, the results of the metric of the importance of military defence capabilities are also robust. The negative level difference in general defence will is also overall consistent. The IV regressions do not yield any significance at conventional levels.

8 Discussion

If military training is a significant determinant of one's willingness to defend, then going from a period where 83.68% (74.85% in sample) of the men on average were treated to a period where 13.61% (16.95% in sample) of the men were treated, should yield negative results.[19] More specifically, perhaps the most intuitive effect due to the large difference in average military training before and after 1996, would be an adverse level difference in defence will in the treated group for combat roles. This thesis is unable to find one. Instead, the greater effect in this most relevant metric stems from being in the treatment group. As mentioned above, the treatment group, men,

[19] When 1996 is used as the cut-off.

contains two often discussed and, due to contextual policy, intertwined determinants of defence will; military training and gender effects. However, the empirical strategy broadly partialled out variation related to training, implying that the remaining variation in the treatment group should be related more to potential gender effects.

Instead, three main conclusions can be drawn when observing the results. First, in the most relevant metric, military training seems not to be a prominent factor in explaining willingness to defend. Instead, substantial effects seem to stem from gender effects. Second, these gender or treatment group effects are lessened in the remaining metrics of defence will. When observing raw data comparisons, this conclusion is not surprising since there seems to be broad consensus and stability across genders and cohorts regarding the willingness or importance of the remaining metrics. This, as mentioned before, is one of the reasons why combat roles are argued to be more relevant and where one would expect to find results. Third, military training is not, on aggregate, concluded to be a prominent factor of defence will in the remaining metrics.

Relating the discussion of the results to the potential channels described in Section 4.3, from an external factor standpoint, perhaps it is not the introduction to new social environments that drive willingness but the participation in existing ones. For instance, relating to the gender and military training discussion, it may be enough that participation in and support of the military is generally viewed as being in the 'male domain' as described by Andžāns and Sprūds (2020), to make men more likely to express positive defence will regardless of military training. Conversely, if gender is viewed from the internal factor standpoint, men might also be inherently more prone to, for example, conflict, which might increase a willingness to partake in war or support defence-related activities. Although the thesis has not been able to test formally any of these channels, and this discussion should be understood as speculative, they represent an interesting dimension and application of the framework when trying to make sense of the results.

These conclusions are somewhat contrary to perhaps the more conventional understanding; that the differences in military training might be the reason for men having a higher defence will than women and younger cohorts having lower defence will than older cohorts (More directly in Jonsson and Wedebrand, 2021, but also in Andžāns and Sprūds, 2020; Palkova, 2021; Gajauskaitė, 2021). In the Swedish context, this might further explain the similarity between the differences in willingness between men and women and those trained and not trained found by Jonsson and Wedebrand (2021) described in Section 2.2. Given that Sweden and many other countries are increasing their focus on conscription, it is of high policy interest to know the determinants of one's willingness to defend. If military training, contrary to what is usually portrayed, does not, in economic terms, significantly increase defence will, conscription would act more as a guarantee of personnel rather than willingness. However, due to the historic policy regarding conscription, only men have been broadly treated, which means that it is primarily their response, or social relation, to the treatment being captured. Conscripting and training women might have, over time, higher returns given their lower baseline, despite the model controlling for gender fixed effects. Furthermore, the empirical understanding will naturally be situated in the Swedish context, which means that the generalisability of the thesis might be stronger in similar social settings such as the Nordic countries.

9 Conclusion and future research

Following the war in Ukraine and the worsening security environment since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden and many other European countries have been increasing their focus on defence-related issues. Two such areas are conscription and understanding why ordinary people are willing to fight for their country. This thesis has aimed to build upon previous research exploring the effects of military training on one's willingness to defend. Overall, military training is not found to be a predominant determinant of defence will. Instead, since conscription has almost exclusively covered men, the treated group contains both treatment and gender effects, whereas the latter seems more dominant. Based on the results, instead of concluding that men as a group have higher willingness due to their military training, it seems to point in the direction that men have a higher will to defend even without treatment. Given that conscription is a widely employed policy and has, as discussed, negative effects on life-time earnings, seriously evaluating the proposed benefits is of high relevance for policy-makers and the future affected generations.

There are several different avenues of further research on the subject. If possible, one such avenue of potential exploration is considering an RCT in connection with who gets chosen to undergo military training. In such a case, it would be interesting to see if the null result presented in this thesis is retained and whether the impact of the gendered effects discussed is reduced.

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Appendices

A Willingness to defend vs morale

Willingness to defend is not understood the same everywhere, as stressed by Wedebrand and Jonsson (2021). Unsurprisingly, their analysis of the concept has strong connections to the Swedish context.[20] One significant aspect is that Sweden has had an unusually long experience of continuous peace. The last war Sweden fought was in 1814 (Sveriges Radio, 2014), and although it has sent troops abroad, they have mostly been through UN or EU-led missions with the involvements though ISAF in Afghanistan (Försvarsmakten, 2021) and OUP in Libya (Försvarsmakten, 2020a) as noticeable exceptions. Both missions were carried out by NATO but had UN mandates. This might imply that when the question *"Are you willing to fight for your country?"* is asked, the existing mental framing in Sweden could be that the military action is defensive rather than offensive and territorial rather than overseas. This context might not be the case in other countries, which may have more experience with offensive wars and overseas missions. Furthermore, as explained in the discussion regarding the survey questionnaire (Appendix D.1), the scenario presented before the questions is a military action in response to a territorial military attack against Sweden.

Another aspect concerns the focus on the individual as the basis for defence will. This understanding is employed in the thesis and informs the construction of the proposed theoretical framework. There are, however, other views on the situation of it. Russia, for instance, has a more spiritual understanding, which extends beyond the individual and is more connected to the soul of the Russian nation and the Orthodox Church, referred to as 'duchovnost'. Moreover, it strongly emphasises military obligations by force rather than voluntary participation. Resulting in a different understanding of defence will, which might be more related to morale (Gustafsson, 2022). Morale might, in turn, be seen as more related to the willingness to carry out orders and objectives on the operative level of the armed forces rather than general attitudes in society.

B Literature study of determinants of defence will

Observing what has been published on one's willingness to defend, most of the literature is empirical and heavily represented by studies using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The literature can be divided into two broad categories based on their methodological approaches. The first category concerns studies primarily carried out with inter-societal or cross-country comparisons. The second category is primarily concerned with intra-societal or within-country comparisons.[21] This section will present them separately.

B.1 Inter-societal comparisons

One of the earliest articles published on defence will utilise World Values Survey data to compare the willingness of individuals in 14 different nations to defend their country. The paper covers

[20] Which is the same context of the thesis.
[21] Inspiration taken from Andžāns and Sprūds (2020).

factors such as the fear of war, willingness to fight for one's country, willingness to sacrifice one's life, and confidence in the Armed Forces. In the WVS survey, the relevant question is phrased *"Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that would you be willing to fight for your country?"*. In the case of Sweden 78%, answer "yes" and 11% "no". The other question about sacrifice is phrased *"Apart from your family, in your opinion, is there anything that you would consider sacrificing everything for, even risking your life if necessary?"* Where 5% of the Swedish respondents answered "my country" (Listhaug, 1986).[22] Listhaug attempts to answer why there are differences between countries where he proposes fear of war, past experience of military defeat and the current geopolitical location as explanatory factors.

Also using WVS data, Diez-Nicolas (2010) examines the connection between national pride, history, confidence in the armed forces, and defence will. The author further examines whether it has been stable over time. National pride seems to be indicative of willingness, as are historical war experiences. An existing and persistent defence will also is more rule than an exception in the examined countries (Diez-Nicolas, 2010).

Relating to feelings of nationalism and national identity, Bayram uses WVS data and finds an increased willingness to go to war with increased feelings of nationalism and national identity. However, those expressing more cosmopolitan feelings are also highly willing to go to war. Observing the ends of both dimensions, those expressing a strong national identity and those feeling very cosmopolitan express a similar tendency of a willingness to go to war, based on the model presented (Bayram, 2019). Bayram argues, therefore that these norms do not necessarily oppose one another. One can have cosmopolitan views and be very willing to fight for one's country, which can be seen as contradicting the theory presented by Puranen (2014) and Inglehart et al. (2015) described below and might be one reason the Nordic countries need to be treated as an exception.

Using WVS data, Torgler (2003) also finds pride and trust important when explaining personal defence will. Women are less willing and education is weakly negatively associated with defence will. Age yields unclear results, but there is a tendency for the youngest age groups to express lower willingness. Political views matter, being more right-leaning increases one's willingness to defend (Torgler, 2003).

Related to past or ongoing military experiences, Kim (2020) finds that territorial disputes increase an individual's willingness to fight. The article is also based on WVS data. One explanation is that territory gain/loss implies resource capture/loss, which can motivate people to engage in conflict. However, many conflicts and territorial disputes concern lands that are useless in economic terms, suggesting that the attachment to territory is also based on people's identity and history. If the country has recently experienced an outright military conflict, this further increases willingness to fight. However, the results seem driven mainly by poorer countries and non-democracies, indicating that economic and governmental factors could be confounding variables. In the study, Kim also finds that being female, religious, more educated and married negatively correlates with willingness to fight (Kim, 2020).

Related to Listhaug's 'geopolitical situation', Yeh (2021) argues that another factor that influences defensive will is the support of a potentially stronger ally. With Taiwan as an example, Yeh

[22] These responses are not directly comparable to the 2018/2022 surveys but share similarities with the different categories presented above, the interaction between WVS surveys and FOI's surveys.

claims that US support impacts defence will because it influences the probability of success in the event of a conflict. Further, there is a discussion about whether there is a difference in defensive will between wars of necessity and wars of choice. One channel through which this difference might arise is the valuation of the costs compared to the benefits between the two types of wars. This contrast might arise from differences in the perception of values such as promoting peace, self-determination, sovereignty and national identity (Yeh, 2021).

Another related explanatory factor is the presence of foreign troops on one's territory. US troop deployment has reduced the willingness to fight among those NATO allies. The tested theory is that countries with a large presence of US troops should experience a lower willingness to fight since they can 'free-ride' on US commitments. Using data from the WVS, the willingness to fight of countries with less than 100 US troops is around 75% compared to those with more than 1,000 troops, which is 57%. These results are robust when excluding Germany and Japan, which tend to be unwilling to fight. These, as will be discussed below, are former Axis powers that both Puranen (2014) and Inglehart et al. (2015) treat as special cases (Jakobsen and Jakobsen, 2019).

Moving from the military history, geopolitics and security dimensions, another strand of research highlights socioeconomic and cultural changes as important factors for defence will. Puranen finds support for the connection between a higher prevalence of 'choice values' and lower willingness in cross-country comparisons. Puranen, as in the article by Inglehart et al. (2015), treats the former Axis powers and Nordic countries as two extreme groups. The former Axis countries experience disproportionately low defence will, and the Nordic countries disproportionately high. The author also finds support for national pride as one influencing factor. Puranen test for longitudinal effect[23] where the strongest effect found is the change in choice values.[24] By comparing changes on a country and individual level, Puranen argues that the effects are more substantial on a societal level, which implies that culture dominates over personal preferences changes. The author argues that it is reduced not because some individuals have an extremely low defence will but because it is lower throughout society. There is a subtle distinction in wording that has considerable effects when trying to identify where defence will 'emanate'.[25] As these cultural changes take place, willingness gets more contingent on personal feelings of pride (Puranen, 2014).

In their widely cited article, Inglehart et al. (2015) present a theory as to why there can be an observed decline in the willingness to defend one's country. They present the same theoretical claim as mentioned by Puranen (2014) as the reason defence will decrease. Their central thesis is that the longing for peace will be stronger with increased material standards and a greater focus on individual self-realisation. Therefore, the shift in culture implies lower defence will in the broader sense. The authors summarise the development as "readiness to sacrifice life gives way to an emphasis on living life as one chooses" (Inglehart et al., 2015, p. 419). These are called 'pro-choice values', which reduce 'life-loss tolerance'. They test these hypotheses on responses reported in the WVS and European Values Studies collected from 1985-2015.[26] Inglehart, Pu-

[23] By comparing the earliest and most recent data for the same country.
[24] These effects are not reported in the article. Neither are the coefficients nor significance levels.
[25] One of the main concerns in the theoretical framework.
[26] The surveys are conducted yearly.

ranen and Welzel treat the Nordics as an exception since, according to the authors, they exhibit high defence will and liberal values. When the authors compare the three groups they constructed (low-opportunity, medium-opportunity and high-opportunity societies), they find that the average willingness to fight decreases between the groups in the hypothesised way. Countries in the category of low-opportunity societies have an average personal defence will of 85%, medium 76% and high 65%. The authors also present some longitudinal data analysis and find a similar trend. Although they mention why the former Axis powers and the Nordic countries should be treated as exceptions, they are not an unnoticeable share of the liberal full democracies and weakens their overall argument (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022). Perhaps Bayram (2019) finding that cosmopolitan views can co-exist with nationalistic tendencies can be applicable here but in the context of liberal views and willingness.

In the context of socioeconomic factors, income inequality is found to be an explanatory factor to defence will. In one of the larger datasets of the articles so far,[27] Anderson et al. (2020) find that countries with larger inequalities exhibit less will on a societal level. One reason proposed is that inequality drives divergent views of defence will between low- and high-income individuals. Specifically, higher-income individuals in societies with large inequalities experience a lower willingness to fight for their country than low-income individuals (a difference of 8.2 against 2.8 percentage points). The paper examines potential explanatory factors, including mobilisation cost, nationalism, redistribution concerns and capital intensity. The most prominent proposed factor is mobilisation cost (Anderson et al., 2020).

In recent years, the Baltics have emerged as a noticeable region in the ambition to better understand the concept. One particularly salient example is an anthology published in 2021, aiming to "reflect one of the core aspects and indicators of societal resilience and national defence – why ordinary people are or are not willing to defend their own countries" (Andžāns et al., 2021, colophon). The Baltics are similar to Sweden in that they observed the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine with large concern.

In a comparative study between the different Baltic states, Andžāns and Sprūds (2020) find that men are more likely to report a willingness to defend their country on a personal level. In Estonia, 72.1% of men and 61.5% of women report a willingness to defend their country. Similarly, in Latvia, 53.3% of the men compared to 44.9% of the women report defence will, while in Lithuania, these numbers were 35.7% compared to 24.8% (Andžāns and Sprūds, 2020). This study also connects to Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel (2015) in that they test a similar hypothesis to the one presented in their article. Andžāns and Sprūds find a connection between increased material status and lower willingness to defend one's country. They also test whether higher income inequality leads to lower will and cannot draw any conclusions. One reason for this difference is that defence-related activities are viewed as within the male domain, according to Andžāns and Sprūds. They also find that the feeling of national pride and confidence in the armed forces influence defence will.

Analysing the impact of multi-ethnic societies in the Baltic context, Andžāns et al. (2021) examines the preferences of the Russian-speaking minority. This dynamic is particularly interesting since Latvia and Estonia have a much larger minority than Lithuania, and these countries perceive Russia as their main threat. The data indicates a level difference in defence will between

[27] It is also based on WVS but in combination with OECD data and some other sources.

ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians compared to the Russian minority. However, there are no major differences in the reasons behind the willingness. In the surveys, the main reason for reporting a positive will is an obligation toward one's country. Another common reason is a willingness to defend oneself. Conversely, a prominent reason for a negative will is that war is perceived as the worst option to potential conflict. A less common reason is that there is a belief that risking 'ordinary' people's lives are unnecessary. The probability of success is also another mentioned reason. As is the lack of knowledge on how to partake in conflict. Lastly, the lack of perceived threats impacts one's willingness (Andžāns and Sprūds, 2021).

B.2 Inter-societal comparisons

Moving to inter-societal comparisons, in addition to his study, Listhaug (1986) refers to a multivariate analysis of Norwegian data which states that gender influence perceptions relating to defence. Women were found to be less likely to fear war, willing to defend their country, risk their lives for their country and have lower confidence in the armed forces (Mysen, 1984).[28]

The Baltics stand out again as one of the more prominent regions of research on the subject. Estonia has since 2000 yearly conducted surveys of defence will. Juurvee (2021) makes use of the data and differentiates between "active" (readiness to participate in armed resistance personally) and "passive" (general approval of resistance in the case of foreign aggression) willingness to defend" (Juurvee, 2021, p. 36). They observe a small difference between those of Estonian heritage and those without. Related, a lack of citizenship seems to affect willingness to defend one's country negatively. Juurvee also finds a lower willingness to actively defend one's country compared to passively (Juurvee, 2021).

Remaining in Estonia and concerning personality and its effect on military morale, Kasemaa and Säälik (2021) studied the Big Five personality traits on Estonian conscripts. The authors find that all traits except neuroticism are positively correlated with military morale. Conscientiousness is the most significant trait in relation to high military morale. Conscientiousness is the personality trait that is linked to people expressing themselves as self-disciplined and dutiful. They also looked at socioeconomic variables such as education, language, residence and age and found no strong support for any impact on military morale (Kasemaa and Säälik, 2021).

In the context of Latvia, Palkova (2021) proposes three explanatory factors for the declining (today around 30 %) Latvian defence will. They are 'attitudes toward economic and political development', 'relationship toward the Russian federation', and 'psychological and physical factors required for active defence' (Palkova, 2021, p. 47).

Relating to the first explanatory factor. Latvia is one of the poorer EU-member countries and has yet to catch up with the rest of the Baltics regarding economic development, inequality and poverty. These economic concerns influence political attitudes, according to Palkova, resulting in a lower sense of national belonging and disinterest in engaging politically. Secondly, while Latvia has a history and clear understanding of where its main security threat emanates, namely Russia, one complicating factor is that Latvia has a sizeable Russian minority, almost a quarter of the population. The last reason described by Palkova is psychological and physical factors. Palkova argues that interactions by the individual with military and defence structures impact the will. She

[28] The report has not been found.

contrasts the differences between older generations who were conscripted into the Soviet Army against younger generations who lack that type of experience. Polkava claims that the decision to end conscription in 2007 has directly impacted people's personal defence will. One reason is that with an exclusively professional army, the public sees the responsibility to defend the country as more distant. The lack of personal experience in military training results in a lower understanding of what combat means and reduced confidence in one's ability to partake. Peer pressure is also briefly mentioned as an influencing factor (Palkova, 2021).

Surveys covering defence will have also been undertaken in Lithuania. Gajauskaitė (2021) cites one study from 2017 that found that military experience in young men increased willingness to defend. In the same study, national pride and patriotism were assumed to be an increasing factor.[29] Another study conducted in 2018 found that almost 30% answered that they do not know how they would behave in case of war.[30] Gajauskaitė mention that one possible reason for this result can be a lack of knowledge and skill. Like Latvia, Lithuania ended its conscription in 2008 but reinstated it in 2015. In the related debate and protests, the main argument against the decision was based on opposition to dying for one's country and being forced to kill others. Interestingly, the share of young people being positive towards conscription has increased from 29% in 2015 to 61% in 2020. The author mentions that this change might be the discomfort in anticipation of the transition period. Another aspect discussed by Gajauskaitė, based on experience from Lithuania, is that defence will increase with one's engagement in organisations (Gajauskaitė, 2021).

C A new framework for the literature of defence will

The foundation of willingness to defend is the individual. Even if defence will can be expressed on a country level – it is always an aggregation of individual answers. This is the main argument for why any theory of it originates from the individual, which is relevant when categorising the literature. Furthermore, the definition of willingness as proposed by Wedebrand and Jonsson (2021), and used in this thesis, assumes the individual as a point of origin.

A foundation of defence will at the individual level further allows for a dynamic interaction between the individual and the environment. This interaction can be heavily processed by the individual or merely observed passively through, for instance, 'being' in a particular context. If willingness is thought of as originating from either the environment or the person, no such interaction is allowed. However, having this foundation does not limit the theoretical framework to one dimension. A distinction can be made by separating from where the author hypothesises the primary causal effect emanates. For instance, one author might think that politics explains defence will, in particular that democratic and liberal views decrease it, and test whether it differs between people living in democracies compared to autocracies. Another author has the same idea but tests whether people with liberal views have less defence will compare with people with authoritarian views. Both authors try to explain it with a similar underlying theory but with two different proposed 'flows' of effects. This example highlights the benefit of the flexibility

[29] *"Subjective Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Peculiarities, Forming Factors, and Strategies Developed by Individuals"*. Lithuanian report, which due to language barriers, has not been read.

[30] *"Who would go to defend Lithuania? Assumptions and possibilities of civic resistance"*. Similarly, in Lithuanian.

of the proposed framework. Furthermore, it does not require factors such as personality which are typically thought of as exclusively individual, to interact with anything else for it to impact defence will. Exclusively internal factors are allowed to be exclusively internal. One implied exclusion in this framework is that the opposite does not hold. Since the foundation for the proposed framework of willingness to defend is the individual, exclusively external factors are not included since they do not interact with the individual at all and hence cannot impact defence will.

This framework for the literature serves several purposes, including synthesising the larger corpus of previous research by allowing for a clearer point of departure for any specific theory of one's willingness to defend, making assumptions more explicit regarding flows of causality made in the literature, and aiding authors when operationalising theory through empirical strategies. Overall, one guiding principle in categorising factors in the framework is the level of individual heterogeneity. It becomes obvious that many external factors are only relevant to test for in inter-societal comparisons since they will be constant within countries unless there is much regional variety.[31]

D Survey data

D.1 Survey questionnaire

Since not all survey questions will be used and many used concern background information, there will be a focus on the most central ones. All questions were originally in Swedish; the translation is the author's.

The first is a question related to military training. It asks if the person has conducted military training for at least three months. Where the answering choices are "yes" or "no". Three months is the minimum for basic military training.[32]

Before the respondent answers the questions on personal or general defence will, a scenario is introduced. The scenario and questions are the same for both surveys. The scenario is the following:

> Sweden has been attacked military by another country. The attacker has destroyed both military and civilian infrastructure. Cyberattacks have been targeted against critical societal functions. The attacking forces have been deployed on Swedish territory and against some strategic areas. The societal challenges are widespread.

Directly after the scenario, the question *"In such a scenario, do you believe Sweden should or should not put up armed resistance?"* is asked. This question aims to capture general defence will. The answer choices vary in four levels of intensity, where two express a positive will and two represent a negative will:

1. Yes, Sweden should definitely put up armed resistance
2. Yes, Sweden should probably put up armed resistance

[31] In Appendix B, a categorisation between inter- and intra-societal studies are made.
[32] (swe.) Grundläggande militär utbildning.

3. No, it is questionable if Sweden should put up armed resistance
4. No, Sweden should not put up armed resistance

Next follows three questions that capture three different roles connected to personal defence will. They are: *While endangering your own life, how willing are you to partake in a combat role in Sweden's defence? While endangering your life, how willing are you to partake in a non-combat role in Sweden's defence? While not endangering your life, how willing are you to partake in a non-combat role in Sweden's defence?* They capture eventual differences in how personal defence will vary depending on what type of threat one might experience to one's life and whether to partake in a combat role. The combat role is always expected to be life-threatening. The answer choices vary in four levels of intensity, where two express a positive will, and two represent a negative will:

1. Very willing
2. Somewhat willing
3. Not particularly willing
4. Not at all willing

Relating to the third defence will category – supportive defence will, both surveys include questions concerning whether the respondent thinks Sweden should have, maintain or develop civilian and military capabilities. Questions such as: *How important is it that Sweden has military defence capabilities? How important is it that Sweden has civil defence capabilities? Do you believe Sweden should dedicate more public funds to increase the preparedness for crises and war, even if that would mean increased taxes or lower priority to other public expenses?* For the first questions, the response options are:

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not particularly important
4. Not at all important

While for the third the response options are:

1. Yes, absolutely
2. Yes, probably
3. No, questionable
4. No, absolutely not

D.2 Data over non-responses

Table 8: Summary statistics over attrition from the surveys

	2018	2022
No answer	2,686	3,132
Declined participation	29	10
Blank returns	79	-
Obstructed participation	16	20
Person not found	45	65
Unusable	3	-
Total	2,858	3,227

D.3 Overview of observations per cohort

Table 9: Table over observations by cohort

Year turning 18	Men	Women	Total	Year turning 18	Men	Women	Total
1970	35	36	71	1997	26	32	58
1971	31	42	73	1998	30	24	54
1972	40	39	79	1999	21	26	47
1973	32	40	72	2000	22	12	34
1974	50	34	84	2001	27	29	56
1975	36	36	72	2002	21	13	34
1976	33	46	79	2003	26	28	54
1977	37	37	74	2004	17	27	44
1978	32	32	64	2005	19	21	40
1979	29	28	57	2006	24	19	43
1980	24	38	62	2007	25	29	54
1981	39	45	84	2008	22	24	46
1982	36	33	69	2009	27	27	54
1983	38	35	73	2010	20	19	39
1984	32	28	60	2011	17	22	39
1985	32	31	63	2012	16	24	40
1986	26	29	55	2013	12	10	22
1987	41	30	71	2014	7	17	24
1988	43	28	71	2015	11	17	28
1989	30	32	62	2016	13	14	27
1990	21	27	48	2017	12	11	23
1991	37	26	63	2018	14	18	32
1992	34	37	71	2019	1	7	8
1993	30	33	63	2020	2	6	8
1994	29	31	60	2021	5	9	14
1995	26	19	45	2022	1	6	7
1996	29	23	52				
Subtotal	902	895	1,797	Total	1,340	1,386	2,726

E Reduced form and robustness controls

E.1 Difference-in-differences on military training

Table 10: Military training

	Military training	
	(1)	(2)
Year	-0.00131	-0.00216
	(-0.52)	(-0.64)
Male	0.539***	0.544***
	(12.88)	(10.98)
Post96	-0.00410	-0.00950
	(-0.08)	(-0.19)
Male * Year	-0.0147***	-0.0143***
	(-5.35)	(-4.28)
Male * Post96	-0.208***	-0.202***
	(-2.97)	(-3.18)
Year * Post96		0.00273
		(0.68)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00156
		(-0.31)
Constant	-0.267***	-0.299***
	(-3.00)	(-2.97)
Observations	2500	2500
Mean	0.305	0.305
Within R-sq	0.556	0.556
Between R-sq	0.960	0.959
Overall R-sq	0.604	0.604

Notes: Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Military training is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent has conducted a military training which is at least 3 months. Z-values in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.2 Using the Defence Act of 1992 as the cut-off

Table 11: Defence will in combat roles - 1992

	Difference-in-differences		IV regressions			
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1		Specification 2	
			Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables of interest						
Military training			-0.927		-0.151	
			(-1.19)		(-0.36)	
Male	0.317***	0.344***	0.873**	0.600***	0.455**	0.665***
	(7.30)	(5.99)	(2.08)	(20.38)	(2.02)	(17.92)
Male * Post91	0.120*	0.123*		-0.130*		-0.128**
	(1.69)	(1.69)		(-1.88)		(-1.98)
Male * Year * Post91		-0.00491				-0.0114**
		(-0.88)				(-2.22)
Other variables						
Year	0.00476	0.00936**	0.00319	-0.00169	0.00942***	-0.000271
	(1.33)	(2.50)	(0.70)	(-0.69)	(2.63)	(-0.08)
Post91	-0.0949**	-0.0859**	-0.0532	0.0450	-0.0285	0.0544*
	(-2.54)	(-2.08)	(-1.22)	(1.41)	(-0.68)	(1.80)
Male * Year	-0.00323	-0.000785	-0.0185	-0.0165***	-0.00252	-0.0106***
	(-1.14)	(-0.19)	(-1.11)	(-5.92)	(-0.29)	(-3.03)
Year * Post91		-0.0113			-0.0149*	-0.00517
		(-1.52)			(-1.87)	(-1.17)
Constant	0.223	0.406*	-0.0196	-0.262***	0.378*	-0.146
	(1.33)	(1.82)	(-0.08)	(-3.13)	(1.72)	(-1.38)
Observations	2525	2525	2525	2525	2525	2525
Mean	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.305	0.512	0.305
F-statistics			3.52		5.64	
Within R-sq	0.166	0.167				
Between R-sq	0.735	0.729				
Overall R-sq	0.182	0.183				

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1991 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 12: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will - 1992

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.0697**	0.0848***	-0.0297	-0.0400	0.00429	0.0159	-0.0431**	-0.0454**	-0.0464***	-0.0427***	-0.0441	-0.0424
	(2.45)	(3.09)	(-1.38)	(-1.38)	(0.17)	(0.64)	(-2.05)	(-2.00)	(-3.09)	(-3.15)	(-1.52)	(-1.10)
Male * Post91	0.0984*	0.103*	0.0373	0.0405	0.0726	0.0727	0.0312	0.0315	0.0221	0.0235	0.146**	0.147**
	(1.87)	(1.91)	(0.98)	(1.07)	(1.54)	(1.61)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.70)	(2.31)	(2.31)
Male * Year * Post91		-0.00289		0.00163		-0.00204		0.000387		-0.000716		-0.000310
		(-0.66)		(0.51)		(-0.50)		(0.10)		(-0.28)		(-0.07)
Other variables												
Year	-0.000152	0.00730**	-0.000301	0.00545	0.0231***	0.0231***	0.0112***	0.0118***	0.00306*	0.00554***	0.0107***	0.0112***
	(-0.05)	(2.41)	(-0.10)	(1.52)	(6.68)	(5.43)	(4.65)	(5.22)	(1.82)	(3.14)	(3.09)	(2.60)
Post91	-0.0134	-0.00237	-0.0107	-0.00471	-0.0673	-0.0659	-0.00146	-0.000936	0.00536	0.00883	-0.0155	-0.0146
	(-0.43)	(-0.07)	(-0.43)	(-0.20)	(-1.19)	(-1.16)	(-0.03)	(-0.02)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(-0.31)	(-0.30)
Male * Year	-0.00507**	-0.00374*	-0.00291*	-0.00387	-0.00389*	-0.00283	-0.00188	-0.00210	-0.00189	-0.00157	-0.00473**	-0.00458
	(-2.33)	(-1.78)	(-1.80)	(-1.50)	(-1.85)	(-1.36)	(-1.00)	(-0.86)	(-1.53)	(-1.17)	(-2.08)	(-1.39)
Year * Post91		-0.0174***		-0.0127**		-0.000380		-0.00134		-0.00575*		-0.00119
		(-3.64)		(-2.50)		(-0.06)		(-0.28)		(-1.78)		(-0.18)
Constant	0.620***	0.886***	0.870***	1.053***	0.310***	0.323***	0.437***	0.455***	0.919***	1.006***	0.465***	0.484**
	(4.72)	(6.14)	(8.32)	(8.87)	(2.70)	(2.62)	(5.80)	(3.75)	(15.85)	(12.93)	(3.01)	(2.41)
Observations	2528	2528	2531	2531	2522	2522	2538	2538	2541	2541	2463	2463
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818
Within R-sq	0.0499	0.0521	0.0393	0.0405	0.0515	0.0517	0.0378	0.0379	0.0428	0.0437	0.0312	0.0311
Between R-sq	0.624	0.642	0.404	0.393	0.556	0.553	0.491	0.491	0.221	0.216	0.219	0.223
Overall R-sq	0.0652	0.0672	0.0599	0.0612	0.0665	0.0667	0.0481	0.0481	0.0479	0.0486	0.0483	0.0483

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1991 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 13: IV regression I: Other metrics of defence will - 1992

	Personal defence will								General defence will			
	Non-combat roles				Non-combat roles, NLT							
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	-0.745		-0.178		-0.283		-0.210		-0.548		-0.129	
	(-1.34)		(-0.76)		(-0.85)		(-0.89)		(-1.13)		(-0.64)	
Male	0.516*	0.600***	0.212	0.667***	0.140	0.600***	0.101	0.666***	0.334	0.601***	0.108	0.667***
	(1.71)	(20.31)	(1.63)	(17.71)	(0.78)	(20.26)	(0.78)	(17.68)	(1.26)	(20.37)	(0.94)	(18.04)
Male * Post91		-0.132*		-0.130**		-0.132*		-0.130**		-0.132*		-0.131**
		(-1.89)		(-1.99)		(-1.88)		(-1.99)		(-1.90)		(-2.02)
Male * Year * Post91				-0.0118**				-0.0118**				-0.0117**
				(-2.26)				(-2.24)				(-2.26)
Other variables												
Year	-0.00127	-0.00151	0.00732**	-0.000186	-0.000683	-0.00135	0.00547	0.0000455	0.0223***	-0.00134	.0222489***	-.0007067
	(-0.32)	(-0.61)	(2.32)	(-0.05)	(-0.22)	(-0.54)	(1.44)	(0.01)	(6.15)	(-0.54)	6.13	-0.23
Post91	0.0204	0.0454	0.0453*	0.0548*	0.00199	0.0449	0.0130	0.0543*	-0.0440	0.0425	-0.0328	0.0518*
	(0.77)	(1.40)	(1.72)	(1.79)	(0.12)	(1.38)	(0.98)	(1.78)	(-0.71)	(1.33)	(-0.57)	(1.73)
Male * Year	-0.0172	-0.0163***	-0.00561	-0.0103***	-0.00753	-0.0163***	-0.00604	-0.0103***	-0.0129	-0.0164***	-0.00423	-0.0104***
	(-1.45)	(-5.75)	(-1.23)	(-2.84)	(-1.05)	(-5.77)	(-1.17)	(-2.85)	(-1.24)	(-5.91)	(-1.10)	(-2.98)
Year * Post91			-0.0204***	-0.00503			-0.0142***	-0.00519			-0.00255	-0.00509
			(-4.20)	(-1.11)			(-2.62)	(-1.16)			(-0.42)	(-1.13)
Constant	0.421**	-0.268***	0.854***	-0.152	0.794***	-0.271***	1.020***	-0.153	0.165	-0.265***	0.416***	-0.149
	(2.16)	(-3.16)	(6.27)	(-1.43)	(6.06)	(-3.20)	(8.41)	(-1.44)	(0.95)	(-3.13)	(3.61)	(-1.35)
Observations	2528	2528	2528	2528	2531	2531	2531	2531	2522	2522	2522	2522
Mean	0.802	0.305	0.802	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.858	0.305	0.858	0.305
F-statistics	3.56		5.66		3.55		5.61		3.62		5.90	

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1991 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 14: IV regression II: Other metrics of defence will - 1992

	Military capabilities				Civilian capabilities				Increased funds			
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	-0.236		-0.120		-0.166		-0.0399		-0.996		-0.457	
	(-0.62)		(-0.64)		(-0.57)		(-0.36)		(-1.39)		(-1.25)	
Male	0.0983	0.599***	0.0362	0.665***	0.0530	0.599***	-0.0143	0.665***	0.565	0.611***	0.273	0.678***
	(0.47)	(20.22)	(0.34)	(17.32)	(0.33)	(20.22)	(-0.23)	(17.32)	(1.41)	(21.19)	(1.35)	(17.29)
Male * Post91		-0.132*		-0.131**		-0.133*		-0.132**		-0.147**		-0.145**
		(-1.89)		(-2.01)		(-1.90)		(-2.02)		(-2.13)		(-2.26)
Male * Year * Post91				-0.0116**				-0.0116**				-0.0117**
				(-2.22)				(-2.21)				(-2.19)
Other variables												
Year	0.0109***	-0.00119	0.0118***	-0.000350	0.00285*	-0.00126	0.00554***	-0.000338	0.00935**	-0.00140	0.0114**	-0.000301
	(4.63)	(-0.49)	(5.17)	(-0.10)	(1.74)	(-0.52)	(3.22)	(-0.10)	(2.15)	(-0.55)	(2.46)	(-0.08)
Post91	0.00987	0.0480	0.0133	0.0561*	0.0134	0.0487	0.0198	0.0569*	0.0364	0.0521	0.0519	0.0613*
	(0.22)	(1.43)	(0.29)	(1.78)	(0.70)	(1.45)	(0.95)	(1.80)	(0.61)	(1.54)	(0.95)	(1.93)
Male * Year	-0.00575	-0.0164***	-0.00337	-0.0104***	-0.00461	-0.0164***	-0.00202	-0.0104***	-0.0206	-0.0160***	-0.00951	-0.00996**
	(-0.72)	(-5.78)	(-0.82)	(-2.85)	(-0.76)	(-5.77)	(-0.85)	(-2.84)	(-1.35)	(-5.50)	(-1.19)	(-2.56)
Year * Post91			-0.00223	-0.00384			-0.00641**	-0.00402			-0.00573	-0.00446
			(-0.45)	(-0.87)			(-2.02)	(-0.91)			(-0.74)	(-0.95)
Constant	0.371***	-0.279***	0.432***	-0.182*	0.873***	-0.279***	0.998***	-0.179*	0.193	-0.273***	0.405*	-0.165*
	(3.00)	(-3.35)	(3.62)	(-1.75)	(8.64)	(-3.34)	(13.01)	(-1.71)	(0.79)	(-3.17)	(1.88)	(-1.66)
Observations	2538	2538	2538	2538	2541	2541	2541	2541	2463	2463	2463	2463
Mean	0.917	0.305	0.917	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.818	0.305	0.818	0.305
F-statistics	3.58		5.40		3.62		5.42		4.54		5.53	

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1991 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

E.3 Using the Defence Act of 2000 as the cut-off

Table 15: Defence will in combat roles - 2000

	Difference-in-differences		IV regressions			
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1		Specification 2	
			Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables of interest						
Military training			0.756		0.625	
			(1.56)		(1.51)	
Male	0.440***	0.443***	0.111	0.434***	0.158	0.426***
	(11.20)	(11.25)	(0.66)	(10.18)	(1.11)	(9.34)
Male * Post00	-0.119*	-0.0983		-0.157**		-0.188***
	(-1.89)	(-1.35)		(-2.41)		(-3.05)
Male * Year * Post00		-0.00311				0.00513
		(-0.40)				(0.97)
Other variables						
Year	0.00244	0.00485	0.00354	-0.00145	0.00666**	-0.00187
	(0.75)	(1.30)	(1.12)	(-0.54)	(2.03)	(-0.57)
Post00	-0.0399	-0.0350	-0.0748	0.0461	-0.0612	0.0571*
	(-0.58)	(-0.49)	(-1.25)	(1.30)	(-1.01)	(1.81)
Male * Year	0.00372*	0.00395*	0.0162	-0.0165***	0.0135	-0.0170***
	(1.83)	(1.91)	(1.56)	(-6.75)	(1.52)	(-6.32)
Year * Post00		-0.0101			-0.0135*	0.00114
		(-1.36)			(-1.88)	(0.26)
Constant	0.235	0.379**	0.431**	-0.259***	0.575***	-0.298***
	(1.49)	(2.15)	(2.37)	(-3.37)	(2.95)	(-3.08)
Observations	2525	2525	2525	2525	2525	2525
Mean	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.305	0.512	0.305
F-statistics			5.81		4.90	
Within R-sq	0.167	0.167				
Between R-sq	0.742	0.745				
Overall R-sq	0.183	0.183				

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 2000 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 16: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will - 2000

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.116***	0.130***	-0.0421**	-0.0417*	0.0715***	0.0608**	-0.00291	-0.0209	-0.0372*	-0.0395*	0.0374	0.0393
	(3.45)	(3.96)	(-1.97)	(-1.87)	(2.83)	(2.36)	(-0.10)	(-0.69)	(-1.81)	(-1.83)	(0.86)	(0.85)
Male * Post00	-0.0350	0.0260	0.0284	0.0356	-0.0930**	-0.129**	-0.0661	-0.130***	-0.0189	-0.0216	-0.0273	-0.0193
	(-0.57)	(0.36)	(0.83)	(0.96)	(-2.07)	(-2.44)	(-1.40)	(-2.87)	(-0.59)	(-0.59)	(-0.41)	(-0.28)
Male * Year * Post00		-0.00982		-0.000904		0.00630		0.0110**		0.000800		-0.00130
		(-1.23)		(-0.22)		(1.05)		(2.37)		(0.22)		(-0.25)
Other variables												
Year	0.000856	0.00456*	0.000395	0.00227	0.0197***	0.0207***	0.00974***	0.0102***	0.00247	0.00451***	0.00843***	0.00886**
	(0.34)	(1.71)	(0.15)	(0.78)	(5.96)	(5.56)	(5.53)	(5.22)	(1.59)	(2.91)	(2.66)	(2.55)
Post00	-0.0932**	-0.0986**	-0.0525	-0.0447	0.0576	0.0788	0.0583	0.0887**	0.0301	0.0431**	0.0670	0.0659
	(-1.96)	(-2.17)	(-1.58)	(-1.36)	(1.02)	(1.31)	(1.49)	(2.31)	(1.63)	(1.99)	(0.98)	(0.95)
Male * Year	-0.00102	-0.000160	-0.00245*	-0.00242*	0.000858	0.000190	0.000826	-0.000281	-0.000697	-0.000843	0.000664	0.000777
	(-0.58)	(-0.09)	(-1.81)	(-1.68)	(0.66)	(0.15)	(0.49)	(-0.16)	(-0.63)	(-0.72)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Year * Post00		-0.0148**		-0.00807		-0.00502		-0.00351		-0.00905**		-0.00165
		(-2.44)		(-1.19)		(-0.69)		(-0.83)		(-2.40)		(-0.19)
Constant	0.663***	0.899***	0.890***	0.998***	0.443***	0.478***	0.501***	0.495***	0.930***	1.043***	0.499***	0.526***
	(5.37)	(6.38)	(9.77)	(8.21)	(4.04)	(4.06)	(6.59)	(5.03)	(18.03)	(14.86)	(3.38)	(2.67)
Observations	2528	2528	2531	2531	2522	2522	2538	2538	2541	2541	2463	2463
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818
Within R-sq	0.0503	0.0522	0.0396	0.0400	0.0518	0.0522	0.0385	0.0406	0.0428	0.0441	0.0293	0.0294
Between R-sq	0.633	0.637	0.401	0.392	0.573	0.608	0.497	0.511	0.217	0.188	0.255	0.258
Overall R-sq	0.0654	0.0676	0.0600	0.0605	0.0669	0.0673	0.0489	0.0510	0.0479	0.0490	0.0460	0.0460

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 2000 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 17: IV regression I: Other metrics of defence will - 2000

	Personal defence will								General defence will			
	Non-combat roles				Non-combat roles, NLT							
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	0.216		0.0297		-0.177		-0.188		0.574		0.620*	
	(0.57)		(0.08)		(-0.75)		(-0.89)		(1.61)		(1.84)	
Male	0.0223	0.436***	0.0880	0.429***	0.0350	0.435***	0.0389	0.428***	-0.179	0.436***	-0.195	0.428***
	(0.16)	(10.12)	(0.65)	(9.27)	(0.41)	(10.12)	(0.52)	(9.28)	(-1.38)	(10.16)	(-1.61)	(9.32)
Male * Post00		-0.162**		-0.192***		-0.160**		-0.189***		-0.162**		-0.192***
		(-2.45)		(-3.09)		(-2.43)		(-3.06)		(-2.47)		(-3.13)
Male * Year * Post00				0.00495				0.00489				0.00513
				(0.93)				(0.92)				(0.98)
Other variables												
Year	0.00113	-0.00128	0.00559**	-0.00174	0.000197	-0.00112	0.00197	-0.00159	0.0204***	-0.00120	0.0214***	-0.00168
	(0.51)	(-0.47)	(2.24)	(-0.52)	(0.07)	(-0.41)	(0.65)	(-0.47)	(6.38)	(-0.44)	(6.25)	(-0.50)
Post00	-0.103***	0.0476	-0.0846***	0.0579*	-0.0443	0.0461	-0.0341	0.0561*	0.0303	0.0475	0.0381	0.0581*
	(-2.75)	(1.33)	(-2.64)	(1.82)	(-1.59)	(1.29)	(-1.24)	(1.77)	(0.62)	(1.34)	(0.72)	(1.85)
Male * Year	0.00250	-0.0163***	-0.00135	-0.0168***	-0.00535	-0.0164***	-0.00559	-0.0168***	0.0103	-0.0165***	0.0112	-0.0170***
	(0.33)	(-6.51)	(-0.18)	(-6.08)	(-1.05)	(-6.54)	(-1.21)	(-6.11)	(1.36)	(-6.71)	(1.56)	(-6.28)
Year * Post00			-0.0191***	0.00132			-0.00780	0.00139			-0.00449	0.00133
			(-3.85)	(0.30)			(-1.26)	(0.32)			(-0.66)	(0.30)
Constant	0.720***	-0.264***	0.923***	-0.304***	0.843***	-0.265***	0.941***	-0.306***	0.593***	-0.261***	0.660***	-0.302***
	(5.17)	(-3.42)	(5.68)	(-3.14)	(7.84)	(-3.43)	(6.92)	(-3.18)	(5.27)	(-3.37)	(5.15)	(-3.14)
Observations	2528	2528	2528	2528	2531	2531	2531	2531	2522	2522	2522	2522
Mean	0.802	0.305	0.802	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.858	0.305	0.858	0.305
F-statistics	6.02		5.01		5.89		4.94		6.10		5.19	

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 2000 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 18: IV regression II: Other metrics of defence will - 2000

	Military capabilities				Civilian capabilities				Increased funds			
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	0.429		0.574*		0.122		0.112		0.182		0.140	
	(1.20)		(1.65)		(0.63)		(0.63)		(0.42)		(0.35)	
Male	-0.188	0.431***	-0.239*	0.422***	-0.0897	0.431***	-0.0864	0.422***	-0.0415	0.434***	-0.0264	0.426***
	(-1.48)	(9.94)	(-1.95)	(9.11)	(-1.33)	(9.94)	(-1.41)	(9.11)	(-0.27)	(9.89)	(-0.19)	(9.08)
Male * Post00		-0.154**		-0.185***		-0.155**		-0.188***		-0.150**		-0.179***
		(-2.32)		(-2.96)		(-2.35)		(-3.04)		(-2.20)		(-2.77)
Male * Year * Post00				0.00520				0.00544				0.00501
				(0.97)				(1.03)				(0.92)
Other variables												
Year	0.0103***	-0.00121	0.0104***	-0.00174	0.00261*	-0.00121	0.00468***	-0.00173	0.00865***	-0.00120	0.00928***	-0.00157
	(5.23)	(-0.45)	(4.22)	(-0.52)	(1.73)	(-0.45)	(3.06)	(-0.52)	(2.98)	(-0.43)	(2.99)	(-0.45)
Post00	0.0306	0.0645*	0.0342	0.0750**	0.0226**	0.0619*	0.0346***	0.0732**	0.0554	0.0637*	0.0582	0.0743**
	(0.85)	(1.83)	(0.94)	(2.38)	(2.18)	(1.74)	(2.77)	(2.32)	(1.06)	(1.71)	(1.12)	(2.24)
Male * Year	0.00795	-0.0166***	0.0109	-0.0171***	0.00133	-0.0166***	0.00112	-0.0171***	0.00371	-0.0168***	0.00284	-0.0172***
	(1.02)	(-6.59)	(1.43)	(-6.17)	(0.31)	(-6.58)	(0.29)	(-6.17)	(0.41)	(-6.38)	(0.34)	(-5.98)
Year * Post00			-0.000956	0.00152			-0.00914**	0.00152			-0.00263	0.000892
			(-0.19)	(0.35)			(-2.45)	(0.35)			(-0.33)	(0.19)
Constant	0.622***	-0.282***	0.669***	-0.326***	0.964***	-0.280***	1.079***	-0.325***	0.549***	-0.273***	0.572**	-0.308***
	(5.65)	(-3.69)	(4.52)	(-3.43)	(14.40)	(-3.66)	(12.65)	(-3.43)	(3.03)	(-3.49)	(2.56)	(-3.14)
Observations	2538	2538	2538	2538	2541	2541	2541	2541	2463	2463	2463	2463
Mean	0.917	0.305	0.917	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.818	0.305	0.818	0.305
F-statistics	5.40		4.66		5.52		4.96		4.85		4.03	

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 2000 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

E.4 Probit model regressions

Table 19: Defence will in combat roles - Probit

	Difference-in-differences	
	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)
Variables of interest		
Male	1.069***	1.128***
	(7.74)	(7.64)
Male * Post96	-0.0930	0.0145
	(-0.42)	(0.07)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.0204
		(-1.11)
Other variables		
Year	0.00711	0.0175*
	(0.82)	(1.88)
Post96	-0.0546	-0.0618
	(-0.27)	(-0.29)
Male * Year	0.00530	0.00951
	(0.69)	(1.13)
Year * Post96		-0.0319
		(-1.52)
Constant	-0.830*	-0.279
	(-1.65)	(-0.45)
Observations	2525	2525
Mean	0.512	0.512

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 20: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will - Probit

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.322**	0.454***	-0.198	-0.251	0.366	0.350	0.0523	-0.0230	-0.125	-0.178	0.0487	0.0845
	(2.41)	(3.22)	(-1.53)	(-1.53)	(0.55)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(-0.10)	(-0.56)	(-0.63)	(0.30)	(0.44)
Male * Post96	0.168	0.361*	0.190	0.182	-0.433	-0.437	-0.521	-0.584	-0.639*	-0.705*	0.0851	0.118
	(0.75)	(1.70)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(-0.26)	(-0.16)	(-1.56)	(-1.61)	(-1.66)	(-1.95)	(0.31)	(0.46)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.0399**		0.0104		0.00385		0.0203		0.0151		-0.00962
		(-2.13)		(0.61)		(0.04)		(0.77)		(0.55)		(-0.55)
Other variables												
Year	0.00325	0.0268***	0.00734	0.0308*	0.105***	0.123	0.0867***	0.109***	0.0281	0.0615***	0.0458***	0.0424***
	(0.35)	(2.72)	(0.47)	(1.73)	(3.10)	(0.34)	(3.52)	(3.65)	(1.62)	(3.17)	(3.41)	(2.73)
Post96	-0.206	-0.199	-0.470***	-0.391**	-0.00507	0.0453	-0.240	-0.152	0.230	0.381	-0.304	-0.325
	(-1.50)	(-1.27)	(-2.75)	(-2.06)	(-0.00)	(0.01)	(-0.73)	(-0.48)	(0.50)	(0.83)	(-1.45)	(-1.59)
Male * Year	-0.0136*	-0.00415	-0.0145*	-0.0182	0.00375	0.00236	0.0105	0.00464	0.0110	0.00656	-0.00387	-0.00119
	(-1.74)	(-0.51)	(-1.68)	(-1.58)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.77)	(0.28)	(0.73)	(0.34)	(-0.42)	(-0.10)
Year * Post96		-0.0659***		-0.0740**		-0.0515		-0.0620**		-0.0940***		0.0101
		(-3.80)		(-2.32)		(-0.06)		(-2.01)		(-2.81)		(0.35)
Constant	0.275	1.312***	1.414***	2.420***	2.627	3.095	-1.320***	-0.620	1.479**	2.576***	-0.135	-0.234
	(0.64)	(2.88)	(2.83)	(3.83)	(1.61)	(0.93)	(-2.80)	(-0.88)	(2.11)	(3.26)	(-0.25)	(-0.33)
Observations	2528	2528	2510	2510	2510	2510	2401	2401	2065	2065	2431	2431
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

E.5 Removed extreme values

Table 21: Defence will in combat roles - Removed extreme values

	Difference-in-differences		IV regressions			
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1		Specification 2	
			Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables of interest						
Military training			0.160		0.205	
			(0.44)		(0.56)	
Male	0.394***	0.414***	0.308**	0.534***	0.289*	0.543***
	(8.53)	(8.48)	(1.97)	(13.24)	(1.82)	(11.42)
Male * Post96	-0.0313	0.00705		-0.196***		-0.183***
	(-0.42)	(0.10)		(-2.87)		(-2.90)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00730				-0.00288
		(-1.19)				(-0.56)
Other variables						
Year	0.00240	0.00561*	0.00250	-0.000685	0.00641**	-0.000886
	(0.79)	(1.69)	(0.86)	(-0.30)	(2.11)	(-0.29)
Post96	-0.0181	-0.0218	-0.0168	-0.00771	0.00296	-0.0136
	(-0.26)	(-0.31)	(-0.26)	(-0.16)	(0.05)	(-0.28)
Male * Year	0.00169	0.00319	0.00406	-0.0149***	0.00499	-0.0142***
	(0.65)	(1.13)	(0.53)	(-5.54)	(0.65)	(-4.41)
Year * Post96		-0.00988			-0.0128*	0.000743
		(-1.35)			(-1.88)	(0.19)
Constant	0.193	0.370*	0.232	-0.241***	0.422**	-0.238**
	(1.10)	(1.70)	(1.31)	(-2.90)	(2.02)	(-2.33)
Observations	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524
Mean	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.305	0.512	0.305
F-statistics			8.24		4.36	
Within R-sq	0.166	0.167				
Between R-sq	0.719	0.710				
Overall R-sq	0.182	0.183				

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 22: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will - Removed extreme values

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.0756**	0.0989***	-0.0308	-0.0355	0.0812***	0.0752***	0.00874	-0.00337	-0.0184	-0.0200	0.0142	0.0229
	(2.25)	(2.90)	(-1.45)	(-1.51)	(3.06)	(2.72)	(0.32)	(-0.11)	(-0.88)	(-0.81)	(0.33)	(0.47)
Male * Post96	0.0651	0.112**	0.0221	0.0214	-0.0969**	-0.103**	-0.0833*	-0.0994*	-0.0472	-0.0450	0.0226	0.0325
	(1.15)	(2.04)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(-2.17)	(-2.07)	(-1.72)	(-1.75)	(-1.41)	(-1.45)	(0.31)	(0.45)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00855		0.000968		0.00169		0.00372		0.000132		-0.00253
		(-1.58)		(0.28)		(0.36)		(0.82)		(0.05)		(-0.50)
Other variables												
Year	0.00119	0.00669***	0.00110	0.00450	0.0204***	0.0221***	0.0114***	0.0127***	0.00295**	0.00555***	0.0116***	0.00999***
	(0.47)	(2.68)	(0.40)	(1.47)	(6.11)	(5.39)	(5.73)	(5.80)	(2.03)	(3.53)	(3.33)	(2.59)
Post96	-0.0773*	-0.0764	-0.0765***	-0.0643**	0.0262	0.0346	-0.0294	-0.0185	-0.00120	0.00696	-0.0774	-0.0867
	(-1.93)	(-1.61)	(-2.78)	(-1.96)	(0.45)	(0.59)	(-0.64)	(-0.43)	(-0.03)	(0.19)	(-1.26)	(-1.43)
Male * Year	-0.00369*	-0.00200	-0.00225	-0.00260	0.00148	0.00104	0.00156	0.000683	0.000202	0.0000794	-0.000596	0.0000355
	(-1.84)	(-0.98)	(-1.49)	(-1.48)	(0.91)	(0.62)	(0.85)	(0.32)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(-0.25)	(0.01)
Year * Post96		-0.0170***		-0.0108*		-0.00550		-0.00430		-0.00818***		0.00519
		(-3.28)		(-1.84)		(-0.83)		(-1.03)		(-2.59)		(0.66)
Constant	0.636***	0.921***	0.886***	1.036***	0.361***	0.431***	0.502***	0.546***	0.934***	1.050***	0.534***	0.472**
	(5.00)	(6.48)	(9.73)	(8.99)	(3.28)	(3.56)	(6.13)	(4.66)	(14.99)	(13.08)	(3.61)	(2.40)
Observations	2527	2527	2530	2530	2521	2521	2538	2538	2541	2541	2462	2462
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818
Within R-sq	0.0499	0.0529	0.0397	0.0404	0.0526	0.0525	0.0390	0.0394	0.0435	0.0444	0.0294	0.0298
Between R-sq	0.620	0.622	0.361	0.351	0.604	0.632	0.539	0.549	0.219	0.204	0.211	0.172
Overall R-sq	0.0649	0.0679	0.0594	0.0602	0.0676	0.0677	0.0505	0.0509	0.0487	0.0498	0.0455	0.0457

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 23: IV regression I: Other metrics of defence will - Removed extreme values

	Personal defence will								General defence will			
	Non-combat roles				Non-combat roles, NLT							
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	-0.324		-0.260		-0.111		-0.136		0.485		0.445	
	(-1.04)		(-0.87)		(-0.60)		(-0.71)		(1.63)		(1.50)	
Male	0.249*	0.536***	0.222*	0.546***	0.0286	0.535***	0.0396	0.545***	-0.179	0.535***	-0.161	0.545***
	(1.80)	(13.23)	(1.66)	(11.39)	(0.35)	(13.20)	(0.46)	(11.35)	(-1.38)	(13.22)	(-1.24)	(11.40)
Male * Post96		-0.201***		-0.186***		-0.199***		-0.185***		-0.200***		-0.186***
		(-2.91)		(-2.94)		(-2.88)		(-2.92)		(-2.91)		(-2.93)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00317				-0.00309				-0.00305
				(-0.61)				(-0.60)				(-0.59)
Other variables												
Year	0.00101	-0.000552	0.00732**	-0.000812	0.00106	-0.000353	0.00437	-0.000586	0.0206***	-0.000438	0.0222***	-0.000708
	(0.37)	(-0.24)	(2.57)	(-0.26)	(0.38)	(-0.15)	(1.41)	(-0.19)	(6.58)	(-0.19)	(6.08)	(-0.23)
Post96	-0.0791	-0.00541	-0.0482	-0.0120	-0.0774***	-0.00775	-0.0680**	-0.0142	0.0295	-0.00678	0.0304	-0.0132
	(-1.57)	(-0.11)	(-0.89)	(-0.24)	(-2.67)	(-0.16)	(-2.13)	(-0.29)	(0.48)	(-0.14)	(0.51)	(-0.27)
Male * Year	-0.00843	-0.0146***	-0.00714	-0.0139***	-0.00388	-0.0147***	-0.00440	-0.0140***	0.00867	-0.0148***	0.00782	-0.0141***
	(-1.31)	(-5.35)	(-1.18)	(-4.23)	(-0.94)	(-5.37)	(-1.04)	(-4.25)	(1.34)	(-5.52)	(1.22)	(-4.37)
Year * Post96			-0.0207***	0.000937			-0.0104**	0.000856			-0.00464	0.000954
			(-4.35)	(0.23)			(-2.02)	(0.21)			(-0.81)	(0.24)
Constant	0.556***	-0.247***	0.862***	-0.245**	0.859***	-0.248***	1.002***	-0.245**	0.479***	-0.244***	0.537***	-0.242**
	(4.08)	(-2.95)	(5.94)	(-2.39)	(8.75)	(-2.96)	(8.25)	(-2.40)	(4.42)	(-2.90)	(4.23)	(-2.39)
Observations	2527	2527	2527	2527	2530	2530	2530	2530	2521	2521	2521	2521
Mean	0.802	0.305	0.802	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.858	0.305	0.858	0.305
F-statistics	8.45		4.47		8.29		4.40		8.44		4.46	

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 24: IV regression II: Other metrics of defence will - Removed extreme values

	Military capabilities				Civilian capabilities				Increased funds			
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	0.403		0.362		0.227		0.209		-0.109		-0.0804	
	(1.44)		(1.29)		(1.41)		(1.25)		(-0.31)		(-0.23)	
Male	-0.208*	0.538***	-0.190	0.546***	-0.141**	0.538***	-0.132*	0.546***	0.0735	0.544***	0.0608	0.552***
	(-1.72)	(13.39)	(-1.57)	(11.45)	(-2.05)	(13.39)	(-1.87)	(11.45)	(0.49)	(13.29)	(0.41)	(11.26)
Male * Post96		-0.207***		-0.196***		-0.208***		-0.198***		-0.207***		-0.197***
		(-3.03)		(-3.15)		(-3.05)		(-3.18)		(-2.99)		(-3.17)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00244				-0.00233				-0.00246
				(-0.48)				(-0.46)				(-0.48)
Other variables												
Year	0.0114***	-0.000149	0.0125***	-0.000857	0.00300**	-0.000218	0.00566***	-0.000840	0.0116***	-0.000271	0.0102***	-0.000798
	(5.35)	(-0.07)	(5.54)	(-0.28)	(2.09)	(-0.10)	(3.83)	(-0.27)	(3.42)	(-0.11)	(2.80)	(-0.24)
Post96	-0.0263	-0.00757	-0.0275	-0.0142	0.000308	-0.00663	0.00776	-0.0128	-0.0783	-0.00826	-0.0796	-0.0142
	(-0.52)	(-0.15)	(-0.54)	(-0.29)	(0.01)	(-0.13)	(0.20)	(-0.26)	(-1.21)	(-0.17)	(-1.27)	(-0.30)
Male * Year	0.00743	-0.0145***	0.00656	-0.0140***	0.00350	-0.0145***	0.00311	-0.0140***	-0.00218	-0.0145***	-0.00158	-0.0140***
	(1.18)	(-5.38)	(1.05)	(-4.27)	(0.96)	(-5.37)	(0.83)	(-4.27)	(-0.30)	(-5.14)	(-0.22)	(-4.06)
Year * Post96			-0.00315	0.00234			-0.00834***	0.00206			0.00416	0.00174
			(-0.71)	(0.59)			(-2.66)	(0.52)			(0.60)	(0.41)
Constant	0.604***	-0.254***	0.641***	-0.276***	0.992***	-0.254***	1.107***	-0.273***	0.507***	-0.241***	0.454**	-0.254***
	(5.78)	(-3.08)	(4.77)	(-2.81)	(14.66)	(-3.09)	(12.65)	(-2.76)	(2.89)	(-2.91)	(2.15)	(-2.60)
Observations	2538	2538	2538	2538	2541	2541	2541	2541	2462	2462	2462	2462
Mean	0.917	0.305	0.917	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.818	0.305	0.818	0.305
F-statistics	9.16		5.01		9.30		5.09		8.96		5.02	

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2022. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

E.6 Removed period when conscription was re-introduced

Table 25: Defence will in combat roles - Removed post-2017 cohorts

	Difference-in-differences		IV regressions			
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1		Specification 2	
			Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables of interest						
Military training			0.171		0.289	
			(0.45)		(0.77)	
Male	0.392***	0.413***	0.302*	0.526***	0.252	0.543***
	(8.47)	(8.40)	(1.88)	(12.71)	(1.59)	(11.39)
Male * Post96	-0.0325	0.0160		-0.189***		-0.156**
	(-0.44)	(0.24)		(-2.73)		(-2.50)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.00860				-0.00661
		(-1.52)				(-1.22)
Other variables						
Year	0.000863	0.00529	0.000975	-0.000654	0.00574*	-0.000870
	(0.28)	(1.59)	(0.33)	(-0.27)	(1.85)	(-0.28)
Post96	-0.0125	-0.0147	-0.0108	-0.0103	0.0243	-0.0257
	(-0.18)	(-0.21)	(-0.17)	(-0.21)	(0.38)	(-0.53)
Male * Year	0.00162	0.00316	0.00427	-0.0155***	0.00681	-0.0142***
	(0.63)	(1.11)	(0.52)	(-5.50)	(0.85)	(-4.39)
Year * Post96		-0.0140*			-0.0177**	0.00175
		(-1.79)			(-2.50)	(0.42)
Constant	-0.0314	0.221	0.0111	-0.248***	0.277	-0.227**
	(-0.18)	(0.99)	(0.06)	(-2.85)	(1.31)	(-2.12)
Observations	2485	2485	2485	2485	2485	2485
Mean	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.305	0.512	0.305
F-statistics			7.65		4.08	
Within R-sq	0.166	0.167				
Between R-sq	0.798	0.799				
Overall R-sq	0.182	0.183				

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude where one equals a positive defence will in the case of military attack in combat roles. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2017. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 26: Difference-in-differences: Other metrics of defence will - Removed post-2017 cohorts

	Personal defence will				General defence will		Supportive defence will					
	Non-combat roles		Non-combat roles, NLT				Military capabilities		Civilian capabilities		Increased funds	
	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Male	0.0643*	0.0992***	-0.0391*	-0.0346	0.0796***	0.0768***	0.0125	-0.00276	-0.0185	-0.0199	0.00914	0.0243
	(1.88)	(2.91)	(-1.83)	(-1.48)	(2.88)	(2.78)	(0.46)	(-0.09)	(-0.87)	(-0.81)	(0.20)	(0.50)
Male * Post96	0.0740	0.149***	0.0286	0.0420	-0.0950**	-0.0984*	-0.0865*	-0.114*	-0.0461	-0.0457	0.0268	0.0505
	(1.28)	(2.92)	(0.78)	(1.14)	(-2.11)	(-1.85)	(-1.77)	(-1.87)	(-1.36)	(-1.51)	(0.36)	(0.68)
Male * Year * Post96		-0.0138***		-0.00204		0.000924		0.00569		0.000321		-0.00541
		(-2.61)		(-0.62)		(0.16)		(1.14)		(0.12)		(-0.96)
Other variables												
Year	0.00261	0.00659***	0.00153	0.00441	0.0209***	0.0222***	0.0114***	0.0126***	0.00345**	0.00558***	0.0136***	0.0102***
	(1.04)	(2.63)	(0.57)	(1.45)	(6.13)	(5.41)	(5.61)	(5.78)	(2.50)	(3.54)	(3.79)	(2.62)
Post96	-0.0870**	-0.103**	-0.0808***	-0.0743**	0.0247	0.0316	-0.0285	-0.0112	-0.00332	0.00548	-0.0862	-0.111*
	(-2.19)	(-2.33)	(-2.93)	(-2.30)	(0.42)	(0.52)	(-0.61)	(-0.26)	(-0.09)	(0.15)	(-1.37)	(-1.84)
Male * Year	-0.00446**	-0.00193	-0.00281*	-0.00249	0.00130	0.00109	0.00183	0.000721	0.000162	0.0000538	-0.00103	0.0000812
	(-2.19)	(-0.95)	(-1.83)	(-1.42)	(0.75)	(0.65)	(0.97)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(-0.41)	(0.03)
Year * Post96		-0.0117**		-0.00966*		-0.00457		-0.00519		-0.00741**		0.0126
		(-2.21)		(-1.76)		(-0.63)		(-1.14)		(-2.55)		(1.52)
Constant	0.485***	0.740***	0.616***	0.764***	0.258**	0.315**	0.406***	0.439***	0.989***	1.089***	0.547***	0.408**
Observations	2488	2488	2491	2491	2482	2482	2498	2498	2501	2501	2423	2423
Mean	0.802	0.802	0.887	0.887	0.858	0.858	0.917	0.917	0.955	0.955	0.818	0.818
Within R-sq	0.0504	0.0542	0.0419	0.0426	0.0518	0.0518	0.0377	0.0385	0.0430	0.0437	0.0286	0.0293
Between R-sq	0.670	0.682	0.843	0.845	0.594	0.598	0.593	0.599	0.671	0.682	0.592	0.592
Overall R-sq	0.0622	0.0660	0.0632	0.0640	0.0665	0.0666	0.0490	0.0498	0.0498	0.0507	0.0426	0.0435

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2017. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 27: IV regression I: Other metrics of defence will Removed post-2017 cohorts

	Personal defence will								General defence will			
	Non-combat roles				Non-combat roles, NLT							
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	-0.380		-0.0954		-0.149		-0.104		0.493		0.407	
	(-1.13)		(-0.34)		(-0.73)		(-0.55)		(1.58)		(1.36)	
Male	0.265*	0.528***	0.144	0.546***	0.0392	0.527***	0.0209	0.545***	-0.180	0.527***	-0.143	0.545***
	(1.79)	(12.69)	(1.15)	(11.37)	(0.45)	(12.65)	(0.25)	(11.32)	(-1.34)	(12.69)	(-1.10)	(11.37)
Male * Post96		-0.194***		-0.159**		-0.193***		-0.158**		-0.193***		-0.158**
		(-2.77)		(-2.54)		(-2.74)		(-2.51)		(-2.76)		(-2.53)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00690				-0.00688				-0.00684
				(-1.26)				(-1.26)				(-1.26)
Other variables												
Year	0.00241	-0.000523	0.00694***	-0.000796	0.00149	-0.000324	0.00443	-0.000574	0.0211***	-0.000384	0.0223***	-0.000688
	(0.85)	(-0.21)	(2.72)	(-0.25)	(0.55)	(-0.13)	(1.45)	(-0.18)	(6.63)	(-0.16)	(6.12)	(-0.22)
Post96	-0.0901*	-0.00792	-0.0359	-0.0242	-0.0823***	-0.0103	-0.0639**	-0.0265	0.0293	-0.00943	0.0245	-0.0256
	(-1.71)	(-0.16)	(-0.76)	(-0.49)	(-2.75)	(-0.21)	(-2.08)	(-0.54)	(0.47)	(-0.19)	(0.41)	(-0.53)
Male * Year	-0.0103	-0.0152***	-0.00422	-0.0139***	-0.00508	-0.0153***	-0.00413	-0.0140***	0.00888	-0.0154***	0.00707	-0.0141***
	(-1.43)	(-5.30)	(-0.74)	(-4.22)	(-1.11)	(-5.32)	(-0.95)	(-4.23)	(1.27)	(-5.47)	(1.09)	(-4.35)
Year * Post96			-0.0184***	0.00199			-0.0108**	0.00191			-0.00363	0.00207
			(-3.89)	(0.47)			(-2.29)	(0.46)			(-0.62)	(0.49)
Constant	0.388***	-0.255***	0.695***	-0.236**	0.578***	-0.256***	0.735***	-0.236**	0.381***	-0.251***	0.415***	-0.234**
	(3.41)	(-2.92)	(6.18)	(-2.18)	(5.49)	(-2.94)	(6.13)	(-2.20)	(3.23)	(-2.88)	(3.19)	(-2.19)
Observations	2488	2488	2488	2488	2491	2491	2491	2491	2482	2482	2482	2482
Mean	0.802	0.305	0.802	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.887	0.305	0.858	0.305	0.858	0.305
F-statistics	7.50		3.99		7.64		4.07		8.27		4.38	

Notes: NLT: not life-threatening. Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2017. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 28: IV regression II: Other metrics of defence will Removed post-2017 cohorts

	Military capabilities				Civilian capabilities				Increased funds			
	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 1		Specification 2	
	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage	Second stage	First stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables of interest												
Military training	0.433		0.291		0.230		0.193		-0.134		-0.0184	
	(1.45)		(1.06)		(1.36)		(1.10)		(-0.36)		(-0.05)	
Male	-0.217*	0.529***	-0.156	0.546***	-0.140**	0.530***	-0.124*	0.546***	0.0807	0.535***	0.0300	0.552***
	(-1.70)	(12.80)	(-1.32)	(11.42)	(-1.98)	(12.80)	(-1.69)	(11.42)	(0.51)	(12.76)	(0.21)	(11.24)
Male * Post96		-0.200***		-0.169***		-0.201***		-0.171***		-0.200***		-0.170***
		(-2.88)		(-2.73)		(-2.90)		(-2.76)		(-2.85)		(-2.77)
Male * Year * Post96				-0.00623				-0.00609				-0.00622
				(-1.16)				(-1.14)				(-1.17)
Other variables												
Year	0.0114***	-0.000110	0.0126***	-0.000846	0.00350**	-0.000180	0.00568***	-0.000830	0.0135***	-0.000439	0.0104***	-0.000796
	(5.14)	(-0.05)	(5.78)	(-0.27)	(2.58)	(-0.08)	(3.87)	(-0.27)	(3.90)	(-0.17)	(2.82)	(-0.24)
Post96	-0.0240	-0.0102	-0.0371	-0.0268	-0.00119	-0.00928	0.00370	-0.0251	-0.0876	-0.0100	-0.0866	-0.0249
	(-0.46)	(-0.21)	(-0.71)	(-0.55)	(-0.03)	(-0.19)	(0.09)	(-0.51)	(-1.30)	(-0.20)	(-1.43)	(-0.53)
Male * Year	0.00839	-0.0151***	0.00539	-0.0139***	0.00363	-0.0151***	0.00287	-0.0139***	-0.00305	-0.0151***	-0.000631	-0.0139***
	(1.22)	(-5.32)	(0.86)	(-4.25)	(0.93)	(-5.31)	(0.72)	(-4.25)	(-0.39)	(-5.11)	(-0.09)	(-4.05)
Year * Post96			-0.00256	0.00352			-0.00729**	0.00319			0.00994	0.00220
			(-0.55)	(0.87)			(-2.55)	(0.78)			(1.39)	(0.50)
Constant	0.518***	-0.260***	0.526***	-0.267**	1.048***	-0.260***	1.142***	-0.263**	0.513***	-0.251***	0.398**	-0.242**
	(4.48)	(-3.01)	(3.71)	(-2.56)	(15.25)	(-3.01)	(13.01)	(-2.51)	(3.20)	(-2.89)	(2.06)	(-2.34)
Observations	2498	2498	2498	2498	2501	2501	2501	2501	2423	2423	2423	2423
Mean	0.917	0.305	0.917	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.955	0.305	0.818	0.305	0.818	0.305
F-statistics	8.40		4.44		8.12		4.26		7.45		3.96	

Notes: Defence will is understood as a binary attitude equal to one if positive in either of the metrics. Military training indicates military training of the individual, equal to one if true. Panel is based on the year when the individual turned 18 years old, centered on 1996 and spanning from 1970-2017. Standard errors clustered on cohort level. Z-values in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.