LEADING THE WALLET

HOW FEMALE HEADSHIP SHAPES HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL BEHAVIOUR ACROSS THE EUROZONE

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Abstract:

This thesis investigates the drivers of female financial headship and its impact on household portfolio allocation across asset classes and gender-based normative contexts. We develop a two-stage utility maximisation model in which households assign financial headship based on observable financial potential and forward-looking expectations of investment performance, subject to gender norms. Using microdata from the European Central Bank's (ECB) Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), we empirically test this framework and examine the impact of female headship on household financial investment decisions. First, we find that while female headship does not affect aggregate market participation or returns, it leads to distinct patterns across five core asset classes. Second, our results indicate that female headship is associated with lower financial literacy and reduced risk-taking. Finally, we show that financial behaviour and investment patterns systematically vary with a country's prevailing gender norms. These findings highlight the importance of gender equality and the broader normative context in shaping household financial decision-making.

Keywords:

Household finance, Gender equality, Household head, Investment decisions

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I. Introduction

Gender equality is a fundamental human right, explicitly recognised in Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: "Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas [...]" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2015). However, formal recognition of this right does not guarantee its realisation in practice. Gender equality remains uneven across sectors, with finance continuing to exhibit notable disparities (Forum, 2024; World Bank, 2015; Čihák & Sahay, 2018).

To this end, we examine an underexplored dimension of gender inequality: the intra-household assignment of financial decision-making authority, or "financial headship". Traditional economic models, such as Becker (1993), adopt a unitary approach in which a household is treated as a single decision-making entity, implicitly assuming that financial authority defaults to the spouse with the highest comparative advantage in market production. This assumption has had implications beyond economic theory: in the 20th century, male financial authority was institutionalised through numerous welfare regimes and social policies (Orloff, 1993). While this logic continues to support many models of pooled household decision-making, recent studies highlight that perceptions of financial competence are not solely economic but deeply cultural. For example, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) shows that norms are historically rooted in gendered labour divisions, such as plough agriculture, which continue to influence attitudes across generations and geographies. Building on this literature, we reconceptualise financial headship not as a passive outcome of economic advantage but as a forward-looking delegation decision shaped by observable traits, intra-household dynamics, and prevailing gender norms. This paper addresses two central questions: *First, what drives the likelihood that a woman is designated as the household's financial head? Second, how does female headship influence household portfolio choices across asset classes, and how do these effects vary across different gender-based normative contexts?* In doing so, we link micro-level delegation processes to macro-level patterns in household investment behaviour, offering new insights into how financial agency is shaped (and constrained) by gender norms.

We used household-level microdata from the European Central Bank's Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), covering four cross-sectional waves (2010, 2014, 2017, 2021) across 23 Eurozone countries. The HFCS provides harmonised data on household balance sheets and demographics, allowing cross-country comparability. The Eurozone offers a unique empirical setting: while unified by a common monetary system, its member states differ substantially in institutional structures and prevailing gender norms. To capture this normative heterogeneity, we classify countries as either *Egalitarian* or *Traditional* based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE).

We begin our analysis by developing a two-stage utility maximisation model to analyse how households assign financial decision-making authority. At time $t = 0$, households evaluate the expected financial potential of each spouse based on observable characteristics such as income, education, participation in the labour market, age and retirement status and weigh this against the disutility of deviating from the prevailing gender norms. Crucially, this model implies that this delegation is forward-looking. Households form expectations about the financial head's future portfolio decisions and returns at time $t = 1$. These expectations feed back into the headship decision, incorporating investment considerations into the initial delegation of authority. This is an extension of the framework developed by Guiso and Zaccaria (2023). However, our model introduces a tractable norm penalty that varies across countries based on structural indicators of gender equality, allowing us to empirically assess how norm salience affects the probability of female financial headship across institutional contexts. We test the predictions of the model by estimating the likelihood of female

leadership as a function of household characteristics, identifying the conditions under which women are more likely to assume financial leadership, both in aggregate and in differing normative contexts.

Next, we examine how female headship influences portfolio allocation across five core asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income, stocks, mutual funds, and deposits. We further disaggregate bond holdings (e.g., bank, corporate, and other) and mutual funds (e.g., equity, bond, real estate, hedge funds, and other) to capture granular differences in risk exposure and investment preferences. This multi-asset approach allows us to capture gendered differences across the full spectrum of household financial portfolios.

We thereafter assess financial outcomes by estimating both total and asset-class specific returns. To interpret these differences, we analyse risk tolerance and financial literacy among household heads, highlighting behavioural variables that may explain observed gendered patterns in portfolio allocation.

Finally, we look at how normative contexts influence these dynamics. Using the Gender Equality Index (GEI), we compare patterns in egalitarian and traditional countries to determine how institutionalised gender norms impact the relationship between female financial headship and household portfolio behaviour.

Our results show that the proportion of female financial heads in the Eurozone has declined modestly over the past decade, with the steepest decline appearing in traditional countries. This trend continues despite advances in factors such as female labour force participation and educational attainment, implying that structural progress has not yet translated into greater intra-household financial authority. The persistence of this gap indicates the importance of informal norms in constraining women's decision-making power within households.

We also find that female financial headship has no significant impact on aggregate financial market participation or portfolio total returns. However, a disaggregated analysis reveals systematic variation in portfolio composition and asset-level returns. Female-headed households are more likely to invest in mutual funds, particularly equity and other mutual funds, while holding fewer fixed income securities, such as corporate bonds. Additionally, female headship is associated with significantly higher returns on mutual fund investments, suggesting that female-headed households may outperform their male-headed counterparts in this asset class.

We subsequently find that female household heads in our sample report lower levels of financial literacy and exhibit greater risk aversion. Both of these variables influence investment behaviour, reinforcing the idea that gender differences in financial preferences and capabilities contribute to portfolio heterogeneity across households.

Finally, we find that these dynamics differ meaningfully across normative contexts. In egalitarian countries, financial potential plays a more decisive role in the assignment of household headship, and the probability of a woman being designated as the financial head is significantly higher. In contrast, in traditional countries, the impact of financial characteristics is muted, and the threshold for women to assume headship appears higher. We also find that portfolio allocation, investment returns, and financial behaviour vary systematically with a country's prevailing gender norms. This normative framework emphasises the significant role that the broader cultural and institutional environment plays in shaping intra-household financial roles and decisions.

One possible limitation of our findings is that the normative classifications derived from the Gender Equality Index (GEI) may not fully reflect cultural attitudes or unobservable aspects of gender norms. To address this, we perform a robustness check on an alternative, attitudinally based measure of gender norms derived from the European Values Study (EVS), which captures self-reported beliefs about gender roles. We find that the main drivers of female headship, market participation, and financial returns remain largely

robust. However, our findings on portfolio allocation differ, implying that investment decisions are more influenced by how gender norms are measured. This most likely reflects fundamental differences between the two measures: the EVS measures individual attitudes, whereas the GEI measures structural indicators of gender equality at the societal level.

This paper contributes to multiple strands of literature. First, we bridge two areas that are often examined in isolation: intra-household financial decision-making and gender differences in investment behaviour. We develop a conceptual framework in which financial headship is assigned through a forward-looking, utility-maximising delegation, based on each partner's financial potential and constrained by prevailing social norms. This approach moves beyond models that assume symmetric or pooled decision-making, offering a more dynamic view of how financial authority is allocated within households. Early work in household economics typically relied on unitary models, which assumed that couples shared financial authority to maximise joint utility and income (Becker, 1993; Dew, 2008; Kim, Gutter, & Spangler, 2017). More recent research challenges this view, showing that spouses often have divergent preferences and that financial responsibilities are frequently delegated to one partner (Bertocchi, Brunetti, & Torricelli, 2014; Kim et al., 2017). However, such delegation tends to follow traditional gender lines. For example, Meier, Kirchler, and Hubert (1999) finds that women are more likely to defer investment and savings decisions to male partners, while Skogrand, Johnson, Horrocks, and DeFrain (2015) reports that men are more inclined to take charge of household finances, often due to greater experience or confidence. Yet, these patterns are not uniform: Bertocchi et al. (2014) shows that women are more likely to assume financial headship when their income, education, or age matches or exceeds that of their partner. These insights are extended by collective household models, which incorporate preference heterogeneity and intra-household bargaining dynamics (Chiappori, 1992; Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997; McElroy & Horney, 1981). In parallel, a large body of literature on gender and financial behaviour shows that women tend to be more risk-averse, less confident in their financial knowledge, and less likely to invest in stock markets (Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, 1997; Barber & Odean, 2001; Bucher-Koenen, Janssen, Knebel, & Tzamourani, 2023; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008; Wagner & Walstad, 2023). However, much of this work focuses on individuals, overlooking how investment decisions are made within households. By contrast, we bridge these strands, and our contribution thereby becomes twofold: first, we reconceptualise financial headship as an endogenous outcome shaped by observable traits – such as income, education, and labour market participation – and constrained by prevailing gender norms; second, we explore how the gender of the designated financial head influences household investment decisions and asset-specific returns. In doing so, we demonstrate that gendered financial outcomes are shaped not only by individual characteristics and preferences but also by gender norms that govern who is empowered to act.

Second, we extend the empirical scope of household finance along two key dimensions: asset coverage and geographic scale. First, most existing studies focus narrowly on a single asset class, typically stocks or retirement accounts (Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, 1997; Barber & Odean, 2001; Itzkowitz, Itzkowitz, & Schwartz, 2023), with the notable exception of Guiso and Zaccaria (2023), who analyse five asset classes. Our study builds on this by not only covering five core asset categories, but also further disaggregating holdings within fixed income and mutual funds to capture greater heterogeneity in investment behaviour and risk exposure. Second, while many prior studies are based on a single country (Brown, Henchoz, & Spycher, 2017; Davoli, 2020; Fuchs-Schündeln, Masella, & Paule-Paludkiewicz, 2020), our analysis spans 23 Eurozone countries, enabling a broader investigation of normative variation. Third, while existing studies have examined the role of cultural determinants in household financial decision-making (Gupta & Blight, 2024;

Ke, 2018), we take a unique approach by classifying countries into traditional or egalitarian groups based on their Gender Equality Index (GEI) scores. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use this index as a proxy for gender norms, providing new evidence on systematic differences within the Eurozone.

Lastly, we advance the conceptual framework of intra-household financial delegation by extending the utility maximisation model proposed in Guiso and Zaccaria (2023). We extend it in four key ways. First, we define financial potential explicitly using observable household characteristics such as income, education, labour market participation, age, and retirement status, rather than treating ability as a latent construct. Second, we operationalise the gender norm penalty as a tractable, country-level classification based on structural indicators, rather than a latent community-specific variable. Third, we incorporate forward-looking expectations by explicitly linking headship decisions at time $t = 0$ to anticipated investment outcomes at time $t = 1$, thus formalising the role of expected portfolio returns in delegation. Finally, we formulate and solve a decision-making rule that determines under what conditions a female is chosen as the household head.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II. outlines the conceptual framework. Section III. presents the data. Section IV. details the empirical methodology and main results. Section V. provides a robustness check. Section VI. concludes the paper.

II. Conceptual Framework

We model household financial behaviour as a two-stage utility maximisation process spanning across two distinct time periods. At time $t = 0$, households assign financial headship by weighing each spouse's expected financial potential against prevailing gender norms. This decision is forward-looking: households form expectations about how each spouse would perform as a financial head, specifically in terms of portfolio allocation and returns at time $t = 1$. These expectations inform and feed back into the headship decision at $t = 0$. Our model builds on the work of Guiso and Zaccaria (2023), who frame headship as a trade-off between expected financial returns and conformity to gender norms. We retain this core structure but extend and refine it in *four* key ways. First, we explicitly define financial potential using a set of observable household characteristics, including income, education, age, retirement status, and participation in the labour market, rather than treating the ability as a latent construct. Second, we operationalise the term gender norm penalty as a tractable, cross-country classification, rather than a latent parameter. Third, we explicitly link financial headship to forward-looking expectations of portfolio returns. Lastly, we formulate a decision-making rule that determines under which conditions a female is selected as the household head.

To formalise these dynamics, we express household i's utility from assigning financial headship to either spouse as:

$$U_{i,G} = \underbrace{\alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,G}]}_{\text{Financial Potential}} - \underbrace{\beta_c (G - \bar{G}_c)^2}_{\text{Gender Norm Penalty}} + \varepsilon_{i,G} \tag{1}$$

The utility function $U_{i,G}$ represents the utility that household i derives from assigning financial headship, defined as the responsibility for making financial investment decisions on behalf of the household, to either the male or the female spouse. Specifically, $G = 1$ indicates that the spouse is female, and $G = 0$ indicates that the spouse is male.

The first term $\alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,G}]$ captures the financial potential (observable traits at $t = 0$) from delegating household headship to spouse G. We formally specify this as:

$$\mathbb{E}[F_{i,G}] = f\left(\text{Income}_{i,G} \uparrow, \text{Hours Worked}_{i,G} \uparrow, \text{Education}_{i,G} \uparrow, \text{Age}_{i,G} \downarrow, \text{Retired}_{i,G} \downarrow\right). \tag{2}$$

Here, $f(\cdot)$ maps observable individual characteristics into an overall assessment of financial potential. The arrows indicate the expected marginal effects of each variable on financial potential: $\uparrow$ denotes a positive association, and $\downarrow$ denotes a negative association. These variables are not chosen arbitrarily; rather, we identify them as central inputs into household delegation decisions. Existing literature supports this view, showing that financial potential tends to increase with income (Bucher-Koenen et al., 2023; West, Cull, & Johnson, 2021), labour market participation (Bertrand, Kamenica, & Pan, 2015), and educational attainment (Bertocchi et al., 2014; Niessen-Ruenzi & Zimmerer, 2024), while it declines with age (Finke & Huston, 2020; Gamble, Boyle, Yu, & Bennett, 2015) and retirement status (Balduzzi, Agnew, & Sundén, 2000; Sharma & Malpani, 2025).[1] By including these characteristics, we also capture two primary determinants of financial behaviour. Specifically, we proxy financial literacy through the education variable and approximate risk preferences using age and retirement status. We empirically test the explanatory power of these characteristics in predicting female financial headship in Table 5, as well as the impact of normative context in Table 13.

The second term $-\beta_z(G-\bar{G}_z)^2$ follows Guiso and Zaccaria (2023) and represents the disutility associated with deviating from prevailing gender norms. $\bar{G}_z \in \{0, \frac{1}{2}\}$ reflects the prevailing expectation that a woman is the financial head in community z. $\bar{G}_z = 0$ denotes a traditional context where male headship is expected, and $\bar{G}_z = \frac{1}{2}$ reflects a norm-neutral setting. The parameter β_z captures the intensity of norm conformity. While Guiso and Zaccaria (2023) models both $\bar{G}_z$ and β_z as latent, community-specific parameters, our empirical setting requires a more tractable implementation. We retain the quadratic structure of the norm penalty but adapt it by absorbing both the expected norm $\bar{G}_z$ and the strength of conformity β_z into a categorical country-level classification. Specifically, we classify Eurozone countries into traditional or egalitarian groups based on their scores on the Gender Equality Index (GEI), treating this categorical measure as a joint proxy for the level and bindingness of social norms.[2] Hence, we formally reinterpret $\bar{G}_z = 0$ as representing traditional contexts and $\bar{G}_z = \frac{1}{2}$ as corresponding to egalitarian contexts. This empirical change allows us to test how variation in norm environments impacts the relationship between financial potential and female headship, without requiring direct observation of norm adherence at the household level.

Lastly, we include a stochastic component $\varepsilon_{i,G} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ to allow for idiosyncratic household-level variation in headship preferences.

Since the investment task at $t = 1$ directly informs the headship assignment, we now specify how households form these forward-looking expectations of financial performance. In the model of Guiso and Zaccaria (2023), the household chooses between a safe asset (a bank deposit with return r) and a sophisticated asset (a stock with expected return R). The return on the sophisticated asset depends on the household head's financial ability, $X_{i,G}$, and an investment opportunity $\kappa \in [-1, 0]$ that arises at time $t = 1$. Financial ability, defined as $X_{i,G} = A_{i,G} + Z_{i,G}$, captures both observable skills $A_{i,G}$ and unobservable traits $Z_{i,G}$, which remain unknown to the econometrician but known within the household. To operationalise $X_{i,G}$ in our framework, we define the observable component $A_{i,G}$ in line with how we construct financial potential $F_{i,G}$, as specified in Eq. (2). In the model, Guiso and Zaccaria (2023) assumes that the sophisticated asset yields an average return of $R > r$ if $X_{i,G} + \kappa > 0$, and zero otherwise. That is, the sophisticated asset outperforms the safe asset only when the financial head possesses sufficiently strong financial skills and encounters a favourable investment opportunity. Consequently, the household invests in the risky asset only if $X_{i,G} + \kappa > 0$; otherwise,

[1] For further research, see Bertocchi et al. (2014); Zhang, Li, and Huang (2024) on labour engagement and income, and Cole, Paulson, and Shastry (2014); Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, and Claessens (2003) on the role of education.

[2] For a detailed explanation of the country classification procedure, please see Section III.

it defaults to saving in the risk-free bank deposit. In Table 12, we empirically test whether this conceptual framework holds by examining how financial ability, proxied by a financial literacy measure, influences household investments in stocks. Based on this, the expected return on financial investments at time $t = 1$ is given by:

$$Y_i = \Pr(X_{i,G} + \kappa > 0)(R - r) + r \tag{3}$$

To close the model's two-period structure, we now connect expected financial performance at $t = 1$ to the headship decision at $t = 0$. We substitute Eq. (3) into the financial potential term of the utility function, resulting in an updated utility expression:

$$U_{i,G} = \alpha \cdot [\Pr(X_{i,G} + \kappa > 0)(R - r) + r] - \beta_c (G - \bar{G}_c)^2 + \varepsilon_{i,G}. \tag{4}$$

This links forward-looking investment expectations directly to the headship decision while maintaining observability constraints. Therefore, household i chooses the financial head G_i^* who maximises total utility:

$$G_i^* = \arg\max_{G \in \{0,1\}} U_{i,G}. \tag{5}$$

That is, the household evaluates the expected financial potential of each partner relative to two opposing forces: (i) the utility gain from assigning financial headship to the partner with superior financial potential and (ii) the disutility associated with failing to conform to prevailing gender norms. Hence, this model allows us to illustrate the tension that arises when the woman has greater financial potential but traditional gender norms dominate. While assigning headship to her would increase financial efficiency, the utility loss from violating social norms may outweigh the gain. As a result, the household may select the male as the household head, reflecting how gender norms can lead to inefficient outcomes.

To formalise this trade-off, we derive the threshold condition under which the female spouse is selected as head. Let $\Delta F_i = \mathbb{E}[F_{i,1}] - \mathbb{E}[F_{i,0}]$ denote the difference in expected financial potential between the female and male spouse. As shown in A.1 in the Appendix, the household selects the woman as financial head if and only if:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z (1 - 2\bar{G}_z). \tag{6}$$

This expression shows how the required financial potential for female headship increases with the strength of gender norms β_z, and decreases with the household's emphasis on financial performance α. The final term $(1 - 2\bar{G}_z)$ captures how this threshold varies across normative environments.

In a *traditional* context, where the prevailing norm is male headship ($\bar{G}_z = 0$), this simplifies to:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z. \tag{7.1}$$

That is, the woman must possess a sufficiently large financial advantage, greater than the norm penalty scaled by $\frac{1}{\alpha}$, to overcome the disutility of violating prevailing gender norms. Even competent women may thus be passed over for headship when traditional norms are strongly binding.
In contrast, in an *egalitarian* context where no gender is favoured ($\bar{G}_z = \frac{1}{2}$), the condition simplifies to:

$$\Delta F_i > 0. \tag{7.2}$$

Here, any marginal advantage in financial potential suffices to warrant female headship. The household decision is efficiency-driven and unconstrained by normative penalties.

Together, these results highlight how gender norms constrain otherwise meritocratic delegation: in norm-constrained societies, women face a higher barrier to headship even when financially more competent, while in norm-neutral settings, households more readily assign headship based on ability alone. We empirically test this decision-making rule in Table 13 to examine how normative contexts influence the likelihood of the household head being female in our sample.
To see our full mathematical derivation and solution to the utility maximisation equation, please refer to subsection A.1 in the Appendix.

III. Data Sources and Description

A. Data Sources

Our primary data source is the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), a cross-national dataset coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB) in collaboration with national central banks and statistical institutes. The HFCS provides detailed household-level information on balance sheets, income, consumption, private pensions, employment, and demographics, enabling a comprehensive micro-level analysis of household financial behaviour across Eurozone countries. The HFCS is administered in a decentralised manner, with each country's national central bank or statistical office responsible for conducting fieldwork while the ECB oversees coordination, data pooling, and quality control. Given the substantial cultural and institutional differences across Eurozone countries, the ECB acknowledges the need for some flexibility in question formulation to ensure the collection of comparable data. While participating central banks and institutes produce harmonised survey data for their respective countries, they are not required to use identical questionnaires. Instead, a common template serves as a guiding framework for both designing country-specific surveys and defining the intended output. Despite possible variations in the questionnaire design, participating institutions are mandated to report a standardised set of core output variables. This standardisation is crucial to ensuring cross-country comparability of the data.

The HFCS questionnaire comprises two main sections. The first focuses on the household as a unit and collects information on real and financial assets, liabilities and credit constraints, as well as consumption and saving behaviours. The second section focuses on individual household members, providing demographic information for each member, along with questions on topics such as employment, income, pensions, and other related areas. Crucial to our study, the survey contains standardised questions[3] to identify the respondent most knowledgeable about the household's finances – referred to as the "financially knowledgeable person" (FKP)[4] – who is tasked with answering the household-level questions. As such, all questions related to the household as a whole (e.g., participation in financial markets and investments in financial assets) are directed to the FKP, while questions concerning personal matters (e.g., income) are addressed to each individual household member. Consistent with Guiso and Zaccaria (2023), we refer to the FKP as the household head. Therefore, the terms FKP and household head are used interchangeably throughout this

[3] Depending on earlier responses, households are asked either, *"Among the people who own or rent this home, who is the most knowledgeable about the household's finances?"* or *"I need to speak with the person who is most knowledgeable about the finances of this household. This may be someone who owns or rents the home. Who would that be?"*

[4] The survey defines the financially knowledgeable person (FKP) as the individual best suited to provide information regarding the household's finances. The FKP may either be a member of the household or an external individual.

paper.

To construct our sample dataset, we utilise all available survey waves for which data access was granted, specifically the 2010, 2014, 2017, and 2021 waves. Fieldwork for the first three waves was conducted during 2010–2011, 2013–2015, and 2017, respectively. The 2021 wave, originally scheduled for 2020, experienced delays and partial disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, fieldwork was conducted at different times across countries between early 2020 and mid-2022, raising some comparability concerns given the varying economic conditions during the pandemic. We further restrict our sample to households composed of heterosexual couples in either legally married or consensual union (cohabitating) arrangements. Additionally, we retain only households where the financially knowledgeable person (FKP) is one of the two spouses, excluding cases in which the FKP is an external individual (e.g., a private wealth manager). Finally, our constructed sample contains one observation per household, including demographic characteristics of the FKP and household-level responses to core financial questions.

This processing results in a filtered dataset comprising over 135,000 households across all four waves, which we use to examine the relationship between the gender of the household head and financial behaviour. Table 1 presents a summary of the number of households per wave included in our filtered sample.

Table 1: Number of Households Per Wave Sample.
This table reports the number of households retained in the cleaned sample, resulting in a total of 135,283 households across four HFCS waves.

Wave	Number of Households
2010	24 453
2014	35 898
2017	39 107
2021	35 825
$\sum$	135 283

Secondly, we draw on publicly available data from the Gender Equality Index (GEI), developed and published by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) [5]. The Index provides a score between 1 and 100 to both the EU and its member states, with a score of 100 indicating full gender equality. It is based on six core domains – Work, Money, Knowledge, Time, Power, and Health – captured through 31 underlying indicators. For instance, the domain "Work" includes five indicators that measure various aspects of labour market participation, occupational segregation, and the quality of employment. Data collection for the GEI began in 2010 and was first published in 2013. Initially, the index was published biennially until 2019, after which it has been released on an annual basis. The GEI enables us to track progress toward gender equality across Eurozone countries over time and serves as a proxy for prevailing gender norms. The Index enables us to distinguish between two primary normative contexts: egalitarian and traditional. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first application of the GEI as a measure of country-level gender norms in the context of household finance, allowing us to provide novel evidence on gendered differences in financial decision-making. Consistent with prior literature (Ke, 2018), we later employ an alternative proxy based on responses to the European Values Survey (EVS), as presented in Section V., to conduct a robustness check for our findings.

[5] For more information, see https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2024.

To classify all 23 Eurozone countries[6] into both normative groups, we begin by calculating each country's average GEI score across all available years, along with the overall mean score for the full country set. Countries with an average GEI score exceeding the overall mean are classified as egalitarian. This category comprises Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Slovenia. Conversely, countries with average scores below the overall mean are classified as traditional, including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia. Table 2 presents an overview of each country's classification into either group, along with the corresponding country code, which will be used interchangeably with the country name throughout this paper. For detailed information on each country's GEI, refer to Fig. B.1(a) in the Appendix, which maps average scores by country across the observed period.

Table 2: Countries in the Eurozone by Gender Norms.
This table lists the Eurozone countries included in the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), along with their corresponding ISO codes, which are used throughout the paper for reference. Countries are categorised as either traditional or egalitarian based on their scores in the Gender Equality Index (GEI), developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Countries with an average GEI score below the full-sample mean are classified as traditional, while those scoring above the mean are classified as egalitarian.

Traditional		Egalitarian	
ISO Code	Country	ISO Code	Country
CY	Cyprus	AT	Austria
CZ	Czech Republic	BE	Belgium
EE	Estonia	DE	Germany
GR	Greece	ES	Spain
HR	Croatia	FI	Finland
HU	Hungary	FR	France
IT	Italy	IE	Ireland
LT	Lithuania	LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia	NL	Netherlands
MT	Malta	SI	Slovenia
PL	Poland		
PT	Portugal		
SK	Slovakia		

B. Descriptive Statistics

As highlighted in the introduction, the share of female heads in couple households across the Eurozone has experienced a slight decline over time, decreasing from 36.4% in 2010 to 34.3% in 2021. To further examine this trend, we analyse temporal variations in female headship across countries classified as either traditional or egalitarian. In Fig. 1(a), we investigate how the proportion of female household heads has evolved over time in both normative groups, in contrast to the development of the GEI scores. At first glance, it is evident


[6] The Eurozone, also known as the euro area, is a currency union comprising 20 European Union (EU) member states that have adopted the euro (€) as their primary currency. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. In addition, three non-euro EU countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – are included in the ECB's HFCS. Although they have not adopted the euro as their primary currency, we follow the ECB's approach and include them in our analysis as part of the euro area.

that although gender equality has steadily improved in both groups between 2013 and 2024, the share of female-headed households has remained largely stagnant in egalitarian countries, whereas it has declined in traditional countries over the period 2010–2021. This difference is notable: while gender equality has improved structurally, female headship has not kept pace.

Given the progress in structural gender equality, one would intuitively expect a corresponding rise in female headship. Yet, the data do not support this assumption. This observation suggests that the GEI effectively captures structural and institutional aspects of gender equality. However, it may fail to reflect more latent attitudinal factors, such as implicit gender biases that influence the attribution of headship roles. For instance, persistent societal norms that portray women as less capable of economic success than men may have contributed to the stagnation and decline in female headship despite institutional progress (Staveren, 2001).

Specifically, in egalitarian countries, such gender bias appears less pronounced: the share of female heads increased from 38.2% in 2010 to a peak of 39.2% in 2017, followed by a modest decline thereafter. In contrast, traditional countries exhibit a more substantial and growing gender gap in headship. Here, female headship peaked at 36.3% in 2014 but fell sharply to 29.0% by 2021. This divergence signals a growing polarisation: egalitarian countries demonstrate normative resilience to gender bias, while traditional countries may be experiencing a reinforcement of gender norms. As such, the overall decline in female headship across the Eurozone appears to be largely driven by the pronounced post-2014 decrease observed in traditional countries.

In order to further investigate female headship across Eurozone countries in greater detail, we examine the share of female household heads at the country level using data from the fourth and most recent wave (2021). As shown in Fig. 1(b), and consistent with our findings in Fig. 1(a), egalitarian countries tend to exhibit a higher prevalence of female headship compared to traditional countries. Specifically, the median share of female household heads in egalitarian countries is 39.6%, while the median in traditional countries is 4.7 percentage points lower. Notably, two countries from each normative group report a female headship rate exceeding 50%: Greece and Latvia among traditional countries, and Austria and Slovenia among egalitarian countries. In contrast to the egalitarian group, the traditional group includes two countries, Portugal and the Czech Republic, with exceptionally low rates of female headship, reporting just 10.5% and 4.8%, respectively. These wide within-group and between-group disparities are consistent with the heterogeneous nature of gender norms and point toward the continued influence of institutional and cultural barriers to female financial headship (Staveren, 2001).



(a) **(b)**

Figure 1: Female Headship Trends Across Normative Groups.
This figure illustrates the share of households in which the financial head is female. Panel (a) displays trends in female household headship from 2010 to 2021 across four HFCS waves, alongside changes in Gender Equality Index (GEI) scores from 2013 to 2024. Solid lines represent female headship rates, while dashed lines depict GEI scores over time. Both indicators are shown separately for countries categorised as egalitarian (grey) or traditional (red), according to our classification derived from data provided by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Panel (b) displays the cross-country distribution of female headship in 2021, grouped by normative category. Vertical dashed lines indicate the median female headship rate within each group.

To better understand the characteristics of female headship and how they diverge from those of male counterparts, Fig. 2 compares the characteristics of household heads by gender and normative context. Figure 2(a) shows that female household heads are consistently younger than male heads in both traditional and egalitarian countries, though this age gap has narrowed slightly over time. Turning to education, Fig. 2(b) reveals a striking pattern: in traditional countries, female heads tend to be more educated than male heads, while the opposite holds in egalitarian countries. Nonetheless, educational attainment is higher for both genders in egalitarian countries. For instance, the average education score among female heads in egalitarian countries rose from 3.3 in 2010 to 3.7 in 2021, compared to a more modest increase from 2.7 to 3.4 among female heads in traditional countries. Income disparities are similarly evident, as shown in Fig. 2(c). Among all groups, male heads in egalitarian countries report the highest average incomes, followed by female heads in the same normative context. In traditional countries, male heads also earn more than female heads, yet both genders lag behind their egalitarian peers. Finally, Fig. 2(d) illustrates employment rates, which show notable divergence across gender and country groups. In 2010, male heads in traditional countries recorded the highest employment rate (57%), though this subsequently declined. Female heads in traditional countries, on the other hand, consistently had the lowest employment rates, despite a sharp rise post-2014, coinciding with the noticeable decline in the share of female heads as shown in Fig. 1(a). Interestingly, from 2014 onwards, female heads in egalitarian countries surpassed both male groups in employment, reaching nearly 58% by 2021.

With respect to differences in female headship across normative contexts, the panels indicate that female heads in egalitarian countries tend to be slightly older, more educated, better paid, and more likely to be employed than their counterparts in traditional settings. The gaps observed across Fig. 2(a)-(d) remain rela-

tively stable over time, indicating persistent structural differences in female headship across these contexts. Such an observation necessitates further exploration of the differences between these two normative settings.




Figure 2: Headship Characteristics by Gender and Normative Groups Over Time.
This figure illustrates trends in household headship characteristics across the four HFCS waves. Countries are classified as either egalitarian or traditional based on their historical performance on the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) Gender Equality Index (GEI). Panel (a) shows the average age of the household head. Panel (b) presents average educational attainment, measured on a scale from 1 (no formal education) to 5 (tertiary education completed). Panel (c) displays average annual income from wages and self-employment, expressed in €. Panel (d) illustrates the share of household heads who are currently employed. Solid lines represent female financial heads, and dashed lines represent male financial heads. Grey lines correspond to egalitarian countries, while red lines correspond to traditional countries. Trends are based on population-weighted means within each subgroup.

Next, we examine household characteristics. Table 3 provides descriptive household statistics for the full sample. It also reports the mean values of the same variables for the two sub-samples – male-headed and female-headed households – along with the corresponding t-statistics of the difference between means across groups. The same comparisons are provided for traditional and egalitarian countries.

We begin by presenting family demographic characteristics. The median household consists of two adults – the spouses – and no children. Some households include additional adults, such as grandparents, as well as children, reflected in an average of 2.12 adults and 0.72 children per household. We next assess the characteristics of household heads. The average age is approximately 56 years, with 34% of household heads retired. The average education level is 3.41 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to no or primary education, 2 to lower secondary, 3 to upper secondary, 4 to post-secondary non-tertiary, and 5 to tertiary education. Home ownership is prevalent, with 79% of household heads owning their residence. Household

heads, on average, earn €21,830 annually from both wage employment and self-employment income. Some household heads report negative income, reflecting losses in self-employment. The average number of hours worked by household heads in the sample is 20.40 hours per week. Lastly, we present measures of comparative advantage, proxied by Female-to-Male ratios in characteristics such as age, education, income, and hours worked. These ratios explicitly capture gender-based differences in these attributes. For example, we show that, on average, female household heads are younger than their male counterparts, have the same educational attainment, earn significantly less income, and work slightly fewer hours. These patterns are further confirmed when examining the mean values of the variables across genders.

When comparing households in traditional and egalitarian countries, demographic characteristics vary meaningfully. On average, traditional countries have more adults per household but slightly fewer children. The age of the household heads is not considerably different between the two groups, nor is the likelihood of home ownership or retirement status. However, there are notable differences in education, income, and hours worked: household heads in egalitarian countries tend to have higher educational attainment and earn substantially more income while working fewer hours. Furthermore, we observe slight differences in gender-based comparative advantage measures across the two normative groups. Specifically, the age gap between female and male household heads is narrower in traditional settings compared to egalitarian ones. Additionally, female heads are better educated than male heads in traditional settings, whereas the reverse is true in egalitarian settings. Interestingly, the gender gap in income and hours worked is somewhat unexpectedly wider in egalitarian settings than in traditional ones.

Table 3: Household Characteristics.
This table presents summary statistics for heterosexual two-spouse households that are either married or cohabiting. We first report family demographics, which reflect characteristics at the household level. These are followed by household head-specific demographics, where the household head is defined as the financially knowledgeable person (FKP). In addition, we provide measures of comparative advantage, proxied by Female-to-Male ratios for age, education, income, and hours worked. Statistics are reported for the full sample, by gender of the household head (FKP), and across normative contexts, distinguishing between households in traditional and egalitarian countries.

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	By Gender			By Normative Context			Obs
					μ: Male	μ: Female	Δt-stat.	μ: Trad	μ: Egal	Δt-stat.	
Family demographics											
Number of Adults	2.12	2.00	0.00	9.00	2.12	2.12	-0.56	2.21	2.06	47.18	135,283
Number of Children	0.72	0.00	0.00	13.00	0.68	0.78	-16.13	0.71	0.73	-2.46	135,283
Head (FKP) demographics											
Age	56.00	56.00	16.00	85.00	57.85	52.75	64.02	55.91	56.02	-1.31	135,283
Retired (Proportion)	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.39	0.24	59.12	0.33	0.34	-3.23	135,283
Education Level	3.41	3.00	1.00	5.00	3.41	3.42	-0.97	3.12	3.63	-67.78	135,283
Home Ownership (Proportion)	0.79	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.80	0.77	11.20	0.79	0.79	0.03	135,283
Income ('000 EUR)	21.83	8.00	-410.00	6,200.00	25.50	15.37	33.68	12.83	28.01	-51.89	135,283
Hours Worked	20.40	20.00	0.00	126.00	21.52	18.43	-27.09	21.44	19.65	15.37	135,283
Comparative advantage measures											
Age FtM Ratio	0.91	0.90	0.19	4.72				0.93	0.91	1.25	135,283
Education FtM Ratio	1.00	1.00	0.20	5.00				1.02	0.96	1.83	135,283
Income FtM Ratio	0.64	0.75	-0.01	1,127.38				0.78	0.66	1.13	135,283
Hours Worked FtM Ratio	0.86	0.95	0.00	12.60				0.90	0.82	2.44	135,283

Note: Blank cells indicate that a value cannot be computed, as gender differences are already explicitly captured in the ratios.

To examine potential gender differences in household financial behaviour, we analyse whether male and female household heads differ in their engagement with financial markets. To quantify such engagement, we construct three key indicators that capture both the extent of financial market participation and the performance of financial investments. We classify household financial holdings into five core asset categories:

(1) government bonds, (2) other fixed income instruments (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), (3) publicly traded stocks, (4) mutual funds, and (5) bank deposits. Let i index households and $j \in \{1,2,3,4,5\}$ index these asset types. Let A_{ij} denote the value of asset type j held by household i, and let I_i represent the aggregate financial income, as the HFCS does not report income at the asset-class level. Based on this notation, we define the following three variables:

$AssetParticipation_i$ is a binary indicator equal to 1 if household i holds a positive amount in any of the five asset categories (i.e., $\sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij} > 0$), and 0 otherwise. This measure captures whether the household participates in any financial asset markets.

$$AssetParticipation_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{8}$$

$AssetCount_i$ counts the number of distinct asset types in which household i has positive holdings. The indicator function $\mathbf{1}(A_{ij} > 0)$ equals 1 if household i holds a positive amount in asset type j, and 0 otherwise. This variable reflects the household's portfolio breadth across asset classes.

$$AssetCount_i = \sum_{j=1}^{5} \mathbf{1}(A_{ij} > 0) \tag{9}$$

$FIAR_i$ (Financial Income-to-Assets Ratio) is a return-like measure defined as the ratio of total financial income I_i to the total value of financial assets held across the five asset classes. It is only defined for households with positive asset holdings and serves as a proxy for the average return on financial investments.

$$FIAR_i = \begin{cases} \frac{I_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij}} & \text{if } \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij} > 0 \\ \text{missing} & \text{if } \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij} = 0 \end{cases} \tag{10}$$

Table 4 presents summary statistics for our constructed measures of financial market participation, along with the associated returns (expressed in percentage points). A substantial proportion of households in our sample hold at least one financial asset (79%), indicating widespread engagement with financial markets. The median household holds only a single financial asset class, while some households hold multiple asset classes, as indicated by the average of 1.12. Regarding participation in the five core asset classes, households in our sample primarily invest in deposits (71%), with relatively lower participation in stocks (18%) and mutual funds (19%). Investment in government bonds (2%) and other fixed income securities (2%) is minimal, with only very few households participating in these asset classes. Financial returns average 3.36%, reflecting the dominant preference for low-risk bank deposits.

Table 4: Household Participation in Financial Markets.
The table reports summary statistics for heterosexual two-spouse households' participation in financial markets. The upper panel reports the share of households investing in any financial asset, followed by the proportion holding each of the five core asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income products, stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. The lower panel presents descriptive statistics for the number of financial asset classes held by each household, as well as the ratio of financial income to the market value of financial assets, which serves as a proxy for financial return.

	Mean	p25	Median	p75	StDev	Obs
Participation						
Any Fin Asset Class	0.79	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.41	135,283
Gov Bonds	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	135,283
Other Fixed Income	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	135,283
Stocks	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	135,283
Mutual Funds	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.39	135,283
Deposits	0.71	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.45	135,283
# Fin Asset Classes	1.12	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.84	135,283
Fin Income / Fin Assets (%)	3.36	0.00	0.42	1.78	11.96	135,283

IV. Methodology and Results

A. Drivers of Female Household Headship

We begin by addressing our first research question, focusing on what drives female financial headship. We construct a linear specification for the probability that a woman is the head (FKP) of the household:

$$FemaleHead_{i,c,t} = \alpha + \gamma F_{i,c,t} + \delta H_{i,c,t} + \theta FtM_{i,c,t} + \lambda_c + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t}, \tag{11}$$

where $FemaleHead_{i,c,t}$ is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head in household i, country c, and wave t is female, and 0 otherwise. We control for household characteristics through three main vectors. First, $F_{i,c,t}$ captures family demographics, such as the number of adults and children in the household. Second, $H_{i,c,t}$ includes attributes of the household head, such as age, retirement status, education level, home ownership, and income. Third, $FtM_{i,c,t}$ represents measures of gender-based comparative advantages, including hours worked by men and women. We include country fixed effects (λ_c) as well as time fixed effects for the respective waves (τ_t) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over time. Furthermore, we use education level as a proxy for financial literacy, and age, together with retirement status, as a proxy for risk preferences.

Table 5: Drivers of Female Household Headship.
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression specified in Eq. (11) where the dependent variable, $FemaleHead_{i,c,t}$, is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Column (1) presents the baseline specification, which includes three vectors of household characteristics: $F_{i,c,t}$, capturing family demographics (number of adults and children); $H_{i,c,t}$, reflecting head-specific attributes (home ownership and income); and $FtM_{i,c,t}$, measuring gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). In Columns (2) and (3), we sequentially introduce proxies for financial literacy, using education, and risk preferences, using age and retirement status. Column (4) presents the full model, incorporating all variables contained in the three specified vectors. Country (λ_c) and wave (τ_t) fixed effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Subscripts i, c, and t denote household, country, and wave, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
# Adults	0.007**	0.004	-0.003	-0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# Children	0.034***	0.035***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	-0.033***	-0.028***	0.012***	0.015***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Log Income	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.017***	-0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Hours Worked F	0.016***	0.016***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education		-0.015***		-0.011***
		(0.005)		(0.004)
Age			-0.003***	-0.003***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired			-0.323***	-0.319***
			(0.056)	(0.056)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.504	0.505	0.560	0.560

As shown in column (2) of Table 5, when we control for financial literacy using education level as a proxy, we find that higher educational attainment is associated with a lower probability of the household head being female. This result is unexpected, as it contrasts with our conceptual framework, which posited that higher education enhances financial potential and, consequently, increases the likelihood of being selected as the household's financial head. In column (3), we include proxies for risk preferences, age and retirement status, and observe a similarly negative relationship: both higher age and being retired are associated with a lower probability of female financial headship. This finding, however, is consistent with our framework, which suggested that older age and retirement may reduce financial potential, possibly through their influence on risk tolerance. Our full model in column (4) confirms the robustness of these findings, with several household and individual characteristics found to be statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of female headship. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that traditional family structures often preclude women from formal headship roles, both the number of adults and children in the household are negatively associated with female headship (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2025). Specifically, each additional child is associated with a 0.7 percentage point decrease in the probability that a woman is

designated as the head of household, while each additional adult decreases the probability by 0.5 percentage points. Turning to individual-level attributes, income, education, age, and retirement status are all negatively and highly significantly correlated with female headship. The probability that a woman is the head of the household decreases by 0.3 percentage points for each additional year of age. Retirement is associated with a 32 percentage point lower probability of female headship, suggesting a strong association between life-cycle status and intra-household decision structures. Furthermore, both higher education and income levels are associated with a reduced probability of female headship. These results are surprising, as they contradict our earlier framework, which suggested that higher education and income would increase the likelihood of being selected as the household financial head. In contrast, home ownership and hours worked by women are, as expected and consistent with our framework, positively associated with female headship, indicating that economic contribution and asset ownership strengthen women's standing within the household structure. We seek to understand plausible reasons why higher education and income do not translate into household financial decision-making among women. Prior research (Barber & Odean, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2015; Ke, 2018; Kim et al., 2017) indicates that gender norms and confidence gaps between men and women often reinforce male authority in financial matters. These patterns highlight that economic capacity alone is insufficient to shift intra-household power structures, as social norms and behavioural considerations continue to shape who is perceived as the "natural" financial decision-maker, which we recognise and empirically test for in Table 13.

B. Effects of Female Household Headship on Financial Investments and Behaviour

We now investigate whether the gender of the household head influences household financial decisions, including investment choices and financial behaviour. To perform this analysis within a multivariate regression framework, we estimate the following model:

$$Y_{i,c,t} = \alpha + \beta FemaleHead_{i,c,t} + \gamma F_{i,c,t} + \delta H_{i,c,t} + \theta FtM_{i,c,t} + \lambda_c + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t}. \tag{12}$$

Let $Y_{i,c,t}$ represent the various dependent variables related to financial investments and behaviour that we seek to investigate. The binary variable $FemaleHead_{i,c,t}$ is set to 1 if the household head in household i, country c, and wave t is female, and 0 otherwise. We control for household characteristics using three main vectors, consistent with those presented in Eq. (11). Country fixed effects (λ_c) and time fixed effects (τ_t) are included to account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over time.

First, we examine the effect of female headship on financial market participation. Table 6 presents the results from a linear probability model where the outcome variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holding investments in any of the five core asset classes. That is, the dependent variable is $AssetParticipation_i$, as defined previously in Eq. (8). Our results indicate that the gender of the household head has no significant effect on financial market participation. In the full sample, as shown in column (1), the coefficient is -0.004 and statistically insignificant, indicating no meaningful relationship between female headship and the probability of participating in financial markets. The result holds in column (2), where restricting the sample to households with heads under 65 yields a slightly positive but still insignificant coefficient of 0.007. This indicates that the findings are not driven by age-related participation patterns and helps mitigate concerns that the hump-shaped investment profile around retirement distorts the relationship between headship and financial market participation (Fagereng, Gottlieb, & Guiso, 2017).

Table 6: Female Headship and Financial Market Participation.
This table shows the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holdings in at least one of the 5 core financial asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. In column (1), we use the full sample, while in column (2), we restrict the sample to households where the head is younger than 65. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement status, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.1 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)
Female Head	-0.004	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	97,407
Adj. R^2	0.552	0.568

To evaluate whether the gender of the household head influences investment behaviour across specific asset classes, rather than only at an aggregate level, we analyse allocation patterns in Table 7. We estimate several linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holding investments in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income assets (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) presents the coefficient estimates from a regression analysing the number of different asset classes held by the household. In other words, the dependent variable is $AssetCount_i$, as defined in Eq. (9).

The impact of female headship on participation in the five asset classes shows mixed results. Female headship does not have a statistically significant impact on investment allocation in government bonds, the stock market, or bank deposits. However, we observe significant differences between male and female household heads in their participation in other fixed income securities, mutual funds, and the overall number of asset classes owned. Specifically, our results indicate that female headship reduces the likelihood of investing in other fixed income securities by 0.5 percentage points (significant at 1%), which contrasts slightly with prior literature suggesting women tend to prefer safer assets such as fixed income instruments (Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, 1997; Oskarsson, 2023).[7] Conversely, female headship increases the probability of investing in mutual funds by 1.7 percentage points (significant at 1%), with some literature supporting this finding (Oskarsson, 2023).[8] Concerning the total number of asset classes held by the household, our results suggest that female-headed households are less likely to diversify their investments across multiple asset classes. However, this effect is only marginally significant.

Interestingly, these results suggest that female headship does not have a clear or consistent influence on household participation in individual asset classes. Contrary to our findings, Gu, Peng, and Zhang (2024)

[7] Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1997) find that women are significantly more likely than men to allocate pension contributions to fixed income options – such as government bonds and guaranteed interest funds – and less likely to invest in riskier assets like employer stock. Furthermore, Oskarsson (2023) find that, based on Swedbank's Risk Index (2023), women exhibit a 6% lower stock exposure in their financial savings and a higher allocation to bonds (and bond funds).

[8] Oskarsson (2023) report that women tend to invest more heavily in funds relative to men. For example, at Avanza, women allocate only 14% of their pension savings to stocks compared to 26% among men, instead favouring mutual funds.

show that wife-headed households are significantly less likely to participate in the stock market and to hold risky assets, suggesting that female headship does have a clear and systematic influence on risky portfolio choices. We will later examine how female headship affects risky asset holdings and stock market participation in our sample. For now, however, we turn to the two asset classes where female headship has a statistically significant effect: other fixed income and mutual funds.

Table 7: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in the Five Core Financial Asset Classes.
This table presents the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holdings in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) shows coefficient estimates from a regression of the number of different asset classes held by the household. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.2 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits	(6) # Assets
Female Head	-0.002	-0.005***	0.013	0.017***	0.002	-0.030*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.017)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.059	0.053	0.143	0.144	0.883	0.382

To gain a deeper understanding of the impact of female headship on investment allocation in other fixed income and mutual funds, we now proceed with a more detailed analysis by further disaggregating these asset classes. First, we estimate a set of regressions analogous to the previous analysis, but this time the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holding bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries (column (1)), non-financial corporations (column (2)), or other types of bonds (column (3)). Our findings in Table 8 Panel A show that female headship is statistically significantly associated with reduced participation in bonds issued by non-financial corporations and other types of bonds. However, the latter effect is economically negligible, as the estimated coefficient is close to zero. We find no statistically significant association between female headship and the probability of holding bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries.

Secondly, we investigate the relationship between female headship and household participation in different categories of mutual funds, as presented in Table 8 Panel B. We estimate a series of regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holding equity mutual funds (column (1)), bond mutual funds (column (2)), money market mutual funds (column (3)), real estate mutual funds (column (4)), hedge funds (column (5)), and other types of mutual funds (column (6)). The results indicate that female headship is statistically significantly associated with participation in equity mutual funds and other mutual funds. Specifically, female-headed households are 1.6 percentage points more likely to invest in equity mutual funds, while the likelihood of holding other mutual funds is reduced by 1 percentage point. However, we find no significant effects of female headship on participation in bond mutual funds, money market mutual funds, real estate mutual funds, or hedge funds.

Table 8: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Other Fixed Income and Mutual Funds.
Panel A presents the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries (column (1)), non-financial corporations (column (2)), or other types of bonds (column (3)). Panel B shows coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in equity mutual funds (column (1)), bond mutual funds (column (2)), money market mutual funds (column (3)), real estate mutual funds (column (4)), hedge funds (column (5)), or other mutual funds (column (6)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results on other fixed income and mutual fund allocations, including all covariates, see Table B.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Panel A: Other Fixed Income

	(1) Banks	(2) Corporate	(3) Other
Female Head	-0.002	-0.002**	-0.000*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.030	0.012	0.002

Panel B: Mutual Funds

	(1) Equity	(2) Bonds	(3) Money M	(4) Real E	(5) Hedge F	(6) Other
Female Head	0.016***	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	-0.010**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.080	0.048	0.011	0.025	0.006	0.059

We now turn to testing whether there are differences between female and male household heads in generating financial returns from the household's investment portfolio. To do so, we use the Financial Income-to-Assets Ratio ($FIAR_i$, as defined in Eq. (10)) as the dependent variable in a linear regression to proxy the average return on household financial assets. The controls are the same as those used in previous analyses. Our results in Table 9 indicate that female headship does not have a statistically significant effect on financial returns relative to male-headed households. This finding is particularly noteworthy given that, as shown in Table 7, female-headed households tend to hold fewer financial assets overall and exhibit slightly different portfolio allocations. Nevertheless, these differences in asset holdings and allocation do not appear to translate into significantly different portfolio-level returns.

Table 9: Female Headship and Financial Returns.
This table reports coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is the household investment portfolio's financial return, measured as the ratio of financial income to the market value of financial assets. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.4 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)
Female Head	-0.046
	(0.041)
Controls	Yes
Wave FE	Yes
Country FE	Yes
Observations	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.090

As we previously established that female headship does not affect financial market participation at the aggregate level but does have a significant impact within specific asset classes, we now investigate whether a similar pattern holds for financial returns. In other words, we examine whether female headship influences returns in certain asset classes, despite no significant aggregate effect. As the HFCS reports financial income only in aggregate, we construct a proxy for asset-class specific returns by weighting each asset class by its share in the total portfolio and multiplying by the aggregate Financial Income-to-Assets Ratio ($FIAR_i$, as defined in Eq. (10)). Formally, this is defined as:

$$r_{i,j} = \left(\frac{A_{i,j}}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right) \times \left(\frac{I_i}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right) \tag{13}$$

where $r_{i,j}$ denotes the asset-specific financial return for household i on asset j, $A_{i,j}$ is the market value of household i's holdings in asset j, $A_{i,\text{total}} = \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij}$ is the total value of financial assets held by household i, and I_i is the aggregate financial income of household i. The full derivation of this proxy is presented and summarized in subsection A.2.

As shown in Table 10, we find a statistically significant effect of female headship on returns generated from mutual funds. Specifically, female-headed households earn returns that are 0.8 percentage points higher than those of male-headed households. This finding is particularly notable given our earlier results, which indicate that female heads are also more likely to invest in mutual funds. Thus, female-headed households not only exhibit a greater propensity to hold mutual funds but also appear to achieve higher returns from them. However, we do not observe similar patterns across the other asset classes. For example, while female-headed households are less likely to hold other fixed income products, this does not appear to significantly affect the returns they generate in those securities.

Table 10: Female Headship and Financial Returns Per Asset Class.
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the financial return associated with each asset class: government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), and bank deposits (column (5)). The asset-specific financial returns are constructed according to Eq. (13). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.5 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits
Female Head	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.008*	-0.052
	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.048)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,873	72,117	23,938	20,350	120,914
Adj. R^2	0.015	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.000

Having examined financial market participation, portfolio composition, and financial returns across households in the Eurozone, we now turn to two primary individual-level determinants of financial behaviour: risk preferences and financial literacy. We begin with risk preferences. A substantial body of research shows that women tend to be more risk-averse than men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Levin, Snyder, & Chapman, 1988; Yao, Sharpe, & Wang, 2011),[9] which contributes to lower participation in stock markets and more conservative portfolio choices (Almenberg & Dreber, 2012; Barber & Odean, 2001).[10] Analysing risk preferences among households in our sample allows us to better understand how gendered attitudes towards financial risk shape investment decisions.

To measure risk preferences, we construct a binary indicator, *Risk Taker*, equal to 1 if the household head reports being willing to either "take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns" or "take above-average financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns," as recorded in the HFCS. This variable serves as a proxy for self-reported risk tolerance. A limitation of this approach is that data from the 2021 wave is unavailable, restricting our sample to the first three survey waves. Additionally, data is missing for Malta, the Czech Republic, and Ireland, resulting in a reduced sample size of approximately 90,000 observations.

First, we examine the effect of female headship on risk tolerance. As shown in column (1) of Table 11, we find that female headship is associated with a statistically significant 1.9 percentage point reduction in the probability of reporting risk-taking behaviour, suggesting greater risk aversion among women. We next examine whether the risk aversion exhibited by female household heads is also reflected in their portfolio

[9] A large body of literature finds that women are generally more risk-averse than men across various domains: they often take fewer risks in experimental gambles (Eckel & Grossman, 2008), investment and pension choices (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), and self-reported survey responses (Dohmen et al., 2011). This pattern also holds in framed gambling scenarios (Levin et al., 1988), and across financial risk profiles, where both married and unmarried women display lower tolerance than married men (Yao et al., 2011).

[10] Almenberg and Dreber (2012) find that women participate less in stock markets and exhibit lower financial literacy and risk tolerance than men, even after accounting for knowledge gaps. Barber and Odean (2001) report that women hold less risky portfolios and attribute gender differences in trading behaviour partly to higher female risk aversion, though they argue overconfidence plays a larger role.

allocations. To investigate this, we construct a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in risky assets, defined as investments in publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. As reported in column (2) of Table 11, we find that female headship, on its own, is not significantly associated with the likelihood of holding risky assets. Consistent with our expectations, household heads identified as risk-takers are significantly more likely to invest in risky assets, reflecting a preference for higher expected returns despite increased risk exposure. Notably, the interaction term between female headship and risk tolerance is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that among risk-takers, female household heads exhibit greater risk aversion than their male counterparts. Hence, our sample reveals that female headship negatively affects the likelihood of holding risky assets, in line with the findings of Gu et al. (2024).

Table 11: Female Headship, Risk Tolerance, and Risky Asset Holdings.
This table presents linear regression results evaluating the relationship between female financial headship and two dimensions of financial risk behaviour. Column (1) presents results where the dependent variable is *Risk Taker*, a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head self-identifies as willing to "take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns" or "take above-average financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns". Column (2) reports estimates where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in risky assets, defined as publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to B.6 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Risk Taker	(2) Holds Risky Assets
Female Head	-0.019***	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.009)
Risk Taker		0.178***
		(0.044)
Female Head × Risk Taker		-0.042***
		(0.015)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	87,989	87,989
Adj. R^2	0.046	0.173

We now turn our attention to another crucial determinant of financial decision-making: financial literacy. While risk preferences capture individuals' tolerance for volatility, financial literacy shapes their ability to form expectations about asset returns and understand the structure of financial markets.

To empirically examine the effect of female headship on financial literacy, we draw on four financial literacy questions included in a subset of HFCS waves which assess respondents' understanding of interest rates, inflation, diversification, and the risk–return characteristics of financial instruments. The full wording of each question and its possible responses is presented in Table B.7. To allow for a more nuanced analysis, we construct two binary indicators capturing different levels of financial literacy. First, we construct a binary variable, *Basic Fin Literacy*, which equals 1 if the household head answered one or two questions correctly. Second, we define a binary indicator, *Advanced Fin Literacy*, which takes the value 1 if the head answered three or all four questions correctly. This approach allows us to distinguish between varying

degrees of financial knowledge, such as between a respondent who may have guessed one answer correctly and another who demonstrates a high level of financial understanding. However, a notable limitation of this approach is restricted data availability: the financial literacy questions were included only in Luxembourg (Wave 2), Greece (Wave 3), and Slovakia (Waves 2 and 3). This reduces our sample to fewer than 5,000 observations, which is substantially smaller than the full HFCS dataset.

In Table 12, we begin by estimating several regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the head demonstrates basic financial literacy (column (1)), or if they showed advanced financial literacy (column (2)). Our results show that female headship significantly reduces the likelihood of answering one or two financial literacy questions correctly by almost 10 percentage points. Interestingly, however, we find no statistically significant effect of female headship on advanced financial literacy. This suggests that, within our highly restricted sample, female headship appears to negatively affect only lower levels of financial literacy. While these findings align with existing literature documenting persistent gender gaps in economic knowledge (Wagner & Walstad, 2023),[11] we provide new evidence suggesting that female headship significantly reduces basic financial literacy but does not appear to impact more advanced levels of financial knowledge.

We next examine whether varying levels of financial literacy impact stock market participation. To this end, we estimate a regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household holds investments in stocks. The explanatory variables include female headship, as well as indicators for basic and advanced financial literacy. In this way, we test both the findings of van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), which show that individuals with higher financial literacy are significantly more likely to invest in stocks, and our framework developed in Section II., which posits that household heads will only invest in risky assets if they possess sufficiently strong financial skills. For this analysis, we proxy financial skills using financial literacy.

While our earlier analysis using the full sample found no significant effect of household head gender on stock market participation, the restricted sample reveals that female headship is significantly and negatively associated with stock market investment (see column (3)). We further find that basic levels of financial literacy are significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of stock market participation, whereas more advanced levels increase this likelihood. This result is somewhat surprising, as it contrasts to some extent with the findings of van Rooij et al. (2011). Rather than observing a consistent positive relationship between financial literacy and stock market participation, we find a non-linear pattern: participation likelihood initially decreases at lower literacy levels but increases at more advanced levels. Interestingly, only the interaction between female headship and basic financial literacy is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that although female-headed households are generally less likely to invest in the stock market, those with basic financial literacy are more likely to do so. We find no such effect for female heads with advanced financial literacy.

Although we cannot directly observe whether the household head meets the threshold of financial ability required to invest in risky assets rather than safe bank deposits, as outlined in our framework, our findings suggest that higher financial literacy increases the probability of stock market participation. Therefore, we can infer that higher financial literacy may play a crucial role in surpassing this threshold and choosing to invest in risky assets rather than opting for a safe bank deposit.

[11] Wagner and Walstad (2023) find that single and partnered women are significantly less likely than men to engage in key financial behaviours, such as maintaining emergency savings or holding non-retirement investments, due to consistent patterns in lower financial preparedness and economic knowledge.

Table 12: Female Headship, Financial Literacy, and Stock Market Participation.
This table presents coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the head answered one or two questions correctly, defined as basic financial literacy (column (1)), or if the head answered three or four questions correctly, defined as advanced financial literacy (column (2)). Column (3) shows coefficient estimates from a regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household reports investments in the stock market. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to B.8 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Basic Fin Literacy	(2) Advanced Fin Literacy	(3) Stock Participation
Female Head	-0.098*	-0.000	-0.014***
	(0.055)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Basic Fin Literacy			-0.016***
			(0.002)
Advanced Fin Literacy			0.052**
			(0.022)
Female Head × Basic Fin Literacy			0.032*
			(0.017)
Female Head × Advanced Fin Literacy			0.024
			(0.025)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,933	4,933	4,933
Adj. R^2	0.086	0.389	0.092

Figure 3 presents the joint impact of financial literacy and risk tolerance on the probability of stock market participation. Financial literacy is categorised into three levels: basic, medium, and advanced. By distinguishing between household heads with low risk tolerance (solid line) and high risk tolerance (dashed line), the figure shows that risk tolerance influences the non-linear relationship between financial literacy and stock market participation. While the probability of participation initially declines at lower levels of financial literacy for both risk tolerance groups, it increases at higher levels and is especially pronounced among individuals with high risk tolerance. In other words, individuals with greater risk tolerance exhibit stronger responsiveness to increasing financial literacy, particularly at the advanced level. This is partially consistent with Mishra (2018), who find that the slope of stock market participation is significantly steeper for high risk-tolerant individuals as financial awareness increases.




Figure 3: Interaction Between Risk Tolerance and Financial Literacy on Stock Market Participation.
This figure visualises predicted probabilities using a logistic regression model that estimates stock market participation as a function of financial literacy and self-reported risk tolerance. Financial literacy is categorised based on the number of correct answers to HFCS financial literacy questions and grouped into Basic (1–2), Medium (2–3), and Advanced (3–4) categories. Solid lines indicate individuals with low risk tolerance, while dashed lines denote those with high risk tolerance. The figure shows that risk tolerance influences the relationship between financial literacy and stock market participation: individuals with high risk tolerance exhibit greater responsiveness to increasing financial literacy, particularly at the advanced level.

C. Disparities in Female Household Headship Across Normative Groups

We now address our second research question, which examines how the effect of female headship on investment behaviour varies across different gender-based normative contexts. To explore this, we extend previous specifications by adding a binary indicator equal to one for countries classified as egalitarian based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) and zero otherwise.[12] This indicator is formally defined as:

$$\text{Egalitarian}_c = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if country } c \text{ is classified as Egalitarian} \\ 0 & \text{if country } c \text{ is classified as Traditional} \end{cases} \tag{14}$$

As a starting point for our analysis, we investigate whether country-level normative contexts influence the probability of a household head being female. Formally, we specify the following linear model:

$$FemaleHead_{i,c,t} = \alpha + \beta Egalitarian_c + \gamma F_{i,c,t} + \delta H_{i,c,t} + \theta FtM_{i,c,t} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t}, \tag{15}$$

which extends the earlier specification presented in Eq. (11). The results, presented in Table 13, show that residing in an egalitarian country is consistently statistically significant and positive across all columns, indicating that an egalitarian context increases the likelihood of the household head being female. This suggests that normative contexts indeed influence the decision on which spouse becomes the head of the household. Furthermore, these findings align with our conceptual framework, which posits that in egalitarian countries, financial ability is the sole determinant for being selected as the household head, whereas in

[12] For a detailed description of how we classify countries into egalitarian and traditional normative groups, see Section III.

traditional contexts, female heads must overcome a gender-based barrier to be chosen (i.e., the probability of becoming a female head is likely lower).

Table 13: Drivers of Female Household Headship Across Normative Groups.
This table presents the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable, $FemaleHead_{i,c,t}$, is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. $Egalitarian_c$ equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Column (1) presents the baseline specification, which includes three vectors of household characteristics: $F_{i,c,t}$, capturing family demographics (number of adults and children); $H_{i,c,t}$, reflecting head-specific attributes (home ownership and income); and $FtM_{i,c,t}$, measuring gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). In Columns (2) and (3), we sequentially introduce proxies for financial literacy, using education, and risk preferences, using age and retirement status. Column (4) presents the full model, incorporating all variables contained in the three specified vectors. Wave (τ_t) fixed effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Subscripts i, c, and t denote household, country, and wave, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p<0.10$, $^{**}p<0.05$, and $^{***}p<0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Egalitarian	0.014*	0.019*	0.030*	0.034*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
# Adults	0.010**	0.008	0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
# Children	0.034***	0.034***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	-0.033***	-0.029***	0.012	0.015**
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log Income	-0.002	-0.001	-0.017***	-0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Hours Worked F	0.016***	0.016***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education		-0.012**		-0.009**
		(0.006)		(0.004)
Age			-0.003***	-0.003***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired			-0.321***	-0.318***
			(0.057)	(0.057)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.492	0.493	0.549	0.550

Next, we investigate whether financial investments and behaviours vary according to normative context. To perform these analyses, we extend our previous model defined in Eq. (12) by incorporating the constructed indicator $Egalitarian_c$ and adding an interaction term between the two variables of interest:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i,c,t} = &\alpha + \beta_1 (FemaleHead_{i,c,t} \times Egalitarian_c) + \beta_2 FemaleHead_{i,c,t} + \beta_3 Egalitarian_c \\ &+ \gamma F_{i,c,t} + \delta H_{i,c,t} + \theta FtM_{i,c,t} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t}. \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

We again control for household characteristics using the three main vectors. Additionally, we include only time fixed effects, as the indicator variable $Egalitarian_c$ already accounts for the time-invariant variation across countries.

We first test whether female headship influences financial market participation differently in egalitarian versus traditional countries. As shown in Table 14, we find that only the indicator for egalitarian countries

is statistically significant, suggesting a positive effect on market participation. Neither female headship alone nor its interaction with the egalitarian indicator is significant. This holds true for both the full sample, reported in column (1), and the subsample restricted to household heads under the age of 65, shown in column (2). These findings reinforce our earlier results (see Table 6): female headship does not significantly affect financial market participation relative to male headship. Moreover, this effect remains unchanged across countries with differing normative profiles.

Table 14: Female Headship and Financial Market Participation Across Normative Groups.
This table reports the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holdings in at least one of the 5 core financial asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. In column (2), we limit the sample to households where the head is younger than 65. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.9 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.006	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.009)
Female Head	-0.005	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Egalitarian	0.107***	0.098***
	(0.027)	(0.022)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	97,407
Adj. R^2	0.539	0.556

Next, we assess whether participation in the five core asset classes varies by normative context. The results in Table 15 show that the interaction between the gender norm indicator and female headship is significant only for government bonds and deposits. In particular, being a female head in egalitarian countries is associated with a 1 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of participating in government bonds compared to female heads in traditional countries (column (1)). Conversely, being a female head in egalitarian countries relative to traditional countries is associated with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of participating in deposits (column (5)).

Interestingly, we observe contradictory results regarding the standalone effect of female headship. While our earlier findings indicated that female headship significantly influences participation in other fixed income, mutual funds, and the total number of asset classes held (see Table 7), these effects become insignificant once we control for country-level gender norms. In contrast, female headship has only a marginally significant negative impact on participation in deposits (column (5)). In other words, female headship reduces the likelihood of investing in deposits compared to male headship. However, female-headed households in egalitarian countries are more likely to invest in deposits than their counterparts in traditional countries.

The country's normative context has mixed effects on household investments across different asset classes. While country-level gender norms do not significantly impact participation in other fixed income

securities, it plays a highly statistically significant role in the allocation to other asset classes. Households in egalitarian countries are more likely to invest in government bonds and deposits (column (1) and (5), respectively), as well as to diversify their holdings across several asset classes as shown in column (6). However, households in these countries also show a lower likelihood of participating in stocks and mutual funds (column (3) and (4), respectively). This contrasts with the findings of Ke (2018), who report that households in more gender-egalitarian countries are more likely to participate in the stock market. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that households in more egalitarian countries may be more risk-averse, as we later show in our sample (see Table 18).

Table 15: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in the Five Core Financial Asset Classes Across Normative Groups. This table shows the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holdings in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) shows coefficient estimates for a regression of the number of different asset classes held by the household. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.10 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits	(6) # Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.010*	0.005	0.018	0.002	0.019***	0.013
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.041)
Female Head	0.005	-0.007	-0.005	-0.000	-0.012*	-0.019
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Egalitarian	0.044**	-0.026	-0.156***	-0.169***	0.045***	0.300***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.011)	(0.083)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.023	0.015	0.112	0.108	0.880	0.353

We further extend our analysis by disaggregating other fixed income securities into bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries, non-financial corporations, or other types of bonds. However, we find no evidence that female headship, normative context, or their interaction significantly affect participation in any of the bond categories. The corresponding regression results are presented in Table B.11 in the Appendix.

Building on our previous analysis of mutual fund investment allocations, we now test whether the effect of female headship varies across normative groups. Our results in Table 16 show that the interaction between female headship and country-level gender norms is statistically significant for equity mutual funds, real estate mutual funds, and other mutual funds. Specifically, female-headed households in egalitarian countries are 3 percentage points more likely to invest in equity mutual funds (column (1)) and 0.6 percentage points more likely to invest in real estate funds (column (4)) than their counterparts in traditional countries. In contrast, they are 1.4 percentage points less likely to invest in other mutual funds (column (6)).

Interestingly, the standalone effect of female headship remains statistically significant for equity mutual funds, similar to our previous finding (see Table 8 Panel B), though the coefficient has changed. While previously positive, the effect now suggests that female headship alone reduces the likelihood of investing

in equity mutual funds. Additionally, the standalone effect of female headship is now statistically significant for bond mutual funds, contrary to our earlier findings where it was insignificant.

The country's normative context alone does not significantly affect household participation in money market mutual funds or hedge funds. However, households in egalitarian countries are significantly less likely to invest in equity, bond, and real estate mutual funds (columns (1), (2), and (4)), but more likely to invest in other types of mutual funds (column (6)).

Table 16: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Mutual Funds Across Normative Groups.
This table shows coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in equity mutual funds (column (1)), bond mutual funds (column (2)), money market mutual funds (column (3)), real estate mutual funds (column (4)), hedge funds (column (5)), or other mutual funds (column (6)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.12 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Equity	(2) Bonds	(3) Money M	(4) Real E	(5) Hedge F	(6) Other
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.030***	0.001	0.001	0.006***	0.001	-0.014**
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Female Head	-0.012*	-0.007*	0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Egalitarian	-0.091***	-0.032*	0.004	-0.019***	-0.001	0.074***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.012)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.058	0.022	0.004	0.014	0.001	0.048

As in our previous analysis, we examine whether female-headed households generate significantly different financial returns compared to male-headed households. Consistent with our prior findings (see Table 9), we do not observe a statistically significant impact of female headship alone on aggregate financial returns. Moreover, the interaction term between female headship and national gender norms is also insignificant, indicating that the effect of household head gender on financial returns does not vary with the normative context of the country. The results are detailed in Table B.13 in the Appendix.

We further disaggregate financial returns into the five core asset classes, as presented in Table 17, to allow for a more nuanced analysis. After accounting for country-level normative contexts, the individual effect of female headship on mutual fund participation is no longer statistically significant, in contrast to our earlier findings. However, the interaction between the egalitarian indicator and female headship is significant, indicating that female heads in egalitarian countries achieve higher returns in mutual funds compared to their counterparts in traditional countries. Additionally, once country-level norms are accounted for, the standalone effect of female headship on other fixed income becomes negative and significant. Hence, these findings suggest that the impact of female headship on financial returns not only varies across asset classes but is also influenced by the country's normative context.

Table 17: Female Headship and Financial Returns Per Asset Class Across Normative Groups.
This table presents coefficient estimates from linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the financial return associated with each asset class: government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), and bank deposits (column (5)). The same return proxy equation from Table 10 is used. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.14 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.002	0.053	-0.023	0.007**	-0.032
	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.045)
Female Head	0.002	-0.065**	0.012	-0.002	-0.034
	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.034)
Egalitarian	0.007	0.064*	0.058*	0.010**	0.139**
	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.005)	(0.061)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,873	72,117	23,938	20,350	120,914
Adj. R^2	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000

Having conducted a detailed analysis of portfolio holdings and returns, we now extend our analysis to investigate whether the relationship between female headship and, respectively, risk preferences and financial literacy varies across normative contexts. As previously established, both factors are important determinants of household financial behaviour. However, in this section, we explore whether these relationships differ depending on the normative country group, given that both risk attitudes and financial knowledge are likely shaped not only by countries' cultural and socioeconomic contexts but also by the prevailing national gender norms – whether traditional or egalitarian.

For instance, our sample shows that household heads in egalitarian countries have significantly higher levels of education than those in traditional countries (see Table 3), which may serve as a proxy for greater financial literacy among heads in egalitarian contexts. Household heads in our sample in both egalitarian and traditional countries are of nearly the same age, and a similar proportion are retired, which may proxy for comparable risk preferences. However, it is plausible to assume that cultural factors shape risk preferences, which may systematically differ with normative orientation.

As reported in Table 18 column (1), our results show that both female headship and egalitarianism individually reduce tolerance for financial risk-taking. However, we cannot find a significant result that the effect of female headship on risk-taking differs by national gender norms. With regard to investments in risky assets, as reported in column (2), we find no statistically significant effect of female headship when considered in isolation. However, both the risk-taking indicator and its interaction with female headship are statistically significant, with coefficient signs consistent with prior results (see Table 11). When controlling for normative contexts, we observe that only the standalone effect of egalitarianism is significant, suggesting that households in more egalitarian countries are less likely to invest in risky assets. Nonetheless, we find no evidence that the effect of female headship on investment in risky assets varies across such normative groups. Thus, we find no indication that the effect of female headship on either risk preferences or investment in risky

assets varies with country-level gender norms. Therefore, we cannot fully conclude that risk preferences are embedded within a country's normative orientation.

Table 18: Female Headship, Risk Tolerance, and Risky Asset Holdings Across Normative Groups.
This table presents linear regression results evaluating the relationship between female financial headship and two dimensions of financial risk behaviour. Column (1) presents results where the dependent variable is *Risk Taker*, a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head self-identifies as willing to "take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns' or "take above-average financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns". Column (2) reports coefficient estimates where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in risky assets, defined as publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.15 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Risk Taker	(2) Holds Risky Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.003	-0.025
	(0.008)	(0.023)
Female Head	-0.016**	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.013)
Egalitarian	-0.051**	-0.193***
	(0.021)	(0.033)
Risk Taker		0.168***
		(0.043)
Female Head × Risk Taker		-0.051***
		(0.018)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	87,989	87,989
Adj. R^2	0.025	0.139

Next, we assess the role of financial literacy in household financial decisions. As presented in Table 19, female headship is significantly and negatively associated with both levels of financial literacy. In line with our expectations, the effect of female headship on financial literacy differs significantly across normative contexts. While female-headed households are generally less likely to correctly answer 3 or 4 financial literacy questions in the HFCS, this likelihood increases for female heads in egalitarian countries compared to those in traditional countries. This pattern aligns with our earlier finding that household heads in egalitarian countries tend to have higher levels of education. However, we do not observe the same variation for basic financial literacy. Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, residing in an egalitarian country is associated with a significantly lower probability of attaining basic financial literacy but a significantly higher probability of achieving advanced financial literacy. This suggests that egalitarian contexts may support the development of advanced skills, even if basic ones are less widespread. With regard to stock market participation, the results in column (3) confirm previous findings: female headship significantly lowers the likelihood of holding stocks, whereas advanced levels of financial literacy substantially increase the probability of participation. We also find that female heads with both basic and advanced levels of financial literacy are more likely to participate in the stock market. Additionally we find that while stock market

participation is lower among households in egalitarian countries, female heads in these countries are more likely to invest in stocks compared to their counterparts in traditional countries.

Table 19: Female Headship, Financial Literacy, and Stock Market Participation Across Normative Groups.
This table presents coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the head answered one or two questions correctly, defined as basic financial literacy (column (1)), or if the head answered three or four questions correctly, defined as advanced financial literacy (column (2)). Column (3) shows coefficient estimates from a regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household reports investments in the stock market. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 for countries classified as egalitarian. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. For full regression results with all the covariates, refer to Table B.16 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Basic Fin Literacy	(2) Advanced Fin Literacy	(3) Stock Participation
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.062	0.113*	0.015***
	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.002)
Female Head	-0.094*	-0.128*	-0.012***
	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.005)
Egalitarian	-0.177***	0.165***	-0.137***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Basic Fin Literacy			-0.001
			(0.011)
Advanced Fin Literacy			0.027***
			(0.009)
Female Head × Basic Fin Literacy			0.015***
			(0.002)
Female Head × Advanced Fin Literacy			0.037**
			(0.015)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,933	4,933	4,933
Adj. R^2	0.085	0.310	0.092

V. Robustness Check

Given our primary assumption that GEI scores provided by the EIGE allow us to accurately classify countries as traditional or egalitarian, one might question if this metric sufficiently captures cultural aspects and unobservable dimensions of societal norms. To address this concern, we conduct a robustness check using an alternative measure of traditional gender norms derived from responses in the European Values Study (EVS). Following prior literature (e.g., Ke (2018)), we proxy traditional gender norms by the proportion of respondents in each country, across all survey waves, who agree with the statement, "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." We then compute the cross-country average share of agreement and classify countries as egalitarian if their national share falls below this average and as traditional if it exceeds it. This approach enables us to include citizens' expressed attitudes and cultural values, which may serve as a more direct proxy for cultural gender norms and underlying gender norms than an

index based solely on observable structural indicators, such as labour market participation.

As shown in Table 20, several countries shift classification under the alternative measure. Specifically, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, and Latvia are reclassified from traditional to egalitarian, while Austria and Belgium shift from egalitarian to traditional. For detailed information on each country's responses to the EVS, refer to Fig. B.1(b) in the Appendix, which maps the proportion of agreement by country.

Table 20: Eurozone Countries by Gender Norms Based on European Values Study Responses.
This table presents the Eurozone countries included in the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), categorised as either traditional or egalitarian based on responses to the European Values Study (EVS). The classification is determined by the proportion of respondents who agree with the statement that "when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". Countries scoring above the mean are classified as traditional, while those scoring below the mean are classified as egalitarian.

Traditional		Egalitarian	
ISO Code	Country	ISO Code	Country
AT	Austria	DE	Germany
BE	Belgium	EE	Estonia
CY	Cyprus	ES	Spain
CZ	Czech Republic	FI	Finland
GR	Greece	FR	France
IT	Italy	HR	Croatia
LT	Lithuania	HU	Hungary
MT	Malta	IE	Ireland
PL	Poland	LU	Luxembourg
PT	Portugal	LV	Latvia
SK	Slovakia	NL	Netherlands
		SI	Slovenia

With the revised classification separating countries into traditional and egalitarian groups, we reassess whether our earlier results remain valid. As before, we illustrate changes in both the GEI scores and the proportion of female-headed households over time.[13] As shown in Fig. B.2 in the Appendix, we observe a similar pattern: GEI scores generally increase over time, with egalitarian countries still starting from a higher baseline under this alternative classification. We also find a comparable trend in female headship, which initially rises, then slightly declines, and eventually stabilises in egalitarian countries. In contrast, traditional countries exhibit a consistent decline in female headship rates. Focusing on the most recent wave (2021), we observe even greater divergence between the two groups: the median female headship rate is 43.0% in egalitarian countries compared to 24.0% in traditional countries.

Our empirical analysis indicates that the drivers of female headship remain largely consistent, despite the reclassification of certain countries. As shown in Table Table B.17 in the Appendix, the coefficients on the egalitarianism indicator remain positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with our earlier finding that more egalitarian gender norms are strongly associated with a higher likelihood of the household head being female.

Next, we re-examine financial market participation, as reported in Table B.18 in the Appendix. Consistent with previous findings, the interaction term between female headship and the egalitarian indicator remains statistically insignificant, indicating that the impact of female headship on financial market partici-

[13] Here, we specifically examine changes in GEI scores under the new country classification, rather than the development of agreement levels in the EVS survey, to allow for a direct comparison with the previous analysis.

pation does not differ under the revised normative classification. Additionally, the egalitarianism indicator itself continues to show a significant and positive association with financial market participation. We conclude that the revised normative classification does not materially affect our previous findings.

We now turn to the analysis of investment allocation across the five core asset classes, as well as a more detailed examination of other fixed income securities and mutual funds. Regarding the five core assets, as presented in Table B.19 in the Appendix, several differences emerge. Notably, the interaction between female headship and the egalitarian indicator for government bonds becomes statistically insignificant, leaving only the interaction with deposits as significant and positive, consistent with prior results. Moreover, the egalitarianism indicator itself is now statistically significant for fewer asset classes, namely stocks, mutual funds, and the number of asset classes held. Importantly, the direction of the significant coefficients remains unchanged. Hence, while we observe fewer statistically significant effects in this specification, those that remain are directionally consistent with our previous results, suggesting a degree of robustness in the core findings.

For a more detailed examination of other fixed income securities and mutual funds, the revised regression results are presented in Table B.20 and Table B.21 in the Appendix, respectively. With respect to other fixed income assets, we again find no significant effects of either egalitarian country-level gender norms or female headship on the likelihood of holding such securities. However, in the case of mutual funds, we observe some deviations from the previous results. Our findings are now less significant, with only the interaction term for real estate funds remaining statistically significant, although its magnitude is almost unchanged. The standalone effect of a female household head becomes insignificant across all mutual fund categories. As for the standalone effect of egalitarianism, it remains significant only for real estate and other mutual funds, with a similar magnitude to previous findings.

Regarding financial returns, our earlier findings are confirmed, both at the aggregate level, as presented in Table B.22, and across asset classes, as shown in Table B.23 in the Appendix. Egalitarian country-level gender norms continue to exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect on aggregate financial returns. At the asset-class level, the coefficients largely remain consistent with previous results.

Lastly, we turn to financial behaviour, specifically risk-taking[14], and present our updated findings using the alternative measure in Table B.24. We now find that egalitarian country-level gender norms no longer have a significant effect on such behaviour. In other words, although our previous results indicated that living in a more egalitarian country decreased the likelihood that the household head would engage in financial risk-taking, this relationship does not persist under the new classification. However, our findings regarding the probability of holding risky assets remain robust.

Our analysis indicates that the findings regarding the drivers of female headship, as well as the impact of female headship on aggregate financial market participation and financial returns, are largely robust and remain consistent when using our alternative measure of gender norms. However, we observe some variation in the findings related to investment allocation and risk preferences. These shifts suggest that some of our results may not be entirely robust when substituting the GEI with a gender norm measure based on EVS survey responses. This discrepancy likely stems from fundamental differences between the two measures. The EVS captures a relatively limited sample of individual attitudes, which may not be representative of broader societal norms within a country's population, whereas the GEI is based on observable structural outcomes between men and women. Consequently, we must acknowledge the limitations of both measures.

[14] We are unable to perform a robustness check on the financial literacy regressions, as the data is limited to a small number of countries that do not change classification under the alternative gender norms measure.

The use of the GEI may fail to accurately capture latent and unmeasurable gender attitudes. On the other hand, employing the EVS as a measure of gender norms also has drawbacks, as it may reflect potentially biased individual opinions rather than accurately representing the structural and systemic context of gender equality within a country. Further research may be necessary to develop an index that captures both structural indicators of gender equality as well as cultural attitudes and beliefs regarding gender norms.

VI. Conclusion

This study offers a comprehensive examination of gendered delegation in household financial decision-making across 23 Eurozone countries. Using a two-stage utility maximisation framework, we reconceptualise financial headship as a forward-looking choice: one shaped by each spouse's financial potential and constrained by the disutility of departing from prevailing gender norms.

Empirically, we identify three key findings. First, despite a rise in factors such as female education and labour market participation, the share of female financial heads has declined over the past decade – especially in countries with more traditional gender norms – suggesting that informal social constraints continue to limit women's financial authority within households. Second, while female headship has no aggregate effect on financial market participation or overall returns, it is strongly associated with differences in portfolio allocation and asset-specific performance. For instance, female-headed households are more likely to invest in mutual funds and less in other fixed income securities, and notably, they earn higher returns on mutual fund investments. Third, normative context plays a vital role. In egalitarian countries, headship more closely reflects financial ability, while in traditional contexts, strong norm penalties dilute the role of financial ability in delegation. These findings reinforce our model's central prediction: gender norms distort merit-based delegation, with possible financial consequences for household portfolios.

To assess robustness, we re-test our results using an alternative measure of gender norms based on attitudinal data from the European Values Study (EVS). While investment allocation results vary slightly, our main findings on headship drivers and asset-specific returns remain consistent. This supports the validity of our structural classification based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI), while highlighting conceptual differences between institutional and attitudinal measures of gender norms. We acknowledge that further research may be necessary to develop an index that captures both structural indicators of gender equality as well as cultural attitudes and beliefs regarding gender norms.

Together, these findings contribute to existing household finance literature by offering a new lens on intra-household finance. First, they challenge models that assume pooled decision-making or income dominance. Second, they highlight the relevance of differences in gendered investment behaviour. Third, by linking normative contexts to financial agency and outcomes, this study provides a foundation for how cultural and institutional factors shape household financial behaviour.

Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, due to the absence of asset-class specific income data in the HFCS, we construct a return proxy that distributes total financial income across assets in proportion to their portfolio weight. While this approach offers a tractable solution, it cannot capture the true performance of individual assets and may understate return volatility or skew. Returns are inherently more complex and dynamic than our proxy allows. Second, our measure of financial literacy is based on four standardised questions, and we define "basic" and "advanced" literacy based on the number of correct responses. We recognise that this approach cannot fully account for the multidimensional nature of financial understanding. Moreover, financial literacy data is only available for three countries (Luxembourg, Greece,

and Slovakia), reducing our estimation sample to under 5,000 households and thereby limiting cross-country generalisability. Lastly, our analysis of risk preferences relies on self-reported attitudes toward financial risk, which, while commonly used in household finance research, remain difficult to quantify. These measures may be subject to lack of introspective accuracy or inconsistencies between stated and revealed preferences. Additionally, risk tolerance questions are missing for several countries (Malta, the Czech Republic, and Ireland), reducing our sample for these regressions to approximately 90,000 households. Despite these limitations, the consistency of our core findings reinforces the study's empirical contribution and invites further research to inform policy efforts aimed at promoting equitable financial decision-making within households and addressing the broader impact of gender norms on economic outcomes.

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Appendix A: Proofs

A.1 Derivation of the Conceptual Framework

We derive the headship selection rule implied by our model, which is based on the conceptual framework developed by Guiso and Zaccaria (2023). However, we have refined it and modified their model in four key ways, which is outlined in section II. As defined in Eq. (1), the utility that household i derives from assigning headship to spouse $G \in \{0,1\}$ (where $G = 1$ is the female spouse and $G = 0$ the male) is:

$$U_{i,G} = \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,G}] - \beta_z (G - \bar{G}_z)^2 + \varepsilon_{i,G}, \tag{A.1.1}$$

where $\mathbb{E}[F_{i,G}]$ is the expected financial potential of spouse G. $\bar{G}_z \in \frac{1}{2}$ represents the prevailing social norm regarding female headship in an egalitarian gender norm community, z, while $\bar{G}_z = 0$ corresponds to the traditional community. β_z captures the strength of conformity to that norm, and $\varepsilon_{i,G} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ is an idiosyncratic variation in headship preferences. The household's decision rule is to select the spouse G_i^* who maximises utility:

$$G_i^* = \arg \max_{G \in \{0,1\}} U_{i,G}. \tag{A.1.2}$$

To make this decision, the household compares the utility of selecting the female spouse versus the male spouse. We compute the difference:

$$U_{i,1} = \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,1}] - \beta_z (1 - \bar{G}_z)^2 + \varepsilon_{i,1}, \tag{A.1.3a}$$

$$U_{i,0} = \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,0}] - \beta_z \bar{G}_z^2 + \varepsilon_{i,0}. \tag{A.1.3b}$$

Assigning financial headship to the female spouse is optimal when $U_{i,1} > U_{i,0}$. Substituting the two expressions gives:

$$\alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,1}] - \beta_z (1 - \bar{G}_z)^2 + \varepsilon_{i,1} > \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[F_{i,0}] - \beta_z \bar{G}_z^2 + \varepsilon_{i,0}. \tag{A.1.4}$$

By rearranging terms to isolate the difference in financial potential and unobservables on the left-hand side and the norm penalty on the right-hand side, we formally get:

$$\alpha \cdot (\mathbb{E}[F_{i,1}] - \mathbb{E}[F_{i,0}]) + (\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_{i,0}) > \beta_z \left((1 - \bar{G}_z)^2 - \bar{G}_z^2 \right). \tag{A.1.5}$$

To simplify the expression on the right-hand side, we expand both squared terms:

$$(1 - \bar{G}_z)^2 - \bar{G}_z^2 = (1 - 2\bar{G}_z + \bar{G}_z^2) - \bar{G}_z^2 = 1 - 2\bar{G}_z. \tag{A.1.6}$$

Substituting this back into the equation yields:

$$\alpha \cdot \Delta F_i + \Delta \varepsilon_i > \beta_z (1 - 2\bar{G}_z), \tag{A.1.7}$$

where $\Delta F_i = \mathbb{E}[F_{i,1}] - \mathbb{E}[F_{i,0}]$ is the difference in expected financial potential between spouses, and $\Delta \varepsilon_i = \varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_{i,0}$ is the difference in unobserved preferences. We now isolate the financial potential differential ΔF_i on the left-hand side:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z (1 - 2\bar{G}_z) - \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \Delta \varepsilon_i. \tag{A.1.8}$$

Under the assumption that the error term $\Delta\varepsilon_i$ is normally distributed with mean zero, the expected threshold then simplifies to:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z(1 - 2\bar{G}_z). \tag{A.1.9}$$

This expression shows that the minimum financial advantage required for the woman to be appointed head increases with the strength of normative pressure β_z, and inversely with the weight placed on financial considerations α. In other words, when financial potential is heavily weighted in household utility, the norm penalty must be correspondingly larger to prevent a woman with greater ability from being selected. Furthermore, the term $(1 - 2\bar{G}_z)$ governs how this penalty varies across normative regimes.

To contextualise this, we first consider a traditional setting, where the prevailing norm is that men should hold financial headship. In our model, this corresponds to $\bar{G}_z = 0$. By substituting this into Equation (A.9), we get:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z. \tag{A.1.10a}$$

This condition implies that only when the financial potential of the female spouse exceeds that of the male spouse by a margin greater than $\frac{\beta_z}{\alpha}$ will she be selected as the household's financial head. The utility loss from violating the norm is fully binding and must be compensated by a comparably large gain in expected returns.

By contrast, in an egalitarian setting where no gender is normatively favoured, we have $\bar{G}_z = \frac{1}{2}$. Substituting this value into Equation (A.9) gives:

$$\Delta F_i > \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \beta_z(1 - 2 \cdot \tfrac{1}{2}) = 0. \tag{A.1.10b}$$

Thus, when gender norms are neutral, no additional financial threshold is imposed. The household assigns financial headship purely based on the relative financial competence of the spouses. Any marginal advantage in expected financial potential is sufficient to select the female head. Together, these results highlight the mechanism through which social norms constrain otherwise merit-based delegation. In traditional contexts, normative penalties elevate the threshold a woman must meet to be appointed head, reducing the likelihood that even competent women are selected. In egalitarian contexts, by contrast, the decision is efficiency-driven. This comparative prediction is central to our empirical analysis, where we test whether financial ability is more predictive of female headship in norm-neutral (egalitarian) countries than in norm-constrained ones (traditional), as classified by the Gender Equality Index (GEI).

A.2 Derivation of Asset-Class-Specific Return Proxies

The HFCS provides aggregate financial income at the household level but does not disaggregate returns by asset class. To analyse return heterogeneity across asset types, we construct a proxy for asset class-specific returns by scaling aggregate returns according to portfolio composition. The following derivations illustrate the mathematical steps taken to reach Eq. (13), with results presented in Table 10 and Table B.5.

We begin by defining the total financial wealth of household i as the sum of its holdings across five asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income, stocks, mutual funds, and deposits. This yields the following expression for total financial assets (which is the same as Eq. (8)):

$$A_{i,\text{total}} = \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{i,j} \tag{A.2.1}$$

Here, $A_{i,j}$ denotes the gross value of household i's holdings in asset class j. Next, we compute the Financial Income-to-Assets Ratio (FIAR) (which is the same as Eq. (10)), which captures the average return across the household's entire financial portfolio. This ratio is defined as:

$$FIAR_i = \frac{I_i}{A_{i,\text{total}}} \tag{A.2.2}$$

In this equation, I_i denotes the total reported financial income of household i. While this income may be composed of various sources, such as dividends, interest, or capital gains, the HFCS aggregates them into a single variable. To estimate the financial return for a specific asset class j, we must allocate the household's total financial return proportionally across its portfolio holdings. We do so by calculating the weight of asset j in household i's financial portfolio as follows:

$$w_{i,j} = \frac{A_{i,j}}{A_{i,\text{total}}} \tag{A.2.3}$$

This weight expresses the share of total financial assets allocated to asset class j. We then assume that the household's total financial return $FIAR_i$ is distributed across asset classes in proportion to these weights. The asset-class-specific return $r_{i,j}$ is thus the product of the weight $w_{i,j}$ and the aggregate financial return $FIAR_i$:

$$r_{i,j} = w_{i,j} \cdot FIAR_i \tag{A.2.4}$$


Substituting the expressions from the steps above, we obtain:

$$r_{i,j} = \left(\frac{A_{i,j}}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{I_i}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right) \tag{A.2.5}$$

This proxy allows us to estimate the financial return attributable to each asset class, conditional on household i's portfolio composition and total income. We use it as the dependent variable in our regression analysis, restricting it to households with non-zero holdings in the relevant asset class. The approach relies on several assumptions. First, it presumes proportional allocation of income across assets, which may be inaccurate when return structures differ – for instance, between interest-bearing instruments and stocks. Second, asset-specific income components (e.g., dividends, interest, capital gains) are not observable, and the HFCS reports financial income in aggregate. Thus, the proxy cannot isolate sources of return or account for differential taxation, timing, or reinvestment.


Appendix B: Figures and Tables

B.1 Figures



(a) **(b)**

Figure B.1: Country Classification by Normative Groups: Egalitarian vs. Traditional.
Panel (a) illustrates the average Gender Equality Index (GEI) scores across Eurozone countries, while Panel (b) shows the average proportion of respondents in the European Values Study (EVS) who agree with the statement that "when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". The colour gradient reflects the strength of gender norms, with darker blue indicating more egalitarian attitudes (i.e., greater gender equality), and darker red indicating more traditional views (i.e., lower gender equality).



(a) **(b)**

Figure B.2: Female Headship Trends Across Normative Groups (EVS-Based Classification).
This figure illustrates the share of households in which the financial head is female. Panel (a) displays trends in female household headship from 2010 to 2021 across four HFCS waves, alongside changes in Gender Equality Index (GEI) scores from 2013 to 2024. Solid lines represent female headship rates, while dashed lines depict GEI scores over time. Both indicators are shown separately for countries categorised as egalitarian (grey) or traditional (red), based on the proportion of respondents in the European Values Study (EVS) who agree with the statement that "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". Panel (b) displays the cross-country distribution of female headship in 2021, grouped by normative category. Vertical dashed lines indicate the median female headship rate within each group.

B.2 Tables

Table B.1: Female Headship and Financial Market Participation (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 6, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holdings in at least one of the 5 core financial asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. In column (1), we use the full sample, while in column (2), we restrict the sample to households where the head is younger than 65. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement status, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)
Female Head	-0.004	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)
# Adults	0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)
# Children	0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.000	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.037***	0.041**
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Education	0.027***	0.026***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	0.046***	0.045***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Log Income	0.003***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.001**	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	97,407
Adj. R^2	0.552	0.568

Table B.2: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in the Five Core Financial Asset Classes (Full Specification). This table provides the full specification of Table 7, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holdings in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) shows coefficient estimates from a regression of the number of different asset classes held by the household. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits	(6) # Assets
Female Head	-0.002	-0.005***	0.013	0.017***	0.002	-0.030*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.017)
# Adults	0.002**	-0.002***	0.001	0.003	0.002	-0.006
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
# Children	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	-0.002*	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Age	-0.001**	0.000***	-0.003***	-0.001***	-0.000	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.011	0.012	-0.012	-0.014	0.024**	0.072*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.038)
Education	-0.008**	0.008*	-0.054***	-0.046***	0.007**	0.122***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.011)
Home Ownership	-0.012**	0.012*	-0.068***	-0.063***	0.016**	0.172***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.020)
Log Income	-0.001*	0.001*	-0.004***	-0.006***	0.002**	0.014***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.001**	0.000***	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.059	0.053	0.143	0.144	0.883	0.382

Table B.3: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Other Fixed Income and Mutual Funds (Full Specification). This table provides the full specification of Table 8, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries (column (1)), non-financial corporations (column (2)), or other types of bonds (column (3)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Panel A: Other Fixed Income

	(1) Banks	(2) Corporate	(3) Other
Female Head	-0.002	-0.002**	-0.000*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
# Adults	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
# Children	-0.000	-0.000**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	0.000***	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.009	0.002	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Education	0.004**	0.002*	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Home Ownership	0.007*	0.002**	0.001**
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Log Income	0.001*	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.030	0.012	0.002

(Continued)

Table B.3 — *Continued*

Panel B: Mutual Funds

	(1) Equity	(2) Bonds	(3) Money M	(4) Real E	(5) Hedge F	(6) Other
Female Head	0.016***	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	-0.010**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.005)
# Adults	0.005*	0.004**	-0.001	0.002**	0.000	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)
# Children	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003***	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Age	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	-0.005	-0.009**	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Education	-0.019***	-0.009***	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.001**	0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Home Ownership	-0.024***	-0.012***	-0.004***	-0.006**	-0.001	0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Log Income	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001*	-0.000	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000**	0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.080	0.048	0.011	0.025	0.006	0.059

Table B.4: Female Headship and Financial Returns (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 9, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is the household investment portfolio's financial return, measured as the ratio of financial income to the market value of financial assets. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)
Female Head	-0.046
	(0.041)
# Adults	-0.035
	(0.026)
# Children	-0.019
	(0.022)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Retired	-0.126**
	(0.055)
Education	0.016*
	(0.009)
Home Ownership	-0.098*
	(0.052)
Log Income	-0.010**
	(0.005)
Hours Worked F	0.003*
	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	0.002
	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes
Country FE	Yes
Observations	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.090

Table B.5: Female Headship and Financial Returns Per Asset Class (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 10, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the financial return associated with each asset class: government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), and bank deposits (column (5)). The asset-specific financial returns are constructed as:

$$r_{i,j} = \left(\frac{A_{i,j}}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right) \times \left(\frac{I_i}{A_{i,\text{total}}}\right)$$

where $r_{i,j}$ denotes the asset-specific financial return for household i on asset j, $A_{i,j}$ is the gross value of household i's holdings in asset j, $A_{i,\text{total}} = \sum_{j=1}^{5} A_{ij}$ is the total value of financial assets held by household i, and I_i is the aggregate financial income of household i. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits
Female Head	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.008*	-0.052
	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.048)
# Adults	-0.001	-0.038	-0.048	-0.001	-0.013
	(0.001)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.009)
# Children	0.002	-0.032*	-0.008	0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Age	0.000	0.003	0.001**	0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Retired	-0.002	-0.115*	-0.035***	0.001	-0.065
	(0.005)	(0.063)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.054)
Education	0.001**	0.003	-0.005	-0.000	0.009
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.009)
Home Ownership	0.004	-0.111	-0.071	0.001	-0.041*
	(0.003)	(0.094)	(0.051)	(0.003)	(0.024)
Log Income	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.001	-0.001*	0.000	0.002**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,873	72,117	23,938	20,350	120,914
Adj. R^2	0.015	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.000

Table B.6: Female Headship, Risk Tolerance, and Risky Asset Holdings (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 11, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions assessing the relationship between female financial headship and two measures of financial risk behaviour. Column (1) uses *Risk Taker* as the dependent variable, a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head reports a willingness to take above-average or substantial financial risks. Column (2) uses as a dependent variable an indicator equal to 1 if the household holds risky assets, defined as publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Risk Taker* is an explanatory variable in column (2). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Risk Taker	(2) Holds Risky Assets
Female Head	-0.019***	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.009)
Risk Taker		0.178***
		(0.044)
Female Head × Risk Taker		-0.042***
		(0.015)
# Adults	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)
# Children	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.007	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.010)
Education	0.012***	0.054***
	(0.002)	(0.007)
Home Ownership	0.002	0.075***
	(0.004)	(0.017)
Log Income	-0.000	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	87,989	87,989
Adj. R^2	0.046	0.173

Table B.7: Financial Literacy Questions and Response Options.
This table presents the four financial literacy questions included in our analysis, along with the corresponding answer choices available to respondents. The first question evaluates understanding of fixed-rate versus floating-rate mortgages. The second assesses comprehension of inflation and real interest rates. The third tests knowledge of diversification, while the fourth addresses understanding of financial instruments and relative risk. These questions, taken from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), are used to construct financial literacy indicators in the regressions presented in Table 12 and Table 19.

Questions	Response Options
Of the following types of mortgages, which one do you think allows you to fix both the amount and the number of instalments needed to pay off the loan from the start?	(1) Floating-rate mortgage (2) Fixed-rate mortgage
Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 1% interest and has no charges. Imagine also that prices increase by 2%. Do you think that if you withdraw the money in a year's time, you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if you spent the 1,000 euros today?	(1) Yes (2) No, I will be able to buy less (3) No, I will be able to buy more
In your opinion, which of the following investment strategies entails a greater risk of losing money?	(1) Invest all savings in the securities issued by a single company (2) Invest all savings in the securities issued by a wide range of unrelated companies
A company can obtain financing either by issuing shares or bonds. In your opinion, which financial instrument entails a greater risk of losing money?	(1) Shares (2) Bonds (3) Equally risky (4) I don't know the difference between bonds and shares

Table B.8: Female Headship, Financial Literacy, and Stock Market Participation (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 12, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable, *Financial Literacy*, is an indicator equal to 1 if the household head correctly answered at least one of the four financial literacy questions in the HFCS, which cover topics such as interest rates, inflation, portfolio diversification, and financial risk. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). Wave and country fixed effects are accounted for. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Basic Fin Literacy	(2) Advanced Fin Literacy	(3) Stock Participation
Female Head	-0.098*	-0.000	-0.014***
	(0.055)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Basic Fin Literacy			-0.016***
			(0.002)
Advanced Fin Literacy			0.052**
			(0.022)
Female Head × Basic Fin Lit			0.032*
			(0.017)
Female Head × Advanced Fin Lit			0.024
			(0.025)
# Adults	-0.012	0.019	0.006*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.003)
# Children	-0.004	0.003	0.003***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Age	-0.002***	0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.037	-0.000	0.007
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.005)
Education	-0.003	0.031*	-0.019
	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Home Ownership	-0.007	0.002	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Log Income	-0.007	0.008	-0.001*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.003***	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,933	4,933	4,933
Adj. R^2	0.086	0.389	0.092

Table B.9: Female Headship and Financial Market Participation Across Normative Groups (Full Specification).
This table provides the full specification of Table 14, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holdings in at least one of the 5 core financial asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. In column (2), we limit the sample to households where the head is younger than 65. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.006	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.009)
Female Head	-0.005	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Egalitarian	0.107***	0.098***
	(0.027)	(0.022)
# Adults	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.005)
# Children	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.033***	0.039***
	(0.010)	(0.014)
Education	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	0.051***	0.051***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Log Income	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	97,407
Adj. R^2	0.539	0.556

Table B.10: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in the Five Core Financial Asset Classes Across Normative Groups (Full Specification).

This table provides the full specification of Table 15, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holdings in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) shows coefficient estimates for a regression of the number of different asset classes held by the household. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits	(6) # Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.010*	0.005	0.018	0.002	0.019***	0.013
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.041)
Female Head	0.005	-0.007	-0.005	-0.000	-0.012*	-0.019
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Egalitarian	0.044**	-0.026	-0.156***	-0.169***	0.045***	0.300***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.011)	(0.083)
# Adults	-0.001	0.002	0.006	0.007	-0.001	-0.012
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.015)
# Children	0.001	-0.000	-0.007**	-0.001	-0.003**	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Age	-0.000**	0.001**	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.000	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.010	0.008	-0.010	-0.023	0.020**	0.071**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.030)
Education	-0.007*	0.006**	-0.050***	-0.043***	0.006**	0.112***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Home Ownership	-0.007	0.005	-0.083***	-0.083***	0.017**	0.194***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.033)
Log Income	-0.001	0.001	-0.006***	-0.008***	0.002**	0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.000	0.000***	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	-0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000***	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.023	0.015	0.112	0.108	0.880	0.353

Table B.11: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Other Fixed Income Across Normative Groups (Full Specification).

This table presents the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries (column (1)), non-financial corporations (column (2)), or other types of bonds (column (3)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Banks	(2) Corporate	(3) Other
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.003	0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female Head	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Egalitarian	-0.017	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
# Adults	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
# Children	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	0.000***	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.006	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.003***	0.002*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Home Ownership	0.004	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Log Income	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.010	0.003	0.001

Table B.12: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Mutual Funds Across Normative Groups (Full Specification). This table provides the full specification of Table 16, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in equity mutual funds (column (1)), bond mutual funds (column (2)), money market mutual funds (column (3)), real estate mutual funds (column (4)), hedge funds (column (5)), or other mutual funds (column (6)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Equity	(2) Bonds	(3) Money M	(4) Real E	(5) Hedge F	(6) Other
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.030***	0.001	0.001	0.006***	0.001	-0.014**
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Female Head	-0.012*	-0.007*	0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Egalitarian	-0.091***	-0.032*	0.004	-0.019***	-0.001	0.074***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.012)
# Adults	0.004	0.002*	-0.001	0.002	0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)
# Children	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.000	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	-0.014**	-0.017***	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.008)
Education	-0.020***	-0.010***	-0.004***	-0.006***	-0.001***	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Home Ownership	-0.024***	-0.014**	-0.002*	-0.002	-0.000	0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.007)
Log Income	-0.003***	-0.001*	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.058	0.022	0.004	0.014	0.001	0.048

Table B.13: Female Headship and Financial Returns Across Normative Groups (Full Specification).
This table presents the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is the household investment portfolio's financial return, measured as the ratio of financial income to the market value of financial assets. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.011
	(0.028)
Female Head	-0.065
	(0.040)
Egalitarian	0.205**
	(0.098)
# Adults	-0.041
	(0.026)
# Children	-0.010
	(0.017)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Retired	-0.134**
	(0.060)
Education	0.012
	(0.009)
Home Ownership	-0.060
	(0.048)
Log Income	-0.006
	(0.007)
Hours Worked F	0.001
	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.001
	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes
Observations	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.032

Table B.14: Female Headship and Financial Returns Per Asset Class Across Normative Groups (Full Specification). This table provides the full specification of Table 17, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the financial return associated with each asset class: government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), and bank deposits (column (5)). The same return proxy equation from Table 10 is used. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.002	0.053	-0.023	0.007**	-0.032
	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.045)
Female Head	0.002	-0.065**	0.012	-0.002	-0.034
	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.034)
Egalitarian	0.007	0.064*	0.058*	0.010**	0.139**
	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.005)	(0.061)
# Adults	-0.000	-0.038	-0.046	-0.001	-0.017*
	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.001)	(0.009)
# Children	0.003	-0.024	-0.004	0.002	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Age	-0.000	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Retired	-0.002	-0.140**	-0.046**	-0.002	-0.060
	(0.004)	(0.065)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.056)
Education	0.001**	-0.000	-0.004	0.000	0.008
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.009)
Home Ownership	0.007*	-0.086	-0.063	0.003	-0.012
	(0.004)	(0.086)	(0.050)	(0.002)	(0.022)
Log Income	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	-0.009**
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	0.000	-0.002**	0.000	0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	-0.002***	-0.001***	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,873	72,117	23,938	20,350	120,914
Adj. R^2	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000

Table B.15: Female Headship, Risk Tolerance, and Risky Asset Holdings Across Normative Groups (Full Specification). This table provides the full specification of Table 18, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions assessing the relationship between female financial headship and two measures of financial risk behaviour. Column (1) uses *Risk Taker* as the dependent variable, a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head reports a willingness to take above-average or substantial financial risks. Column (2) uses as a dependent variable an indicator equal to 1 if the household holds risky assets, defined as publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Risk Taker	(2) Holds Risky Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.003	-0.025
	(0.008)	(0.023)
Female Head	-0.016**	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.013)
Egalitarian	-0.051**	-0.193***
	(0.021)	(0.033)
Risk Taker		0.168***
		(0.043)
Female Head × Risk Taker		-0.051***
		(0.018)
# Adults	0.001	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.008)
# Children	0.002	0.008*
	(0.002)	(0.005)
Age	-0.001*	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.003	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.014)
Education	0.010***	0.051***
	(0.002)	(0.007)
Home Ownership	-0.001	0.090***
	(0.007)	(0.022)
Log Income	-0.000	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.001**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	87,989	87,989
Adj. R^2	0.025	0.139

Table B.16: Female Headship, Financial Literacy, and Stock Market Participation Across Normative Groups (Full Specification).

This table provides the full specification of Table 19, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the head answered one or two questions correctly, defined as basic financial literacy (column (1)), or if the head answered three or four questions correctly, defined as advanced financial literacy (column (2)). Column (3) shows coefficient estimates from a regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household reports investments in the stock market. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Basic Fin Literacy	(2) Advanced Fin Literacy	(3) Stock Participation
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.062	0.113*	0.015***
	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.002)
Female Head	-0.094*	-0.128*	-0.012***
	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.005)
Egalitarian	-0.177***	0.165***	-0.137***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Basic Fin Literacy			-0.001
			(0.011)
Advanced Fin Literacy			0.027***
			(0.009)
Female Head × Basic Fin Literacy			0.015***
			(0.002)
Female Head × Advanced Fin Literacy			0.037**
			(0.015)
# Adults	-0.013	0.027*	0.006*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
# Children	-0.004	-0.001	0.002***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Age	-0.002***	0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.036	0.011	0.009*
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.006)
Education	-0.005	0.047***	-0.020
	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Home Ownership	-0.015	0.056***	-0.016
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Log Income	-0.008	0.010*	-0.002**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.003***	-0.001*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,933	4,933	4,933
Adj. R^2	0.085	0.310	0.092

Table B.17: Drivers of Female Household Headship Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).
This table provides robustness results for Table 13, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable, $FemaleHead_{i,c,t}$, is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. Column (1) presents the baseline specification, which includes three vectors of household characteristics: $F_{i,c,t}$, capturing family demographics (number of adults and children); $H_{i,c,t}$, reflecting head-specific attributes (home ownership and income); and $FtM_{i,c,t}$, measuring gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). In Columns (2) and (3), we sequentially introduce proxies for financial literacy, using education, and risk preferences, using age and retirement status. Column (4) presents the full model, incorporating all variables contained in the three specified vectors. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Wave (τ_t) fixed effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Subscripts i, c, and t denote household, country, and wave, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Egalitarian	0.016*	0.022*	0.022*	0.025*
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
# Adults	0.010*	0.008	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
# Children	0.034***	0.035***	-0.008**	-0.007**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	-0.034***	-0.030***	0.010	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log Income	-0.002	-0.001	-0.017***	-0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Hours Worked F	0.016***	0.016***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education		-0.013**		-0.008**
		(0.005)		(0.004)
Age			-0.003***	-0.003***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired			-0.320***	-0.317***
			(0.058)	(0.057)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.492	0.493	0.549	0.549

Table B.18: Female Headship and Financial Market Participation Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification). This table provides robustness results for Table 14 and Table B.9, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the household reports holdings in at least one of the 5 core financial asset classes: government bonds, other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds), stocks, mutual funds, and bank deposits. In column (2), we limit the sample to households where the head is younger than 65. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)	(2)
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.002	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.013)
Female Head	0.003	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Egalitarian	0.058*	0.063**
	(0.031)	(0.026)
# Adults	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)
# Children	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.039***	0.045***
	(0.011)	(0.014)
Education	0.027***	0.025***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Home Ownership	0.044***	0.045***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Log Income	0.006***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	97,407
Adj. R^2	0.528	0.547

Table B.19: Female Headship and Investment Allocation Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).
This table provides robustness results for Table 15 and Table B.10, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the household reports holdings in government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (e.g., bank, corporate, and other bonds) (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), or bank deposits (column (5)). Column (6) shows coefficient estimates for a regression of the number of different asset classes held by the household. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits	(6) # Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.001	0.010	0.008	-0.003	0.015*	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.043)
Female Head	-0.001	-0.010	-0.004	-0.004	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.029)
Egalitarian	0.026	-0.038	-0.104***	-0.099**	0.021	0.160*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.015)	(0.091)
# Adults	-0.002	0.001	0.011	0.014**	-0.003	-0.025**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.012)
# Children	0.001	-0.001	-0.009***	-0.003	-0.003*	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Age	-0.001**	0.001**	-0.004***	-0.002***	0.000	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.009	0.007	-0.017	-0.030	0.023**	0.085**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.034)
Education	-0.006*	0.007**	-0.053***	-0.046***	0.007**	0.119***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.013)
Home Ownership	-0.010	0.008	-0.073***	-0.072***	0.014	0.177***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.009)	(0.036)
Log Income	0.000	0.001	-0.009***	-0.011***	0.003***	0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.001**	0.000*	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.014	0.021	0.093	0.081	0.878	0.332

Table B.20: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Other Fixed Income Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).

This table provides robustness results for Table B.11, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in bonds issued by banks or other financial intermediaries (column (1)), non-financial corporations (column (2)), or other types of bonds (column (3)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Banks	(2) Corporate	(3) Other
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.006	0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female Head	-0.006	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Egalitarian	-0.024	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.001)
# Adults	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)
# Children	-0.000	-0.001*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	0.000***	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	0.006	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.003***	0.002**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Home Ownership	0.006	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Log Income	0.000	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked F	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.014	0.003	0.001

Table B.21: Female Headship and Investment Allocation in Mutual Funds Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).

This table provides robustness results for Table 16 and Table B.12, presenting the coefficient estimates from linear regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the household reports holdings in equity mutual funds (column (1)), bond mutual funds (column (2)), money market mutual funds (column (3)), real estate mutual funds (column (4)), hedge funds (column (5)), or other mutual funds (column (6)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Equity	(2) Bonds	(3) Money M	(4) Real E	(5) Hedge F	(6) Other
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.017	-0.001	0.004	0.007***	0.000	-0.009
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.009)
Female Head	-0.008	-0.008	-0.000	-0.005	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Egalitarian	-0.041	-0.004	0.002	-0.013*	-0.000	0.040**
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.017)
# Adults	0.009***	0.005***	-0.001	0.003**	0.000	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)
# Children	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.000	0.003*
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001*	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	-0.017**	-0.019***	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.009)
Education	-0.023***	-0.012***	-0.004**	-0.006***	-0.001	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Home Ownership	-0.020**	-0.013**	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.000	0.025***
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.008)
Log Income	-0.004***	-0.002**	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.000	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked F	0.001**	0.000	-0.000	0.000*	0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.041	0.016	0.004	0.012	0.001	0.035

Table B.22: Female Headship and Financial Returns Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).
This table provides robustness results for Table B.13, presenting the coefficient estimates from a linear regression where the dependent variable is the household investment portfolio's financial return, measured as the ratio of financial income to the market value of financial assets. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1)
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.009
	(0.031)
Female Head	-0.063
	(0.039)
Egalitarian	0.214**
	(0.094)
# Adults	-0.041
	(0.027)
# Children	-0.007
	(0.017)
Age	0.004
	(0.003)
Retired	-0.126**
	(0.059)
Education	0.011
	(0.009)
Home Ownership	-0.078
	(0.050)
Log Income	-0.004
	(0.007)
Hours Worked F	0.001
	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.001
	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes
Observations	135,283
Adj. R^2	0.032

Table B.23: Female Headship and Financial Returns Per Asset Class Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification). This table provides robustness results for Table 17 and Table B.14, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the financial return associated with each asset class: government bonds (column (1)), other fixed income (column (2)), stocks (column (3)), mutual funds (column (4)), and bank deposits (column (5)). *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Gov Bonds	(2) Other FI	(3) Stocks	(4) Mutual F	(5) Deposits
Female Head × Egalitarian	0.004	0.057	-0.046	-0.009	-0.023
	(0.008)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.048)
Female Head	0.001	-0.061**	0.031	0.013	-0.038
	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.033)
Egalitarian	0.013**	0.084**	0.061*	0.012**	0.147***
	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.005)	(0.056)
# Adults	-0.000	-0.035	-0.047	-0.001	-0.018*
	(0.001)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.001)	(0.010)
# Children	0.003	-0.024	-0.004	0.002	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Age	-0.000	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Retired	-0.003	-0.131**	-0.043**	-0.001	-0.055
	(0.005)	(0.062)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.057)
Education	0.000	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.008)
Home Ownership	0.007**	-0.095	-0.064	0.003	-0.023
	(0.003)	(0.088)	(0.050)	(0.002)	(0.021)
Log Income	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	-0.008*
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Hours Worked F	-0.000	0.000	-0.001**	-0.000	0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hours Worked M	-0.000	-0.002***	-0.001***	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,873	72,117	23,938	20,350	120,914
Adj. R^2	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000

Table B.24: Female Headship, Risk Tolerance, and Risky Asset Holdings Across Normative Groups (Robustness Specification).

This table provides robustness results for Table 18 and Table B.15, presenting coefficient estimates from linear regressions assessing the relationship between female financial headship and two measures of financial risk behaviour. Column (1) uses *Risk Taker* as the dependent variable, a binary indicator equal to 1 if the household head reports a willingness to take above-average or substantial financial risks. Column (2) uses as a dependent variable an indicator equal to 1 if the household holds risky assets, defined as publicly traded stocks, equity mutual funds, or hedge funds. *Female Head* takes the value 1 if the household head (FKP) is female. *Egalitarian* equals 1 if the country is classified as egalitarian and 0 if it is classified as traditional, based on the survey responses developed by the European Value Survey (EVS). Controls include family demographics (number of adults and children), household head attributes (age, retirement, education, home ownership, and income), and gender-based comparative advantages (hours worked by men and women). We account for wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Levels of significance are denoted as follows: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$.

	(1) Risk Taker	(2) Holds Risky Assets
Female Head × Egalitarian	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.030)
Female Head	-0.016**	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.017)
Egalitarian	-0.034	-0.096*
	(0.024)	(0.052)
Risk Taker		0.147***
		(0.049)
Female Head × Risk Taker		-0.053***
		(0.019)
# Adults	0.004	-0.018**
	(0.004)	(0.009)
# Children	0.002	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.004)
Age	-0.001*	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Retired	-0.004	0.019
	(0.009)	(0.018)
Education	0.009***	0.056***
	(0.002)	(0.007)
Home Ownership	0.003	0.076***
	(0.006)	(0.024)
Log Income	-0.001	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Hours Worked F	0.000	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Hours Worked M	0.001***	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	87,989	87,989
Adj. R^2	0.020	0.104

Appendix C: AI Disclosure

We used ChatGPT to assist with grammar and spelling checks, as well as to support coding tasks and LaTeX formatting.